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ABSTRACT  
This thesis explores the manner in which accountability relations are made, re-
made and exercised in a British public service. Developing a framework that 
captures these processes and lays the foundations for further application to 
other public services is the aim of this thesis. 
The focus of the study is the privatisation of council housing through large-
scale voluntary transfers (LSVTs). Council housing is a service that has 
democratic accountability relations at its heart via directly elected municipal 
representatives. Over the past three decades the neoliberalisation of this 
public service has reformed these accountability relations; moving them to 
corporate governance-styled accountability, in not-for-profit private limited 
companies. This process has generated a reaction in the form of civil society 
campaigns that contest the transfers. The outcome is either to reproduce the 
existing democratic accountability relations or transform them to privatised 
corporate governance-styled accountability.  
The thesis develops a theoretical framework rooted in the classical Marxist 
tradition and extended to include a critical realist theory of science and a 
materialist dialogical theory of language. The framework is applied to three 
comparative case studies in the search for generative mechanisms and the 
context they operate in. The case studies are developed using data from 
documentary sources, interviews, secondary statistics and observation. 
The main contribution to knowledge is an integrated two triadic research 
framework (of, Neoliberalisation – Reaction/Contestation – Reproductions or 
Transformation; and a dynamic relationship between the state and civil society) 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
7 | P a g e  
for analysing changes in public accountability relations. There is also a second 
empirically-based contribution relevant to the accounting literature, with the 
focus on the actions of tenants and other civil society actors in making, re-
making and exercising accountability relations. Both these contributions can be 
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This thesis explores the manner in which accountability relations are made, re-
made and exercised in a British public service. The study focuses on the 
privatisation of council housing using large-scale voluntary transfers (LSVTs). 
Council housing is a service that has democratic accountability relations at its 
heart via directly elected councillors. However, over the past three decades the 
neoliberalisation of this public service has changed accountability relations, 
moving them to corporate governance-styled accountability (McDermont et al., 
2009) in the form of not-for-profit private limited companies. This process has 
generated a reaction in the form of civil society campaigns that contest the 
transfer. The stock transfer policy makes this contestation obvious with a 
formal consultation period culminating in a ballot of the tenants affected. The 
outcome of which is either to reproduce the existing democratic municipal 
accountability relations or transform them to privatised corporate governance-
styled accountability. Developing a framework that captures these processes is 
the aim of this thesis. 
Accountability is a totem of our neoliberal age. It is elusive, iconic, chameleon-
like and ever-expanding (Dubnick, 2002; Sinclair, 1995, Mulgan, 2000); a word 
and a concept that is liberally deployed and especially prominent in rhetoric 
(Dubnick, 2002). It is something that governments and organisations strive to 
increase but is also seen as lacking and ineffective (Cooper and Johnston, 
Stewart Smyth 
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2012). Politicians break election promises; executives pay themselves 
performance-related bonuses while their corporations avoid paying taxes; 
financial institutions are bailed out by taxpayers but refuse to provide credit. In 
each case there are calls for accountability to be enacted, with individuals and 
organisations called to account for their actions (Mulgan, 2003). Accountability 
is also mobilised to justify reforms of services (Dubnick, 2002; Goddard, 2005) 
and to ‘improve the quality of services and make them more responsive to 
users’ demands’ (Gosling, n.d.: 4).  
Accountability is notoriously difficult to define, with synonyms (responsibility, 
transparency, responsiveness and account-giving) regularly and inaccurately 
used in its place.  In academic literature, accountability is seen as being 
closely related to accounting (or account-giving) leading to a school of thought 
that equates the two together (Cooper and Johnston, 2012; Roberts and 
Scapens, 1985). Others have rejected this equivalence in favour of exploring 
how accountability is experienced by individuals (Sinclair, 1995). In both cases 
accountability is abstracted from its social context and roots. 
The nature of public accountability relations is dependent, in the first instance, 
upon the form and structure of the state. As the state has different formations 
in different periods of history, public accountability also changes and adapts. 
Thus, accountability is temporally specific. The role and actions of citizens 
(collectively through civil society institutions) also influences public 
accountability relations. This has been recognised and studied in a range of 
international contexts, where local civil society campaigns have fought to hold 
their own governments to account over access to water, housing or healthcare 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
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(Newell and Wheeler, 2006). Thus, accountability is spatially specific. These 
examples have largely been ignored in the accounting and management 
literature on accountability; as has the history of citizens and civil society 
holding the government of the day to account1.  
This thesis draws on those ideas, seeing accountability as socio-temporal-
spatially specific, to analyse the changing nature of public accountability 
relations in Britain during the course of the neoliberal age. During this age, the 
public housing sector has been subject to neoliberal reforms with the Right-to-
Buy policy first introduced in the Housing Act (1980) having the single biggest 
impact in reducing the council housing stock. Local councils were heavily 
restricted from re-investing the capital receipts in new housing stock. The 
second biggest impact came from the emergent policy of stock transfers 
(Pawson and Mullins, 2010). Stock transfers have generated significant 
opposition with the emergence of civil society campaigns (such as Defend 
Council Housing) leading to an estimate of twenty five per cent of all tenant 
ballots rejecting the proposed transfer (Pawson and Mullins, 2010). One of the 
arenas that the pro- and anti-transfer campaigns contest is the nature of 
accountability. This thesis argues that the processes (generative mechanism) 
of neoliberalisation – reaction and contestation – reproduction or 
transformation, is evident in the British public housing sector. 
The remainder of this chapter outlines the motivations for the study of 
accountability generally and public housing specifically (section 1). This is 
followed, in section 2, by the research design adopted. Section 3 develops the 
research aims and objectives centring on how public accountability relations 
                                            
1 
For example, the citizens of ancient Athens (Bird, 1973). 
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are made, re-made and exercised. The chapter concludes with an outline of 
the contribution to knowledge and structure of this thesis. 
1. Why study accountability?  
The elusive nature of accountability has already been noted; yet, the concept 
is seen as a cornerstone of liberal democratic societies based on the people 
holding the government to account (Mulgan, 2003; Normanton, 1966). In this 
respect accountability is a form of ex-post control. This element is important 
and distinguishes the approach to accountability adopted in this thesis from the 
more limited but widely cited Roberts and Scapens (1985: 447) definition of the 
‘giving and demanding of reasons for conduct’. Gray and Jenkins’ (1993) 
formulation of accountability in practice as control exercised through ‘praise 
and blame, reward and sanction’ (Gray and Jenkins, 1993: 55) is a more 
appropriate reference point, as it identifies accountability as a relationship of 
control. 
However, there is more to the study of accountability than a clearer definition 
of the subject. While accountability is central to the delivery of public services 
in liberal democratic societies, it is not a static concept but changes in different 
ages and different states (Normanton, 1966). The history of the concept is 
explored (in chapter 3) from ancient times to the modern day, emphasising the 
central role of social movements in extending democratic accountability. This 
leads to the focus of the thesis on the past four decades, the neoliberal age. 
Since the mid-1970s neoliberal-inspired policies have been the mainstay of 
British governments resulting in a rolling-back (although not necessarily a 
shrinking) of the state. This is coupled with a rolling-out of governance-based 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
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forms of service delivery using partnerships, networks and increasing amounts 
of private sector finance (Jessop, 2002). A central element of which is the 
privatisation of public services (Ashman and Callincos, 2006; Harvey, 2003, 
2005; Whitfield, 2006). Alongside the restructuring of services delivered by the 
state, there has been a restructuring of accountability relations. Where 
previously bureaucratic and democratic forms of accountability dominated, 
these have been replaced by managerialist and market-based forms of 
accountability (Laws, 1999; Pollitt, 2003). This requires the study of 
accountability relations in their socio-economic and historical context. 
However, (as is shown in chapter 2) not only does much of the literature on 
accountability suffer from definitional issues (e.g. the conflation of accounting 
or auditing with accountability) but it also abstracts the phenomenon from its 
social context leading to functionalist and reductionist understandings of how 
accountability relations are made, re-made and exercised in the public sector. 
In contrast, this thesis analyses public sector accountability relations as 
contingent, dynamic, complex and contested. Further these neoliberal policies 
once implemented have led to contradictory, unintended and contested 
outcomes (Peck, 2010) as public service users campaign against different 
aspects of the reforms. These points are elaborated on, below and further in 
chapters 2 and 3. 
The importance of the research field is also relevant.  Private housing is a 
commodity, an investment and a source of capital gains. Yet, housing (or the 
need for shelter), is a basic human need ranking alongside food and sleep 
(Marx, 1998). Further, to participate in modern society an address is needed, 
on job application forms, to register with a GP or gain any form of educational 
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grant. Housing illustrates the contradictory nature of capitalism, the system of 
commodity production, where housing is both a commodity and a human need, 
like food. Government policy in Britain on housing has a default setting of 
belief that the market can satisfy the need for accommodation (Glynn, 2009). 
However, relevant evidence shows the market cannot provide decent 
affordable homes for all in society. At the peak of the last boom, in the mid-
2000s, there was an estimated 4 million people on council housing waiting lists 
(LGA, 2008) while nearly 700,000 homes stood empty (Seager, 2005) and 29 
per cent (over 6 million) (Wilcox, 2006: table 23b) of homes were deemed not 
to be of a decent standard2.  
However, to leave the analysis at this point would be one-sided. Housing is 
also an issue that organised labour and working class people have 
campaigned to have taken out of market relations, at least in part. From the 
building of Arnold Circus, the first council housing project in Britain in the East 
End of London in 1890, throughout the twentieth century and up to the present, 
there has been an ebbing and flowing of (council) housing being provided to 
address human need, not commodification. The periods of major council 
house building (after each world war) have come as reactions to the economic 
and political circumstances immediately preceding, and pressure from social 
movements of tenants and organised labour (Glynn, 2009). These council 
housing programmes are based on the idea of assets being held for the benefit 
of society as a whole, by the local authority that is in turn under the democratic 
control of the local community (Glynn, 2009).  Council housing tenants have 
                                            
2
 Decent homes are those that meet the fitness standard, which includes that they are in a 
reasonable state of repair; have reasonably modern facilities and services and provide a 
reasonable degree of thermal comfort (Wilcox, 2007: 116).  
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been described Grayson as unique citizens (Robbins, 2010) in that they can 
vote their landlords out at the next local election. As a concrete example of 
Mulgan’s (2003) and Gray and Jenkin’s (1993) expression of accountability, 
council tenants can hold their landlord accountable. It is also through studying 
these relationships that new ways of understanding accountability in the public 
services is possible. The contradictory nature of housing, the dynamic 
relationship between council and private housing, driven by socio-economic 
and political factors including tenants and organised labour campaigns are all 
essential features of this thesis and the ideas that are discussed in the case 
studies in chapters 6 to 8.  
This leads to the final and ultimate justification for this thesis. In addressing 
accountability in the public services, the idea that service users, tenants (or 
more broadly civil society), could play a role as active agents is absent from 
the literature. Service users (the electorate, the taxpayer or other civil society 
organisation), if they are included in any analysis (Day and Klein, 1987; Collier, 
2005), are portrayed as passive individuals who have accountability done to or 
for them. This thesis rejects the portrayal of service users as passive and 
draws on the rich tradition of “history from below” research (Perry, 2002)   that 
sees social change developing from the struggles of ordinary people (Watt, 
2008), for example the Chartists and the right to vote (Foot, 2005; Saville, 
1987). 
2. Research design 
Locating the thesis on an analysis of human agency (tenant campaigns) and 
its dialectical relationship with social structures (neoliberal restructuring of the 
Stewart Smyth 
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state) requires an alternative theoretical framework and research design. A 
research design that has at its core a recognition of the potential for human 
self-emancipation (Bhaskar, 1989) and an understanding of the historical 
materialist method (Marx, 1998) of analysing society. Further, there is a need 
to understand the role of language as an expression of the concrete, real and 
contradictory social reality of capitalism (Bakhtin, 1981). Thus chapter 3 
develops a theoretical framework that is rooted in the classical Marxist tradition 
and is extended by interweaving a critical realist theory of science and a 
materialist dialogical theory of language3. The focus of this framework is the 
search for, description and explanation of relevant generative mechanisms 
(Bhaskar, 2008). Generative mechanisms are ‘nothing other than the way of 
acting of a thing’ (Bhaskar, 2008: 51). According to critical realist thought, 
reality is composed of generative mechanisms acting (or not) and interacting 
causing empirical events to emerge.  
Starting from Marx’s primacy of production to sustain human life, before 
humanity can make history (Marx, 1998), class society (and struggle); the state 
and civil society all emerge and are constantly being reproduced or 
transformed (Bhaskar, 1989). Thus, 
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas ... They are the 
real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both 
those which they find already existing and those they produced by their activity. 
(Marx, 1998: 36-37) 
                                            
3 
The approach to dialogics developed in chapter four draws on the materialist accents and 
influences in the Bakhtin circle’s work and stands in contrast to the post-structuralist versions 
such as Macintosh (2002). 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
19 | P a g e  
Marx argues that as the forces of production develop, relations of production 
also develop, including the emergence of a ruling class that then seeks to 
defend its social position through the development of the state. However, this 
process is dynamic, based on structural contradictions and subject to 
contingencies and tendencies.  So the economic base does not determine the 
form of the social superstructures but limits the possibilities to those that 
sustain the existing relations of production (Harman, 1998). However, the state 
cannot prevent the structural contradictions between the forces of production, 
relations of production and other social relations clashing with each other (an 
expression of which is class struggle). ‘It follows from this that all struggles 
within the state, the struggle between democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, 
the struggle for the franchise, etc., etc., are merely the illusory forms ... in 
which the real struggles of the different  classes are fought out among one 
another’ (Marx, 1998: 52). 
These are the theoretical foundations to the study of accountability 
relationships between the state and civil society that build through the literature 
review in chapters 2 and 3; where it is argued that there is a dynamic 
relationship between the state and civil society in which accountability is a 
contested concept. This makes it necessary to employ a theory of language 
that possesses the appropriate methodological tools to analyse this 
contestation and is consistent with historical materialism. Chapter 4 argues 
that it is possible to utilise Bakhtin’s dialogical terms (utterance and 
heteroglossia) in such a materialist manner. This enables an analysis of 
competing views on what characterises an accountable landlord, which is a 
Stewart Smyth 
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reflection of the concrete social reality (Bakhtin, 1981) of each local case 
study. 
The critical realist ontological and epistemological assumptions, Marxist 
analysis of base and superstructure, the state and civil society, and materialist 
dialogics, lead to an adoption of case study as the research strategy in this 
thesis. The three local case studies below (one in each jurisdiction of England, 
Scotland and Wales) draw on multiple data sources including publicly available 
official documents and, press and campaign materials. These are 
supplemented by interviews with key active participants in the stock transfer 
process. The resultant case studies are rich descriptions and accounts of the 
generative mechanisms operating in different circumstances and with different 
outcomes. In the English and Welsh cases the accountability relations have 
been transformed as the tenants voted in favour of transfer; whereas, in the 
Scottish case the accountability relations are reproduced following a vote to 
stay with the local authority.  
3. Research aims and objectives 
The over-arching research aim of this project is to explain the changes in 
public accountability relations over the past 30 years, by placing them in a 
broader social, economic and political context, paying particular attention to 
the agency of service users (although not to the exclusion of the existing social 
structures). In other words, to explain how accountability relations in the public 
sector are made, re-made and exercised. Drawing on the previous discussions 
concerning the nature of the current theorisations of accountability, its 
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relationship with public services and the emphasis on human agency, the 
following research aims have been derived:  
1) To develop a framework that explores public accountability as a 
dynamic, complex and contested social process; 
2) To analyse how accountability relations between public service 
providers and users are made, remade and exercised in the context of 
marketised and/or privatised provision. 
In relation to 1) above, the literature on accountability has recognised the 
different elements of dynamism (Broadbent et al. 1996), complexity (Sinclair, 
1995) and contestation (Laughlin, 1996), bringing these together in a 
framework that also stresses the agency of service users has not been 
attempted before. In relation to 2) above, the existing literature has not 
concentrated on the role of service users or civil society campaigns in relation 
to accountability, instead focusing on managers (Day and Klein, 1987) or 
public sector employees (Broadbent et al. 1996).  Therefore it is both the 
manner in which these over-arching research aims are addressed and also the 
focus on the agency of ordinary people (Watt, 2008) as a reaction to neoliberal 
reforms that distinguishes this thesis from the existing literature.   
These research aims require a series of related research objectives to guide 
the case study development. Each objective is discussed separately below: 
a) To explore and evaluate the impact of neoliberal market reforms on 
public services and related accountability relations. 
As part of the development of the conceptual framework in chapter 3 the 
neoliberalisation of the capitalist state including privatisation, use of private 
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finance and increased managerialism, is discussed. There is a common 
perception that these reforms are a series of government driven measures that 
have been coherent in nature, universally accepted and overwhelmingly 
successful.  The discussion addresses these perceptions and argues that the 
actual reform process is more complex and contradictory.   Further, the 
literature review in chapter 2 shows how there has been a change in 
accountability relations from democratic and bureaucratic forms to market and 
managerial-based forms (Law, 1999; Pollitt, 2003). This objective addresses 
the neoliberalisation element identified above. 
b) To demonstrate and account for how these reforms have generated 
opposition/resistance in the form of civil society campaigns. 
As shown in chapter 3, some have argued that an important consequence of 
the contradictory neoliberal reform process has been the generation of 
reaction/contestation. This research objective seeks to develop a rich 
understanding of this contestation through the study of local civil society 
campaigns against stock transfers (see chapters 5 to 8). This objective 
addresses the reaction and contestation element identified above. 
c) To demonstrate the extent to which the actual form and content of 
accountability relations is contingent on the outcome of the contestation 
between neoliberal state reforms and civil society campaigns. 
Following on from the previous objective it is necessary to relate any 
reaction/contestation back to the overall aim of this thesis (i.e. how 
accountability relations are made, re-made and exercised in the public 
services). Further, it is necessary to evaluate the impact that these civil society 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
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campaigns have on accountability relations. As identified earlier the idea of 
service users as active agents in the process of making, re-making and 
exercising accountability is absent from the literature. This objective addresses 
the reproduction or transformation element identified above. 
d)  To develop an initial research framework that enables new insights into 
the workings of accountability relations in the context of marketised 
and/or privatised public services. 
The previous objectives address the second research aim of understanding 
how the accountability relations in the public sector are made, re-made and 
exercised. The foregoing three objectives, while linked, are designed to form 
the basis on which to develop an initial research framework that seeks to 
explain the operation of generative mechanisms that cause changing 
accountability relations.  
4. Thesis contribution 
The primary contribution to knowledge is the development of an initial research 
framework (of, Neoliberalisation – Reaction/Contestation – Reproduction or 
Transformation) for analysing changes in public accountability relations. 
Specifically the contribution of this thesis is the recognition and account of 
tenants and other civil society actors’ agency in which accountability relations 
are made, re-made and exercised. This contribution is limited to the data field 
under study but does outline a future research agenda where the framework 
can be applied to other public services in Britain or changes in the 
accountability of public services in other countries. In this way the contribution 
in this thesis can be seen as a stage on the way to developing a theory of 
Critical Public Accountability (Smyth, 2007; 2012).  
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There is a second empirically-based contribution to knowledge. Cooper (1997) 
has identified that, 
... a large group—the working class—has to date been denied a voice in the accounting 
literature. The majority of ‘‘workers in the accounting industry’’, the bookkeepers, data 
processors and so on, are almost invisible even in critical accounting research. 
Moreover, those suffering the effects of new accounting regimes also seem to be 
invisible. 
(Cooper, 1997: 35) 
This thesis addresses the second of Cooper’s (1997) invisible groups, those 
who are suffering from the effects of the new accounting regimes, and by 
extension accountability. This thesis is focused on examining the agency of 
those who live in council housing and those who provide it as a public service 
(including trade unionists) alongside other civil society groups. As is argued in 
chapter 2, this approach contrasts with those that currently dominate the 
accountability literature, with their concerns for improving accountability 
through more accounting or understanding the experience of managers. This 
approach also brings into focus those whose actions have been hinted at but 
not previous analysed (Laughlin, 1996). It should be stated that this omission 
is not unique to the accounting/accountability literature but is also present in 
housing studies. These contributions to knowledge are revisited and discussed 
in chapter 9. 
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5. Conclusion 
Following this introduction, there is a literature review spread over two 
chapters. The first chapter (2) looks at the current state of the art of the 
accountability literature. This includes the development of a working definition 
of accountability in the public services and making the distinction between 
related terms such as transparency and responsibility. Chapter 2 also includes 
an organising and critiquing of the existing literature on accountability. Here 
the job is one of removing the undergrowth that surrounds the existing 
conceptions of accountability to provide clarity on the nature of accountability 
relations in the public services. To aid this process, the distinction made by 
Cooper and Johnston (2012) of two approaches to accountability research 
(where accounting satisfies accountability and, where accountability is more 
than accounting) is utilised. Chapter 2 explores the arguments in favour of the 
need to develop a new conceptual framework through which to understand 
and analyse accountability relations in the public sector, while chapter 3 looks 
outside of the accounting literature for ideas that can inform the development 
of that framework. This includes a critique of the neoliberalisation of public 
services, formulations on accountability from Development Studies and a 
history of the struggle for democratically accountable government in Britain. 
Drawing on these ideas, chapter 3 develops a research framework based on 
two triads where first, there is a dynamic relationship between the state and 
civil society; and second, where neoliberalisation (Neo) generates a 
reaction/contestation (R/C) that leads to the reproduction or transformation (R 
or T) of accountability relations. 
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Chapter 4 (Research Design) starts by developing the theoretical foundation to 
the research process adopted in this thesis, that interweaves classical 
Marxism, critical realism and Bakhtinian dialogics. The second part of chapter 
4 lays out in detail the research method followed with regard to data collection 
and analysis, and discusses the limitations of the research strategy. The 
“Background to the studies” in chapter 5 is the bridge between the research 
framework (chapter 3), the theoretical framework (chapter 4), and the local 
case studies. This chapter takes a macro perspective on social housing policy 
in the three jurisdictions. Having set out the national context, chapters 6 to 8 
contain the local case studies in England, Scotland and Wales respectively. 
Each case study is structured using the triadic research framework (Neo – R/C 
– R or T). As the case studies progress the discussion of the research 
framework in the context of the data just presented develops. 
The local case studies illustrate with preliminary discussions of the 
neoliberalisation – reaction/contestation – reproduction or transformation 
process triad. The final chapter contains a cross-case discussion leading to a 
potential future research agenda. The thesis concludes by presenting the 
contribution to knowledge, a number of preliminary theorisations and a 
concluding reflection. 
  
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 




The research aim is to analyse the changes in public accountability relations 
over the last 30 years, by placing the concept in a broader social, economic 
and political context, paying particular attention to the role of service users. In 
other words, to analyse how accountability relations in the public sector are 
made, re-made and exercised. To achieve this, it is necessary to interrogate 
the existing literature on accountability, look for alternative ideas and develop a 
research framework that enables such an analysis.  
Day and Klein (1987) described this process as the career of a concept. A 
more appropriate analogy would be that of clearing a path to reconnect the 
ancient concept of democratic accountability with the struggle for the popular 
franchise, through to the struggles of tenants and campaigners to defend their 
democratically accountable landlords, in recent decades. This chapter is 
concerned with the first of the above tasks – interrogating the existing literature 
on accountability to identify its suitability for addressing the stated research 
aims. 
Cooper and Johnston (2012: 609-610) outline the distinct approaches to 
accountability within the accounting literature. The first “conflates accounting 
with accountability”; the second where “accounting is not accountability”. While 
these two literatures cover most of the existing accountability research they do 
not exhaust all research approaches to the topic. Drawing on critical 
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accounting ideas a third distinct literature is possible. An approach that 
recognises the abstractions and limitation of the accounting satisfies 
accountability literature, without falling into the obsessional focus of the 
accounting is not accountability literature on the experience of the individual.  
This chapter has three tasks. To begin, there is a need to establish as clearly 
as possible the nature of accountability, how it is distinct from related concepts 
and contextualised within modern democratic states. This is achieved by 
comparing and contrasting three definitions of accountability and ultimately 
recognising accountability as a relationship of control based upon praise or 
blame, reward or sanction (Gray and Jenkins, 1993) (see section 2.1). Having 
established the essence of accountability, section 3 critically reviews the 
existing literature starting with Cooper and Johnston’s (2012) distinction. This 
distinction is matched to the philosophical streams in accounting research of 
Mainstream Accounting Research (MAR) and Interpretivist accounting 
research (Chua, 1986). These streams are then critiqued and shown not to 
possess appropriate tools and insights to address the research questions of 
this thesis.  Section 4 explores a third set of accountability studies that draw on 
critical theory. These studies recognise the complexity of accountability 
relations in the public and NGO sectors, and often see these relations as 
tension-filled and contested. However, there is a general lack of identifying 
active agents who can challenge the imposition of neoliberal forms of 
accountability in place of democratic forms. This argument provides the 
stepping off point for the following chapter. 
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2. Understanding Accountability 
Accountability as a concept has developed a ubiquitous nature in modern 
society. Holding an individual or organisation to account is seen as essential 
for the achievement of a range of social goals. In this way accountability is 
considered to be a force for good. Yet, the literature on accountability shows a 
range of competing theorisations and in general, a lack of empirically based 
work. There are some notable and influential exceptions to this; for example 
Day and Klein’s (1987) seminal work on accountability in five UK public 
services or Sinclair’s (1995) interviews with 14 public body CEOs in Australia. 
Recent years have seen an limited increase in empirically based accountability 
studies in a range of fields such as schools (Bracci, 2009; Farrell and Law, 
1999); accountancy bodies (Mitchell and Sikka, 2004); internet domain 
management company (Koppell, 2005); state audit functions (English, 2003); 
financial reporting in universities (Coy, et al., 2001), and football clubs (Cooper 
and Johnston, 2012). There have been studies into the link between 
accountability and performance (Cunningham and Harris, 2005, Kluvers, 
2003); accountability and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) (Demirag and 
Khadroo, 2011); accountability and budgeting (Goddard, 2005), and 
accountability and outsourcing (Barton, 2006). 
There is also a significant contribution from those working on the accountability 
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (e.g. Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006; 
O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007) and Corporate Social Reporting (Gray et al. 
1987; Gray et al. 2006; Parker, 20054). A range of theories have been adopted 
                                            
4 
Parker labels this sub-stream of accounting research as Social and Environmental 
Accountability (SEA). 
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in attempts to generate insights into accountability; for example, the use of 
legitimacy theory (Deegan, 2002), stakeholder theory (Gray et al., 1995) and 
principal-agent theory (Laughlin, 1990). In these circumstances this section 
attempts a Lockean under-labouring task of clearing out the undergrowth that 
covers the literature and conceptions of accountability. 
2.1 Defining accountability – To whom, For what 
Accountability has become a central element of modern (political) discourse 
and something that we cannot have too much of (Mulgan, 2003). It has 
become ubiquitous: ‘A simple search of the term accountability in Nexis 
showed an increase in the use of the word by over 1,000 per cent in the press 
...’ (Cooper and Johnston, 2012: 604) between 1990 and 2009. Dubnick (2002) 
and, Dubnick and Justice (2004) start by recognising the definitional difficulties 
with accountability, particularly where accountability is invoked in a rhetorical 
manner and linked to “better” (more efficient) performance of services. The 
roots of these difficulties lie in the word’s notorious ambiguity, 
incommensurability and its etymology. The word accountability has modern 
roots5 and is more prevalent to English speaking countries. For example there 
are no direct equivalent words in the major European romance languages 
(Dubnick, 1998; Harlow, 2002) and the Japanese word for accountability is a 
transliteration of the English (Dubnick and Justice, 2004). 
For this thesis it is necessary to establish a definition of accountability relations 
in the public services. This can be achieved by looking at three definitions of 
                                            
5 
Circa 1800 (Hoskin, 1996), see chapter 3 below for a fuller discussion of the concept 
accountability. 
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accountability relations in a democratic state. From the accounting literature 
Gray and Jenkins state: 
In essence, accountability is an obligation to present an account of and answer for the 
execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted those responsibilities. On this 
obligation depends the allocation of praise and blame, reward and sanction so often 
seen as the hallmarks of accountability in action.   
 (Gray and Jenkins, 1993: 55) 
Gray and Jenkins’ definition outlines key elements of an accountability 
relationship including the delegation of responsibilities and an obligation to 
account for actions taken. However, the most important element of this 
definition (and what distinguishes it as an accountability relationship) is the 
element of control ‘... praise and blame, reward and sanction ...’ (see Smyth 
(2012) for a more detailed discussion on this distinction).  However, Gray and 
Jenkins’ definition is essentially abstract and needs to be contextualised in 
modern democratic societies. Thus, Mulgan states that: 
‘Accountability’, the obligation to be called ‘to account’, is a method of keeping the 
public informed and the powerful in check. It implies a world which is at once complex, 
where experts are needed to perform specialised tasks, but still fundamentally 
democratic in aspiration, in that members of the public assert their right to question the 
experts and exercise ultimate control over them. 
(Mulgan, 2003: 1) 
Here, Mulgan keeps the essential element of control, however he specifically 
states the parties involved (“the public” and the “powerful”) and the role of 
transparency (“keeping the public informed” and the “right to question”). 
Further, Mulgan recognises that due to the complexity of modern societies 
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there is a need for specialisation (the use of experts) and that these experts 
can play powerful roles, for example auditors (see discussion below). 
However, it is the nature of democratic societies that the powerful are (to be) 
kept in check, hence the need for accountability relations.  
Mulgan is outlining accountability in a broad societal-wide role. The concern for 
this thesis is accountability relations in the public services. To that end it is 
necessary to look to classical democratic theory for a richer definition of public 
accountability: 
In the broadest sense accountability is the central objective of democratic government: 
how can control be exercised over those to whom power is delegated? Democratic 
theory provides a traditional answer which runs roughly as follows: power emanates 
from the people and is to be exercised in trust for the people. Within the government 
each level of executive authority is accountable to the next, running up to the President 
or Cabinet. The executive authority as a whole is accountable to the Congress or 
Parliament, which is assisted in its surveillance of expenditures by an independent audit 
agency. Officials are required to submit themselves to periodic elections as a 
retrospective evaluation of their performances and to receive a new mandate from the 
people. 
(Smith, 1971: 26)  
Smith provides a classical framework for accountability in government and the 
public services. This framework is relevant for two reasons. Firstly, the clear 
identification of accountability as a form of control; and secondly, the location 
of the ultimate power being derived from the people and exercised for the 
people.  However, it should be noted that Smith’s (1971) conception of 
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accountability is based on representative democracy (rather than participatory 
democracy), in the sense that power emanates from the people and must be 
renewed by the people at periodic elections (Roper, 2013). In representative 
democratic theory, between elections the people are largely irrelevant and cast 
as passive recipients of public services. It is the main argument of this thesis 
that at times and in certain circumstances, ordinary people will become active 
agents who play a central role in how accountability relations are made, re-
made and exercised in the public services.  
Synthesising these definitions of accountability in democratic states and 
governments, the following are the central elements: 
a) Accountability is a form of control based on ‘... praise and blame, reward 
and sanction ...’ which in democratic states is exercised through the 
ballot box; 
b) There are two major parties involved in an accountability relationship, 
the public and their elected government, with authority emanating from 
the people; 
c) The exercising of control is based on a delegation of responsibilities in 
one direction, a report (account) of activities in the opposite direction 
and an evaluation of that report before exercising praise or blame. 
 It is worth highlighting an aspect of Mulgan’s definition that in complex modern 
societies there is the need for specialists and experts to carry out delegated 
responsibilities. This creates a level of complexity that some researchers have 
addressed by considering key questions – to whom are we accountable and 
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for what? These questions appear simple but are problematic to answer. For 
example, Bovens (1998) and Sullivan (2003) raise the issue of ‘many hands’ in 
the context of accountability relations in the public sector. ‘Many hands’ is ‘... 
the proposition that the more contributors there are to public decision making, 
the more difficult it is to specify who is accountable’ (Sullivan, 2003: 354). 
Bovens (2005) also identifies the issue of ‘many eyes’ where the account given 
will be seen and utilised by multiple, often competing, groups or entities.  
The literature on NGO accountability (Gray et al., 2006; Unerman and 
O’Dwyer, 2006; O’Dwyer and Unerman, 2007), also addresses the question of 
who are we (the NGO) accountable to? The question is often posed in terms of 
accountability to the funders or accountability to the beneficiaries. Unerman 
and O’Dwyer (2006) and O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007) argue NGOs need to 
discharge accountability in different directions and conceptualise both upwards 
accountability towards the funders and downwards accountability towards the 
beneficiaries. The difference between this work and that presented below 
concerns the conceptualisation of the accountability relations between service 
users and providers. Whereas, Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006) and O’Dwyer 
and Unerman (2007) take an organisational perspective, the case studies 
explore the manner in which service users act to create, re-create and 
maintain accountability relations with service providers. In this respect, it is 
accountability from below, rather than downwards accountability. 
2.2 Conclusion  
This section has sought to clarify accountability by comparing and synthesising 
three definitions. Starting with an abstract definition drawn from the accounting 
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literature, this was contextualised for modern complex democratic societies. In 
the process the issue of accountability to who and for what was addressed. 
The conclusions drawn are that accountability is a relationship of control; there 
is a role for accounting in providing the basis on which an evaluation can take 
place; in democratic societies this control emanates from the people, but 
representative democratic theory sees the people as passive recipients of 
services between elections. Challenging that conception is an important 
contribution of the case studies below. The rest of this chapter analyses the 
existing literature on accountability using the two distinct literatures identified 
by Cooper and Johnston’s (2012) – accounting satisfies accountability and 
accounting is not accountability. The philosophical roots of these literatures are 
interrogated to establish their limitations in addressing the research aim of this 
thesis. The chapter concludes with an analysis of alternatives perspectives on 
accountability that do not fall into either of the two distinct literatures. These 
studies draw on broad variants of critical theory. 
3. Interrogating the literature 
3.1 Conflating accounting with accountability 
Roberts (2010) makes the simple and obvious statement that accounting is not 
accountability. Above it was noted that accountability includes an exercising of 
praise or blame (Gray and Jenkins, 1993) and delegation of a responsibility 
and resource. Accounting is only one part of a system of accountability. 
However, the conflation of accounting and accountability remains a distinctive 
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element of the accounting literature on accountability. Cooper and Johnston 
set out the characteristics of this distinct literature6, which: 
conflates the provision of accounts (in their various forms) with accountability. This is 
the case, for example, with many of those who call for organisations to be made more 
accountable through the production of (for example) government reports and various 
forms of performance metrics like key performance measures, and perhaps social and 
environmental accounts.  
(Cooper and Johnston, 2012: 609-610) 
The call for more forms of accounts may come from a range of different (and 
seemingly opposed) perspectives but essentially have similar philosophical 
roots within Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) Functionalist research paradigm. 
These include the adoption of a naive realist ontology, and the belief that 
knowledge can develop incrementally to secure ever more accurate models of 
reality. Functionalist-based research often produces work that is abstracted 
and shorn of its social context (Chua, 1986). Examples of this literature 
include, Cunningham and Harris (2001; 2005) who seek to develop a 
framework of control for government sub-units linking accountability to 
effectiveness; Ryan and Walsh (2004) and Hodges et al. (2002) focus on the 
production of annual reports and their sufficiency as part of the accountability 
of public bodies. In a similar manner Sullivan (2003) looks at the issue of “too 
many hands” when it comes to policy making and accountability for local 
government based partnerships. All these papers address key technical issues 
                                            
6
 The order of the distinct literatures has been reversed in this thesis from how they were 
presented in Cooper and Johnston (2012). This is only to conform to the traditional approach 
to discussions of philosophical underpinnings that start with positivist/functionalist approaches 
and then move onto interpretivist approaches latterly. 
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but their focus is necessarily narrow and leads to an analysis and proposed 
solutions that treat the issues in isolation. 
Further, for many discussions of accountability the starting point is Roberts and 
Scapens (1985) paper on accounting systems and systems of accountability. 
Using Giddens’ Structuration theory, Roberts and Scapens theorise the role of 
accounting within a wider context of accountability, where ‘Accountability in its 
broadest sense simply refers to the giving and demanding of reasons for 
conduct …’ (Roberts and Scapens, 1985: 447). The use of Structuration theory 
is an attempt to avoid some of the obvious criticisms associated with 
functionalist research7. However, these benefits are compromised in the 
second half of the paper by the use of Weber’s ideal-typical method. Where: 
By “ideal-type” analysis we mean that although empirically grounded, the analysis does 
not claim to describe the contingencies of any specific context of interaction. Instead, for 
the sake of exposition, we have merely sought to describe typical elements of different 
forms of interaction. 
(Roberts and Scapens, 1985: 450) 
Thus, their conception of accountability becomes abstracted from a broader 
social context, is limited to two parties in a hierarchical relationship (the 
manager and the managed) and in doing so underplays the potential of human 
agency to make and re-make the social structures they operate within.  
Also within this distinct literature is a stream that focuses on the role of audit 
(Normanton, 1966, 1971, 1980; Lovell, 1996). Munkman states that the origins 
of the word comes from a Roman legal official who listened ‘... to the accounts 
rendered by trustees of minors and other parties seeking redress against 
                                            
7
 For example, abstracted and ahistorical theorisation (Chua, 1985). 
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accountables’ (Munkman, 1971: 12). The roots of modern auditing in the 
British state can be traced to the Gladstonian settlement that introduced the 
role of the Comptroller and Auditor General (C and AG) in 1866, and post facto 
authorisation of expenditure. Normanton’s concern is that while this model 
worked in the late 19th century by the mid-twentieth century significant flows of 
public money were not audited or investigated by Parliament (Normanton, 
1971). For example, the nationalised industries at no stage came under the 
purview of the C and AG, and it was not until 1951 that the Select Committee 
on the Nationalised Industries was created (Normanton, 1980: 182). In 1976, 
the Layfield report8 concluded ‘... there exists no clear accountability for the 
expenditure of vast sums of public money on local services’ (quoted in 
Normanton 1980: 178). The complexity of local government financing and 
corresponding difficulties for accountability continues into the new century 
(Watt, 2004). 
Normanton’s work conflates accountability and audit. This is a more 
sophisticated version of the functionalist focus on the report/account. Here the 
implicit argument is that by auditing the account, accountability is enhanced. 
This enhancement is improved by the auditors acting independently 
(Normanton, 1971) or by having the requisite staffing levels of suitably 
qualified staff (Normaton, 1980). This conflation leads Normanton to conclude: 
It has been our view that the most effective form of public accountability is through the 
medium of an independent state audit, which alone can bring to light and publish the 
unvarnished truth from the original sources in the records of the organization concerned 
                                            
8
 The Layfield Report is the more common name for the 1976 report of the Committee on Local 
Government Finance.  
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... This is probably the citizen’s best defence against misuse (using the word in its 
broadest sense) of money taken from his pocket. 
(Normanton, 1966: 410) 
The conflation of audit and accountability is expressed by Bird (1973) as a dual 
obligation where the party who has resources delegated to them not only has 
to provide an account (first obligation) but also to submit to an examination or 
audit (second obligation) ‘... of that account by or on behalf of the person or 
body to whom he (sic) is accountable’ (Bird, 1973: 2). The difficulty here is that 
the second obligation does not lead to a form of accountability based on 
control (i.e. the exercising of reward or sanction, praise or blame). Instead the 
audit seeks to verify the accuracy of the account. While this is beneficial it is 
not a substitute for the exercising of control through “reward or sanction” (Gray 
and Jenkins, 1993). The party who delegated the resources in the first place 
still has to evaluate that account and on that basis decide whether further 
action is to be taken.  Normanton’s formulation of public accountability stands 
in marked contrast to that developed earlier based on representative 
democratic theory (Mulgan, 2003; Smith, 1971).  
Finally, Normanton is writing at a time of change for example the introduction 
of the Fulton and Layfield committees’ recommendations, which lay the basis 
for the current forms of public audit. Lovell (1996) addresses audit and 
accountability after more than a decade of new public management (NPM) 
reforms, including the setting up of executive agencies in 19889. The debates 
prevalent at the time include Michael Power’s work on the Audit Explosion 
                                            
9
 This development has its roots back in the late 1960s and earlier 1970s as covered in Smith 
and Hague (1971).  
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(Power, 1994). Power (1994) argues that audit symbolises independent 
validation, rationality, visibility and the promise of control; to which Lovell points 
out that ‘these might be comforting images, but they are argued to be mere 
chimeras’ (Lovell, 1996: 267). Lovell continues to lay out the difficulties that 
audit suffers from in the way it is exercised and conceptualised in NPM terms 
but concludes in an equivocal manner, recognising these difficulties but not 
presenting any alternative.  
The formulation that accountability is conflated with accounting or auditing, 
does not provide a basis on which to address the research objectives which 
emphasise accountability as a form of democratic control, exercised by the 
people. The following section explores whether the literature based on the 
premise that accounting is not accountability provides a suitable foundation for 
this thesis. 
3.2 Accounting is not accountability  
The second distinct literature rejects (often consciously and deliberately) the 
previous conflation and instead sets out to analyse accountability in a broader, 
more complex context. Cooper and Johnston (2012) set out the characteristics 
of this literature:  
This group is more social constructivist in nature and tend towards more psychoanalytic 
conceptions of accountability in which social actors recognise that their actions impact 
on others. Work in this arena’s dominant concern is with the adverse impacts of the 
“McKinsey/managerial/hierarchical” form of accountability on individuals within 
organisations and consequently on organisational performance.  
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(Cooper and Johnston, 2012: 609) 
In addition to Roberts and Scapens (1985) in the mid-1980s, two significant 
works dealt with accountability in the public sector. Stewart (1984), based on 
theorisation rather than empirics, identifies the increased complexity that 
accountability relationships have in real world situations, especially in the 
public services. This complexity is a theme that develops through the second 
work – Accountabilities: five public services (Day and Klein, 1987). Day and 
Klein (1987) identify that the main concern of the literature on public 
accountability has been to seek solutions in an institutional and structural 
context. 
Day and Klein’s (1987) work seeks an alternative approach through a series of 
interview based comparative studies, ‘… to explore the members [public 
servants] own perceptions of their accountability – to whom and for what; and 
how they themselves assessed the performance of the services for which they 
were responsible…’ (Day and Klein, 1987: 71). They recognise the limitations 
to this approach, but argue that to develop a more complete picture would be 
an impossible task ‘… short of a vast and unaffordable research enterprise…’; 
thus, their work ‘… is a report on perceptions of accountability…’ (Day and 
Klein, 1987: 72). This approach to studying public accountability is also 
followed by Sinclair (1995) in her seminal work interviewing 14 CEO’s from 
public agencies in Australia. Sinclair is reacting to the lack of complexity in the 
accounting satisfies accountability literature10. To order this complexity and the 
competing accountability demands public managers’ face, she develops a 
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 This thesis seeks to overcome these previous limitations by adopting a theoretical 
framework involving critical realism, classical Marxism and dialogics – see chapter 4. 
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taxonomy approach. Here public managers are held accountable in different 
forms – political, public, managerial, professional and personal.  
A review of public sector management and accounting research provides a 
range of differing taxonomies and definitions. Below is a synthesised six-form 
taxonomy: 
a) Market Accountability seeks to hold service providers to account by use 
of market forces (Law, 1999). These market forces are based on the 
ideas of ‘consumer sovereignty’ and perfect competition (Mayston, 
1993).  
b) Communitarian Accountability ‘…involves seeking the legitimacy and 
consensus of stakeholder groups affected by a particular policy through 
their participation in the decision making process’ (Demirag et al., 
2004). For Sinclair (1995: 225) (who uses the term Public 
Accountability) the stakeholder groups in this form of accountability are 
‘the public, interested community groups and individuals.’  
c) Political Accountability is one of the most commonly defined forms. For 
many this form has two varieties – accountability to the electorate and 
accountability to central government (Mayston, 1993; Law, 1999). There 
is also the view, manifest in both Athenian democracy and the 
Westminster model, that these two forms of accountability are linked by 
‘…vesting responsibility in the public servant [in the Westminster model 
this is the relevant minister]. This officer exercises authority on behalf of 
elected representatives, who are directly accountable to the people.’ 
(Sinclair, 1995: 225). Also of relevance, Pollitt (2003) and, Goetz and 
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Jenkins (2001) point out that public servants can be politically 
accountable to a diverse combinations of the elected representatives, 
for example in the form of parliamentary committees. 
d) Managerial Accountability occurs within an organisational structure 
(Sinclair, 1995; Law, 1999; Stewart, 1984; Pollitt, 2003; Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2001) where a subordinate is accountable to a superior. There 
are variations on this as Sinclair (1995) points out Administrative and 
Bureaucratic accountability are often all treated as the same form, 
although this has started to change as the full impact of New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms have taken hold. Pollitt (2003) locates 
Bureaucratic accountability within the organisational structure but uses 
codes of conduct or codes of ethics within the civil service to illustrate 
this form of accountability. This example is one step removed from the 
codes of conduct and ethics that are an essential element of being a 
member of a professional body. 
e) Professional Accountability is being held to account by one’s own peers 
for your conduct, often against a set of standards or codes of practice 
(Law, 1999; Pollitt, 2003).  
f) Legal Accountability in its simplest form is accountability to the courts 
(Law, 1999; Pollitt, 2003). Legal accountability can take a number of 
forms such as judicial review and statutory appeals (Law, 1999). A 
subset of this form of accountability covers Contractual accountability 
(Demirag et al., 2004), where public service objectives are incorporated 
into contracts, for example in the case of a PFI scheme. 
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The predominant concern of the above is to answer the question ‘Who are we, 
the public servants, accountable to?’  This literature seeks to analyse the 
accountability relationships in case studies (see Demirag et al., 2004) or to 
theorise the relationships. This leads to the impression that each form of 
accountability is of equal importance or impact to the public servant. Indeed 
even within forms of accountability the power relations (e.g. control through 
reward or sanction) are blurred. Day and Klein point out that ‘... to set out a 
taxonomy of different kinds of accountability, is to risk confining any analysis in 
a mechanistic, verbal strait-jacket...’ (Day and Klein, 1987: 29). Although the 
use of taxonomy is popular in accountability research, it does not help to 
answer the question at hand, how are accountability relations made, remade 
and exercised in the public services? 
Also looking to extend the perspective of accountability research in a different 
direction, Roberts (2001) seeks to transcend the agency theory influence on 
corporate governance research. Agency theory assumes that individuals act 
solely in a self-interested, opportunistic manner (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In a corporate governance context this means accountability mechanisms must 
be put in place to ensure the maximisation of shareholder value, as the 
shareholders are the principals. Accountability relations based on agency 
theory conform to the assumptions that underpin the accounting satisfies 
accountability literature. However, Roberts (2001) argues that accountability 
relations are not a necessary consequence of self-interested managers but 
instead act as causal mechanisms that produce (and reproduce) the 
individual’s beliefs and values; and, at the other extreme produce (and 
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reproduce) objective economic, social and other consequences (see figure 1). 
To construct this duality Roberts relies upon social constructionist ideas in 
Giddens’ (1984) work. While this is a step forward from the crude determinism 
of agency theory, the social constructionist influence leads Roberts back to the 
safe haven of a taxonomy of governance systems, based on a two by two 
matrix and the socialising and individualising effects of accountability (Roberts, 
1991) practices and processes. Further, Roberts’ (1991) conceptualisations do 
not leave any space for the transformation of either the objective 
consequences or individual subjectivity11. The adoption of Bhaskar’s (1989) 
Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) is an attempt to remedy this 
weakness12. 
                                            
11 
This thesis adopts a materialist understanding of subjectivity, where individual subjectivity is 
rooted in language, and language is conceptualised as “practical consciousness” (Marx, 1998). 
Practical consciousness “arises from the social demands and needs of the material world and 
also, through human co-operation and activity, contributes to the transformation of that world” 
(Holborow, 2006: 6). Therefore subjectivity is rooted in the material world and is also an 
expression of the individual-collective dynamic (Brook, 2013). This is explored further in 
chapter 4. 
12
 See chapter 4 on Research Design, for more detail. 
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The taxonomy approach has a number of related weakness and limitations. As 
already mentioned power relations are almost completely omitted, giving the 
impression that all forms of accountability are (or could be of) equal import. 
This is not the case, as an example drawn from Sinclair’s (1995) paper 
illustrates. When discussing communitarian accountability Sinclair quotes one 
public sector CEO’s attitude to dealing with problematic issues, which 
…can blow up very quickly…Because if it’ll get publicity, the minister then wants to 
know what the position is… the politicians are pandering to what ‘The Sun’ is going to 
do with any item. And if ‘The Sun’ doesn’t like it, then you have got to cut your cloth to 
make sure that it can be, either you’ve got to have good supportive staff so that you can 
stand up to the onslaught, or you’ve really got to cut your cloth so that you don’t get 
ripped apart. 
(Sinclair, 1995: 226) 
The impact of an article in a tabloid newspaper giving bad publicity is of more 
concern to the CEO than that of an unhappy member of the public who has 
written a letter of complaint. Both maybe concerned about the same issue but 
‘The Sun’ article puts the item higher up the CEO’s priority list.  
Furthermore, the above quote also illustrates another weakness of the 
taxonomy approach in that ultimately there is little that ‘The Sun’ or indeed any 
individual member of the public can do to change the behaviour of the CEO 
and his/her organisation. This power lies in other types of accountability for 
example with the relevant Minister, who can implement penalties such as 
clawing-back funding or pressurising the CEO to resign.   
Another example of the limitations involved relates to Contractual 
accountability and the case of the PPP covering the UK passport agency. 
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Edwards and Shaoul (2003) show how despite the private sector contractor 
not performing to the required standard and incurring penalty credits, the 
agency waived ‘… credits worth about £275,000, presumably in the interest of 
establishing a good working relationship over the ten year life of the project’ 
(Edwards et al., 2003: 409). Of course, there are other potentially more covert 
reasons why the credits were waived. For example, the political cost to a 
government committed to PPPs, of a well-known contractor pulling out of any 
future schemes because of ‘onerous’ costs. This is an example of a theorised 
form accountability that was overridden or ineffective when it came to a real 
world situation.  
Finally, both Day and Klein (1987) and Sinclair (1995) conclude that future 
research should focus on how accountability is experienced and internalised 
by public managers. The ultimate objective of which is ‘Defining accountability, 
the way it is internalised and experienced should be our focus, not retreating to 
ever more desperate calls for audits or tougher controls’ (Sinclair, 1995: 233). 
Thus, Sinclair’s work conforms to criticisms common to other interpretivist 
accounting work with a reductionist approach to the individual manager that 
can often lead to solipsism and neglecting broader social phenomena, such as 
class conflicts in modern capitalism (Chua, 1986). The foregoing makes clear 
the need to look beyond this distinct accountability literature with its limited 
concerns of whom we are accountable to and for what. Instead, there is a 
need to focus on the generative mechanisms and context that show how 
accountability relations are made, remade and exercised in real world 
situations.   
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3.3 Summary 
This section has analysed the second of Cooper and Johnston’s (2012) distinct 
literatures, that accounting does not satisfy accountability. This literature is 
influenced by interpretivist and social constructionist ideas which lead to a 
focus on the individual experience of the public managers. In the process, a 
taxonomy of accountability forms has been developed. However, the 
limitations in this approach were also identified in particular the focus on the 
individual and the lack of appreciation of socio-power relations. Thus, while 
this literature does recognise the complexity of accountability relations due to 
the philosophical assumptions and tools dominant in social constructionism it 
fails to provide a holistic understanding of how accountability relations are 
made, re-made and exercised. In particular this literature is often blind to the 
socio-economic and historical context that ordinary people (Watt, 2008) act 
and react within, when addressing accountability. The next section seeks to 
move beyond these limitations and searches for alternative ideas from those 
working in what could be described as critical accountability studies. 
4. Critical accountability studies 
Taking a stance drawn from the critical accounting research paradigm (Chua, 
1986) there have been attempts to address some of the weaknesses identified 
in the other approaches. For example, Broadbent et al. (1996) start from the 
impact of the New Public Management (NPM) reforms on the behaviour of the 
public officer. Instead of seeing the public officers’ behaviour in an isolated 
manner, Broadbent et al. (1996) seek out the tensions caused by 
conceptualising accountability relations within Agency theory. Fundamentally, 
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they bring into question the appropriateness of this approach on the ethos and 
ethics prevalent in the public sector.  Another attempt to locate accountability 
in a more complex environment is Laughlin’s (1996) paper “Principals and 
higher principles”, where starting from the tensions outlined in Broadbent et al. 
(1996)  he explores the issue of control by the principal and the circumstances 
in which the agent may rebel. Both these papers move beyond the isolated 
concerns of the individual to look at other factors; however, the focus on ethics 
or ethos underplays important questions, such as economic and political 
factors.  
A substantial contribution to the accountability literature has come from those 
working in the Corporate Social Reporting (CSR) field, including Bird (1973) 
and Jones (1977), through to the writings of the CSR school starting in the 
1980s (e.g. Gray et al., 1987). This literature has seen the most consistent 
continuing work on accountability from its origins as a minority pursuit in the 
1980s, to becoming ‘... a significant stream of scholarship in the accounting 
literature’ (Parker, 2005: 856). However there are echoes of the issues raised 
earlier concerning the definition of accountability. Gray et al. (1987) premise 
their work on an accountability relationships using a stewardship approach, 
which they are at pains to stress is not agency theory as expounded by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976)13. Their concern is to move beyond the limitations of 
financial accounting by developing the ideas of social responsibilities, social 
accountability and social reporting. Social accountability: 
                                            
13
 Despite describing their formulation as “The principal-agent accountability contract” (Gray et 
al., 1987: 3). 
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... is the responsibility to account for actions for which one has social responsibility 
under an established contract. The terms in which the accountability is discharged ... 
must be appropriate to the actions. Thus, for example, a financial account is inadequate 
to discharge accountability about actions designed to improve health care or the 
environment. 
(Gray et al, 1987: 4) 
They go on to argue for a broader conception of reporting that includes 
account-giving on the social responsibilities14 of the entity. However, even after 
this broadening there is a difficulty with this approach in that it misses out a key 
component in the processes of accountability, the ability to mete out ‘a reward 
or sanction’ (Gray and Jenkins, 1993). Effectively this literature falls back into a 
form of accounting satisfies accountability. This phenomenon is also 
recognised in the terms “ex gratia disclosure”’ (Gray et al. (1991) and “praxis-
to-disclosure reductionism” (Tinker, 1999).   
There is a more fundamental issue with this literature concerning the nature of 
human agency and change. The CSR literature is normative and places the 
responsibility for changing behaviour (e.g. increasing disclosure) on the 
organisations or capitalist firms (Tinker and Gray, 2003). This raises the 
question, what expectations should we have of managers and organisations, in 
a capitalist society. The explicit assumption in CSR literature is that firms have 
broader responsibilities to other stakeholders, the community and environment 
(Gray et al., 1987; 1996). However, the issue of how these broader 
responsibilities and reporting could be achieved is left to enlightened 
                                            
14
 There is a large and contentious debate about what are appropriate social responsibilities 
for corporations. See pages 10-11 of Gray et al. (1987) for a brief exposition of various 
positions. 
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managers or accountants. Instead of seeing accountability in a context where 
it is an expression of underlying generative mechanisms (for example, as an 
arena in which civil society clashes with organisations and seeks to exert 
control) the CSR literature retreats into individualism and ethics. The clearest 
expression of which comes from Dillard (2007) in his discussion of legitimating 
the social accounting project where he advocates an ‘ethic of accountability’, 
which ‘…provides the legitimating justification for the social accounting 
project…’ (Dillard, 2007: 48).  
Parker also finds a similar conception in Lehman’s (1995, 1999, 2001) work 
and his use of a ‘... placement ethic encompasses equality of respect, 
exploring theoretical perspectives that promote the interests of those with 
restricted access to information, and institutionalising open and transparent 
publicity’ (Parker, 2005: 848). Parker criticises Lehman’s work, along with 
others in the ‘heartland theory group’ of Social and Environmental 
Accountability (SEA) for a lack of implementable strategies while those who 
oppose SEA are left ‘... to ride unchallenged across the battlefield...’ (Parker, 
2005: 849).  Cooper et al., (2005) remind academics that they possess skills 
that could be brought to the development of social accounts. ‘But accounts 
alone cannot bring about social change. Social movements are required for 
that ... In short from a broader social perspective Social and Environmental 
Accounts can never fulfil a social accountability function’ (emphasis in the 
original) (Cooper et al., 2005: 955). As argued below a key driver of the need 
for a new research framework is including the activity of service users and civil 
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society campaigns in the making, remaking and exercising of accountability 
mechanisms. 
There is a second reason for looking to integrate service users and civil society 
campaigns into formulations on the reproduction/transformation of 
accountability relations. Among those academics that are critical of the 
neoliberal project and its implications for democratic accountability there is a 
general level of despondency. Some for example argue that the new 
accountability relations in the public sector are being imposed in a ‘seemingly 
inevitable and unquestioned march’ (Broadbent et al., 1996: 281). Similarly, 
Kamuf (2007) describes the ‘irresistible logic of [neoliberal] accountability’; 
Ranson (2003) recognises the ‘increasing intensity’ of the ‘iron design type of 
neo-liberal corporate regulation’ as opposed to democratic accountability. It is 
argued below that this despondency can be countered by looking to the self-
organising actions of service users and civil society campaigns, which 
ultimately have the power to challenge the irresistible logic of neoliberal 
accountability relations. 
4. Conclusion 
The research task is to explain and conceptualise how accountability relations 
are made, remade and exercised in the public services. The foregoing analysis 
shows that research in the functionalist accountability (accounting satisfies 
accountability) paradigm has reductionist tendencies with a focus on improving 
the report (account) and setting accountability relations in abstracted, 
hierarchical managerial structures. The interpretivist accountability (accounting 
is not accountability) paradigm explores some of the complexity ignored by the 
Stewart Smyth 
54 | P a g e  
 
functionalist research but also suffers from a reductionism; here focused on the 
subjective reflections of (public) managers. For these reasons neither 
paradigm enables an addressing of the question at hand.  
Accountability research in the critical theory paradigm addresses some of the 
relevant issues, with its emphasis on placing accountability in a broader socio-
economic and historical context; and at times portraying the conflictual nature 
of these relations. However, much of this research falls back into individualism 
and a reliance on personal ethics as the basis of enhancing accountability 
systems, or a retreat to the accounting satisfies accountability literature with 
the search for appropriate forms of social accounting (report giving).  Further, 
academics (operating in all paradigms) and practitioners omit service users 
and civil society campaigns from their analysis of accountability systems. From 
this review two points become clear. First, that the critical accountability 
research tradition provides the best starting point to address the research aims 
of this thesis, despite the limitations identified. Second, these existing 
formulations are incomplete, allowing for a new comprehensive framework to 
be built; one that focuses on the changing nature of accountability relations. 
This task is addressed in the next chapter; first, by looking at the roots of an 
alternative conceptualisation; and second, by developing a framework that 
seeks to capture the dynamics and changes in current public service 
accountability relations.   
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CHAPTER 3 
Developing an alternative framework 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to develop the foundations of the neoliberalisation – 
opposition/reaction – reproduction or transformation framework outlined in 
chapter 1. Each element of this triad addresses a research objective 
(objectives a) to c) respectively as set out on pages 21 to 23). In turn these 
objectives address the research aims of developing a framework that explores 
accountability as a dynamic, complex and contested social process, and 
analyses how accountability relations between public service providers and 
users are made, remade and exercised in the context of marketised and/or 
privatised provision.  
The previous chapter sought to clear out some of the undergrowth surrounding 
the literature on accountability. In the process the two distinct and dominant 
literatures on accountability identified by Cooper and Johnston (2012) were 
analysed and rejected as a basis for addressing the research aims. A third 
literature, broadly based on critical accounting research, was shown to have 
some relevance but needs to be extended in its concerns, especially with 
regard to the theorisation of the role of “ordinary people” (Watt, 2008). It is this 
extension of the literature that section 2 below is concerned with, and is 
addressed by firstly, exploring the history of the “awful idea of accountability” 
(Hall, 1801). Secondly, accountability formulations from the Development 
Studies literature are identified and explored.   
Stewart Smyth 
56 | P a g e  
 
This extension, while important, is a preamble to the major concern of 
developing a research framework:  the neoliberalisation – opposition/reaction – 
reproduction or transformation formulation. This triad conceptualises the 
neoliberal reforms of the state and more particularly public services as 
generating opposition/reaction from civil society groups, who in turn reproduce 
or transform the accountability relations.  
The chapter provides detailed critiques of the state and civil society during the 
course of the neoliberal era. The critique of the state recognises the roll-
back/roll-out dynamic of neoliberal reforms (Peck and Tickell, 2002) before 
establishing a synthesis of Harvey’s (2005), Ashman and Callinicos’ (2006) 
and Whitfield’s (2006) work on the neoliberalisation of public services. This is 
followed by a critique of the concept of civil society; a term that has become 
legion and co-opted by the neoliberalisation process. Yet civil society is a 
contradictory term being theorised as a site of resistance (Harvey, 2005). 
Finally, this section addresses the ongoing dynamic relationship between the 
state and civil society, a central element of which is the nature of the 
accountability relations between the two. The history explored in section 2 
illustrates the changing nature of this relationship; one that continues today in 
the clash between civil society campaigns and the neoliberalisation of the 
state. This chapter does not address the specific reforms of council housing or 
the relationship between tenants and their landlord (the local authority); 
instead, the framework developed in this chapter is applied to council housing 
in general in chapter 5 and then in the local case studies in chapters 6 to 8. 
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This chapter is divided into two substantive parts. Sections 2 and 3 look for 
alternative ideas on accountability beyond those discussed in the previous 
chapter. In this respect the history of accountability is explored, especially 
drawing on conceptions of democratic accountability. This is supplemented by 
the ideas of social and civil accountability that have been developed in recent 
years within the Development Studies literature. The second substantive part 
(sections 4 and 5) takes the conception of public accountability as a dynamic 
relationship between the state and civil society and critiques each element. 
This provides the theoretical foundations for the neoliberalisation – 
opposition/reaction – reproduction or transformation triad which is then used to 
analyse the case studies.  
2. The roots of a contested idea 
Central to the arguments in this thesis is a theoretical understanding of the role 
of social structure and human agency; they are ontologically separate but 
intertwined with relatively autonomous mediating processes (see chapter 4).  
At this stage it is sufficient to recall Marx’s aphorism that ‘men make history but 
not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have 
chosen but under given and inherited circumstances with which they are 
directly confronted’ (Marx quoted in Blackledge, 2006: 153)15. This approach 
also draws heavily on the history of the struggle for democratically accountable 
government. This section covers the roots of this alternative framing including 
a brief history of the “awful idea” of accountability showing how at times the 
powerful have sought to hold the people to account but more often it has been 
                                            
15
 There are a number of translations of this well-known sentence from Marx’s ‘The Eighteenth 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ (1852). The one that Blackledge uses seems most appropriate 
as he is discussing structure, agency and freedom in the context of the theory of history. 
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ordinary people who have campaigned, demonstrated, struck and fought for 
accountability over those who govern. The aims of this section are threefold; 
first to show that accountability has a longer history than some academics 
argue; second, to show the central (but not exclusive) role that ordinary people 
(Watt, 2008) play in making accountability relations during different historical 
episodes. And third, to note that the struggle for the vote in nineteenth century 
Britain resulted in more than just periodic general elections but also the 
creation of democratically accountable local government providing public 
services such as housing and education. 
2.1 Accountability – the history of an “awful idea” 
In his work on the emergence of accountability, in modern society, Hoskin’s 
(1996) notes that the word accountability only came into being around 180016. 
An early entry in Webster’s 1828 American dictionary carries the following 
phrase as an example of its use: ‘“the awful idea of accountability”, R. Hall’17. 
For Hoskin and his collaborator Macve, the emergence of accountability is 
based on the development and fusion of accounting systems and discipline 
(Hoskin and Macve, 1988; Hoskin, 1996). Hoskin and Macve (1988) argue that 
this fusion developed in the field of pedagogy specifically at West Point military 
academy. In Britain, Hoskin (1996) locates the same process at work in 
Glasgow University where Adam Smith was a teacher.  While it may be the 
case that these changes fed into the development of modern accountability, 
                                            
16 
To be precise Hoskin does not just see the word being invented around 1800 but the whole 
concept of accountability: ‘... the invention of accountability is one sign of a profound 
transformation beginning from around 1800’ (Hoskins: 1996: 266). 
17
 Robert Hall (1764-1831) was a Baptist minister from Leicestershire, England. The “awful 
idea” quote (Hall, 1801: 30) comes from one of his sermons published in 1801 entitled ‘Modern 
Infidelity Considered with respect to its influence on society’. 
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the roots of the concept are in ancient civilisations (Day and Klein, 1987; 
Normanton, 1966) and can also be seen in medieval English society (Dubnick, 
1998, Fukuyama, 2011).  
The history of accountability is as old as the governments of the ancient world 
(Day and Klein, 1987; Normanton, 1966). The ancient Greeks saw 
accountability as an essential counterpart to the spending of public money. 
According to Aristotle18 the constitution of classical Athens allowed for the 
people to elect their magistrates and hold them to account. Bird explains how 
this accountability was exercised: 
In Athens all public officials were subjected to monthly interim audits. Then at the end of 
their year in office they faced a two-part audit; first they had to pass an examination of 
their handling of public funds, and then a review procedure was set up at which any 
citizen could complain about any aspect of the official’s administration. 
(Bird, 1973: 17) 
In line with the conception of accountability developed in chapter 2, it was only 
after successfully passing both audits that the official could be ‘... crowned or 
otherwise honoured’ (Bird, 1973: 17) (i.e. that reward could be meted out).  
Dubnick (2002) locates the roots of present day accountability in the Norman 
conquest of Britain in 11th century. Normanton (1966) argues that 
accountability was also prevalent from medieval times through to the 
emperors, monarchs and dictators of the Renaissance and Baroque ages. 
Accountability in these state forms is hierarchical, secretive and constructed 
                                            
18
 ‘Solon himself would seem to have given the people only the necessary minimum of power. 
He gave them simply the right of electing the magistrates and calling them to account’ 
Aristotle, The Politics, quoted in Bird (1973: 17). Solon was an Athenian statesman and 
lawmaker from 6
th
 century BC. 
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such that ‘The ruler must learn what his servants have been doing, so that he 
can promote or punish; private persons need know nothing of the secrets and 
the errors of administration ... Government is an authoritarian mystery.’ 
(Normaton, 1966: 3). This form of accountability drives Dubnick (2002) to 
comment that in contradistinction to the ancient and modern conceptions of the 
people holding power to account; here rulers seek to hold their subjects to 
account. 
At this point the history of accountability in the main accounting texts skip 
several hundred years (Bird, 1973); whereas others only start with the system 
of parliamentary accountability set-up under Gladstone in the 1860s 
(Normanton, 1971; 1980). What is missing from these histories is the most 
important development in public accountability since the ancient Athenians, the 
struggle for accountable government through the extension of the popular 
franchise (Foot, 2005; Hill, 1972; Manning, 1996; McKeiver, 2009). The 
following briefly explores two key episodes in this development – the English 
revolution in the seventeenth century and the struggle for the vote in the 
nineteenth century – before observing the discussions on public accountability 
on the eve of the neoliberal age in the 1970s. The criteria used to select the 
historical episodes are that they show first how the idea of an accountable 
government has been a recurring theme for nearly four centuries. And second, 
they highlight the importance of the actions of ordinary people in achieving at 
least an element of control over their rulers; thus, linking with Marx’s aphorism 
noted above. 
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2.2 Accountability in the English revolution 
Time and again from the collapse of the government after the Short Parliament 
in 1640 throughout the next two decades, popular intervention arose in politics 
‘... where the people, of their own accords, in a seeming tumultuous manner, 
do express their liking or dislike of matters in government ...’ (Manning, 1991; 
quoted in Manning, 1996: 28). Manning (1996) explores a range of these 
popular interventions through the course of the 1640s and 1650s including 
riots in London against the power of the bishops (1641), popular 
demonstrations in support of the Five Members of the Commons (1642) and 
the Clubmen rising against the civil war in 1645. The period after the surrender 
of the Royalists and the abolition of the Episcopacy in 1646, saw the 
development of an important accountability mechanism in the New Model 
Army. Having fought and won the war, the soldiers in the New Model Army 
anticipated their ideals19 would be implemented. The soldiers also had 
concerns directly related to their own position including the receipt of pay 
arrears, forgiveness for actions taken during the war and the right not to be 
conscripted for future conflicts. While the soldiers were pressing parliament on 
these matters, parliament took the decision that army divisions would either be 
disbanded or sent to fight in Ireland. These actions sparked a revolt in the 
army, with rank and file soldiers refusing to follow orders and/or being 
commanded by their own elected representatives (known as “agitators”) 
instead.  ‘Each troop ... each company ... chose representatives to a 
regimental committee, which in turn selected two of its number to speak for the 
                                            
19
 It should be noted that these ideals were not a single coherent and comprehensive set. As 
subsequent events showed there was a range of opinion across all parties on the 
parliamentarian side, but they did concern the relationship between the people, the parliament 
and the established church. 
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whole regiment: they were called ‘agitators’, which meant agents’ (Manning, 
1996: 90). Importantly, in an early example of accountability from below, the 
agitators were subject to recall and replacement by other agents from the 
ranks of the soldiers (Hill, 1972).  
The English civil war and revolution generated more than new forms of 
democratic organisational accountability. Following the revolt in the army, a 
fortnight long debate (known as the Putney Debates) concerning the role of 
parliament, the King and universal suffrage was held (Foot, 2005; Manning, 
1996). These debates were about the functioning of parliament and whether 
the people should comply with laws made by a body they had no control over. 
The kernel of the debates was put forward by colonel Rainsborough, a leader 
of the Levellers20: 
For really I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live, as the greatest 
he; and therefore truly, Sir, I think it’s clear, that every man that is to live under a 
government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government; and I 
do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that 
government that he hath not had a voice to put himself under... 
(Colonel Thomas Rainsborough, quoted in Foot (2005: 28) and 
Manning (1996: 1)) 
In practical terms, the Levellers advanced a series of demands the central one 
was that parliament had to be reformed to become more representative. The 
implications of this demand went far beyond the operations of parliament or 
                                            
20
 A group or faction covering the rank and file soldiers and others who organised within the 
army and took part in the debates. 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
63 | P a g e  
even the extension of the vote and included free speech, the right to silence for 
prisoners, religious tolerance, fair taxation and reform of the hated tithes.  
Rainsborough and the Levellers were not the only ones advocating an 
extension of the voting rights; so did Gerrard Winstanley and the Diggers21. In 
1652 Winstanley published The Law of Freedom in a Platform, with a plea to 
Oliver Cromwell22 to constitute the laws and rules within it. The Law of 
Freedom lists 62 laws that were to govern the new commonwealth of all 
England. Winstanley’s laws contain conceptions of the people holding those in 
power to account; for example, the call for annual parliaments (Hill, 1972). 
Officials of the parliament (“overseers”) were also to be chosen by the people 
annually, and as law 24 states: 
New overseers shall at their first entrance into their office look back upon the actions of 
the old overseers of the last year, to see if they have been faithful in their places, and 
consented to no breach of law, whereby kingly bondage should any ways be brought in. 
 (Winstanley, 1983: 382) 
In the transitional period to this new commonwealth ‘... such officers might 
receive pay and maintenance allowances, in order to ensure that poor men 
served’ (Hill, 1972: 109). With this and the call for annual parliaments, 
Winstanley is foreshadowing two of the demands of the Chartists’ movement 
two centuries later. 
  
                                            
21
 Winstanley and his fellow political activists identified themselves as the True Levellers. It 
was their contemporaries that coined the term the Diggers to reflect their emphasis on land 
rights for commoners and an experimental commonwealth community during 1650. 
22
 Cromwell was at that time trying to galvanise the various factions in the Rump Parliament 
which had been in power since the execution of Charles I in 1649. 
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2.3 Accountability in 19th century Britain - the struggle for the vote 
The nineteenth century saw a major extension of the right to vote and thereby 
the ability to hold the government of the day to account. However, this 
extension was driven not by enlightened leaders from the parliamentary parties 
but by big explosions of civil disobedience and campaigns organised by a 
growing labour movement. The century was bookended by the Peterloo 
massacre (McKeiver, 2009) and the New Unionism (Charlton, 1999; 2000). In 
between the rotten boroughs23 were abolished (Foot, 2005), municipal 
authorities established (Saville, 1987), two thirds of the male population won 
the right to vote (Foot, 2005) and the context set for the establishing of the 
welfare reforms of 1906 (Charlton, 2000). These reforms and changes have 
both political and economic aspects to them that were often interlinked. For 
example, Saville (1987) illustrates how the Chartists movement of the 1830s 
and 1840s was able to gather other concerns under its leadership, such as the 
campaign for a ten-hour day. Yet Engels states, ‘this proposed law is the 
People’s Charter, which in form is purely political, and demands a democratic 
basis for the House of Commons’ (Engels, 1892: 228). While the economic 
and political motivations over-lapped the demands of the People’s Charter 
reflect the idea of accountability especially with the call for annual 
parliaments24.  
Following the Peterloo massacre in 1819, the reform movement and the call for 
accountability from below subsided during the 1820s; but the ideas of suffrage 
                                            
23
 Rotten boroughs would elect an MP on a very small electorate in some cases less than 100 
hundred voters. A swathe of these boroughs was disenfranchised following the 1832 Reform 
Act.  
24
 The only one of the Charter’s six points where there has been no significant progress to 
date. 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
65 | P a g e  
and parliamentary reform returned, taking inspiration from events in France in 
183025. This time accountability was overtly stated in the six-point People’s 
Charter of 1838. In 1837 a committee including MPs and representatives of the 
London Working Men’s Association was set-up to look at the question of 
electoral reform. The following year, the committee produced The People’s 
Charter containing six points26: 
1. A vote for every man twenty one years of age, of sound mind, and not undergoing 
punishment for crime. 
2. The Ballot, — To protect the elector in the exercise of his vote.  
3. No property qualification for members of Parliament—thus enabling the 
constituencies to return the man of their choice, be he rich or poor. 
4. Payment of Members, thus enabling an honest tradesman, working man, or other 
person, to serve a constituency, when taken from his business to attend to the interests 
of the country. 
5. Equal Constituencies securing the same amount of representation for the same 
number of electors,--instead of allowing small constituencies to swamp the votes of 
larger ones. 
6. Annual Parliaments, thus presenting the most effectual check to bribery and 
intimidation, since though a constituency might be bought once in seven years (even 
with the ballot), no purse could buy a constituency (under a system of universal 
suffrage) in each ensuing twelve month; and since members, when elected for a year 
only, would not be able to defy and betray their constituents as now. 
While all six points of the Charter are clearly focused on extending the 
franchise in favour of the poor and working classes, the point that stands out 
                                            
25
 In July 1830 a revolution saw the overthrow of the Bourbon monarch, Charles X. 
26
 The version shown is taken from a leaflet of the time reproduced in Cole and Filson (1951).  
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most is the call for annual parliaments. In particular the final clause illustrates 
the idea of accountability being applied to the running of the parliament. Here 
the notion of control is to the fore with the electorate able to change their 
representatives (in a similar manner to the Agitators), to mete out reward or 
sanction (Gray and Jenkins, 1993).  
Over the next decade the Chartist movement gathered support to a level that 
challenged the existence of the British capitalist state on more than one 
occasion (Saville, 1994). On the last occasion in 1848, following the outbreak 
of revolution in Paris in February, a third Chartists petition was presented to 
parliament. The Chartist leader Feargus O’Connor claimed over 5.6 million 
signatures but MPs claimed only 1.7 million, with many forgeries. In support of 
the third petition, a rally organised on 10th April, 1848 at Kennington Common, 
London ended with a violent confrontation between the protesters and state 
authorities. Although the rally drew tens of thousands, this was below the 
expected hundreds of thousands. Emboldened the authorities suppressed the 
movement and carried out mass arrests including leaders such as Ernest 
Jones (imprisoned for 2 years) and William Cuffay (transported to Tasmania). 
The Chartists’ movement was ultimately unsuccessful in the short-term. 
However, the episode illustrates that the ideas of a broader accountability, 
than Hoskin (1996) subscribes to, was prevalent in British society and that the 
social force that drove this agenda forward was the actions of ordinary people 
and the early formations of organised labour. The violence at Kennington 
Common was to remain in the collective memory of the establishment and 
government, playing a role two decades later when the question of extending 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
67 | P a g e  
suffrage was back on the political agenda. The 1867 Reform Act finally 
extended the franchise to two thirds of the male population but only after the 
re-igniting of a radical reform movement in 1863 that culminated in a three-day 
battle at Hyde Park, London  in 1866 (Foot, 2005). 
By the early 1880s two-thirds of adult males could vote; further reforms bills in 
the 1870s sought to equalise the constituency sizes (another key Chartist 
demand). This still left two-thirds of the population (including all women) 
without the vote (Foot, 2005). The struggle for the vote was far from complete. 
The subsequent decades saw agitation for female suffrage continue and 
increase; as did working class struggles in the form of the New Unionism 
(Charlton, 1999; Gallhofer and Haslam, 2003). The New Unionism set the 
backdrop to the first moves towards modern welfare with the reforms 
introduced by the 1906 Liberal government (Charlton, 2000). These struggles 
went on to result in universal suffrage being achieved by the second decade of 
the new century and a new arena for accountability to be contested in – local 
government. 
2.4 Public accountability in 20th century 
In this new arena, one of the first battles was the Labour councillors’ revolt in 
the London Borough of Poplar (Branson, 1979). This was followed later in the 
century by tenants, the trade union movement and at times Labour councillors 
organising campaigns to defend the provision of decent, affordable, public 
housing (Burn, 1972; Glynn, 2009; Grayson, 1997; Skinner and Langdon, 
1974). For example in 1959/1960 a rent strike broke out in St. Pancras, 
London against proposals to introduce means testing. The rent strike illustrates 
that while not explicitly calling for accountability the tenants’ movement in St 
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Pancras was seeking to hold the local authority to account, to control the local 
housing policy (Burn, 1972).  
The changing and dynamic nature of accountability relations can also be 
highlighted in the debates immediately prior to the adoption of neoliberal 
policies in the early 1970s.  A collection of essays was published in 1971 
(entitled The Dilemma of Accountability in Modern Government: Independence 
versus Control), based on a series of meetings between US and British 
academics, practitioners and politicians, into the terra incognita of 
accountability in modern democratic government (Smith and Hague, 1971). 
This expedition is significant on three fronts. Firstly, in the UK the late 1960s 
into the early 1970s represents a tipping point in the development of 
‘government by contract’ (Pifer, 1971: ix). This development was more 
advanced in the United States of America but was starting to become 
prevalent in the UK and was taken up as a key element of neoliberal reforms 
such as contracting-out and compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). 
Secondly, these discussions give a glimpse into the history of the 
accountability relations in public services and government forty years ago; 
including the inherited ideas of accountability – for example, the Gladstonian 
conceptions of post facto financial accountability developed in the 1860s 
(Johnson, 1971; Normanton, 1980) – that policymakers, academics and 
practitioners were grappling with. Thirdly, and crucially, the essays give an 
indication of the practice and conceptions of accountability in the pre-neoliberal 
period. It is an accepted norm in the current public accountability literature that 
as the public services have been reformed along neoliberal lines, so too have 
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the related accountability relations (Law, 1999; Pollitt, 2003). Strikingly, this 
collection of essays highlights the concern that accountability to parliament 
needs to be strengthened. There is no discussion of accountability to markets 
or consumers; instead the concern is over public money that is being 
expended through local government or the nationalised industries that is not 
overseen by parliament. All this has changed fundamentally in the intervening 
period with the re-organisation of local government financing and the 
privatisation of the nationalised industries. However, the essays illustrate that 
there were and still are alternative ideas about what accountability is and how 
it should/could be exercised. 
2.5 Section summary 
In summary the historical episodes outlined above, from the English revolution 
through to the 1867 Reform Act and the tenant struggles of the twentieth 
century, illustrate the two central points of this thesis. First, is the relevance of 
studying the action of working people as agents of social change. It is the 
actions of the 97 per cent (Manning, 1996)27 that create the context and apply 
the pressure on the remaining three per cent in power, that forces the changes 
and advances in the franchise and accountable governments. Second, the 
idea of accountability has deeper roots than the etymology of the word. The 
modern conception of holding those in power to account has roots that go back 
to Athenian democracy, but the intervening history shows that accountability 
relations are context specific and dynamic. The extending of the franchise, in 
                                            
27
 Brian Manning, while exploring the role of the “middling sort” in the English revolution,  
justifies the history from below approach by criticising the histories focused solely on those at 
the top of society ‘... as if the other 97 per cent of the population did not exist or did not matter’ 
and goes on to state ‘... the people other than lords and squires did play parts worthy of 
investigation – for one thing they did most of the fighting and dying – and they did not always 
follow blindly the lead of their social superiors’ (Manning, 1996: 1). 
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the nineteenth century, went beyond the holding of central government to 
account through the ballot box; it also covered the public services provided by 
local government (such as housing and education). The neoliberal age has 
seen a reform process attempting (and in large part succeeding) in 
undermining the democratic and bureaucratic accountability relations put in 
place as part of the post-war consensus. This process is not complete nor is it 
uncontested. The dynamics and causal processes of the neoliberal 
restructuring are addressed in section 4 of this chapter. First, there is an 
exposition of relevant ideas on accountability drawn from beyond the 
accounting and management literatures, from the Development Studies 
literature where civil society campaigns aim to hold local, national and supra-
national bodies to account. 
3. Closely related cousins – Social and Civil accountability 
From the perspectives of poor people worldwide, there is a crisis in governance…State 
institutions, whether represented by central ministries or local government, are often 
neither responsive nor accountable to the poor…Poor people see little recourse to 
injustice, criminality, abuse and corruption by institutions. 
(Narayan et al., 2000: 172) 
In this thesis, a major concern is to avoid the reductionist and managerialist 
tendencies found in the accounting and public management literatures on 
accountability. In the search for alternative formulations and ideas the 
literatures of other disciplines were perused, resulting in two conceptions of 
accountability that have influenced the triadic research framework. Both 
conceptions originate in the Development Studies literature. Social 
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Accountability has been developed by Peruzzotti and Smulovitz  (2002), and 
‘… explores the way in which citizen action, aimed at over-seeing political 
authorities, is redefining the traditional concept of the relationship between 
citizens and their elected representatives’ (Newell, 2006: 47). The tools that 
social accountability uses include mobilising citizens, media campaigns and 
legal cases aimed at increasing government transparency and abuses of 
power such as police violence (Stanley, 2005). The aspirations of social 
accountability are closely related to those of this thesis with an emphasis on 
the role of ordinary people in exercising and influencing the form of 
accountability relations. However, at it is heart social accountability views 
control of the state through elections and constitutional means, as the basis of 
accountability. This position rests on a conception of the state as an 
independent neutral body that can be captured by campaigners to exert 
change. This is much debated, (see section 4) as there is often a conflictual 
relationship between campaigners and the state, one which cannot be 
resolved through elections and constitutional means alone. 
In response, Newell (2006) advances the concept of Civil Accountability. 
‘Strategies for civil accountability are non-state, often informal and distinct in 
form from political, social and financial accountability’ (Newell, 53: 2006). The 
examples of civil accountability explored by Newell and Wheeler (2006) differ 
from the approach taken in social accountability; their accountability becomes 
a means to a specified goal. For example, access to land rights and related 
resources in Chiapas province or the right to housing in Mombasa. These 
campaigns have specific goals, which will often involve some conflict with the 
local state. They differ from social accountability in two key ways. Firstly, their 
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overall goal can stretch beyond simple reform of governmental processes (e.g. 
access to land or housing). Secondly, the strategies employed are often a 
combination of using the existing mechanisms (e.g. court cases or international 
legal networks) and developing their own informal mechanisms (e.g. armed 
conflict, mobilising residents to protest and block construction sites).   
Civil and Social Accountability have a common base; both are attempts to 
move the discussions on accountability beyond narrow confines that currently 
dominate the research fields of accounting and public management. There is a 
second and more important common thread, both conceptions stand as a 
reaction to the neoliberal models and policies being pursued by states and 
trans-national bodies.  This becomes clear when looking at the examples in 
Newell and Wheeler (2006) such as the right to water campaigns in South 
Africa and Veracruz in Mexico or the health campaign in Cabo, Brazil. Here the 
campaigners come up against governments, agencies and private companies 
that are following and benefiting from the neoliberal policies (such as structural 
adjustment plans and privatisations) being advanced by the World Bank and 
the IMF. In a similar manner, this study is based on a data field in a developed 
economy which has over the last 30 years been subject to a variety of 
neoliberal inspired policies from the right to buy to the large scale voluntary 
transfers.  
3.1 Conclusion 
It is not possible to understand the attachment that ordinary people, in the late 
20th and early 21st century, have for democratic accountability expressed 
through the ballot box without understanding the history of previous 
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generations who both formulated the (awful) ideas of accountability and 
organised, campaigned and ultimately died to secure (albeit, limited and 
partial) control over key public services. Further, the historical episodes 
explored above and the modern conceptions of social and civil accountability 
show how the socio-economic and political intertwine to produce social 
campaigns that advance democratic accountability. It is argued in the next 
section that these tendencies continue in modern day Britain, with resistance 
to the neoliberal reforms to public services. One of the concerns of this 
resistance has been over the question of control and accountability of service 
providers. This resistance has originated in civil society through existing 
organisations (such as trade unions) and the generation of new forms such as 
local and national campaigns, like Defend Council Housing or the tenant-led 
campaigns explored in the local case studies in chapters 6 to 8. The next 
section, drawing on the roots outlined above and the definition of accountability 
as a form of control, explores and critiques the literature on the state and civil 
society with the aim of laying the foundations for an analysis of how the 
accountability relations have been made, re-made and exercised over the past 
thirty years in the British public services, using the triadic research framework 
of neoliberalisation – reaction/contestation – reproduction or transformation.  
4. Framing an alternative accountability  
The previous sections argued that the nature of public accountability relations 
have been a product of an ongoing dynamic between the state and the 
governed. This was shown historically (in section 2) but also in the 
formulations of civil and social accountability (Newell and Wheeler, 2006; 
Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2002; Stanley, 2005). For example, McEwan (2005) 
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notes that the Bolivian uprising against water privatisation in 2000 was about 
‘... how this vital economic activity would be controlled, whether by political 
process or by profit-driven market decisions ... once an activity is removed 
from the political realm a democratic process becomes impossible’ (McEwan, 
2005: 172). This provides the starting point for the discussion and analysis 
below, which is arranged over three elements.  
First, there is an exposition the nature of the state and more importantly the 
role and impact of neoliberalisation. Second, there is a critique of the term civil 
society identifying a duality in the term where it is both a justification for 
neoliberalisation and for resistance to the same neoliberal reforms. The third 
element is the nature of the dynamic relationship between the state and civil 
society; one that involves contestation as well as compromise and co-option. 
This section and the chapter are concluded by integrating the arguments from 
these three elements into a research framework of neoliberalisation – 
reaction/contestation – reproduction or transformation. 
4.1 The State  
This thesis does not intend to (re)theorise the role and nature of the capitalist 
state within the accounting literature; instead, the focus is on the impact of the 
neoliberalisation (Peck, 2010) of the state; specifically the post-war consensus 
on the welfare state. However, this requires an outlining of the nature of the 
state in late capitalism. As a concept, in the accounting literature, the state 
remains an under-theorised area (Gray et al., 2006)28. Only intermittently in 
                                            
28
 This is not a totally surprising position given the difficulties that sociologists and political 
economists have experienced in trying to develop a theory of the state in capitalist society 
(Knutilla and Kubik, 2000). 
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recent decades have accounting academics tackled the topic (Cooper et al., 
1989; Catchpowle et al., 2004; Tinker, 1984). These papers have addressed 
the relationship between the accounting profession and the state (Cooper et 
al., 1989); the role of the state in dealing with accounting failures (Tinker, 
1985); the limitations of neoclassical theories of state regulation (Tinker, 1984; 
1985); the relationship between the bourgeois nation state and globalised 
capital (Armstrong, 1998) and a classical Marxist analysis of the relationship 
between the state and accounting (Catchpowle et al., 2004).   In addition some 
address the state in passing such as Sikka’s (2008) analysis of the impact of 
the enterprise culture in accounting firms or Gray et al. (2006) analysing the 
accountability of NGOs and their relationship to the state and civil society.  
The state plays an important role in forming, protecting and regulating social 
relations that ensure the sustained rule of capital (Catchpowle et al., 2004; 
Harman, 1991).  This does not mean that the actions of each state body are 
predictable in an economic deterministic manner. Instead, the state and the 
economic base are part of a contradictory totality29, with different elements 
dominating at different times and over different issues. A differentiation can be 
made between the strategic and the tactical. Tactically the state can make 
compromises with labour and civil society over a range of issues, however 
there are limits to these compromises – as the state is dependent upon 
capitalist relations for its revenue (Sikka, 2008) – that are reached when 
attempts are made to transcend capitalist relations (Harman, 1991; Harvey, 
2005).  
                                            
29
 This is an application of the Marxist dialectic, as explained in chapter 4. 
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Further, Barker (1991) notes that each state is part of a broader system of 
capitalist states that are all interdependent. This interdependence gives rise to 
what Barker has called the “Dual Determination” of capital. Here capital is a 
relationship that rests on the control of social production being separated from 
those carrying out the production; hence, the producers are alienated from the 
fruits of their labour. This alienated relationship has impacts beyond the point 
of production and encompasses the full circuit of capital (e.g. exchange, 
realisation, price-setting). However, to talk of capital in this abstracted and 
singular manner is misleading; capital only exists in a multiple state 
(Armstrong, 1998) where different blocks of capital compete with each other. 
Moreover, that competition takes place not just on the local or national level 
but also internationally. Capital’s dual determination is expressed as the 
“anarchy” of competition between capitals and the “despotism” of exploitation 
of labour within each capital. The state is an expression of capitalist relations 
and those relations that give rise to a dual determination of anarchy and 
despotism: the state is a complicated organisation of intra-class competition 
and inter-class domination (Barker, 1991). The need for this analysis becomes 
clear in the next section where the changes in the welfare state over the last 
30 years are analysed.  
In contrast to an instrumental perspective (Sikka, 2008), a post-Marxian 
perspective (Cooper et al., 1989) or a relative autonomy perspective (Tinker, 
1985), this thesis follows the framework set out by Catchpowle et al. that 
emphasises: 
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the structural dependence of the state on capitalism as being the main cause of the 
state’s shift in policy or actions. Therefore, the actions of states … and other social 
institutions cannot be understood on their own but only in relation to what shapes the 
dynamics of society as a whole, which in a capitalist system remains the pursuit of 
profits and capital accumulation. 
(Catchpowle et al., 2004: 1049) 
By adopting neoliberal policies the state is reacting to the changed socio-
economic circumstances of the late 20th and early 21st centuries; in the same 
way as the previous Keynesian consensus was a reaction to the socio-
economic circumstances of the mid-20th century (Catchpowle et al., 2004; 
Barker, 1991).  
Peck (2010) argues that the period of unrestrained market fundamentalism, a 
central characteristic of the neoliberal age, came to an end in 200830. Due to 
the credit crunch and the seizing up of the money markets, a series of banks 
and financial institutions have had to be fully or partly nationalised31. These 
actions by the state are in direct contradiction to the theory of self-correcting 
market capitalism, where poorly performing companies collapse, clearing the 
way for better performing ones to take their place. However, they are 
consistent with neoliberal practice where the role of the state is to intervene 
and ensure the financial markets do not collapse. As Harvey states: 
                                            
30
 Watkins argues that neoliberalism has not been transcended but made over into a form of 
“regulatory liberalism” (Watkins, 2010). 
31
 For example, Northern Rock in the UK, AngloIrish in Ireland and Fanny Mae and Freddie 
Mac in the USA.  
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... in the event of a conflict, neoliberal states typically favour the integrity of the financial 
system and the solvency of financial institutions over the well-being of the population or 
environmental quality. 
(Harvey, 2005: 71) 
The actions by states across the globe since 2008 of intervening in and 
propping-up the financial and banking systems re-enforces the point made 
previously that the state in capitalism acts and reacts to the socio-economic 
circumstances operating at that time. This formulation is now applied to the 
changes in the welfare in Britain over the past thirty years. 
4.1.1 The Welfare State – Traditional and Neoliberal Consensuses  
The establishment of the welfare state in Britain by the 1945 Labour 
government saw the beginning of a post-war political consensus founded on 
Keynesian economics and a predominately bureaucratic approach to welfare 
provision (Knuttila and Kubik, 2000). This consensus broadly stayed in place 
until the mid-1970s when under a Labour government, monetarist/neo-liberal 
policies were implemented at the behest of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Harvey (2005) outlines the theoretical basis to these policies: 
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade… It holds that the social 
good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, 
and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market.  
(Harvey, 2005: 2-3) 
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In neoliberal theory there is no agreement over the role and extent of the state 
(Peck, 2010). Individual rights (such as to private property) and the free 
operation of the market, are essential elements that require the state to 
enshrine and protect. However, whether the state should protect victims of 
crises (an ordoliberal policy) or just act as a night-watch man (a Hayekian 
position) has not been resolved by neoliberal theorists (Peck, 2010).This lack 
of clarity and agreement led Keynes to chide Hayek and other neoliberals that 
they did not know where to draw the line between the market and the state. 
The rise of neoliberal policies relied on both economic circumstances and 
ideological justifications; for example, the state must be reduced because the 
money was running out. Neoliberal policies sought to roll-back the state and 
reduce expenditure on public services; as the percentage of public expenditure 
as part of GDP was rising from the mid-1960s to a peak in the mid-1970s. This 
coincided with the global crisis of capitalism sparked by the Middle East oil 
crisis. While there has been a reduction in the levels of public expenditure (as 
a percentage of GDP) since the middle years of the Wilson/Callaghan Labour 
government, the reduction is not a qualitative one and did not achieve the 
levels the Conservative government initially expected to. From 1979 to 2000, 
public expenditure has generally floated between 40-48 per cent of GDP only 
twice dipping below the 40per cent level (Talbot, 2001). Instead of a reduction 
in spending, there has been a restructuring of spending priorities. As Talbot 
(2001) puts it, analysing the period 1980 to 1994, there has been “winners and 
losers”: 
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The “winners” included social security and welfare (up from 24 per cent to 34 per cent) 
… and health (up from 11 per cent to 13.5 per cent). The “losers” included defence 
(down from 11 percent to 8.3 percent), housing (down from 6 percent to 3.7 percent), 
and subsidies to manufacturing and other industries (down 2.6 percent to 0.6 percent)… 
(Talbot, 2001: 286) 
 
Furthermore, Hay (2008) has compiled statistics showing that in the period 
from 1960 to 2005, all major western economies32 have increased government 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP by at least 16 per cent and at most 108 
per cent33,and remaining ‘... substantial in all developed capitalist countries’ 
(Lapavitsas, 2005: 35) . The details for the UK illustrate the typical trend (albeit 
in a much less dramatic manner than some others34); in 1960, government 
expenditure was 32.6 per cent of GDP; this reached a peak in 1975 of 46.9 per 
cent but had only declined to 44.7 per cent by 2005. Neoliberal reforms have 
not been about reducing state expenditure but re-organising it.  
It can be difficult to retrospectively identify with certainty the motivations of 
individuals and groups; however, it is clear that the actual impact of neoliberal 
policies over the last thirty years has been a dramatic shift of power and wealth 
to rich and ruling elites from the most disadvantaged (Glynn, 2009; Harvey, 
2005; Saad-Filho and Johnston, 2005). Neoliberalisation is a class project 
                                            
32
 The countries covered are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom and the United States. Hay’s sources for the data are various years of the 
OECD’s Economic Outlook. 
33
 The percentages refer to net growth over the 45 years. In all cases the same pattern 
develops where the percentage grows in early years and starts to decline from a peak in more 
recent years. However, the decline is smaller than the previous growth hence a net growth. 
34
 For example Denmark had the biggest net growth of 108 per cent, with growth to the peak of 
158 per cent and decline from a peak of 19 per cent. 
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(Ferguson, 2009; Harvey, 2009; Peck, 2010) where the ‘...main substantive 
achievement ... has been to redistribute, rather than to generate, wealth and 
income’ (Harvey, 2005: 159). This should not be a surprise as Antonio Gramsci 
writing about the original era of laissez-fare liberalism describes it as a ‘political 
programme, designed to change ... the economic programme of the State itself 
– in other words the distribution of the national income’ (Gramsci, 1971: 160). 
Gramsci’s parallel is given more resonance by the work of Mirowski and 
Plehwe (2009) who trace the origins of neoliberalism to a group of like-minded 
academics and intellectuals who formed the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) in 
1947. Although, the aims of neoliberalism are notoriously difficult to delineate 
Plehwe states: 
The various groups of neoliberals that joined the MPS from different countries and 
professional backgrounds were driven by the desire to learn how to effectively oppose 
what they summarily described as collectivism and socialism, and to develop an agenda 
diverging from classical liberalism. 
(Plehwe, 2009: 6) 
Thus, from the start the neoliberal project had a duality at its core: to oppose 
collectivism predominantly seen as state control and, to save the liberal project 
from its faults and failures that had been exposed at the turn of the twentieth 
century.  
The neoliberal project contains contradictions and pitfalls (Mirowski and 
Plehwe, 2009; Peck, 2010). For example, ‘Neoliberalism, in its various guises, 
has always been about the capture and reuse of the state, in the interests of 
shaping a pro-corporate, freer-trading “market order” ...’ (Peck, 2010: 9), 
despite the close association seen between state control and collectivism. 
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Peck further outlines how neoliberal theory once put into practice results in 
converse outcomes, such that ‘... markets would fail, that bubbles would burst, 
that deregulation would descend into over-reach, that privatization would make 
monopolies’ (Peck, 2010: xiii). Thus, neoliberalism in practice leads to a murky 
world of market-oriented governance through a contradictory and contested 
series of reforms. The foregoing shows that rather than the state solely being 
rolled-back, neoliberalism in practice requires the rolling-out of reforms and 
policies through state actions (Peck and Tickell, 2002); for example the bailing 
out of the financial system (Harvey, 2005). Further, the history of 
neoliberalising the state highlights the combination of ideological, economic 
and political (as embodied in the MPS network). More precisely the occurrence 
of economic and political crises (Mudge, 2008) that opened the space for 
neoliberal theories to be put into practice, for example, the debt crisis in 1970’s 
New York or New Orleans after hurricane Katrina (Harvey, 2005; Klein, 2007; 
Peck et al., 2009). 
However, the complete neoliberalisation of the state ‘... was never achieved 
because it could never have been achieved ... it never entailed an “absentee” 
state, but various kinds of reconstructed and reoriented states, dedicated to 
the ongoing tasks of market-making and market-guided regulatory 
restructuring’ (Peck et al., 2009: 109). To establish how the changes in the 
economic structures of capitalism over the last forty years have affected 
changes in the role and functions of the state, the following paragraphs 
develop a synthesis of Harvey’s (2003; 2005), Ashman and Callincos’ (2006), 
and Whitfield’s (2006)  writings.  
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Central to Harvey’s analysis of neoliberalism is his conception of accumulation 
by dispossession (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006; Harvey, 2003; 2005). Harvey 
develops the term from Marx’s primitive accumulation (Marx, 1990). ‘A closer 
look at Marx’s description of primitive accumulation reveals a wide range of 
processes ... All features of primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have 
remained powerfully present within capitalism’s historical geography up until 
now’ Harvey (2003: 145). Harvey locates the need for accumulation by 
dispossession in the overaccumulation35 of capital that has plagued the system 
since the early 1970s36. Accumulation by dispossession seeks ‘... to release a 
set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some instances zero) 
cost. Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately 
turn them to profitable use’ (Harvey, 2003: 149). An example of this process is 
Arnold and Cooper’s (1999) documenting of the Medway Ports, UK 
privatisation37.  
However, Harvey’s conceptualisation of accumulation by dispossession has 
been criticised because ‘... not simply are the boundaries of accumulation by 
dispossession not clearly drawn, but its functions need more fine-grained 
analysis than Harvey offers’ (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006). For Harvey 
privatisation has opened state assets, previously off-limits, to overaccumulated 
capital arguing that: 
                                            
35
 Overaccumulation ‘... is a condition where surpluses of capital (perhaps accompanied by 
surpluses of labour) lie idle with no profitable outlets in sight’ (Harvey, 2003: 149). 
36
 Given the secretive nature of capitalists when it comes to profitability (hence the use of 
commercial confidentiality) differing methods of calculating profit rates have been employed by 
a range of economists, leading to results that are not fully compatible. However, Harman 
(2009: 195) is able to conclude that the ‘various efforts at measuring it [the rate of profit] have 
come to a single conclusion: it fell sharply between the late 1960s and the early 1980s’. 
37
 Immediately after the privatisation half of the work force was sacked and forced to sell the 
shares they had in the new private company for a price of £2.50 per share. Within a year the 
new directors cashed in those shares selling them at £37 per share when the company was 
taken-over. 
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... if capitalism has been experiencing a chronic difficulty of overaccumulation since 
1973, then the neo-liberal project of privatization of everything makes a lot of sense as 
one way to solve the problem. 
(Harvey, 2003: 149-150) 
However, Ashman and Callinicos (2006) argue that privatisation has many 
forms and functions not just the release of public assets. Instead they propose 
an alternative conceptualisation of commodification, recommodification and 
restructuring (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006: 121-122). This conceptualisation 
has two benefits. Firstly that dynamism is central, so that assets or services 
are located within a process that is on-going and changing. This can be 
illustrated by taking a historical perspective on the cost of prescriptions. Prior 
to the establishment of the welfare state prescription drugs were available 
through market relations (i.e. if you were wealthy you could afford them); the 
drugs were a commodity. The establishment of the welfare state allows for the 
collective provision of certain drugs. These drugs are still commodities, but as 
Ashman and Callinicos (2006) argue they have to an extent been 
‘decommodified’ (i.e. the market relations covering the prescription drug 
market have been disrupted). The past thirty years has seen a process of 
recommodification with several increases in prescription charges38. There is an 
additional aspect to this process with the role of the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NIHCE) who decides which drugs should be 
subsidised from public money through the prescription scheme and which are 
subject to unfettered market relations. This leads to the second benefit in that it 
                                            
38
 Prescription charges in England have increased from £6 in 2000 to £7.40 in 2011. It should 
be noted that in the devolved countries and regions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
prescription charges have been phased out by the end of 2011. 
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allows a much closer, more detailed (fine-grain) analysis of the processes at 
hand. Ashman and Callinicos (2006) illustrate this under their conception of 
restructuring, by reference to the growth of Diagnose and Treatment Centres 
(DTCs) in the NHS. These centres run by private companies provide services 
free at the point of delivery to the public but are paid for out of the public purse. 
In the process the private healthcare company benefits from a stream of public 
funding previous locked away from them. Their shareholders receive dividends 
from the tax-payer and their senior management justify exorbitant 
remuneration packages on the basis of market relations. DTCs also illuminate 
how the UK government’s total expenditure has been restructured, rather than 
reduced. This is not to negate the importance of Harvey’s conception of 
accumulation by dispossession, only that with regard to certain processes 
most notably privatisation there may be a need for a more subtle analysis and 
understanding.  
Harvey’s (2003; 2005) accumulation by dispossession and Ashman and 
Callinicos’ (2006) commodification – recommodification – restructuring 
approaches are developed from within the classical Marxist tradition. Whitfield 
(2006) approaches the actual policies implemented by New Labour in 
government and develops a conception of Marketisation, where ‘… the process 
by which market forces are imposed in public services, which have traditionally 
been planned, delivered and financed by local and central government’ 
(Whitfield, 2006:7). He identifies five elements of marketisation39, including the 
                                            
39
 The other four are: the commodification (commercialisation) of services, the commodification 
(commercialisation) of labour, restructuring of the state for market mechanisms and 
embedding business interests in policy-making. See Smyth (2012: 236-237) for an illustration 
of these elements in the social housing context. 
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‘restructuring of democratic accountability and user involvement’. A process 
that Harvey (2005) labels as governance by experts and elites.  
Bringing these formulations together the past thirty years has seen, alongside 
the commodification and financialisation of public assets, a restructuring 
(Ashman and Callinicos, 2005) of the democratic accountability relations 
(Whitfield, 2006) to achieve a governance by experts and elites (Harvey, 
2005).     
4.1.2 Privatisation and accountability (market or democratic) 
The rise of privatisation as the cutting edge of neoliberalism is not just a matter 
of economic determinism. Harman (2008) identifies the ability to deflect 
political flak onto private managements away from politicians; the opening up 
of international markets, particularly of state industries in the Third World; and 
the lobbying interests of individual blocks of capital (e.g. American healthcare 
firms gaining access to NHS funding), as other reasons for the continued 
pursuance of privatisation policies. Harman’s first point is relevant to this thesis 
as it alludes to the changing nature of accountability relations due to the 
privatisation process. Harman (2008) and Harvey (2003; 2005) both point to 
the manner in which many privatisations took place at low cost into non-
functioning markets that ultimately require the state to intervene in the form of 
regulators. According to neoliberal theory this position is preferable to the 
continuance or even extension of democratic control over public services. 
Examples of these tensions include the privatising of prison services (Andrew, 
2007) and the use of outsourcing contracts (Barton, 2006). In both cases, the 
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nature of public accountability is fundamentally changed. ‘Accountability in its 
modern manifestation has become a largely technical and instrumental 
process...’ (Andrew, 2007: 877); a manifestation encouraged by privatisation 
and outsourcing. In the process the public sphere is diminished by managing 
to the contract specifications and performance indicators (Andrew, 2007)40 or 
the use commercial-in-confidence (CIC) clauses (Barton, 2006).  These 
critiques of the relationship between privatisation and accountability are 
developed from an ethical perspective (Andrew, 2007) and an economic theory 
perspective (Barton, 2006). Both perspectives do not address the concern of 
this thesis (i.e. how the service users influence the accountability relations). 
Barton (2006) also draws on democratic theory to highlight the need for 
transparency of information in a functioning democratic government; 
something that CIC clauses restrict. However, his analysis is limited to this 
element of democratic accountability. 
The neoliberal project is profoundly suspicious of democratic control (Allen, 
2006; Harvey, 2005), seeing action through the state as both a less efficient 
mechanism of resource allocation (than the market) and also subject to 
influence by vested interests. This stance led Alvin Hansen to portray the MPS 
neoliberals as seeing ‘hobgoblins under all the beds’ (Peck, 2010: 274).  
Hayek saw democracy not as a principle but as ‘... essentially a means, a 
utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and individual freedom’ 
(Hayek, 1997: 52). As such it was a social structure not to be fetishised 
(Hayek, 1997). David Harvey (2005: 66) addresses the neoliberal’s attitude 
                                            
40
 Cooper and Taylor (2005) detail the logic of this process in relation to the justification for use 
of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the Scottish prison system. The whole of the Scottish 
government’s policy is reduced to one net present value figure.  
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towards democratic control directly when he argues neoliberals prefer 
‘governance by experts and elites’. Harvey identifies a further contradiction at 
the heart of the neoliberal project (Harvey, 2005: 69), between the individual’s 
freedom to choose and the rights of individuals to form collectives (e.g. trade 
unions or anti-privatisation campaigns), which may ultimately challenge the 
neoliberal processes. ‘This creates the paradox of intense state interventions 
and government by elites and “experts” in a world where the state is supposed 
not to be interventionist’ (Harvey, 2005: 69). This contradiction plays out in the 
case of council housing stock transfers with a highly interventionist local state 
being challenged by a tenants’ campaigns, where there are huge asymmetries 
in resources and finances between the two. These contradictions are explored 
in the case studies. 
4.1.3 The neoliberal state - summary 
Is it the case that the neoliberal state represents a new form of state that has 
been moved beyond the previous conceptualisation of the capitalist state? 
Here the previous analysis of the state being locked into a system of national 
states all competing with each other on behalf of their own domestic blocks of 
capital provides a basis on which to answer the question. The economic crisis 
of the early to mid-1970s allowed neoliberal theories the space to be adopted 
by policy makers, where the rate of profit fell in advanced economies from its 
post-war high (Harman, 2008; 2009) and world leaders lost faith in state 
intervention’s ability to stave off economic crises and restore profit levels. This 
did not occur spontaneously but was the consequence of a policy that 
promoted the Chicago school of economic thought (Harvey, 2005). Academics 
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such as Milton Friedman and the Chicago Boys (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010) 
had their ideas implemented in extreme social conditions such as Chile after 
the Pinochet coup. Their free-market ideas were gaining ground in economics 
departments and business schools across the US and beyond. At the same 
time business lobby groups took up the ideas and enthusiastically promoted 
them in industry and then by extension into the political and policy-making 
worlds.  
The neoliberal project is full of contradictions and tensions (Harvey, 2003; 
Jessop, 2002; Peck et al., 2009), no less so than with regard to the functioning 
of the capitalist state. The past thirty years have seen a rolling-back of the 
traditional post-war bureaucratic delivery of public services (Jessop, 2002). 
This is accompanied by a rolling-out of new forms of service delivery based on 
private and voluntary sector providers and partnerships. Central to this process 
is the policy of privatisation. This process have been conceptualised in three 
different forms as accumulation by dispossession; commodification – re-
commodification – re-structuring, and marketisation. The three frameworks all 
posses different strengths, that enable analysis of different elements of the 
privatisation and neoliberalisation of public services. A synthesis of the release 
of public assets at below (or zero) cost (Harvey, 2005), coupled with the 
dynamism of Ashman and Callinicos’ (2006) work and the identification of the 
restructuring of the democratic accountability (Whitfield, 2006) provides a basis 
on which to analyse the housing policy of LSVT.  
This section on the nature of the state and how it has been neoliberalised over 
the past three decades addresses research objective a) and the first element 
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of the triad framework. The groundwork for research objectives b) (R/C) and c) 
(R or T) are addressed in the remainder of this chapter, by focusing on two 
other key components – the nature of civil society and the dynamic relationship 
it has with the state. 
4.2 Civil Society 
Neoliberalism, the grand political project of our time, ostensibly aims to roll back the 
state and redistribute its functions to the market, but it also has a politics with respect to 
civil society. 
(Sinha, 2005: 163) 
The ascendency of neoliberal policies has been accompanied by a revival in 
conceptions of civil society (Lavalette and Ferguson, 2007; Sinha, 2005).  As 
with the state there are differing, contested conceptions of what constitutes 
civil society and its role. Civil society is a term that is embraced by neoliberal 
governments, their supporters in the NGO sector and those from social 
movements and NGOs who aim to resist the neoliberalisation process. The 
following short discussion outlines the history of civil society as a concept; its 
modern day use in the neoliberal age and finally an exposition of civil society 
relevant to this thesis. 
The modern day version of civil society has its roots in German philosophical 
thought of the late eighteenth century. Hegel argued that an ethical life had 
three moments: family, the state and civil society (Hegel, 1991). The family and 
civil society could not provide a stable basis for society and thus the state was 
needed to resolve conflicts in and between the other two moments. ‘For Hegel 
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... civil society is a site of conflict whose reconciliation comes via regulation by 
the state’ (Lavalette and Ferguson, 2007: 449). Marx (1992) criticised Hegel’s 
attitude towards the reconciling role of the state. Marx saw the state as an 
expression of the contradictions in bourgeois society and is needed to maintain 
the rule of capital. Civil society, for Marx, is capitalist society. This means that 
civil society contains both the exploitation of labour by capital and also 
resistance by labour to capital. ‘Civil society, therefore, is the site of class 
conflict, inequality and struggle’ (Lavalette and Ferguson, 2007: 449).  
Antonio Gramsci (Gramsci, 1971) deepens the classical Marxist understanding 
of civil society, with his theorisations of hegemony, and its relationship to the 
state and civil society. Gramsci writing after the failure of the post-World War I 
revolutionary tide to make a breakthrough in Western Europe sought to explain 
how this had occurred. ‘In the East the state was everything, civil society was 
primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between 
state and civil society, and when the state trembled a sturdy structure of civil 
society was at once revealed’ (Gramsci, 1971: 238). Gramsci sees civil society 
here as an essential element contributing to the ruling elites’ hegemonic grip 
on society. Elites rule through a combination of force and consent; with the 
state monopolising physical force and exercising the former and civil society 
developing the latter. How civil society’s role is to be theorised is not clear in 
Gramsci’s work. Using different metaphors Gramsci sees civil society as an 
initial hurdle that must be overcome; yet elsewhere, the state is ‘an outer ditch, 
behind which there stands a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks’ 
(Gramsci, 1971: 207). Equally, the state is considered to be ‘political society + 
civil society’ (Gramsci, 1971: 263), or a balance between the two or further still 
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‘in actual reality civil society and State are one and the same’ (Gramsci, 1971: 
160). In an echo of Marx and Engel’s phrase – ‘The history of all hitherto 
existing society is the history of class struggles’ (Marx and Engels, 1996: 3) – 
Gramsci outlines the relationship between the state and civil society: 
The historical unity of the ruling classes is realised in the State, and their history is 
essentially the history of States and of groups of States. But it would be wrong to think 
that this unity is simply juridical and political ... the fundamental historical unity, 
concretely, results from the organic relations between State or political society and “civil 
society”. 
(Gramsci, 1971: 52) 
These imprecise formulations are not just context specific (i.e. Gramsci’s 
imprisonment and need to outwit the censors) but arise due to the application 
of the dialectical analysis he employs41. In Gramsci’s work he describes ‘the 
theory of the “dual perspective”’ (Gramsci, 1971: 170). Thus, building on 
‘Guicciardini’s assertion that two things are absolutely necessary for the life of 
a State: arms and religion’ (Gramsci, 1971: 170); Gramsci formulates this 
duality in other forms such as force and consent, coercion and persuasion, 
political society and civil society, violence and fraud. These dualities are not 
rigid but are context (socio-historical and economic) specific42 and furthermore 
are dynamic and have emergent powers, out of which a contestation develops 
between each and the context they operate within43.   
                                            
41
 See chapter 4 for further exploration of this approach. 
42
 ‘These observations must not be conceived of as rigid schemata, but merely as practical 
criteria of historical and political interpretation. In concrete analyses of real events, the 
historical forms are individualised and can almost be called unique’ (Gramsci, 1971: 217). 
43
 ‘The separation of powers ... is a product of the struggle between civil society and political 
society in a specific historical period’ (Gramsci, 1971: 245). 
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This approach is applied below to the revived use of civil society in neoliberal 
times. The basic idea here is that neoliberal policies have sought to deploy and 
utilise civil society as part of the greater neoliberalisation process of society as 
a whole. However, this has caused a reaction and contestation among some 
elements of civil society; while other elements have sought compromise and/or 
co-option. This is achieved because the term civil society has become a catch-
all phrase whose only characteristic is that it is not the state (Sader, 2002). 
Thus, the Commission for Africa was able to state: 
The organization of civil society – trade associations, framer organizations, business 
groups, trade unions, development agencies, women’s organizations, faith groups and 
community groups – all have a role to play in ensuring that those in charge truly reflect 
what the various sections of society want. 
(Commission for Africa, 2005: 35) 
This formulation, conforming to a pluralist view of civil society, raises the 
danger of being co-opted and deployed in the service of private capital. Any 
radical intent is diminished and excluded. This can also be seen in the 
accounting literature, where Gray et al. (2006), highlight that civil society is 
defined by what it is not; so that civil society ‘… is that which exists between 
other elements of our social world and hence, civil society is defined by what it 
is not’ (Gray et al., 2006: 322). Further, they extend Hegel’s position by taking 
into account the increased role of the market in the neo-liberal age and 
conclude that civil society lies between the market, the family and the state 
(Gray et al., 2006). Thus, reflecting the pluralism and opposition to the state of 
the neoliberal formulations.  
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In contrast, the above list of what constitutes civil society, besides being vague 
enough to become virtually useless as a conceptual tool, also ‘... masks the 
class nature of its components – multinational corporations, banks and mafia, 
set next to social movements, trade unions, civic bodies – while collectively 
demonizing the state’ (Sader, 2002: 93). These reasons alone raise significant 
difficulties in using the term civil society, but are there are further problems. 
Despite these conceptual difficulties the term civil society is welcomed by 
elements at both ends of the political spectrum. For example, organised labour 
is depoliticised in the neoliberal version of civil society, by being re-
conceptualised as human capital (Sinha, 2005: 167). Further, while civil 
society is granted a role in holding the state to account, not all development 
agencies (NGOs) approach the issue in the same way. Some NGOs work with 
neoliberal institutions (such as Oxfam and the World Bank); others seek 
greater transparency such as Bretton Woods Watch. However, Sinha (2005) 
points out that civil society can also be organised through NGOs and social 
movements to challenge the neoliberal policies and actions of the state, 
locally, nationally and globally. This point was illustrated in the earlier 
discussions of civil and social accountability earlier. 
Third, this process is not limited to developing economies or the politics of 
development aid. The past decade has seen a growth in the NGO and 
voluntary sector in industrial democracies. For example, before the Big Society 
ideology, New Labour had presided over huge increase in charities and not-
for-profit organisations providing public services. By 2005, ‘the third sector 
already provide[d] over 40 percent of personal social care, and 37 percent of 
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charities’ funding comes via the state (via contracts for service delivery)’ 
(Lavalette and Ferguson, 2007: 455). In these circumstances, the NGO/Third 
sector is not a neutral alternative to state provision of services but is ‘... part of 
the privatization of the world. The business of governments is privatized and 
now the NGOs are responsible to no one except the funders’ (Neale: 2002: 
41). 
Lavalette and Ferguson (2007) advise radical researchers and others, to take 
care when utilising the term civil society. There is however, an alternative 
conception that draws on Marx’s work and reflects the duality in civil society of 
both exploitation and resistance. As shown in section 2 others have studied 
the actions of civil society groups in a variety of circumstances in the 
developing world (Newell and Wheeler, 2006; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz, 2002; 
Stanley, 2005).  Harvey (2005) argues that the main source of collective 
opposition to neoliberal policies has been expressed through various advocacy 
groups dealing with issues such as consumer rights, environmental politics, 
anti-debt campaigners and single-issue organisations.  Therefore, it can be 
argued there has been a change in the form of the relationship between civil 
society and the state:  ‘The Gramscian idea of the state as a unity of political 
and civil society gives way to the idea of civil society as a centre of opposition 
… to the state’ (Harvey, 2005: 78). Here Harvey is half right. As already shown 
Gramsci’s conceptualisation of the relationship between the state and civil 
society is more complex than a simple unity with “political society”. His 
conceptualisations are derived from analysing the dynamic and context 
specific relations between the two. Harvey (2005), Sinha (2005) and Lavalette 
and Ferguson (2007) reflect this analytical approach in their conceptualisations 
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of civil society which is now a contradictory category containing social 
structures that both seek to extend the neoliberalisation project and those that 
seek to challenge the neoliberal agenda.  
It is this notion of civil society as a contradictory totality which contains 
oppositional forces to the state that is utilised in this research project. 
Research objective b) seeks to account for how the neoliberalisation process 
has generated opposition and resistance. It was argued above that this 
opposition and resistance can be theorised, with care, as located in civil 
society. The next section looks in more detail at the nature of the relationship 
between civil society and the state. 
4.3 Dynamic relationship 
As noted above there is an on-going dynamic and dialectical relationship 
between civil society and the state. Bourgeois history puts this down to the 
actions of great leaders. For example, Gladstone’s introduction of the 1867 
Reform Act; completely ignoring the actions of the thousands who fought the 
police for three days. The current period is marked by a struggle over where 
the line between the state and the market should be drawn. The neoliberal age 
inherited a welfare state that embodied collective solidarity to ensure certain 
minimum living conditions (MacGregor, 2005)44. The neoliberal project has 
sought to roll-back that collective solidarity and (when that stalled) to 
restructure the state and embed marketisation policies at all levels. However, 
                                            
44
 ‘It was thought that to bring about a full welfare state, governments would need to 
emphasise education as a key social service, accept responsibility for ensuring full 
employment and pursue policies of economic growth and redistribution of income from rich to 
poor’ (MacGregor, 2005: 142). 
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there has been resistance to these processes (see for example Cooper et al., 
2010). Peck (2010) in attempting to assess the impact and legacy of 
neoliberalism identifies resistance to its policies in the form of new social 
movements as one of the enduring elements. Further, ‘... the long history of 
social struggles and institutional  transformations ... have marked 
neoliberalism’s uneven ascendency, consolidation, and crisis-driven adaption 
– including those around privatization, public austerity measures and welfare 
retrenchment ...’ (Peck et al., 2009: 104).  
This raises the question of where to locate this resistance theoretically. Some 
on the left, as the old left has retreated and the neoliberal onslaught seemed 
all powerful (Sader, 2002), have theorised a role for civil society in opposing 
neoliberalisation. However, civil society is not a neutral or independent 
bystander in this process, as argued above. In these circumstances, different 
actors within civil society face a choice between forms of co-option, co-
operation and compromise, or resistance.  It is the latter that forms the central 
element of the conceptual framework for this thesis. The resistance of social 
movements within civil society has an impact on the dynamic relationship and 
can be justified based on three lines of argument.  
First, from the historical analysis above the conceptions of accountability 
differed in ancient Athens to Norman England. Further since the time of 
the English civil war the question of universal suffrage and democratic 
control over the government has been central to public accountability. 
However, the granting of universal suffrage for all adults in the early 
twentieth century did not see an end or even settling of the issues 
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around democratic control. For example, the neoliberal age has seen a 
changing and restricting of the government by democratic means. Tony 
Benn contrasts the gains made by civil society social movements, following the 
expansion of the franchise in the 19th and early 20th centuries to the restrictions 
carried out in the neoliberal age. The vote enabled democratic control over 
basic social goods such as housing, education and health. This contrasts with 
the neoliberal reforms and its: 
‘Free trade, the level playing field, limits on public expenditure and a host of other new 
laws  have produced a shift of power in the opposite direction, since privatisation moves 
power from the polling station to the marketplace, from the ballot to the wallet.’ 
(Benn, 2006) 
Thus, the relationship between the state and civil society is changing 
and dynamic.  
Second, neoliberalism has its own approach towards accountability, 
something that neoliberal reforms are supposed to enhance (Lavalette 
and Ferguson, 2007; Sinha, 2005). ‘Neoliberals grant a role to civil 
society in holding the state accountable for growth and service provision. 
But forms of civil society offer an alternative politics of accountability’ 
(Sinha, 2005:167). Here Sinha (2005) is referring to a twofold process 
where, firstly the ideas of accountability are being turned around and 
applied to the neoliberal institutions advancing them (for example the 
anti-capitalist movement targeting the WTO and G8 meetings); and 
secondly, the growth of democratising policies such as participatory 
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budgeting in Porto Alegre (Wainwright, 2003). The previous section 
identified other examples of this process with the formulations of civil 
and social accountability.  
Third, in line with a critical realist approach and based on the concepts of a 
stratified social world with emergent properties45 (the base/superstructure 
distinction in Marxist terms), each PA relationship will vary depending upon 
social, political and economic influences at various levels – international, 
national state, organisational and individual.  Moreover, these levels and 
relations are in a constant state of flux resulting in constant changes 
(sometimes subtle, others revolutionary; sometimes hidden, others open). This 
conception of a dynamic relationship stands in opposition to the hierarchical 
static relations envisaged in functionalist accountability and the internalised 
voice relations that interpretivist accountability relies on. It also moves beyond 
the upward/downward distinction that has come to the fore in NGO 
accountability recently. The dynamic relationship envisaged here could be 
seen as a form of accountability from below, in the sense that it is 
accountability running in the opposite direction to the downward accountability. 
For example Agyemang et al. (2009) start from the NGO and argue for a 
downward accountability to the service users of the NGO. The conceptions in 
this thesis start with the service users and argues for an accountability from 
below; an accountability that comes from the service users. The difference 
between the two can be characterised as seeing service users as passive 
recipients of accountability (downward accountability) or active agents 
                                            
45
 See chapter 4 for more detail. 
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influencing the nature of accountability relations that involve them 
(accountability from below). 
5. Conclusion - a research framework 
From the above discussion, it is now possible to set out a research framework 
that addresses the research aims and objectives (see chapter 1). Figure 2 
below, starts with the triad introduced in chapter 1: neoliberalisation – 
reaction/contestation – reproduction or transformation (Neo – R/C – R or T). 
The first two elements are mapped to the earlier discussions of the state and 
civil society. First, the above discussion highlights the way the neoliberalisation 
of the state and public services have been theorised. Second, the literature on 
civil society was analysed and, while there are competing conceptions of both 
what civil society includes and what its role is, it was argued that it can been 
seen as site of resistance. Hence, figure 2 shows the neoliberalisation of the 
state and the reaction/contestation that is generated in civil society.  
The final element of the triad, reproduction/transformation of existing 
accountability relations, is largely absent from the existing literature on 
accountability in the accounting and public management disciplines. The 
theoretical roots of this element are instead provided by the history of 
accountability, highlighting the role ordinary people have played in fighting for 
democratic accountability forms; and in recent years in different parts of the 
world where social campaigns have been mobilised to hold those in power to 
account on a range of issues. This last point feeds back into the final part of 
the framework that of the dynamic relationship between the state and civil 
society in the arena of accountability. The changing nature of this relationship 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
101 | P a g e  
can be seen in the history of accountability with rulers holding their people to 
account, giving way to the people holding the powerful to account for their 
actions; or the moving boundary between the state and the private sector 
which can be seen in the debates about accountability at the end of the 1960s 
to the restructuring of state throughout the neoliberal age.  
 
Figure 2 – A triadic research framework for public accountability 




The State Civil Society History of accountability 
Social/Civil accountability 
   
Dynamic relationship  
 
Importantly, as will be illustrated in the case studies, human agency 
(specifically that of tenants and social movements) plays a central role in the 
dynamic relationship between civil society and the state. The above framework 
thus contains two triads. In addition to the Neo – R/C – R or T, there is a 
second triad containing the state, civil society and a dynamic relationship. This 
second triad are the building blocks for a new theorisation, Critical Public 
Accountability (Smyth, 2007; 2012). 
The framework developed can be distinguished from traditional approaches to 
accountability on four different levels. Firstly, there is the need to overcome 
reductionism. Traditional models of PA focus on the individual manager, 
sometimes in an organisational context. This framework sees these models of 
accountability as subsets of the broader state - civil society relationship. It will 
often be appropriate to analyse at the sub-set level but this needs to be 
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informed by and linked to higher levels of analysis. Another aspect of this 
reductionism comes in the conflation of accounting and auditing with 
accountability, which the framework rejects focusing instead on accountability 
as a form of control. Secondly, the framework is not prescriptive about the 
manner in which the dynamic relationship is formed (and re-formed). The 
relationship will depend on historical, political, social and economic factors 
relevant at that time. This means that each dynamic relationship will be unique 
whilst still having the key elements of a relationship, an exchange, control and 
being public (Bovens, 1998; 2005). However, it is a central element of this 
thesis that to get a full understanding of the nature of public accountability 
relations it must include the actions of services users. In this respect the 
dynamic relationship has to include accountability from below. Thirdly, the 
control element (i.e. “reward or sanction”, “praise or blame”) is an essential 
characteristic. While traditional PA models recognise a role for “reward or 
sanction” too often it is not just abstracted but un-exercisable. For this 
framework the exercising of the control element must be viable; if this is not the 
case then it is not an accountability relationship.  Finally, this framework 
utilises a different set of philosophical and methodological tools46, which 
emphasise the interaction between structure and agency, recognise social 
reality as a stratified emergent totality with a role for theory building to explain 
causation. It is here that the inclusion of the tenants’ perspective and seeing 
the tenants as active agents in making, remaking and exercising accountability 
relations is crucial. 
                                            
46
 See chapter 4 for more details. 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
103 | P a g e  
This chapter has provided the heavy-lifting in developing a research framework 
that will enable a coherent approach to addressing the research aims of 
showing how accountability relations are made, re-made and exercise, and 
conceptualising this process. The first section searched for ideas on which to 
base an alternative approach to accountability relations including a historical 
analysis of the “awful idea” of accountability. This history showed firstly the 
changing and dynamic nature of accountability relations; which at times saw 
the powerful holding the people to account (top-down accountability) and at 
other times the people holding those in power to account (accountability from 
below). The search for alternative ideas also reached into other disciplines in 
particular development studies, with the formulations of civil and social 
accountability. 
The fourth section developed an alternative research framework for analysing 
accountability relations in the public sector. This required a detailed 
elaboration of the reforms and restructuring that neoliberalism has pursued 
with regard to both the state and civil society. The state is conceptualised as 
an expression of the class forces in society; and is needed to maintain social 
relations that allow for the accumulation of capital. Three different theorisations 
of the neoliberalisation process were analysed (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006; 
Harvey, 2005; Whitfield, 2006) and synthesised to provide a robust basis on 
which to explain the changes in public services (e.g. housing and education). 
The conceptions of civil society were then interrogated and critiqued. Although 
the term has become ubiquitous and deployed as an agent for privatisation, it 
is also theorised as a site of resistance to neoliberal reforms. This provides the 
basis for conceptualising a dynamic relationship between civil society and the 
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state. One of the arenas in which this dynamism and contestation takes place 
is the nature of accountability relations – whether it is governance by experts 
and elites or democratic control through the ballot box.   
Based on the foregoing a research framework was developed that if coupled 
with sufficient, relevant and reliable evidence will illustrate how accountability 
relations are made, re-made and exercised in the public services.  The next 
chapter addresses the research design for operationalising this framework, 
linking it to the research aims and objectives set out in chapter 1 along with a 
detailed exposition of how the data for the case studies was collected and 
analysed. In the process, the journey of accountability along the path indicated 
earlier from the ancient Athenians to the current housing campaigners is 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND 
METHODOLOGY 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to explain and justify the research design, including 
the theoretical framework and methodological tools, used in this thesis. This 
chapter analyses relevant philosophical debates, familiarises the reader with 
how the research was carried out and develops a theoretical framework to 
complement the triadic research framework developed in the previous chapter. 
The chapter is structured as follows; section 2 explores the philosophical 
debates concerning the theory of knowledge, theory of society and theory of 
language utilised; this is achieved by integrating a critical realist epistemology 
with classical Marxist historical materialism and a materialist dialogical theory 
to provide the theoretical foundations on which the operational research design 
is built. Critical realism (CR) is a theory of science and dialogics a theory of 
language. These are both topics that Marx spent little time analysing or 
exploring, leading to the need to integrate these theories within an overall 
classical Marxist historical materialist framework. In this context Bhaskar’s 
claim that one of the pre-suppositions of critical realism is as an under-
labouring task (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003) is relevant. This is followed (in 
section 3) by an elaboration of the research aims, objectives, framework and 
data analysis themes. 
Stewart Smyth 
106 | P a g e  
 
Section 4 outlines the methods, tools and instruments used in the research 
design. It provides the rationale for the use of a comparative case studies 
research design including the appropriateness of case study research, the 
reasoning behind the selection of the cases, the nature and relevance of the 
data collected and how it was analysed and written-up. This is followed by a 
consideration of research ethics and the limitations of the research design. 
This chapter should also be considered in conjunction with the reflexive 
account of pursuing the research design, which considers the difficulties and 
serendipity involved, set out in appendix 5. 
2. Theoretical framework 
This thesis develops a theoretical framework which is rooted in the classical 
Marxist tradition (Callinicos, 1983, 1987, 2006; Rees, 1998), while also 
seeking to extend such a Marxist understanding by interweaving critical realist 
(Ackroyd, 2009; Bhaskar, 1989; Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003; Fleetwood, 
2004; Reed, 2005) and dialogical (Bakhtin, 1981; Barker, 2006; Joseph and 
Roberts, 2004a; Roberts, 2004, Sullivan, 2012; Vice, 1997) ideas. This 
development takes place over three terrains. First, there is a review of the 
current literature on the broad links between the three sets of ideas, with the 
aim of identifying commonalities. Second, building on the previous, there is an 
exposition and integration of the specific elements adopted. Therefore, the 
views of commentators on the commonality of the three theories, is followed by 
an account of how the theories themselves have been interwoven for this 
thesis.  
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
107 | P a g e  
The third section develops the application of this theoretical framework to two 
key issues in social science research – the structure and agency dilemma and, 
the role of theory. While these are important issues in all social science 
research they are particularly important in the case studies below that seek to 
explore the interaction between public service providers and users in how 
accountability relations are made, remade and exercised (requiring an 
understanding of structure and agency). While development of a 
comprehensive theory is not a research aim, the development of a framework 
in which to analyse these interactions requires an understanding of theory and 
how it can be developed. 
2.1 Integrating historical materialism, critical realism and dialogics 
Marx will be remembered not primarily as a philosopher but as the founder of a 
research programme ... a research programme which we call historical materialism. 
(Roy Bhaskar in Bhaskar and Callinicos, 2003: 101) 
Taking classical Marxism as the starting point, there are debates about its 
relationship to critical realism. These debates centre on whether Marxism 
requires a full-blown philosophy of science (Brown et al., 2002) with Creaven, 
and others, arguing that this role can be fulfilled by critical realism (Creaven, 
2002; Joseph, 2002). Marxism is a theory of society; whereas, critical realism 
is a theory of science encapsulating the object of social science, human 
society. Joseph (2002) argues critical realism is related to but comes from 
outside of Marxism. At a time when grand-narrative based theories (such as 
Marxism) have been under attack from post-structuralist and post-modernist 
thinking, ‘Critical realist philosophy can help us engage in a process of re-
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thinking Marxism without having to re-think it in a post-Marxist way’ (Joseph, 
2002: 23). CR seeks to clear out some of the thorny undergrowth that all 
scientific research must address, either explicitly or implicitly, and as such 
needs to be used in conjunction with other theories of specific phenomena; in 
this case a Marxist theory of capitalist society. Equally, this under-labouring 
task can be used to bolster a Marxist analysis of social phenomena.  Below the 
links and utilisations of critical realist philosophical tools and ideas are related 
to classical Marxism particularly with regard to the structure/agency debate. 
Beforehand, there is a brief outlining of commentators views on the 
commonality between critical realism, dialogics and classical Marxism. 
Fairclough et al. point out that ‘... critical realism qua philosophy does not entail 
commitments to any particular substantive social or psychological theory,’   
(Fairclough et al. 2004: 24) or any theory of language. It is therefore not only 
possible but necessary to link a theory of language to critical realism. The 
reading of Bakhtin’s (1981) (and the Bakhtin circle’s47) writing on the dialogical 
nature of language adopted in this thesis identifies a materialist current that is 
consistent with Marx’s dialectical historical materialism. Dialogical theory is 
explored in detail below and states that language is tension-filled with 
competing meanings which are produced by concrete social forces (Bakhtin, 
1981).  
In what follows it is argued that the dialogics of the Bakhtin circle can be read 
in a manner that is consistent with both critical realism and classical Marxism.  
                                            
47
 The Bakhtin circle is a term used to describe a group of intellectuals in post-revolutionary 
Russia who wrote on literary criticism and language among other topics. The members 
included Bakhtin, Volosinov and Medvedev (Sullivan, 2012).  
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The inter-linkages between Marxism and dialogics revolve around a debate 
over the disputed authorship of certain texts48, mainly between Bakhtin on the 
one side, and Volosinov and Medvedev on the other. First, there is some 
debate as to whether Bakhtin and Volosinov was the same person (Holborow, 
1999). It is most likely that they were two individuals, both part of intellectual 
circles in Nevel, Vitebsk and Leningrad between 1924 and 1929. Volosinov 
“disappeared” sometime in 1934 during Stalin’s purges and Bakhtin never 
officially denied or accepted that he wrote the texts ascribed to Volosinov 
(Holborow, 1999).  
Second, Vice sets out in detail what the implications are of this authorship 
debate: ‘... opinion on the authorship debate generally line up with particular 
views on Bakhtin’s Marxist leanings’ (Vice, 1997: 8). For Vice (1997) there are 
three positions. Bakhtin’s Marxism is either a case of window-dressing, a 
genuine element or an open mind should be kept on the issue. This is not the 
place for a detailed discussion of each position but it should be noted that one 
of Vice’s arguments is that Bakhtin’s dialogics are compatible with Marxism; a 
point also endorsed by Sullivan (2012). In contrast to mono-logical approaches 
to the issue, Roberts (2004) seeks to resolve the debate by applying dialogical 
ideas to the texts of Bakhtin, Volosinov and Medvedev49. Roberts (2004) 
identifies elements of weak social constructionism, critical realism and Marxism 
in the texts, before stating that ‘... I believe that Marxist materialism, 
encompassing a form of realism, is a more satisfactory way of exploring the 
                                            
48
 Vice (1997) states the texts in question are Freudianism and Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language ascribed to Volosinov and The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship ascribed to 
Bakhtin and Medvedev. 
49
 ‘Those who attempt to derive one ‘true’ Bakhtin Circle operate in a very non-Bakhtinian 
manner’ Roberts (2004: 108). 
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discourse theory developed by the Bakhtin Circle’ (Roberts, 2004: 90). 
Following in the spirit of Roberts’ work the term used in the remainder of this 
thesis is the Bakhtin Circle with reference to the development of dialogical 
terms and concepts. 
This short introductory sub-section seeks to demonstrate, on a theoretical 
level, how the three theories used in the research design are compatible and 
can be integrated into a coherent theoretical framework, with the objective of 
analysing how accountability relations are made, re-made and exercised in the 
public services. The next two sub-sections apply these ideas and theories to 
the practical task of collecting and analysing the data in the rest of the thesis. 
Sub-section 2.2, sets out which elements of classical Marxism, critical realism 
and materialist dialogics are emphasised and utilised in the remainder of the 
thesis. The following sub-section (2.3) looks at two specific issues that social 
science research must address; the structure/agency debate and the role of 
theory generation using a qualitative research design.    
2.2 Links in this thesis  
The theoretical framework draws on the application of classical Marxism, 
critical realism and dialogics to specific issues. For example, the previous 
chapter has already critiqued neoliberalism and the relationship between the 
state and civil society, from a classical Marxist perspective. For clarity a list of 
these elements across the three theoretical perspectives is provided:  
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 Critical realism: 
o Stratified, emergent reality; 
o Generative mechanisms; 
o Structure/Agency; 
o Role of theory. 
 Classical Marxism: 
o Historical materialism – the Marxist dialectic; 
o Critique of neoliberalism (as a class project); 
o The State/Civil Society (as a manifestation of class struggle). 
 Materialist dialogics: 
o Heteroglossia – language is situated in a stratified social reality; 
o Utterance – an episode of language that is stratified, with a 
contested meaning. 
It was alluded to above and is argued below that there is a common root to 
these theoretical perspectives, that of Marxist historical materialism with its use 
of the dialectic.  
Central to historical materialism is the philosophical tool of the dialectic. 
Dialectical thought has its roots in the ancient Athens (Rees, 1998); however, 
its modern form emerges from German philosophy following the 
Enlightenment. While Hegel had developed a dialectic that was based on 
idealism, it was Marx and Engels who took Hegel’s ideas and applied them in 
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a materialist (realist) manner, by turning the dialectic the right side up and 
making humanity the centre of the historical process. As part of this process, 
Marx and Engels re-worked Hegel’s categories of the dialectic. Rees (1998) 
summarises the new categories: ‘this then is the general form of the dialectic: it 
is an internally contradictory totality in a constant process of change … [where] 
[t]he part and the whole mutually condition or mediate each other’ (Rees, 
1998:7)50. Totality holds that individual phenomena (parts) do not stand alone 
but are inter-related and influenced by other phenomena that ultimately make 
up the whole. Change, counters static, ahistorical explanations of reality by 
holding that being is in a constant state of change, irrespective of whether that 
change is perceptible at any one moment in time. Contradiction is the motor 
that drives Change, where two opposing entities are held in a symbiotic 
(opposite but related) relationship, which once realised creates a new 
contradiction. Mediation holds that the parts and the whole will interact but the 
specifics of that inter-relationship will vary at each historical moment 
depending on concrete empirical, social, political and economic conditions 
prevailing at that moment. By applying this approach to an analysis of capitalist 
society Marx and Engels were able to identify the tensions and contradictions 
in the commodity form of production, which leads to the symbiotic struggle 
between capital and labour. 
These elements of the Marxist dialectic are present in the critical realist 
conceptions of a stratified emergent (totality) reality (Bhaskar and Callinicos, 
                                            
50
 Cooper et al. (2005) also utilise Rees’ (1998) work – totality, change and contradiction – but 
do not explicitly refer to mediation. However, as is shown below mediation is an essential 
element of the dialectic when analysing multiple competing generative mechanisms and 
tendencies. 
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2003, Sayer, 2000).  This reality is not flat or static but is stratified with surface 
level phenomena emerging from deeper generative mechanisms and levels 
(Sayer, 2000). Thus, the search for and account of generative mechanisms is 
central to critical realism.  At its simplest ‘A generative mechanism is nothing 
other than the way of acting of a thing’ (Bhaskar, 2008: 51). This description 
needs to be placed in the context of the other elements of critical realist 
ontology, particularly structure and emergence. So Bhaskar expands:  
The world consists of mechanisms not events. Such mechanisms combine to generate 
the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states and happenings of the world. 
They may be said to be real, though it is rarely that they are actually manifest and rarer 
still that they are empirically identified by men. They are the intransitive objects of 
scientific theory. They are quite independent of men--as thinkers, causal agents and 
perceivers. They are not unknowable, although knowledge of them depends upon a rare 
blending of intellectual, practico-technical and perceptual skills. They are not artificial 
constructs. But neither are they Platonic forms. For they can become manifest to men in 
experience. Thus we are not imprisoned in caves, either of our own or of nature's 
making. We are not doomed to ignorance. But neither are we spontaneously free. This 
is the arduous task of science: the production of the knowledge of those enduring and 
continually active mechanisms of nature that produce the phenomena of our world.  
(Bhaskar, 2008: 47)51  
This lengthy quote contains a number of key points. First, the stratified realist 
ontology where generative mechanisms operate is the domain of the real; 
generative mechanisms produce events (objects) in the actual world that we 
                                            
51
 Although Bhaskar is referring here to the real world his basic conceptions can also be 
applied to the social world which is covered in his development of the Transformational Model 
of Social Activity (TMSA) – see section 2.3. 
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then perceive (empirical domain). In contrast to other 
philosophical/theoretical/practice schools, ‘Critical Realism challenges the 
“ontological determinism” of orthodox positivism/functionalism and the 
“ontological conflationism” of heterodox constructivism/interpretivism …’ 
(Reed, 2009: 58). The real (and social) world is stratified and thus has depth 
(Sayer, 2000); as opposed to a reality that is flat, which is pre-supposed by 
empiricists in their search for Humean constant-conjunctures (Manicas, 1993). 
Ontological depth occurs where the surface level appearances (the empirical) 
are the products of the interaction of deeper generative mechanisms and 
structures (Reed, 2009). In other words by advancing ontological depth and a 
stratified social reality emergence plays a central explanatory role (Llewellyn, 
2003; Reed, 2009). Thus, Bhaskar (2008) argues that reality has three levels. 
The empirical covers our experiences of reality but our experiences pre-
suppose the actual which covers the events that occur. However these events 
are the results of deeper mechanisms at the level of the real. Of crucial 
importance here is the idea of emergence where the levels are inter-related 
but not reducible to each other.  
Second, one of the strongest elements of CR’s critique of positivist-inspired 
research is the misplaced emphasis on finding regularities as evidence of the 
way the world works (Fleetwood, 2004; Sayer, 2004). As Sayer (2004: 11) 
states ‘While regularities maybe interesting and sometimes helpful for making 
observations, they are not essentially related to causation. What makes things 
happen has nothing to do with whether social scientists have plenty of regular 
instances to observe and quantify’. In its place critical realists advance 
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ontological depth and generative mechanisms as a preferable explanation. 
However, generative mechanisms are not singular but plural. Furthermore, 
they ‘... interact with each other, and in so acting affect each other’s operation 
... there is no a priori answer to the questions of whether any given mechanism 
will actually operate, either at all or purely’ (Callinicos, 2006: 162). These 
conceptualisations of emergence and plurality of generative mechanisms fit 
with a classical Marxist conception of the base and superstructure argument 
(Catchpowle and Cooper, 1999; Catchpowle et al., 2004; Harman, 1998): 
Political, juridical, philosophical, religious, literary, artistic etc. development is based on 
economic development. But these all react on one another and also upon the economic 
basis. It is not that the economic situation is cause, solely active, while everything else 
is only passive effect. There is rather interaction on the basis of economic necessity 
which ultimately always asserts itself. 
(Engels, quoted in Harman, 1998: 11-12) 
As was argued in chapter 3, to conceptualise any state form as a mechanical 
deterministic outcome of a certain set of economic relations, is inappropriate 
and crude.  Applying the Marxist dialectic gives a much more sophisticated, 
contingent understanding of differing and changing formations of the capitalist 
state. 
Third, sitting alongside this pluralism is the contingent nature of the 
interactions between generative mechanisms and contexts, structures and 
agents. Thus,  
Causal powers are dependent on the nature of objects or structures of which they are 
properties ... it is contingent whether they are exercised at any particular time or place.  
 (Sayer, 2004: 11)  
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Critical realist research emphases the accurate description of generative 
mechanisms and the contexts they operate within. Mechanisms have causal 
powers but the exercising of those powers depends on the context and other 
mechanisms (i.e. the powers are transfactual) (Ackroyd, 2009). So the 
phenomena, observed at the level of the empirical, are contingent on deeper 
(directly) unobservable generative mechanisms and contexts. The ideas of 
contingency, plurality and emergence lead to a (social) reality that is in the 
process of changing (change and contradiction) (Joseph, 2002). Thus, 
Creaven quotes Engels on emergence and change: 
The great basic thought is that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of 
ready-made things, but as a complex of processes, in which the things apparently 
stable ... go through an uninterrupted process of becoming and passing away ... For 
dialectical philosophy nothing is final, absolute, sacred. 
 (Engels, quoted in Creaven, 2002: 146)  
For further clarity, mechanisms are not events. As Callinicos (2006: 167) 
states: ‘For one thing, mechanisms and events are different kinds of being: in 
what way, for example, does a falling leaf resemble gravitation?’ It is also 
possible to see the influence of Marx in the critical realist conception of 
tendencies; for example, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall (Joseph, 
2002).These tendencies are however, mediated by counter-veiling tendencies 
and conditions, so that the rate of profit can be maintained or increased by 
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extending the working day without an equivalent increase in workers’ pay 
(Fleetwood, 2012)52.   
This leads Brown et al. (2002: 7) to summarise, ‘It appears that the term 
mechanism is a label we apply to the ensemble of structures, powers and 
relations. Once a specific set of intrinsic structures combine to form an entity 
with a power, and this entity enters into appropriate relations with other 
entities, the power is triggered and becomes an exercised power’.  
In summary, in contrast to the empiricist scientific method with its foundation 
on the search for constant conjunctures (Manicas, 1993), the key task of any 
Marxist or critical realist influenced research is to look for explanations and 
analyse phenomena beyond their surface appearance (i.e. to identify and 
account for generative mechanisms). As Ehrbar states: ‘The core-surface 
distinction can be located in the intersection of critical realism and historical 
materialism’ Ehrbar (2002: 47). This is only possible because both critical 
realists and Marxists advance the idea of ontological depth (Bhaskar, 2008).  
Ontological depth occurs where the surface level appearances (the empirical) 
are the products of the interaction of deeper generative mechanisms and 
structures (Reed, 2009). In other words by advancing ontological depth and a 
stratified social reality, emergence plays a central explanatory role (Llewellyn, 
2003; Reed, 2009).  
Turning to dialogics, it is possible to see the Marxist dialectic in the concepts of 
heteroglossia and utterance; the elements of totality, change, contestation and 
mediation are all essential to understanding the dialogics of the Bakhtin Circle. 
                                            
52
 Although it should be noted there is often an ambiguity regarding the exact nature of a 
tendency in both Marxist (Fleetwood, 2012) and critical realist thought (Brown et al. 2002). 
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For example, Bakhtin (1981) advances a model that is based on a view of 
language as tension-filled and stratified, interacting with the concrete socio-
historical environment (heteroglossia53). Heteroglossia: 
Represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present 
and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between differing socio-ideological 
groups in the present, between tendencies, schools, circles and so forth, all given a 
bodily form. 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 291) 
Here is an example of the influence of the Marxist method on Bakhtin’s work, 
with the emphasis on contradiction, opposing social forces and change over 
differing time periods. Bakhtin’s analysis goes further.  
First, language is stratified by real concrete social forces54; for example, the 
manner in which the term “civil society” is used by advocates and opponents of 
neoliberalism and globalisation (Lavallette and Ferguson, 2007). Second, an 
episode of language – an utterance – enters into a dialogised heteroglossia so 
that it does not relate to its object in a simple single manner but interacts with a 
changing environment of alien words and themes about the same object. An 
example of this is the term an “unqualified audit report”. The use of the word 
“unqualified” in this context is contrary to the common understanding of lacking 
in qualifications or measures of quality. In addition, once this (mis-)perception 
is explained a second level of issues arise over what an unqualified report 
                                            
53
 Bakhtin’s term to describe the base condition of language ‘… which insures the primacy of 
context over text’ (Bakhtin, 1981: 428). 
54
 “At any given moment … language is stratified not only into linguistic dialects in the strict 
sense of the word … but also … into languages that are socio-ideological: languages of social 
groups, “professional” and “generic” languages, languages of generations and so forth” 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 271-2). 
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signifies with the audit profession restricting its meaning to an opinion based 
on examinations and tests that the financial statements are materially correct 
but not necessarily free of fraud. These restrictions again contrast with 
common perceptions that it is the auditors’ responsibility to find fraud and the 
financial statements are accurate and provide a truthful representation. The 
differences in these perceptions, known as the “expectations gap”, reflect a 
strategy employed by the auditing profession to defend its social position 
following cases of audit failure (Sikka et al., 1998). Barker (2006) carries out a 
similar dialogical analysis on the phrase “care in the community”. 
Third, the foregoing leads to both centrifugal (separating) and centripetal 
(unifying) forces at work in any utterance. Centripetal forces seek to unify a 
single meaning for the utterance, to make it mono-logic; whereas, the 
centrifugal forces counter with multiple meanings, based on dialogised 
interactions. Thus, 
Every utterance participates in the “unitary language” (in its centripetal forces and 
tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the 
centrifugal, stratifying forces) … It is possible to give a concrete and detailed analysis of 
any utterance, once having exposed it as a contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of 
two embattled tendencies in the life of language. 
(Bakhtin, 1981: 272) 
Further, Roberts concludes that the ‘... materialist accents in the Bakhtin Circle 
suggest that discursive method must isolate a “contradictory unit” of analysis55 
                                            
55
 The contradictory unit of analysis adopted in this thesis is the utterance, which forms the 
basis of the data analysis. See below for further detail, particularly Sullivan’s (2012) key 
moments. 
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that contains an interconnected contradictory “developed whole” within itself’ 
(Roberts, 2004: 103). 
The relevance of the Bakhtin Circle’s work is to provide the link between those 
competing conceptions (of accountability) and real material (socio-economic 
and historical) circumstances (of a contested reform of council housing) which 
the utterances are formed in and interact with. Dialogics are compatible with 
the critical realist philosophy outlined above as both view social relations and 
language as contradictory, stratified totalities whose surface appearance is 
generated by underlying mechanisms and structures. In addition, both anchor 
their analysis in materialist ontologies. Finally, it is worth noting that critical 
realism and dialogics are also seen by some as being compatible (Joseph and 
Roberts, 2004b). For example, Roberts notes that the Bakhtin Circle ‘... would 
no doubt agree with the “early Bhaskar” ... that the natural and social world 
exists independently of human thought’ (Roberts, 2004: 99).  
In summary, this subsection has argued for an integration of the classical 
Marxist tradition with the use of critical realist and materialist dialogical 
theories. The two most important elements of which are the emphasis that 
critical realism places on the search for generative mechanisms and the 
dialogical conceptions of the utterance and heteroglossia. These elements are 
added to and complement the classical Marxist understanding of the state, civil 
society and the materialist dialectic, which provides the theoretical 
underpinning of the triadic research framework developed in the previous 
chapter. 
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2.3 Other issues 
This thesis includes two other theoretical elements covering the attitude 
towards structure and agency, and the role of theory in research. These 
elements are both drawn from critical realist ideas, but again the influence of 
the historical materialist method can be seen in them. An understanding of the 
relationship between structure and agency is necessary, as at its heart is the 
dialectical relationship between human action, underlying social structures and 
social change. In simplified terms, a continuum can be drawn between seeing 
human behaviour as being determined by an outside force – social structure, 
economic mechanisms, genes – and seeing behaviour as driven by individual 
free-will.  
The attitude of the researcher to the question of human behaviour, although 
rarely discussed openly, has profound implications for any research. 
Discussion of how human society is composed is often set up as an opposition 
between social structure and human agency. This opposition has led to a 
tradition ‘... for discussions of social structures to polarize between two 
unappetizing positions ...’ of normative functionalism or methodological 
individualism (Callinicos, 2006: 182). There have been attempts to reject this 
polarization most notably by Giddens and Bhaskar, and instead ‘... to 
conceptualize the mutual interdependence of structure and agency’ (Callinicos, 
2006: 183). This is explored below. 
Critical realists advance a complex and subtle understanding of the structure 
and agency relationship. It is not the case that the actions of human beings are 
determined by social structures; nor, can social structures be changed either 
by the actions of individuals or changing the language used; but to paraphrase 
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Marx, men (and women) make history but not under conditions of their 
choosing.  
Moreover, this understanding opens up the space for real change through the 
emancipatory potential of human action. Thus, Reed states: ‘It is this dynamic 
interplay between “structure” and “agency” that lies at the very intellectual core 
of critical realism’s explanatory quest’ (Reed, 2009: 69, emphasis in the 
original). Giddens’ Structuration theory has been criticised by critical realists 
(most notably Archer) and Marxists (such as Callinicos) for conflating structure 
and agency into one moment with ‘... the claim that structure and agency are 
mutually constitutive’ (Callinicos, 2006: 185). For this reason as argued below 
Giddens’ work has not been utilised in this thesis. 
Critical realists argue for the separation of social structures and individuals so 
that each can be analysed as part of understanding how they are related. 
Critical realists see society as relational; one that is stratified and as such 
irreducible to its atomistic components; society is made up of individuals but 
society is not just a sum total of the individuals in it.  Understanding the 
relational nature of society is a pre-requisite for understanding Bhaskar’s 
Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA) (see Figure 2 below). 
Bhaskar’s model developed in contrast to the two existing extremes of 
humanism and structuralism, both of which fail to adequately deal with the 
evidence and arguments proposed by the other. Archer (1995) identifies a 6-
point charter56 in Bhaskar’s work that is embedded in the TMSA: 
                                            
56
 Archer draws this charter from Bhaskar (1989: 25-6). 
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a) Societies are irreducible to people and a model is needed to sketch 
their connection; 
b) Social structures are necessary for any intentional act; 
c) Social structures pre-exist and are autonomous, thus allowing 
investigation; 
d) Social structures’ causal power establishes their reality; 
e) The pre-existence of social forms requires a transformational model of 
social activity, and 
f) The causal power of social structures is mediated through individual 
human agency. 
David L. Harvey (2002: 168) expands on the last point by stressing ‘the relative 
autonomy of the mediating processes’ between society and the individual. This 
is important to avoid the central conflationism of Giddens. 
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Figure 3 – ‘Bhaskar’s transformational model of the society/person 
connection’ as shown by Archer (1995) and Harvey (2002). 
Thus, the TMSA allows for society, the individual and the mediating processes 
to be separate for analytical purposes but recognises they are mutually 
ontologically dependent. Further, the dependency of these triads (society, 
individual and mediating processes) are ontologically irreducible moments 
(Harvey, 2002). Leading Bhaskar to state: 
Society is both the ever-present condition (material cause) and the continually 
reproduced outcome of human agency. And praxis is both work, that is conscious 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
125 | P a g e  
production, and (normally unconscious) reproduction of the conditions of production, 
that is society.  
(Bhaskar, 1989: 35, emphasis in the original) 
In this thesis it is posited that the nature of accountability relations are the 
outcome of contestation between different social forces; in the cases below, it 
is a clash between those who support stock transfer and those who oppose it. 
These individuals create time-limited social structures in the form of pro- and 
anti-transfer campaigns. This process has been described by Margaret Archer 
as accentuation, where ‘... groups, actuated by interests, making a 
contradiction competitive, by taking sides over it and by trying to make other 
people take their side’ (Archer, 1995: 239, emphasis in the original). It must be 
noted at this point that the TMSA needs to take account of collective agents 
not individual agents, as it is ‘... the relations between structures and collective 
agents’ (Joseph, 2002: 33) that is important.  The question remains, how social 
structures and individual humans actually interact in this relational conception 
of society and the TMSA. The key to understanding this is that for ‘... social 
science, the relations to be studied are those between ‘positioned-practices’ 
rather than between individuals ... For it is the relations between positioned-
practices that endure through changes in individual bearers’ (Collier, 1994: 
150). Social structures only become active when an individual enters into that 
social relation, at that point the structure becomes a generative mechanism 
and is thus observable (e.g.  forming a campaign to oppose a stock transfer).  
This does raise the issue of what motivates agents to act in specific ways, 
especially where the individual(s) involved seek to challenge or indeed 
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transform existing social structures (such as defending democratic 
accountability relations). The work of Margaret Archer (2003) provides an 
insight, with her conceptualisation of an internal conversation. Also described 
as the mediation of meditation, Archer argues that the reflexive thoughts of the 
individual act as an internal conversation, which ultimately acts as the 
mediating force between the agent and social structure. As Vandenberghe 
(2008) states: ‘It is this meditation of the ruminating self that constitutes the 
mediatory mechanism which links the causal powers of structure to agency’. 
Archer’s work at times slips into idealism where she allows a mediating role for 
an eternal being. In contrast, Marx sees consciousness, and that includes any 
internal conversation, as having materialist roots: 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness is at first directly interwoven 
with the material activity and the material intercourse of men ... Men are the producers 
of their conceptions ideas, etc.   
(Marx, 1998: 42) 
However, this is not a one way deterministic process, as consciousness is 
expressed in language, or to use Marx’s phrase “practical consciousness” 
(Marx, 1998); and Marx argues that language only develops out of the need for 
individuals to communicate with each other, ‘... for it [is] the consciousness not 
merely of a single individual but of the individual in his interconnection with the 
whole of society’ (Marx, 1998: 198). It is these materialist formulations that 
lead in the cases studies below, to a focus on the tenants and other activists, 
both their motivations and actions. 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
127 | P a g e  
Critical realists have an alternative conception of the role and development of 
theory. ‘Theory is a conjecture about the connectedness of events and the 
causal sequences produced by generative mechanisms’; this means 
‘something is explained if it is allocated a place at the end of a causal 
sequence’ (Ackroyd, 2004: 151). Here Ackroyd is expressing the core-surface 
distinction made earlier. It is shown in the case studies that the contestation of 
the stock transfer campaigns are the surface level appearance, and that the 
case studies seek to analyse and explain the generative mechanisms that 
cause that contestation.  
Llewellyn (2003) develops a five level framework (from Level one: metaphor 
theories to Level five: grand theorising) to illustrate theorising in qualitative 
management and accounting research. In the process she relies upon a range 
of critical realist ideas, including the importance and role of theory, and a 
critical realist attitude towards agency and emergence (Bhaskar, 1979; Sayer, 
2000). For Llewellyn (2003) theories are the “value-added” of academic 
research; theories are part of everyday life and the sense-making all humans 
do: ‘... theories reflect the contestation of meaning and significance in social 
and organizational life’ (Llewellyn, 2003: 664). However, the current 
approaches to theorising are too limited, with academics showing a preference 
for labelling level four and five theorisations as theories but not giving the 
same credit to level one to three theorisations. As a result: 
“what counts as theory” are currently, too narrow to conceptualize agency, emergence 
and change adequately in organization life and, hence, the full range of significant 
empirical phenomena that characterize the management and accounting areas are not 
being researched.  
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(Llewellyn, 2003: 662) 
The ideas of agency, emergence and change are important elements of the 
how case studies below have been developed.  
This alternative approach to theory requires alternative approaches to the logic 
of scientific discovery.  In positivist and social constructionist research 
deductive and inductive logic predominates, respectively. As critical realists 
reject the ontological foundations of positivism and social constructionism, an 
alternative logic of scientific discovery is required (Sayer, 2000). Instead critical 
realists aim to develop theories that accurately identify and explain generative 
mechanisms (Ackroyd, 2004), and therefore use retroductive and abductive 
logic. Retroductive logic seeks to identify the conditions that must be in place 
for the empirical to be the way it is. While abductive logic seeks to recast our 
understanding of a research object by ‘... the contestable postulation of ideas 
and concepts ...’ (Lawson, 2006: 30) developed through careful data analysis, 
conceptualisation and theorising (Sayer, 2004). The research aim for this 
thesis is to illustrate the manner in which accountability relations are made, re-
made and exercised through contestation by active human agents and in the 
process identify the generative mechanisms that cause this contestation. 
Therefore, the case studies below use a combination of retroductive and 
abductive logic.  
2.4 Summary 
Adopting a critical realist approach to research design and practice ‘…will need 
to combine abstract conceptualization, creative model building and detailed 
historical interpretation within a philosophical framework that is sensitive to the 
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“structure/agency” dilemma and its critical implications for social explanation’ 
(Reed, 2005: 1637). While the early elements of this quote are developed later 
in this thesis; the foregoing analysis has sought to develop a framework that is 
sensitive to the structure/agency dilemma by searching for and analysing 
generative mechanisms, utterances and heteroglossia. This all takes place 
within the historical materialist perspective of classical Marxism, where 
The first real premise of human existence, and therefore of all human history, the 
premise that men must be able to live in order to ‘make history’. But life involves before 
everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and various other things. The 
first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the 
production of material life itself  ... a fundamental condition of all human history which 
today as thousands of years ago must be daily and hourly fulfilled merely in order to 
sustain human life. 
Marx (1998: 47) 
From this historical materialist premise Marx develops his critique of political 
economy that includes the development of the forces and relations of 
production, accompanied by the rise of class society and the ensuing dynamic 
of class struggle. Emerging out of this analysis is the capitalist state and civil 
society, as analysed in the previous chapter. 
The discussion also seeks to illustrate the compatibility and influence of the 
Marxist method with the forms of critical realism and dialogics adopted here. 
The focus of this thesis is to show how accountability relations are made, re-
made and exercised by a) illustrating that accountability is a contested concept 
and, b) uncover the generative mechanisms that drive this contestation. In that 
respect, dialogics and in particular the analysis of the utterance is required. 
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However, the other elements of heteroglossia, structure and agency are 
necessary (in addition to the previous discussions of the state, civil society and 
neoliberalism) to adequately describe the generative mechanisms at work. 
This contestation and generative mechanisms are the focus of the case 
studies developed in chapters 6 to 8. The role of theory will be addressed 
again in the discussion/conclusion chapter. The next section briefly revisits the 
research aims and objectives and, links them to the themes (Braun and Clarke, 
2006: Thomas, 2011) used for data analysis in the case studies below. 
3. Research aims, objectives, framework and data themes 
There is some debate in academic circles over the best way to approach the 
formulation of a research problem. Saunders et al. (1997) argue that while 
researchers may start with a research question (or questions), this should be 
used as a stepping off point that allows more detailed research objectives. 
Objectives: 
Are more broadly acceptable to the research community as evidence of the 
researcher’s clear sense of purpose and direction ... We contend that research 
objectives are likely to lead to greater specificity than are research questions. 
Saunders et al. (1997: 23) 
Following Saunders et al. (1997), chapter 1 introduced this thesis’ two 
research aims and four research objectives; which in turn lead to the 
development of the triadic research framework at the end of the previous 
chapter. The two research aims are: 
1) To develop a framework that explores public accountability as a 
dynamic, complex and contested social process; 
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2) To analyse how accountability relations between public service 
providers and users are made, remade and exercised in the context of 
marketised and/or privatised provision. 
Table 2 below summarises how the research framework (of neoliberalisation – 
reaction/contestation – reproduction or transformation) is mapped onto the 
objectives. Further, for each element of the framework/objective the table also 
states the data themes57 that were used to analyse the case studies data. 
There is a column that references the relevant chapter in which the analysed 
data is provided for each framework element/research objective. The first three 
rows cover the evidence to address research aim 2) above; the last row 
contains the information to address research aim 1) above.  
The third column – Data analysis themes – contains the types of evidence 
sought for each of the elements of the triadic research framework. For the 
neoliberalisation (Neo) element evidence has already been identified in the 
previous chapter; for example accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2005), 
commodification (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006) and restructuring of services 
and service user accountability (Whitfield, 2006). For the reaction/contestation 
(R/C) element the data themes are drawn from a combination of the discussion 
in the previous chapter (e.g. role of tenants and campaign actions) and from 
the earlier discussion on dialogics (e.g. contested language). The reproduction 
or transformation (R or T) element of the framework has data themes looking 
at the post-ballot period including the result, the rent levels, board membership 
and improvements. The final research objective relies upon the analysis from 
                                            
57
 See section 4.4 below for a discussion on thematic analysis. 
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the previous data themes coupled with the role of theory as outlined earlier in 
this chapter. 
  
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
133 | P a g e  






Data analysis themes Chapters 
 
Neoliberalisation Objective: 
To explore and 
evaluate the impact 
of neoliberal 
market reforms on 





-Roll-back/roll-out of the state 
(use of finance) 
-Dispossession of council 
housing 
-Restructuring of service user 
accountability(governance by 

















and account for 
how these reforms 
have generated 
opposition/ 
resistance in the 
form of civil society 
campaigns. 
 
-Tenant-led civil society 
campaigns 
-Local state reactions 
(asymmetries of the process) 
-Contested language (‘an 
accountable landlord’) 
-Other civil society groups 
 
-Background 








To demonstrate the 
extent to which the 




contingent on the 
outcome of the 
contestation 
between neoliberal 






-Post-ballot board membership 



















insights into the 
workings of 
accountability 





-Use retroductive logic and CR 







134 | P a g e  
 
The next section delineates how the data, that makes-up the case studies, was 
collected and analysed. 
4. Data collection, analysis and presentation 
The aim of this section is to present and critique the research tools used to 
collect, analyse and present the data in the case studies. The research 
strategy adopted is one of comparative case studies (Thomas, 2011; Yin, 
2003a,b), which have been developed using data drawn from a range of 
sources including official government documents, campaign materials, 
newspaper cuttings and interviews. The data was analysed using the data 
themes outlined above and the cases developed through a layering approach 
where each document (piece of evidence) is considered and added to the draft 
case study.   
 Ackroyd (2009) outlines the range of possible research designs and related 
epistemological outcomes that flow from the earlier discussion. Critical realists 
are methodological pluralists. Thus, quantitative and qualitative data can be 
mixed and presented together in a case study if they first, address the problem 
at hand – the pragmatists’ approach (McEvoy and Richards, 2006); and more 
importantly second, can be sustained on the basis of the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions adopted (McEvoy and Richards, 2006).  
This thesis adopts a mixed method approach (with the use of qualitative and 
quantitative data, and primary and secondary data sources) with the aim of 
identifying and accounting for the generative mechanisms that cause the 
reaction/contestation and reproduction or transformation of accountability 
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relations. While critical realist research has a preference for case study design 
as it allows the in-depth study of causal mechanisms, Ackroyd (2009) sets out 
a continuum of research designs going from ‘intensive’ to ‘extensive’ forms of 
studies. Intensive studies seek to answer the question what is the generative 
mechanism? Whereas extensive studies address the question what is the 
context?  
Ackroyd (2009) argues that intensive studies are best approached using case 
studies or action research; while for extensive research studies 
surveys/census data and policy critique are most appropriate. Although a stark 
distinction between intensive and extensive studies is hard to maintain 
(generative mechanisms are not free-floating and therefore some 
understanding of context is always necessary). Broadly, the case studies 
below are intensive according to Ackroyd’s (2009) classification, focusing on 
explaining the generative mechanisms involved with making accountability 
relations contested in public services.  
This section expounds in detail the research strategy employed in this thesis. 
This includes a discussion of the appropriateness of using comparative case 
studies research design (section 4.1) and is followed by an account of the case 
selection and development (section 4.2). The next three subsections cover a 
discussion of the data – documents and interviews (4.3) – and analysis 
techniques (4.4) utilised. This section concludes with a consideration of ethics 
(4.5) and the limitations (4.6) of this research design. The limitations 
subsection signposts important issues that are considered further in the 
reflexive account, in appendix 5. 
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4.1 Comparative case studies research 
This sub-section outlines and critiques the strengths, weaknesses and 
misconceptions of (comparative) case study research.  
Yin defines case study research as:  
…a strategy for doing research, which involves an empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of 
evidence. 
 (Yin, quoted in Robson, 2002: 179) 
Expanding on this definition, for Yin (2003b) case study research is 
appropriate where the boundary between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident (i.e. the study is by nature an open system), where there are 
many variables of interest and where there are ‘benefits from the prior 
development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis’ 
(Yin, 2003b: 14).  
These definitional elements fit with the research task for this thesis of studying 
how the accountability relations are made, re-made and exercised in the public 
services. Thus the case studies below are built from data drawn from multiple 
sources, in multiple forms using both primary and secondary data. The case 
studies have more than one single interest point focussing on the search for 
generative mechanisms that cause reforms in public services and the reactions 
they generate in the form of social movements; all of which requires a 
significant degree of reliance on prior theorisations (see chapter 3).  
In the context of the accounting literature Cooper and Morgan argue that, 
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While recognizing the complementary nature of many research methods, we stress the 
benefits of case studies for understanding situations of uncertainty, instability, 
uniqueness and value conflict. 
(Cooper and Morgan, 2008: 159) 
Cooper and Morgan’s (2008) defence of case study research strategy includes 
that it ‘is an in-depth and contextually informed examination of specific 
organizations or events that explicitly address theory’ (2008: 160) and ‘case 
study research is extremely useful in raising questions, highlighting issues, 
developing and testing theory, and providing guidance in solving problems’ 
(2008: 161). Further, they draw on Starbuck’s (1993) work to suggest that it is 
the study of systems in flux rather than the search for general properties of all 
organisations or systems that gives the greatest insight. The local case studies 
below all seek to capture the organisation and provision of social housing in 
the process of change (moving to a transfer housing association) and/or 
contestation (by anti-transfer campaigns).  
As already noted it is intensive case studies (Ackroyd, 2009) that are adopted 
here with the emphasis on identifying and analysing particular generative 
mechanisms in multiple context; i.e. multiple, comparative case studies 
(Thomas, 2011). This approach has been described by Stake as when ‘... a 
number of cases may be studied jointly in order to investigate a phenomenon, 
population, or general condition. I call this a multiple case study or collective 
case study’ (Stake, 2005: 445). There is some discussion on what constitutes 
comparative case study research design with different emphasise on the focus 
of the comparison (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Thomas, 2011; Yin 2003b). If the 
focus is on the cases and their unique contexts, it is labelled a multiple-case 
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study, whereas ‘if the emphasis is on producing general findings, with little 
regard for the unique contexts of each ... [case study] ... it is better viewed as a 
cross-sectional design’ (Bryman and Bell, 2011: 63). 
To confuse matters further, comparative research design is often but not 
exclusively linked to multiple-case studies, leading further to research designs 
that focus on international and cross-cultural studies (Bryman and Bell, 2011). 
Many of these distinctions are not relevant or applicable to this thesis. For 
example the emphasis in the case studies is not on the differing cultural 
frames of the participants. Significantly, Bryman and Bell’s (2011) distinction 
between multiple-case study and cross-sectional design is not appropriate for 
the research objectives.  
However, it is both the unique contexts and the need to develop general 
findings from the case studies (see discussion below on generalisability) that 
are relevant. Thus, the case studies below seek to identify and analyse the 
generative mechanisms (neoliberalisation – reaction/contestation – 
reproduction or transformation) in three different cases58.  The aim of 
comparative case study research, in a critical realist view, is to develop 
accounts of patterns of generative mechanisms and their interactions; the use 
of different contexts is not based on the search for similarities, between the 
three cases.  
Case study research also has its critics. Thomas (2011) stresses a common 
perception that case studies, as they are focussed on a deep exploration of a 
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 In addition, the national context is incorporated into chapter 5 Background to the studies, 
effectively making a fourth case study. 
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single (or a limited amount) of cases cannot be vehicles for generalisations: 
‘Let’s start with what the case study is not good for. It’s not good for 
generalising from ...’ (Thomas, 2011: 17, emphasis in the original), and 
‘[r]emember (once again) that case studies can never form a sample from 
which you can generalise’ (Thomas, 2011: 141). In what would appear to be a 
contrasting position Yin (2003a, b) argues that the more individual case 
studies of a particular phenomenon are completed then generalisations can be 
made. Thus, ‘[e]ven if you can only do a “two-case” case study, your chances 
of doing a good case study will be better than using a single-case design ...’ 
which leads to ‘... immeasurably expanded the external generalizability of your 
findings’ (Yin, 2003b: 53). Yin’s (2003b) arguments are heavily influenced by 
positivism and the hypo-deductive scientific method with liberal use of the 
terms such as experiments, replications, propositions and hypothesis all seen 
as benchmarks that case study research should aspire to59. Even though these 
two positions may appear contradictory, lying behind both is the strong 
influence of the traditional hypo-deductive scientific method that dominates 
most mainstream business and management research (Bryman and Bell, 
2011). This approach to the logic of scientific discovery is rejected through the 
adoption of a critical realist framing (as outlined above).  
Thomas (2011) attempts to address his strong stance on generalisability by 
discussing the logic of scientific discovery and counter-posing inductive and 
abductive logic; though the arguments still lapse back into fetishising the hypo-
deductive method60. Yin follows a similar logic, stressing that positivistic 
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 See for example his arguments in support of multiple case studies (Yin, 2003b: 47). 
60
 Thus, when arguing in favour of abductive logic Thomas (2011: 213) still looks for 
regularities as the basis on which generalisations can be made. This contrasts strongly with 
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sampling logic is not appropriate or achievable for case study research but 
instead a researcher ‘... should try to generalize findings to “theory”’ (Yin, 
2003b: 38). Robson makes the distinction succinctly, where case study 
research ‘... is not concerned with statistical generalization but with analytic 
generalization’ (Robson, 2002: 183, emphasis in the original). However, this 
linking of case study work to analytic (or theory) generalisation has also been 
criticised. 
Thus, a second criticism comes from those working in a positivist Mainstream 
Accounting Research (Chua, 1986) paradigm; they complain that there is a 
lack of theory and hypothesis testing in case study research (Zimmerman, 
2001). This criticism misses the point of the earlier discussion on the nature of 
reality and seeks to apply the hypothetic-deductive scientific method to a 
reality that does not correspond to its assumptions. Thus, the case study 
strategy is appropriate for dealing with ontological depth and the identification 
of generative mechanisms, such as those that this thesis is concerned with.  
Cooper and Morgan (2008) identify a concern with case study research and 
theory generation (i.e. that case study research allows the researcher to favour 
their preferred theoretical explanation). Here again it is necessary to move 
beyond the influence of positivist research, by seeking to extend our 
understanding of what counts as theory. In this thesis the use of critical realist 
concepts helps by drawing on the discussion in the first part of this chapter on 
the role and import of theory to critical realist influenced research. As critical 
realists seek to move beyond surface level appearances of phenomena to 
                                                                                                                              
the critical realist version of abduction which looks for generative mechanism as the source of 
causation. 
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identify generative mechanisms it is important to both rely upon existing 
theories (e.g. the Marxist theory of the state) as well as generating new 
accounts and theories (for example, the triadic research framework).  
In summary, the output of critical realist influenced research also addresses 
two related concerns and criticisms of case study research – the limited 
replicability and generalisability of research findings. Critical realists recognise 
that human society is an open system in a constant state of change, of 
becoming rather than being. Therefore each case study will have differences 
which mean that laboratory style testing and results are inappropriate (and 
indeed unachievable).  This does not mean that research must start from a 
blank slate with each case study. The contexts will be different (Thomas, 2011) 
but similar generative mechanisms will be operating. This is illustrated in the 
next chapter with an analysis of the development for LSVT policy in three 
different jurisdictions, and explains the emphasis critical realists place on 
seeking generative mechanisms and accurate accounts of their operation in 
differing contexts. Further, because critical realist research is theoretically 
based it is possible to generalise case study findings at a theoretical rather 
than empirical level (Ackroyd, 2004).  
4.2 Case study selection and development 
This sub-section has two objectives; first, to explain why and how the three 
specific local case studies were selected and second, to set out and justify 
how those case studies were developed, including the data analysis approach 
adopted.  
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Buchanan et al.’s (1988: 55) advice ‘that the researcher should take an 
opportunistic approach to fieldwork’ (emphasis in the original) is aptly 
illustrated in the case selection for this thesis. The local case studies were 
selected through a combination of purposive and snowball approaches to 
sampling (Saunders et al., 1997). Purposive sampling describes an approach 
where the researcher is working with very small samples and wishes to select 
cases that are particularly informative (Neuman, 1991). Further the nature of 
this purposive selection can be described as heterogeneous where the focus 
of the research is on key themes (Saunders et al., 1997: 145). For this thesis 
the initial case study selection was based on the need to compare and contrast 
two local campaigns; one that had voted in favour of transfer and one that had 
voted against. To that was added the desire to observe an on-going campaign 
in the field. Hence, the aim of selecting three case studies was established. 
Prior to the fieldwork and before access had been negotiated with any local 
campaign, the question of different jurisdictions was not relevant. The fact that 
the case studies cover the three jurisdictions in Britain was an outcome of 
chance rather than design. With the on-going case study eventually voting in 
favour of transfer, the sample of two-thirds in favour of transfer and a third 
against, is in line with the findings by Watt (2008) into ballot results of stock 
transfers in London, but is a little higher than the whole England results that 
Pawson and Mullins (2010) found. Having a sample with such similarities to 
the findings of other research on this population was not a primary concern but 
a welcome outcome of the purposive heterogeneous sampling. 
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‘Snowball sampling is commonly used when it is difficult to identify members of 
the desired population’ (Saunders et al., 1997: 147). The records of stock 
transfer and related campaigns are limited and fragmented. DCLG keeps a list 
of transfers that have proceeded, but this is the only official record kept. The 
Defend Council Housing campaign group published a list of “no votes”, from 
1988 to 2008, on their website. This is a welcome resource but as it is 
compiled from newspaper reports by volunteers its completeness can be called 
into question. Reading the housing trade press it was possible to identify some 
high profile stock transfers, where tenants had voted in favour (Glasgow, 2003) 
or against (Birmingham, 2002), but press coverage could not be relied upon to 
provide a complete population. Further there was the difficulty of accessing 
campaigns. Here using an existing contact locally to access the English case 
study, was added to by attending a DCH national meeting in 2009 and the 
DCH national conference in 2010. At these events I met activists in the Welsh 
and Scottish case studies, respectively, who after I briefly explained my 
research aims agreed to help and gave me their contact information. In each 
case the initial contact introduced me to, or provided me with contact details for 
other tenants or activists involved with their local campaign. These sampling 
processes are reflected on further in the reflexive account in appendix 5.  
In all three cases campaign members gave me access to their personal 
records from the campaign. These included copies of publicity materials, 
documents and reports from the pro-transfer campaigns, anti-transfer 
campaign materials, letters and press clippings from local newspapers and 
minutes of campaign meetings. 
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Securing access to the anti-transfer campaigns of the three cases was seen as 
a priority given the emphasis identified in the research framework of the lack of 
research that is informed by tenants’ perspective. However, where stock 
transfers advance they do so on the basis that there are some tenant board 
members (TBM). Therefore, in both the English and Welsh cases, direct 
approaches where made to the transfer housing association and the local 
authority respectively asking for an interview with a tenant board member, 
which with limited difficulties was secured in both cases. As the tenants in the 
Scottish case had voted against transfer there were no tenant board members 
to interview. Pro-transfer data was not just drawn from the TBM interviews but 
also from publicly available documents, minutes and reports on local and 
central government websites. In both the English and Welsh cases after the 
interviews with the TBMs, follow-up enquiries resulted in securing a range of 
confidential documents for example the business plan for the housing 
association in the English case study.  
The data analysis methods employed are discussed in section 4.4 below; here 
is a general overview of how the case studies were developed. The approach 
taken to developing the case studies could best be described as one of 
layering. This approach involves taking each piece of data (for example, 
newspaper-cutting, council minutes, transcribed interview) individually and 
extracting the key moments (see section 4.4. below) and adding these to the 
case study. In this way the case study is developed layer by layer. For each 
case study, before the interviews were carried out, an initial search of publicly 
available documents (from the local authority, housing association (in the 
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English case) and newspaper reports) was carried out via the internet. This 
search allowed a familiarisation with any local and unique characteristics of 
each case study, which also informed the semi-structured interview questions. 
Then following the interviews and their transcription by a third party, the 
transcribed scripts were reviewed for errors and corrections. Through these 
three processes (preliminary internet search, the interviews and transcription 
reviews) an initial outline of the case including the key points in each was 
written-up in draft form. Following this initial outline, the layering approach 
described above was followed. Some data pieces involved just a single page 
(e.g. a campaign leaflet); others such as government reports could be over a 
hundred pages. It is at this point that the use of Sullivan’s (2012) key moment 
data reduction technique played an important role in making the data more 
manageable (see section 4.5. below).   
Following Yin (2003b), the data collected was sorted into and stored in case 
study databases. The databases are a combination of both hard and electronic 
forms. Most of the documents from the local authorities and transfer housing 
association(s) and some press clippings are held electronically. Most of the 
campaign materials (e.g. leaflets), press clippings and internal local authority 
documents are held in a hard-copy form. The interviews are held in both hard 
and soft-copy form, with media files and Word document transcriptions held on 
computer and a hard printed copy of the transcriptions held in files.  
Each case study is structured to address the conceptual framework directly. 
First, in a brief introduction the context of each case is laid out. The main body 
of each chapter is divided into three sections, each one covering an element of 
the conceptual framework developed above (of neoliberalisation – 
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reaction/contestation – reproduction/transformation). These sections in 
addition to providing evidence for each data analysis theme, also discusses 
the data presented in each case study. The final section starts to draw these 
discussions together and provides insights relevant to the conceptual 
framework.   
4.3 The Data 
Appendix 2 contains the case study databases for the three local campaigns. 
The majority of the data collected was in the form of documents, from a range 
of sources. These include official government reports, agendas and minutes of 
local government committees, anti-transfer campaign materials (such as 
leaflets and newsletters), transfer housing association documents (such as 
business plans and financial statements) and cuttings from local newspapers. 
Scott (1990) has developed four criteria for assessing the quality of 
documentary data; the criteria are authenticity, credibility, representation and 
clear meaning. The authenticity of each type of document is addressed below. 
In the main the remaining three criteria feed directly into the data analysis, the 
background to the cases (chapter 5) and the case studies in chapters 6-8. For 
example it is recognised that the publicity materials for both the pro and anti-
transfer campaigns will contain competing claims on specific issues (thus 
challenging the credibility and clear meaning of their own and other 
documents); for example, what is “an accountable landlord” (Smyth, 2012). It is 
the utilisation of dialogics that enables such an analysis. This approach 
contrasts with Scott’s (1990) ideas of bias and distortion as characteristics of 
credibility. Instead, the credibility is established when they express the views of 
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a particular social group, which in turn contests the views of other social 
groups.  
In addition to these documents, a total of thirteen interviews were carried out 
with key actors in the local case studies and national figures. The interviewees 
are drawn from both anti- and pro-transfer campaigns. The objective of the 
interviews was to add key insights and depth to the events of each case study, 
supplementing the analysis of the documents. These data sources are listed 
below with a brief discussion of relying on each type of document for research 
purposes. 
4.3.1 Documents 
i. Local/national government documents – These documents range from 
reports carried out by national organisations (e.g. The NAO, Scottish 
Government, Welsh Assembly Government and the DCLG) to minutes 
of local council meetings for each case study. Fairclough notes, 
‘Government departments produce texts in ways which anticipate their 
distribution, transformation, and consumption, and have multiple 
audiences built into them’ (Fairclough, 1992: 790). He goes on to 
identify these audiences as ‘addressees’, ‘hearers’ and ‘overhearers’. 
Thus, these documents reflect the stratified social world (heteroglossia) 
in which they are produced and the impact they are expected to have. 
The documents have a dual role of communicating housing policy and 
the practice of pursuing stock transfers; and an ideological impact to 
garner support for the policy among the various audiences. For these 
reasons these documents are a key source of data covering the ideas 
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and actions of those favouring LSVT nationally and locally. The 
authenticity of these documents was easily established as they were 
sourced from official websites and branded with logos of relevant 
departments or bodies. 
ii. Anti-transfer campaign documents – These documents, in the main, 
come in the form of leaflets and newsletters with the aim of promoting 
the anti-transfer arguments. There is a much more limited purpose for 
these documents, as the focus is to contest the stock transfer process 
on an ideological level. There is a secondary purpose to some of these 
documents, of providing information about future campaign activities 
such as local meetings. Watt (2008) notes that these documents are an 
under-examined resource of data with regard to housing policy. 
However, they are important in understanding the nature of the 
contestation generated by the anti-transfer groups. The authenticity of 
these documents was in part established by analysing the documents 
themselves and identifying who claimed publication; and in part, due to 
the source of the documents being the anti-transfer campaign activists. 
iii. Post-transfer housing association documents61 – these documents have 
characteristics similar to those of the national/local government reports, 
in that they have multiple audiences. Some (for example, housing 
association press releases) seek to communicate to the media as well 
as tenants and other local stakeholders. Regulatory reports are 
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 These documents are only relevant for the English and Welsh case studies, as the tenants 
in the Scottish case study voted against transfer, although the prospective Scottish transfer 
housing association did produce a business plan. 
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addressed to the relevant regulatory authority (e.g. the FSA or the 
Tenants’ Services Authority) but are also publicly available. This level of 
transparency is seen as either an essential component of accountability 
relations or the exhausting of accountability (see discussion in chapter 
2). The authenticity of these documents was established as they were 
either sourced direct from the organisation in question or from official 
websites. 
iv. Press cuttings – these documents come from local weekly newspapers 
and national trade publications (such as Inside Housing). In part the 
case studies follow the approach adopted by Watt (2008) of analysing 
letters to local newspapers concerning the proposed stock transfer in 
Wycombe District Council in 2000, with a focus on capturing the 
counter-hegemonic ideas of “ordinary people”. Newspapers attempt to 
portray a balance in the reporting of both sides of a local transfer 
campaign. However, a further complicating factor is the recognition that 
media outlets will also have an influence on how and what is reported 
(Saunders et al., 1997). In addition, care was taken when seeking to 
use data from press cuttings to corroborate it with other evidence, as 
often the press will only be reporting something that was contained in 
another document; for example a national or local government report. 
During the course of an LSVT campaign and ballot the press becomes 
an arena where both pro- and anti-transfer campaigns seek to gain 
publicity, and so also becomes an important source of data for this 
thesis. The press cuttings were obtained from three different sources – 
direct from the publication’s own website; accessing the collections at 
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public libraries and from anti-transfer campaigners’ personal records. 
This final group of press cutting, where the details of the publication was 
not obvious, where checked against on-line sources. Thus, the 
authenticity of these documents was established again through a 
combination of information on the documents themselves (newspaper 
title and date) and the source of the data (official websites and public 
libraries). 
v. Other – In two case studies the Freedom of Information (FoI) legislation 
was used. In the Welsh case the anti-transfer campaigners used the 
legislation (unsuccessfully) to obtain a list of properties subject to the 
transfer; this is discussed in the case study (chapter 8). In the English 
case, I used the FoI legislation to gain information (with limited success) 
from the local authority. This data is included in the case study 
databases. Other data in this category covers the observation notes I 
took of an anti-transfer campaign meeting during the Welsh stock 
transfer campaign and a UNISON briefing62 in the Welsh case. These 
documents, coming from an eclectic mix of sources contain important, if 
small amounts of data, and have been analysed in the same manner as 
other documents with a search for relevant utterances (key moments). 
This is possible as the documents contain the characteristics identified 
in other documents (i.e. being products of social processes, addressed 
to multiple audiences and thus, having contested (dialogical) voices 
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 The Unison briefing is recorded here under Other rather than anti-transfer campaigning 
materials, as in the whole of a 4-page document there is only one line stating Unison’s national 
(Note: the briefing at no stage states the local branch’s position on the transfer), which is to 
oppose all housing funding policies except that of direct provision. 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
151 | P a g e  
within them). For the documents of this categories (with the exception of 
the ones I generated) their authenticity was established in the same 
manner as in the other categories (i.e. a combination of official source 
and labelling detail on each document). 
4.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
A total of 13 interviews involving 13 different people were carried out between 
October 2009 and August 2010 (see Table 3 below). Of this total, two 
interviews in the Welsh case study were group interviews63, with the remaining 
interviews conducted on a one-to-one basis. All interviews were semi-
structured with the participants have a short briefing in advance, on the topics 
to be discussed. An interview consent form was distributed in advance and 
signed by the participants (see Appendix 3). Barring minor timing difficulties 
arranging access to some individuals, the administration and execution of the 
interviews was carried out without incident, with one exception the tenant 
board member interview in the Welsh case. This is discussed in the reflexive 
account in appendix 5.   
                                            
63
 Group interviews is the best description here as the same questions were used as in the 
one-to-one interviews except here there were two or three interviewees taking part at any one 
time.  
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Table 2 – Interview participants and details 
Case study /Name 
 
Role Interview dates 
English case study 
 
  
Joe Tenant activist and ex-
Labour councillor 
Pilot – October 2009; Real 
– December 2009 
Steve Tenant activist and ex-
Labour councillor 
March 2010 
Kevin Tenant activist and tenant 
board member 
March 2010 
Scottish case study 
 
  
Mary Executive member of 





Tenant activist July 2010 
David Unison branch officer and 
anti-transfer campaigner 
July 2010 
Welsh case study 
 
  
Hywel Anti-transfer campaigner Solo – October 2009; 
Group – October 2009 and 
August 2010 
Lydia Tenant activist Group – October 2009 and 
August 2010 
Morgan Plaid Cymru councillor, 
anti-transfer campaigner 








Eileen Short Chairperson, Defend 
Council Housing 
March 2010 
Austin Mitchell, MP Chairperson, House of 
Commons Council 
Housing  Group 
March 2010 
DCLG Official Team leader Decent 
Homes programme 
March 2010 
NOTE: with the exceptions of Eileen Short and Austin Mitchell, all other participants have had 
their names changed to protect their anonymity. 
The aim of carrying out the interviews was two-fold. First, the participants were 
selected as each was an active agents in their own stock transfer campaign, 
whether in favour or against the proposed transfer. As noted earlier, the 
emphasis here is not on the individuals as individuals but on their agency in 
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positioned-practices that endure beyond the individual (Collier, 1994).  Further, 
as identified in the literature review and partly in response to Cooper’s (1997) 
call for research involving those suffering the effects of new accounting (and 
by extension accountability) regimes, the emphasis in this thesis is on 
capturing the actions and ideas of those outside of the managerial and policy 
sphere (i.e. tenants and campaigners) and to analyse their impact on 
accountability relations. This approach does not ignore the managerial and 
policy spheres but instead by using a comparative case studies research 
design integrates these spheres through documentary analysis. Thus, the first 
objective was to get an overview of the individual events of each stock transfer 
process. The second objective focused on the ideas surrounding the 
accountability relations of a stock transfer process. This was addressed by 
drawing on the earlier discussion of dialogics, and analysing the competing 
conceptions of the utterance “an accountable landlord”. Each participant was 
asked directly to explain what the term meant to them, the responses form part 
of the case studies in chapters 6 to 8.  
All interviews were semi-structured, but more often took the form of a guided 
conversation. This approach was thought the most appropriate method to relax 
the interviewees (and to a degree the interviewer) and in the process create a 
space where the interviewees felt able to speak freely. In this respect, beyond 
the question of the meaning of the term an accountable landlord, there were 
no pre-prepared standard questions but a series of themes to explore. In 
addition, the preparation and pre-reading for each case had generated some 
case specific issues to discuss. If these issues had not been discussed during 
the course of the interview they were raised directly towards the end. The 
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combination of these actions meant that data covering a range of themes, both 
relevant and unexpected (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000), was captured. Another 
strength of this approach is that for each local case study those interviewed 
were directly involved with the transfer process either opposing or supporting 
it.  
The interviews also contain potential weaknesses including a lack of reliability 
(Saunders et al., 1997). For example, in the Welsh case study one of the anti-
transfer campaigners could claim that the pro-transfer campaign had spent £5 
million to secure the ballot result. The actual amounts spent are not publicly 
available but the council budget for the whole transfer process was £6 million, 
split between £1.3 million for pre-transfer costs and £4.45 million for post-
transfer cost.   This lack of reliability can be overcome by including the 
interviews within a case study research design with data drawn from multiple 
sources allowing for corroboration of evidence from other sources, thus 
clarifying and enhancing the reliability of the interview data. Saunders et al. 
(1997) also note that forms of bias are present in interviews. In a similar 
manner to the bias contained in documents (as discussed above) this research 
design and the use of dialogics actively seeks out such contrasting or biased 
claims so that they can be analysed to uncover the concrete social reality that 
gave rise to them. Finally, it should be stated that while the interviews played 
an important role in familiarisation with the data, the case studies are not 
(overly) reliant on the data collected in this manner, but have been developed 
through a careful consideration of all the data collected.   
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The next sections set out how the data was analysed, ethical considerations 
and limitations of the research design.  
4.4 Data analysis 
The preparation of this thesis has employed a flexible research design 
(Robson, 2002), closely associated with qualitative data research projects, with 
a strong element of pragmatism in pursuing real world research using such a 
design. The analogy of the “garbage can” (Martin quoted in Robson, 2002: 
377) is appropriate. ‘Here the four elements of research – theory, methods, 
resources and solutions swirl about in the garbage can ... Each influences the 
others ...’ (Robson, 2002: 377). This has already been illustrated above with 
the purposive and snowball sampling for case study selection. The research 
aim is to develop a framework that analyses how public accountability relations 
are made, re-made and exercised. The literature review brought to the fore 
that accountability is a contested idea. The discussion earlier in this chapter 
highlights that this contestation has real, concrete social roots. As already 
noted the case studies were developed through a series of drafts each time 
adding more data to provide greater depth; a layering process. However, this 
process still requires the data to be analysed.  
Case study research can quickly generate large amounts of data that then 
becomes a challenge for the researchers to sift through, reduce, analyse and 
present (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Swanborn 
(2010) discusses five different traditions of analysing data within case study 
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research64.  Although not following directly in anyone of these traditions, 
Bryman and Bell (2011: 571) note that a common approach to analysing 
qualitative data is referred to as thematic analysis. There is some 
disagreement about what a theme is; are they just restricted to codes or do 
themes transcend any one code or are they built out of codes (the question of 
coding is addressed below) (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thomas (2011: 171-
172) sets out how themes can emerge through the constant comparative 
method. The aim of this method is for the researcher to regularly and iteratively 
revisit the data refining the themes each time. This approach has parallels with 
one of the tools of grounded theory (Bryman and Bell, 2011: 577). The 
difficulty with Thomas’s (2011) approach is that the generation of themes 
occurs in one direction only, from the data; there is no mention of themes 
having been derived from a previous literature review or a research framework. 
In contrast, Braun and Clarke (2006) identify that themes can be derived 
theoretically as well as inductively. In this thesis as already shown there is a 
strong theoretical influence on the data analysis themes, as set out in Table 1 
above. It should also be noted that the themes in Table 1 were not solely 
derived from the previous literature but also through a familiarisation with the 
case studies as they were developed. Therefore, the themes and data analysis 
themes are derived from a back and forth between theory and data. For 
example, most of the themes in the neoliberalisation element of the framework 
are clearly drawn direct from theory (e.g. accumulation by dispossession). 
However, the long term deployment (or lack) of public finance as a key 
                                            
64
 Swanborn’s five data analysis traditions are based on the work of 1) Yin, 2) Strauss and 
Corbin, 3) Miles and Huberman, 4) Ragin (using Boolean logic). The fifth tradition is time-
series analysis. 
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generative mechanism (data theme65) only became evident after the data 
collection had commenced. 
At the start of the data collection there was no planned analysis technique. An 
initial attempt was made at a more structured approach by coding documents 
from the House of Commons Council Housing Group (HOCCHG) and the 
former regulator the Housing Corporation. However, it quickly became 
apparent that by highlighting words or phrases in this manner, they were being 
abstracted from their context in the documents. This is a problem and criticism 
of coding that has been identified by some researchers (Bryman and Bell, 
2011; Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). Therefore, a more holistic data analysis 
technique was needed. This is where thematic analysis is relevant, with its 
flexible approach to searching for repeating patterns of meaning across data 
sets (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis is compatible with a critical 
realist epistemology; for example the use of latent themes (Braun and Clarke, 
2006) fits with the concepts of ontological depth and emergence. Thematic 
analysis is also congruent with ideas drawn from dialogical analysis; for 
example, with ‘key moments’ (see below) forming part of a theme. 
Drawing on the dialogical approach outlined above, when analysing the data 
utterances were identified and relevant links to the appropriate heteroglossia 
drawn66.  Sullivan (2012) has developed this data analysis approach with ‘key 
moments’ or ‘key extracts’, using definitions and concepts drawn from 
Bakhtin’s (1981) work. ‘“Key moments” are an “utterance” of significance. An 
                                            
65
 It should also be noted that there is not a direct link between data analysis themes and 
generative mechanisms, as there is in this example. 
66
 A paper containing the analysis of the HOCCGH and Housing Corporation using this 
dialogical approach was published in 2012 (Smyth, 2012). 
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utterance is a significant unit of meaning, different from the sentence or the 
line and is defined by its readiness for a reply/reaction. As a unit of meaning, it 
can be of variable length’ (Sullivan, 2012: 72). Sullivan then outlines two 
selection criteria for selecting key moments that concern the content67of the 
utterance and/or the form68 of the utterance. Applying these ideas to the data 
collected, the central analysis technique used was to identify the key moments 
in each document.  
Utilising elements of both thematic (Braun and CIarke, 2006) and dialogical 
analysis (Sullivan, 2012) in this manner the data was reduced (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). However, as Miles and Huberman (1994) stress data 
reduction also includes an element of data analysis, for example deciding what 
constitutes a key moment. In turn, data display/presentation cannot be 
separated from the data reduction and analysis. The manner in which the case 
studies were developed using a layering approach, consciously seeking out 
the dialogical tensions in the key moments and identifying the empirical effects 
of deeper generative mechanism, led to the data being displayed in the case 
study formats below.    
Accountability is an element but not the central focus of the documents 
collected. For example, the national/local government reports often have an 
individual section on accountability relations, but also have key moments 
scattered throughout the documents. The anti-transfer documents although 
smaller in size (in both page numbers and word counts) than the national/local 
                                            
67
 The content of the utterance contains data relevant to the study, for example about the 
governance structures of a transfer housing association.  
68
 The form of the utterance covers the direct appearance of the thoughts of the participants 
such as an anecdote, belief or reflection. 
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government reports, again have key moments scattered throughout the 
document. The key moments were identified through a two-fold process. First, 
the large reports were searched for key words (“accountable” and 
“accountability”) with the resultant key moments noted and/or highlighted. 
Secondly, all documents were read closely. Again the key moments were 
noted and/or highlighted. In the case studies below, these key moments are 
most prominent when contrasting the differing conceptions of accountability. 
However, the utterances also inform the context setting (heteroglossia) for 
each case study.  
The major weakness of this (and other qualitative) data analysis techniques is 
its reliance upon the skills and experience of the individual researcher carrying 
out the analysis. This reliance could in theory lead to very different analyses by 
different researchers based on the same data. However, the techniques 
discussed above of utilising case study research design, multiple source data, 
corroborative evidence, the layering process and use of key moments are all 
designed to minimise such theoretical outcomes. Further, the individual skills 
and experience of the researcher can also be seen as a strength, as they open 
up the possibility of unique or novel insights. 
4.5 Ethics 
For much of the data collected in the case study databases (see appendix 2) 
there are no direct ethical concerns. These are publicly available documents 
prepared by local or national governments and distributed on official websites. 
It was also assumed that such documents would have been checked by 
government officials that they complied with legal requirements and do not 
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slander, defame or otherwise harm any individuals. Even with this, care has 
been taken with these documents not to disclose or use any information that 
could be prejudicial for individuals. The more pressing ethical issues were 
twofold – the interviewees and, to a lesser degree, the confidential data 
supplied in the English and Welsh cases. For each of the interviewees 
informed consent was secured before the interviews commenced (a sample 
copy of the consent form used is in appendix 3). Often these forms would be 
signed without the participant reading the form in full or only paying scant 
attention to all the elements (despite the interviewee being given time to do 
so). In these circumstances, the important elements of the form were verbally 
repeated at the start of the recording and the interviewee asked if they agreed. 
The two most important elements of the consent form are the commitment to 
anonymise the case studies and that the interviewee could withdraw from the 
study at any point. This second point is particularly important as it allows the 
interviewee to control the interview process if they felt the need to. No 
interview participant exercised their right to withdraw from the project. With 
regard to the confidential information supplied in the English and Welsh case 
studies, a similar assurance over anonymity was given.  
4.6 Limitations 
The reflexive account in appendix 5 explores in more detail the limitations of 
the research design pursued in this thesis, both theoretically and practically. 
Many limitations and criticisms of elements of the research design have 
already been identified and discussed above. For example, Yin’s (2003b) 
identification of the perception that case study research lacks rigour and 
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provides a poor basis from which to scientifically generalise. To counter these 
perceived limitations rigorous data analysis was carried out, utilising a 
combination of thematic analysis and dialogical analysis. It was also argued 
that generalisation can be made using case study research but not by using 
traditional inductive (or deductive) logics but instead through abduction and 
careful theory building. 
Criticisms were also identified and discussed with regards to the theoretical 
framework developed above, integrating critical realism, classical Marxism and 
materialist dialogics; these are explored again in appendix 5. There was also a 
discussion of the various limitations and problems addressed in analysing the 
data, including why traditional coding was not adopted and the development of 
themes that are derived both inductively and theoretically. However, this 
section focuses on four main issues affecting the research quality. 
First, while the case study approach has enabled a data rich picture of each 
local campaign, more interviews could have developed this further. As two of 
the case studies were historic (English and Scottish) going back several years, 
it would have been unduly difficult, if not impossible, to carry out a significant 
number of interviews with tenants and other actors, as individuals have moved 
on and in some cases passed away. Second, as already noted there is a lack 
of a clearly identifiable data population (i.e. there is no comprehensive record 
of proposed stock transfers and their outcomes). Purposive and snowball 
sampling techniques were employed and the resultant case selection does 
have strengths as outlined above (covering three jurisdictions and 
approximating the actual outcome of transfer ballots). The use of appropriate 
Stewart Smyth 
162 | P a g e  
 
theories will further strengthen the conclusions drawn from these case studies. 
Third, in common with other qualitative (flexible) research designs, funding and 
timing considerations also played a role in selecting only three case studies 
(Bryman and Bell, 2011; Robson, 2002). However further case studies would 
have allowed for greater integrity in the research findings.  
Fourth, the data analysis techniques evolved through a combination of 
attempting analysis in practice and a limited input from research methods 
textbooks and journal articles. The latter is due to the theoretical framework 
utilised and in particular the integration of critical realist ideas with materialist 
dialogics. These are both relatively new theories with little attention so far paid 
to operationalising the ideas in accounting or management research. Hence, 
the data analysis used in this thesis has produced data rich case studies but 
the techniques will be unfamiliar to most readers and may seem alien.  
4.7 Summary  
This section has provided detailed arguments and justifications on how the 
data was collected, analysed and presented. As such it shows how the 
theoretical framework developed in section 2 coupled with the data analysis 
themes developed in section 3, have been put into practice. This has included 
how the case studies were identified, documents collected and interviews 
carried out, and subsequently analysed. The strengths and weaknesses have 
been set out. However, this has been done by relying on existing academic 
literature in what could be considered an abstract manner. In contrast 
appendix 5 sets out a reflexive account of the research process drawing on the 
actual experience of the researcher. This reflexive account is also relevant 
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given the growing recognition of the need for critical researchers to be aware 
of their political and social position within the research process (Cooper and 
Coulson, 2013: Brook and Darlington, 2013). 
5. Conclusion 
Overall, the aims of this chapter have been twofold. The first part addresses 
the philosophical and theoretical underpinning of the research work. This 
involved showing how three related theoretical perspectives – classical 
Marxism, critical realism and materialist dialogics – have been interwoven to 
provide a robust foundation on which to build the data collection, analysis and 
presentation. The second part of the chapter set out how the earlier discussion 
and theoretical framework was utilised and applied to develop the comparative 
case studies, from the data collection to analysis and then presentation stages. 
This approach has the benefit of highlighting the clear links back to the 
theoretical and philosophical grounding developed in the first part. This 
grounding enables the development of rich case studies that focus on the 
research objective of showing how tenants’ and campaigners’ ideas and 
actions influenced the nature of accountability relations.  
The case studies in chapters 6 – 8 follow this approach drawing on a wide 
range of evidence from different data sources. However, the earlier discussion 
of Bhaskar’s TMSA illustrated that human actions do not occur either in a 
random manner or a social vacuum. There is a range of social structures that 
frames and mediates human actions. This understanding of the 
structure/agency dichotomy, with the emphasis on the ability of individuals to 
reproduce or transform social structure, is central to the way that both the 
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research framework was developed in chapter 3 and the development of the 
local case studies. 
Finally the limitations of the research design were identified and discussed. 
This discussion should be coupled with the reflexive account of the research 
experience, set out in appendix 5. While challenges were encountered during 
the data collection phase, these were overcome through a variety of actions 
(e.g. building strong relations with interview participants or the use of FoI 
legislation) to collect sufficient and appropriate data to prepare the case 
studies. Before setting out those case studies, the next chapter explicates and 
analyses the context of the LSVT policy at a national and policy level.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Background to the studies 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the development and initial impact of the 
LSVT policy in England, Scotland and Wales. Chapter 3 concluded with a 
research framework based on a set of triadic theorisations, (Neoliberalisation – 
Reaction/Contestation – Reproduction or Transformation). This chapter 
contextualises this triadic framework within the national, devolved69 and 
council housing policy context.  The local case studies cover three 
jurisdictions, each one having different legal frameworks and social housing 
traditions. It is necessary to explore each using the framework, with a section 
below for England, Scotland and Wales. Each section starts with a brief 
historical analysis of the LSVT policy development including arguing that stock 
transfer is a form of privatisation. This is then followed by an analysis of the 
triadic framework across four headings – dispossession of council housing; 
restructuring the social housing sector; restructuring of democratic 
accountability and user involvement; and, tenant-led civil society campaigns. 
The first three headings all fall within the neoliberalisation of the state, while 
the final heading covers the civil society reaction/contestation and in part 
addresses the reproduction or transformation of accountability relations. The 
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 Including the devolved governments in Scotland and Wales housing is also a devolved 
responsibility in Northern Ireland. However, until January 2013 the LSVT policy has not been 
developed or pursued by the Northern Ireland Assembly government. 
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chapter concludes by drawing out the key elements of this analysis for the 
case studies in chapters 6 to 8. 
2. The story of Large-scale Voluntary Stock Transfer (LSVT) 
2.1 An emergent policy 
The first stock transfer was completed in December 1988, covering 4,650 
homes previously with Chiltern District Council (DC) (HCA, 2012; Wilcox, 
1994)70. This transfer took place under the Housing Act 1985 (Mullins et al., 
1993) although ‘... the statutory powers for disposal in the 1985 Act were not 
introduced with voluntary transfers in mind ...’ (Mullins et al., 1993: 170). The 
development of LSVTs came as a response from local authorities to a change 
in government policy under the Conservative government. From 1979, council 
housing was starved of funding and privatisation was promoted as a policy aim 
(Lee, 2002). For example, Wilcox reports that the investment levels in housing 
by English councils fell by over half, from £12,082 million in 1979/80 to £4,802 
million71 in 1996/97 (Wilcox, 2009a: Table 57b). However, the privatisation 
policies were not always a success. 
The Right to Buy (RtB) policy introduced in the Housing Act 1980 was 
considered a success. In the first eleven years (from 1980 to 1990 inclusive) of 
the policy, just over one million (Wilcox, 2009a: Table 20a) council houses 
were privatised under the RtB programme in England. However, other 
government schemes to extend and develop other forms of privatisation were 
not so successful (Lee, 2002). For example, the Housing Act 1988 introduced 
                                            
70
 Pawson (2009) points out that there were earlier tenanted transfers of council housing in 
England and Scotland. However, Chiltern DC was the first using the legislative framework that 
subsequent transfers have been subject to. 
71
 Using 2007/08 a base prices. 
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Housing Action Trusts (HATs) and Tenants Choice. The government proposed 
six HATs, all of which were either withdrawn or rejected by tenants in ballots 
(Lee, 2002). Although these schemes were considered to be failures they do 
provide evidence of the government’s intention to change local authorities from 
being service providers to enablers (Ridley, 1988). Also, the schemes 
politically paved the way for LSVTs to be taken up more broadly (Lee, 2002). 
In their review of the first 16 stock transfers Mullins et al. (1993) outline both 
the process and motivations behind these early transfers. The initial move 
towards a stock transfer would most commonly come from a council officer 
reviewing the government housing policy, with funding cuts and privatisation to 
the fore. Thus, ‘... the specific threats identified shifted from Right to Buy, 
through Tenants’ Choice to the new financial regime; but reaction to central 
government policies was always a prominent theme’ (Mullins et al., 1993: 177). 
The initial popularity of the LSVT policy was largely confined to southern and 
rural local authorities in England (NAO, 2003). By the middle of the 1990s the 
government needed to encourage stock transfers in inner city and urban 
areas. The problems were twofold – financial and political. The financial 
problems related to the poor state of the housing stock resulting in lower 
valuations, coupled with large historic debt. The political problems came in the 
form of opposition from Labour-run councils who saw stock transfer as a form 
of privatisation. To overcome the financial difficulties the Conservative 
government channelled public funds through the Estates Renewal Challenge 
Fund (ERCF), introduced in 1995 (NAO, 2003). The ‘ERCF was seen as 
breaking new ground in bringing the transfer mechanism to bear in resolving 
the problems of poor condition and often socially deprived estates in inner 
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London and other cities’ (Pawson, et al., 2005). The ERCF provided £488 
million as dowries (which later became known as ‘gap funding’) where the 
estates had a notionally negative value (i.e. the cost of estimated repairs plus 
the historic debt was greater than the value of the housing stock). The political 
opposition to stock transfers was undermined by the election victory of New 
Labour in 1997, and a change of attitude towards stock transfers by the new 
ministers, who had previously opposed the policy (DETR, 1999).   
However, the major reform to social housing under New Labour was the 
development of the Decent Homes policy. In 2000 the New Labour 
government set a target that by the end of 2010 all social housing in England 
would be of a decent standard72 (DETR, 2000). The Decent Homes 
programme73 was not a benign, neutral policy. The government applied the 
Decent Homes Standard to all council housing but only provided additional 
funding to those authorities that chose one of three ‘marketisation options’ 
(Hodkinson, 2010) to set-up an Arm’s Length Management Organisation 
(ALMO), develop a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) scheme or transfer its 
housing stock under the LSVT provisions.  Those authorities that chose to 
retain their housing stock would have to achieve the standard from their 
already inadequate funding (NAO, 2003; ODPM, 2004a). This programme has 
been portrayed as the Trojan Horse of neoliberalism (Hodkinson, 2010) in 
social housing and led the ODPM Select Committee to describe the 
government’s refusal to fund authorities directly as dogmatic (ODPM, 2004a), 
                                            
72
 The Decent Homes Standard included four targets that covered the health and safety 
statutory minimum standard, reasonably modern facilities and services, reasonable state of 
repair and thermal comfort (NAO, 2010: 15). 
73
 Comparator programmes were later developed in Wales (Welsh Housing Quality Standard) 
and Scotland (Scottish Housing Quality Standard) starting in 2002 and 2004 respectively 
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stating additionally that, ‘[t]he Government is in effect using the Decent Homes 
target as an indirect means to lever local authority housing stock out of direct 
local authority control, or even ownership’ (ODPM, 2004a: 36).  
The emergence of LSVT as set out above is consistent with classical Marxist 
and CR research perspectives by illustrating Peck’s (2010) conception of 
neoliberalism as a contradictory phenomenon driven by economic and 
ideological motives. Before turning to the impacts of the LSVT policy in terms 
of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2005), restructuring of state 
provision (Ashman and Callinicos, 2006) and restructuring of user involvement 
and democratic accountability (Whitfield, 2006), the question of stock transfer 
as a form of privatisation is discussed. 
2.2 Stock transfer and privatisation 
Whether stock transfers are a form of privatisation is a contentious issue that 
goes to the heart of the ideological and propaganda battle over the future of 
council housing. The argument is often high profile in local campaigns (see for 
example the Scottish case study below). Privatisation is also an element of 
Harvey’s (2005) accumulation by dispossession. The following argues that 
LSVT is a form of privatisation.  The basis of this argument, in a manner which 
is consistent with the approach used elsewhere in this thesis, is an application 
of the accounting principle of substance over form (i.e. that a transaction 
should be accounted for on the basis of its economic substance not its strict 
legal form).  
Those who argue that stock transfers are not privatisation do so because the 
housing ends up in a not-for-profit company (often with charitable status). In 
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effect they look to the legal form of the transfer and see that it is not a profit-
making private company and therefore conclude this is not privatisation. This 
narrow perspective on privatisation is countered by Robbins who argues that 
whether transfer housing associations are in the private sector or not ‘there are 
two things for sure; they are certainly not public sector organizations and nor 
are the banks they borrow from’ (Robbins, 2002: 269-270). Ginsburg (2005) 
advances three interpretations of this process one of which is that ‘transfer 
marks a decisive shift towards monopolistic private landlordism, with public 
control and accountability fading away over time – a true privatisation’ 
(Ginsburg, 2005: 132). Ginsburg’s paper is a review of the evidence available 
on the stock transfer, and concludes that irrespective of the short-term impacts 
of individual transfers (perceived as successes or failures) the long-term trend 
in the sector is towards the interpretation above, that he labels ‘quasi-
privatization’.  
Further, a key purpose of stock transfers is to raise private finance, using the 
housing stock as security. Thus, there is an element of profit making via a third 
party, the result of which is the housing association must act like a business, 
rather than a public service. An extension of this argument dovetails with the 
governance of housing associations with a board that must act in a fiduciary 
manner and in the best interests of the organisation. In practice this means 
prioritising the interests of the finance provider ahead of the tenants (Mooney 
and Poole, 2005).  
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The question of privatisation came up in the interviews of key informants at the 
national level. The DCLG official while not directly addressing privatisation did 
reflect one of the arguments that those who support stock transfers advance: 
... in terms of securing capital to improve the quality of housing, if the stock transfers 
from the council to housing association, it’s no longer within the public sector, so it’s not 
under the public sector borrowing restrictions and requirements. So the housing 
association can go out and use the value of the stock to borrow money on the private 
markets. 
(DCLG official)  
In contrast, Austin Mitchell, MP was clear that stock transfer represented a 
form of privatisation. Using the word privatisation twelve times during the 
interview (of the same duration as the DCLG official), Mitchell described stock 
transfers as ‘... the ultimate form of privatisation’ explaining: 
we always call it ... privatisation. But the supporters of the system said it wasn’t 
privatisation, it was social ownership. But of course it wasn’t really, because the housing 
associations are companies, actually under company law...  
Profitability is the more important aim, rather than accountability, so they can make as 
many promises as they want about tenants being represented and being consulted and 
sitting on the Board and all of that. But those representatives ...  can’t vote against 
general interests of the company as a company. So it’s crap. I think the privatisation 
label is well justified. 
 (Austin Mitchell, MP) 
Finally, the housing association sector is not static but is subject to the same 
pressures that operate in other regulated quasi-markets. There are mergers 
and takeovers. Pawson, et al. (2009) report that a third of all housing 
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associations have been engaged in merger, restructuring or deregistering 
activities in the six years up to 2007. In addition, housing associations are 
planning to use a variety of vehicles to gain a listing on the stock markets 
(Duxbury, 2012; Inside Housing, 2009). The Cambridge Centre for Housing 
and Planning Research reported that: 
In 2008/09, the number of HAs operating in England was 1,578. This represented a 
decrease of six percent (or 98 HAs fewer) over the previous year and 18 percent (347 
HAs fewer) since 2002/03.  
(Tang, 2010: 3) 
Further, the biggest reduction in the sector occurred with the very small 
housing associations (i.e. those with less than 250 homes). Whereas at the top 
end, the super-large HAs (i.e. those with more than 10,000 homes) continued 
to grow where ‘in 2008/09, there were 54 such super-large HAs compared with 
29 in 2002/03’ (Tang, 2010: 3). This concentration and centralisation of the 
sector makes sense to the housing associations as they are able to access 
economies of scale across a range of activities such as procurement and 
administration. It has also been the policy of both the government and the 
regulator that there needs to be a reduction in the number of associations in 
the sector (Mullins, 2006; Victory and Malpass, 2011). However, there is a 
tension between these processes and the ability of local tenants to hold their 
landlord to account, if decisions are increasingly being made in remote 
corporate headquarters. It should also be noted here that the promises made 
to tenants during the transfer process (and embedded in the deed of covenant 
between the transfer housing association and the local authority) are only 
applicable as long as the transfer housing association remains independent. If 
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the housing association is taken-over, the deed of covenant (and by 
implication the promises to tenants) no longer holds and therefore does not 
have to be complied with.  
This leads Mooney and Poole (2005) to an unequivocal stance ‘that stock 
transfer represents the wholesale privatisation of council housing’ (Mooney 
and Poole, 2005: 28). Having set out the arguments for stock transfer as a 
form of privatisation over the next four headings the research framework from 
chapter three is applied to social housing in England, before repeating the 
process for Scotland and Wales later in this chapter.  
3. Neoliberalisation 
3.1 The dispossession of council housing 
The following illustrates Harvey’s (2005) argument of the release of public 
assets at low or zero cost for private capital to exploit either directly or 
indirectly. Due to the roll-back policy of starving council housing of funds, the 
government estimated that the sector faced a backlog of repairs amounting to 
a cost £19 billion in 1997 (NAO, 2010: 12). In 2003 the NAO published a report 
entitled Improving social housing through transfer (NAO, 2003), analysing the 
stock transfer policy in England since the first transfer. The report identifies 
how the policy has been constructed to be attractive to private finance by using 
subsidies from public funds. First, each transfer is designed to be cost neutral 
to the transfer housing association (NAO, 2003). This is achieved through 
calculating the Tenanted Market Value (TMV). ‘The Tenanted Market Value is 
calculated as the net present value of the RSLs' projected stream of income 
from renting out the transfer stock, less its expenditure stream’ (NAO, 2003: 4). 
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Despite stock transfers coming in various sizes, with homes of differing ages 
and states of repair a standard 30 year period is assumed for the net present 
value calculations. In addition, the NAO found that a higher discount rate was 
being used in the TMV calculations, than the cost of capital for transfer 
housing associations: 
Using data for our eight LSVT case studies, ... we estimated that if the life of properties 
had been assessed as 40 years the potential transfer value would have increased by 
£51 million (14 per cent) compared with the actual transfer price of £356 million ... we 
calculated the potential transfer value of one of our case study transfers would have 
been £27.5 million (53 per cent) higher using the real cost of capital compared to the 
actual transfer price of £51.9 million. 
(NAO, 2003: 4) 
It is not just a matter of biased calculations. Up to 2010 the government 
subsidised 136 LSVTs to a total of £5.7 billion (Pawson and Wilcox, 2011: 
Table 68b) in public funding (in the form of ERCF grants, Gap funding and 
Over-hanging debt write-offs).   
Second, the NAO also disclosed the overall finance implications of this funding 
model, reporting that the ODPM’s own figures show transfer to be a more 
expensive option. ‘Based on a hypothetical 5-year LSVT programme involving 
1 million homes it estimated the cost to the taxpayer to be £4.2 billion (£4,200 
per home) spread over a 30 year period, which was £1.3 billion (£1,300 per 
home) more than fully funded local authority retention and renovation’ (NAO, 
2003: 32). The justifications for this additional cost are the unquantifiable 
benefits that arise from stock transfer such as risk transference, greater tenant 
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participation and community regeneration74. Third, much of the housing stock 
had a negative value; here the government has used a combination of gap-
funding (on-going subsidy) and historic debt–write offs. For example, in 
2003/04 the government budgeted £800 million in stock transfer debt write-offs 
(HOCCHG, 2005: 9). High profile stock transfer cases such as the Birmingham 
(in 2002) and Glasgow (in 2003) were promised debt write-offs totalling over 
£1 billion if the tenants agreed to transfer their homes. The gap-funding 
(excluding debt write-offs) for stock transfer was £0.46 billion (NAO, 2010: 28). 
Ginsburg (2005: 123) provides further evidence of accumulation by 
dispossession, by calculating the average price paid for house transferred 
under the LSVT policy as £6,600, with the Glasgow transfer being the lowest 
at just £310 per house. Ginsburg also points out that these figures do not 
include the overhanging debt that the municipal authorities retain after transfer 
and which is only discharged by a write-off from the Treasury or devolved 
government. This is another public subsidy for privatisation, which amounted to 
£1.6 billion in 2002-03 alone (Ginsburg, 2005: 123).  
The above are all examples of Harvey’s (2003; 2005) accumulation by 
dispossession, by releasing council housing stock (assets) at very low (nearly 
zero) cost. Although, the assets are transferred to not-for-profit organisations, 
this is done on the basis that those organisations can raise funds from private 
financiers. In this way, through government policy, transfer housing 
associations and the banking system, private capital gains access to the rents 
of council tenants and generate surpluses from the privatisation of public 
assets.  
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3.2 Restructuring the social housing sector 
Ashman and Callinicos (2006) add the dimension of restructuring to Harvey’s 
(2005) accumulation by dispossession. This section looks at the available 
statistical data on the social housing in the period since 1979 to illustrate how 
this process has occurred in the social housing sector. It is difficult to assess 
Ashman and Callinicos’ (2006) dynamic at a local level, in part due to a lack of 
detailed statistics over the long-term. However, such analysis is possible and 
insightful at a national level.  
Social housing has seen a range of reforms over the last 30 years. Second 
only to the RtB policy, LSVTs have had the biggest restructuring impact on the 
sector. In unit terms the RtB has seen nearly 1.8 million homes privatised in 
England up to March 2008 (Wilcox 2009: Table 20a); by way of contrast the 
LSVT policy has resulted in 1,208,533 homes being privatised (Pawson and 
Wilcox, 2011: Table 68a) in England from 1988 – 2010. The gross transfer 
price was £6.2 billion for 290 transfers (of which 112 were partial transfers75). 
These policies have led to a reduction in social housing from 31 per cent of the 
total housing stock in England in 1979 to 18.5 per cent in 2004 (Hills, 2007). In 
addition, there has also been a restructuring of the social housing providers, 
where in 1981 local authorities dominated the social housing sector with nearly 
4.8 million homes in England (Pawson and Wilcox, 2011: Table 17a); by 2009 
housing associations controlled 2.2 million homes as opposed to 1.8 million 
controlled by local authorities (Pawson and Wilcox, 2011: table 17a). This 
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 A partial transfer occurs where the local authority does not transfer all of its housing stock in 
a single move. They may break-up their total housing stock and transfer in a series of 
tranches. Or, use a combination of LSVT, PFI and ALMO as NCC has done (see English case 
study). 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
177 | P a g e  
change has been achieved by the use of the roll-back/roll-out dynamic (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002) – a reduction in government spending on social housing and 
the implementation of a series of policies favouring private or housing 
association ownership.  
Government spending, on social housing in England, fell from 3.7 per cent of 
government expenditure in 1985/86 to 1.8 per cent in 2004/05 (Wilcox, 2006: 
Table 56), before starting to rise again to 2.7 per cent in 2008/09 (Pawson and 
Wilcox, 2011: Table 56). Part of the reason for this rise is the treatment of 
capital receipts from the Right to Buy policy which are seen as negative 
expenditure; thus with their dramatic reduction since 2003, the identifiable 
expenditure76 on housing has increased. The continued reduction in 
investment in social housing can be seen in the Gross investment in Social 
Housing figures in England, which fell from £13.1 billion in 1979/80 to £7.8 
billion in 2009/1077 (Pawson and Wilcox, 2011: 57b) 
The Housing Corporation found that up to 1997 ‘... 48per cent of all units 
transferred were in the South East, South West and London’ (Kiddle, 2003: 
21).  By December 2008 the Decent Homes programme had restructured the 
social housing sector such that 170 local authorities had transferred all their 
stock; 112 remained direct providers; 66 ALMOs were established and 14 
authorities were using PFI schemes (NAO, 2010: 14). 
3.3 Restructuring of democratic accountability and user involvement 
                                            
76
 ‘Identifiable government expenditure is net of housing capital receipts, which are treated as 
‘negative expenditure’ rather than income’ (Pawson and Wilcox, 2011: Table 56 note). 
77
 In constant prices with 2009/10 as the base. 
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As Whitfield (2006) argues neoliberalism also restructures accountability and 
user involvement. Although the tenants perspective is largely marginalised in 
the literature (McKee, 2009; Mooney and Poole, 2005), LSVT policy 
justifications use and invocate greater tenant involvement as a reason for 
tenants to support stock transfer. However, there are tensions and 
contradictions around this conceptualisation. Pawson et al. (2009) while 
analysing LSVTs, adjust Foucalt’s (2003) concept of governmentality, where: 
civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to being both an object 
and subject of government [so that] organisations and individuals in civil society ... are 
“responsibilised” to take on functions hitherto undertaken by state agencies organised 
on a bureaucratic “command and control” model.  
(Pawson et al., 2009: 416)  
Housing stock transfers represent a restructuring not just of the state but also 
redefining tenants as consumers. Mooney and Poole highlight a central 
tension in the stock transfer policy relevant to this thesis: 
There is at the heart of all of this an irreconcilable conflict between the needs of private 
financiers and the pursuit of meaningful tenant empowerment and quality social housing 
provision that is democratically controlled. 
  (Mooney and Poole, 2005: 38) 
Further, Pawson et al.’s (2009) study into the reform of governance and 
organisational culture of social housing through stock transfers raises the issue 
of tenant influence / involvement / empowerment / participation. These terms 
are often used inter-changeably both by policy-makers and housing 
researchers. Pawson et al. (2009) argue that tenant empowerment is a 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
179 | P a g e  
particular policy goal of stock transfers reform of social housing governance. 
They then go on to quote policy documents from the Westminster and Scottish 
governments that use the term ‘tenant involvement’ and ‘tenants to have a real 
say in the ownership and management of their houses’ (Pawson, et al., 2009: 
413) respectively. In Wales the policy has developed transfers to Community 
Housing Mutuals (CMH) ‘where tenants are the only shareholders’ (Pawson et 
al., 2009: 414). At this stage there are two points to be made about the 
perceived (acceptable) role of tenants according to policy-makers and 
researchers. Firstly, some of these terms are of a more recent vintage than 
others; for example, tenant involvement and empowerment have their roots in 
New Labour’s “Third Way” formulations (Giddens, 1998). Tenant participation 
on the other hand has roots stretching back to the 1970s and the experiments 
carried out by local authorities in bringing tenants onto housing committees 
(Richardson, 1983). There is a wide variation in practice such that in some 
cases tenants only had advisory powers on sub-committees or council 
committees. ‘In some cases, however, tenants have been given full voting 
powers as members of the housing committee or a housing sub-committee’ 
(Richardson, 1983: 35).  
Secondly, a central contention of this thesis is that the tenants as active 
participants (in making, remaking and exercising the accountability relations in 
the social housing sector) will, depending on the socio-historical context, 
challenge these conceptions of tenant involvement as advanced by neoliberal 
inspired reforms. The basis on which this challenge develops is in counter-
posing democratic control through traditional forms of accountability to the new 
forms of tenant involvement as conceptualised by governance (Rhodes, 1997). 
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3.4 Summary 
This section has analysed stock transfers on the basis of actual existing 
neoliberal reforms of public services and the state. The analysis utilised and 
adapted three related interpretations of this process in the form of 
dispossession of council housing (Harvey, 2005), restructuring of the sector 
(Ashman and Callinicos, 2006) and restructuring of democratic accountability 
and user involvement (Whitfield, 2006). All these arguments are concerned 
with the first element of the triadic research framework (i.e. the 
neoliberalisation of the state). The state has increasingly withdrawn from direct 
service provision (council housing); opening up former public assets and rental 
incomes to private financial institutions to profit from. In addition, the state has 
played a role of subsidising this process from the public purse. The 
neoliberalisation of the public services has also generated a 
reaction/contestation from civil society groups, as analysed in the next section. 
4. Reaction/Contestation 
4.1 Tenant-led civil society campaigns 
‘Tenants have to fill in a ballot form, but there’s only one candidate on the list. This 
sounds more like a medieval dictatorship than democracy’ 
(Gordon Brown, MP in 1996, quoted in HOCCGH Report, 2005)  
There is a crucial part missing from Pawson et al.’s (2009) formulations above, 
that of civil society as a site of opposition and resistance (Harvey, 2005; Sinha, 
2005) to the neoliberalisation of public services, in this case municipal housing. 
Thus, council housing tenants do not just comply with neoliberal desires for 
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governance by experts and elites (Harvey, 2005), and enter onto the boards of 
transfer housing associations. Some also seek to actively challenge the 
transfer in the first place. Portraying tenants as active agents of contestation 
has registered with very few housing researchers. One of the few is Watt 
(2008: 345) whose ‘... paper demonstrates how the housing campaign 
presented a counter hegemonic discourse of tenants as ‘ordinary people’’. This 
thesis also regards tenants as active agents. 
An illustration of the impact that tenants as active agents can have comes from 
the origination of the ballot that is needed for any stock transfer. As part of the 
Housing Act, 1988, the Conservative government introduced a scheme called 
Housing Action Trusts (HATs) whereby council housing estates were to be 
handed over to a development company that would have no statutory 
responsibilities or accountabilities; would not be bound to re-house tenants 
moved out while their estate was being redeveloped and would not have to 
keep the rents of the new houses at affordable levels. In July 1988 the 
government announced six HAT schemes78. The official motivation for the 
areas chosen was due to high concentrations of:  
poor quality public sector housing which have associated with them a combination of 
social, economic and environmental problems; a high level of crime and vandalism; high 
unemployment; a concentration of families with severe disadvantage and heavily 
dependent on income support; a low level of commercial and economic activity. 
(Department of the Environment consultation quoted in Ginsburg, 1989)  
Tenants in the proposed HATs areas took offence at what they saw as 
caricatures of their estates. In addition, there were no plans for consultation 
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with the tenants. This position was further inflamed when the minister, Nicolas 
Ridley, stated ‘if you are trying to help somebody ... you don’t want them to 
vote against that being done!’ (quoted in Ginsburg, 1989). Ridley’s declaration 
was a response to months of campaigning, lobbying and agitation by tenants 
in all six proposed HATs areas. One of the most vibrant groups was 
Sunderland Tenants Action – No Dictatorship (STAND), who a week before the 
third reading of the bill in the House of Commons lobbied parliament with 
signatures from 86 per cent of all affected tenants, calling for their right to vote 
on the proposal. Just before the third reading the government announced an 
amendment to allow tenants to be balloted before a HAT was set-up 
(Ginsburg, 1989). This apparently small concession, was firstly the culmination 
of months of campaigning by tenants; and secondly, was to have unforeseen 
implications for the stock transfer policy. In the same manner that working 
class men and women, from the Chartists to the Suffragettes, campaigned for, 
and won the right to vote (Foot, 2005), tenants in the HATs areas campaigned 
and won the right to decide who their landlord is. In the process they showed 
themselves as active agents that changed how accountability relations are 
exercised in the council housing sector. 
From its emergence LSVT has generated resistance from tenants and other 
civil society groups, for example Torbay in 1989. These campaigns were local 
and often isolated. However, in 1998 the Defend Council Housing (DCH) 
campaign was formed, by groups of activists who had been fighting local 
campaigns. The catalysts for DCH’s formation were twofold. Firstly, the 
election of the New Labour government the year before and their adoption of 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
183 | P a g e  
stock transfer as the key plank of their social housing policy. The new 
government talked of an end to council housing within a decade (Walker, 
2001) by setting a target of transferring 250,000 homes per annum. This policy 
led the local tenant activists to realise that they also needed to challenge the 
transfer policy at a national level. As Eileen Short, Chair of DCH explains:  
... we always say we fight locally and nationally. Locally we fight against privatisation, so 
that’s where the campaign has its roots. That’s where we started fighting privatisation in 
local areas, but we soon realised that we needed to compare notes with other people 
and learn lessons. And that we also needed, if we weren’t going to be worn into the 
ground just by an endless succession of privatisation campaigns, we needed to push ... 
nationally. We needed to push and demand fair financing for council housing, because 
that’s the only way to shut the door against privatisation. 
(Eileen Short, DCH) 
Since its formation DCH has built a broad-based campaign that uses a variety 
of tactics to oppose stock transfers and advance a case in support of the 
“Fourth Option” (DCH, 2003; 2006; 2008) of direct investment in local authority 
maintained housing stock79. The broad-based nature of the campaign has 
tenants at its core but also unites with local councillors, MPs and trade unions 
(both local and national). For example the national committee of DCH in 2011 
had tenants’ representatives from twelve80 different local areas in England and 
Wales and one MP (Austin Mitchell).  In addition, the ‘DCH Constitution also 
provides reserved spaces for TAROE (Tenants & Residents of England), 
Welsh Tenants Fed, Scottish Tenants Organisation and affiliated national trade 
unions which currently include CWU [Postal and communications workers], 
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 The other three options being those pursued by the government of ALMO, PFI and LSVT. 
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 Birmingham, Cambridge, Camden, Cornwall, Harlow, Lewisham, Mid-Glamorgan, Milton 
Keynes, Southwark, Taunton, Tower Hamlets and Winchester. 
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FBU [Fire-fighters], GMB [General workers], PCS [Civil servants], RMT [Rail 
workers], TSSA [Transport workers], UCATT [Building workers], UNISON 
[Public servants], UNITE [General workers]’81. DCH also has close links to the 
House of Commons Council Housing Group (HOCCHG) of back-bench MPs, 
some of whom have spoken at its conferences, for example Frank Dobson 
(Labour, 2008 and 2010) and Simon Hughes (Liberal Democrat, 2010). DCH 
supports local grass-roots campaigns against stock transfers; and additionally 
organises national events and campaigns including national conferences, 
lobbies of parliament and MPs, passing motions at union and the Labour Party 
conferences. The issues that DCH addresses have also broadened from a 
narrow focus on LSVTs to cover the financing of council housing as a whole, a 
critique of ALMOs and PFIs in council housing, the proposal to end life 
tenancies and fighting against far-right extremists’ attempts to increase racial 
tensions on estates.  
Further evidence of reaction and contestation is provided by a House of 
Commons Council Housing Group report (HOCCHG, 2009), based on 
evidence and testimony from council tenants and other civil society groups. 
The report sets out evidence of ‘... the biased nature of the stock transfer 
“consultation” process’ (HOCCGH, 2009: 49). These included, in South 
Cambridgeshire a local councillor describing the threats of cuts in services if 
transfer is not agreed, as ‘bullying pure and simple’. A number of local 
authorities had been the subject of complaints upheld by the Advertising 
Standards Agency that pro-transfer literature was misleading. District Audit on 
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two occasions found that the local authorities had unlawfully used public 
money to promote ‘unbalanced, one-sided and misleading’ material. There 
have also been two court cases where campaigners against a stock transfer 
(Parkside, Tower Hamlets) and an ALMO (Camden) challenged their local 
authorities for not following the ODPM guidelines. In both cases the relevant 
judges found that the guidelines did not need to be followed as there was no 
statutory requirement to do so (HOCCGH, 2009). These, and other examples 
forced the government to admit that ‘... local authorities are free to determine 
themselves tenant opinion (including how, when and if any ballot is conducted) 
and the fact that tenants are able to make representations during the whole 
process has brought the system into disrepute’ (DCLG, 2007: 134).  
Before the HATs schemes could be implemented a number of local authorities 
(including Chiltern and Torbay) used the provisions of disposal to a private 
landlord in the Housing Act 1985 to pursue stock transfers.  The 1985 Act does 
not set out how the tenants should be consulted or in what form – it was not 
until 2009 that the New Labour government actually sought to specify the 
conduct and form of consultations under the 1985 Act provisions (DCLG, 
2009). In these circumstances Chiltern and Torbay authorities followed the 
guidance under the Tenants’ Choice policy, where ‘... it is assumed that non-
voters are in favour of transfer’ (Ginsburg, 1989: 66-67). Ginsburg goes on to 
explain the implications for the vote in Torbay:  
In Torbay however the opponents of transfer actively mobilised tenants’ support: 787 
tenants voted in favour of transfer, 2,210 voted against and 2,209 abstained. The 
council asked the government to approve the transfer after counting the abstentions as 
votes in favour as prescribed under the Act. Nicholas Ridley, the Environment 
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Secretary, responded by asking the council to hold another ballot because the first one 
had failed ’to provide a clear enough expression of tenants’ views’. (The Guardian, 
January 25th,1989). 
(Ginsburg, 1989: 67) 
Since the late 1980s it has become custom and practice82 to hold a ballot 
although it is not a legal requirement (ODPM, 2004b: 67). This position has led 
to a lack of clarity about the form and content of the consultation and approval 
by tenants. This is an on-going feature of some transfers (see the English and 
Scottish cases below). The HOCCHG report in 2005 highlighted a range of 
problems with ballots for both stock transfers and ALMOs (HOCCGH, 2005: 
32). Moving the proposed date of the ballot is the most frequently used tactic; 
as well as repeated ballots in response to rejections. In addition, the local 
authority can decide to break-up its housing stock and pursue partial-stock 
transfers. The effect is that the local authority can draw their own boundary 
lines. For example, the London Borough of Camden balloted all its tenants on 
the proposal to transfer to an ALMO, which was rejected, and subsequently 
balloted the tenants of a single estate on a PFI scheme; that was also rejected.  
Not only has the LSVT process been brought into disrepute there are structural 
resource and information asymmetries built into the process. ‘A council will 
typically spend around £500,000 to promote a large-scale stock transfer’ 
(HOCCGH, 2009: 49)83. A case outlined in the report concerns Salford council 
which had budgeted to spend £10 million on its stock options process. The 
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 ‘A ballot is considered a good way of establishing tenants views, although we are willing to 
consider other methods’, the Housing Transfer Manual (ODPM, 2004b: 63). 
83
 This figure is likely to be an underestimation given the amounts spent in the case studies 
below. 
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anti-transfer campaigns are not allowed access to public funds and so are 
reliant on fundraising and donations, usually from local trade union branches. 
This is another example of using public money to smooth the transfer of public 
assets out of the public control. A second asymmetry concerns access to the 
addresses of those homes that are covered by the proposed transfer. Initially, 
anti-transfer campaigners were not allowed access to the addresses of the 
council homes that were to be transferred. This presented an obvious hurdle in 
delivering anti-transfer publicity to the relevant tenants. However two cases 
(Braintree District Council, 2007 and Mid-Devon District Council, 2006) brought 
under the Freedom of Information Act set the precedent that anti-transfer 
campaigners were allowed access to the addresses. These asymmetries of 
information and resources, and issues related to the execution of the ballots 
feature in the cases studies below. 
4.2 Summary 
These last two sections (3 and 4) have taken key elements of the research 
framework (Neoliberalisation – Reaction/Contestation) developed at the end of 
chapter 3 and applied them to the development of the LSVT policy in England. 
On a national level, it has provided evidence to support accumulation by 
dispossession, restructuring of the sector and of user involvement. Further 
there has been an outlining of the reaction/contestation that tenant-led civil 
society campaigns have pursued, including the House of Commons Council 
Housing Group (HOCCGH) and Defend Council Housing (DCH) campaign. 
The impact of these changes and the contestation they have generated will be 
explored further in the local case studies, in chapters 5 to 8. These sections 
have in passing addressed the third element of the framework – reproduction 
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or transformation of accountability relationships – with evidence of the 
successful anti-HATs campaigns leading to tenants being balloted over a 
change in their landlord. This third element is addressed in more detail in the 
local case studies. 
5. Social Housing and devolution 
Housing is a devolved responsibility of the Scottish Government and the Welsh 
Assembly Government (WAG). The devolution settlement in 1999 produced 
similarities and differences in both Scotland and Wales. The major difference is 
that the Scottish Government can pass primary legislation in devolved areas, 
such as housing; whereas, the WAG must work within the legislative 
framework passed for England and Wales84. The main similarity concerns 
finance, where HM Treasury set the overall budget for each devolved 
government; although ‘... the priority given to housing expenditure within those 
budget constraints is entirely a matter for the devolved administrations’ 
(Wilcox, 2009b: 13). On that basis the remainder of this chapter sets out the 
history (both pre and post-devolution) of stock transfers in Scotland and Wales; 
and the development of alternative policy emphases. This is achieved by 
utilising the framework applied to the English experience above. The aim is to 
set the context for the two case studies in chapters 7 and 8, as well as 
illustrating that the same neoliberal inspired reform trends can be identified in 
the devolved administrations. 
5.1 Stock transfer in Scotland 
5.1.1 Policy development  
                                            
84
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The divergence between Scotland and England on stock transfers precedes 
devolution. The Housing (Scotland) Act 1987 played a similar role to the 
English Act of the same year, in terms of expanding the scope and 
rationalising the existing provisions allowing stock transfers (Scottish 
Parliament, 1999). In April 1989 Scottish Homes (a Quango) was established 
with similar powers to the Housing Corporation acting as a regulator and 
funder for social housing provision. However, Scottish Homes also inherited 
74,500 homes from the Scottish Special Housing Association. This inheritance 
took place on the basis that the homes were to be transferred to a range of 
alternative landlords. In the ten years to 1999 almost 40,000 homes had been 
transferred to 90 different landlords (Scottish Homes, 1999). In comparison 
transfers from local authority housing stock have been comparatively small 
with only 22,866 between 1980 and 1997/98 (Scottish Parliament, 1999: 13-
14); during the same period there were over 322,000 RtB sales.  
The council housing transfers at this early stage were a response to the policy 
framework established and developed from the 1987 White Paper ‘Housing: 
The Government’s Proposals for Scotland’. The White Paper drew on familiar 
themes of the dominance of public sector housing leading to a lack of choice, 
unresponsive management service, unsuitable housing design and disrepair. 
The government’s proposed remedies included increasing capacity; 
partnerships between public and private sectors; and, a reduction in local 
authority housing funding (Scottish Parliament, 1999).  Notably, and in contrast 
to the English procedure, the stock transfers that took place under this 
framework had a strong competitive element, with transfer landlords being 
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chosen through a bidding process85. With the election of the New Labour 
government in 1997 a new impetus was given to promote stock transfers using 
a ‘community ownership’ model.  As Goodlad (2000) points out there is no 
definition of community ownership. However the Scottish Office Development 
Department stated: 'The aim is that the housing will be owned and managed 
by a non-profit making, community landlord body with tenants represented on 
the board or management committee' (Scottish Office Development 
Department, 1999: 9). This policy was promoted by the use of New Housing 
Partnerships (NHP) (Scottish Parliament, 1999). The NHP policy was backed 
by significant funding. In 1997-98 £10 million was allocated to encourage 
partnership working; in 1998-99 £35 million and in the period 1999-2002 the 
government made £278 million available as part of the programme (Scottish 
Parliament, 1999). This funding was used for a range of activities including 
development and regeneration partnerships (£120 million), feasibility studies 
and options appraisals (£33 million) and post-transfer residual debt write-offs 
(£125 million) (Scottish Federation of Housing Associations, 1999). 
One council housing stock transfer dominates the development and 
implementation of the policy in Scotland, Glasgow City Council’s in 2003 
(Pawson, 2009). In part this is due to the size of the transfer involved, 81,366 
homes (Audit Scotland, 2006: 55), making it the single biggest stock transfer in 
Britain. It also took over four years from when the council first decided to 
pursue transfer to completion. The transfer aimed to unlock £1.3 billion in 
investment over the following decade and result in the achievement of the 
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competitive bidding process’ (Scottish Parliament, 1999: 17). 
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Scottish Homes Quality Standard (SHQS) and 13,000 new homes for rent 
(Audit Scotland, 2006). The impact of the Glasgow transfer defined the 
Scottish Executive’s development of the stock transfer policy. For example an 
Audit Scotland (2006) report criticises the NHP for a lack of prior planning and 
specifically the absence of pilot projects in Glasgow. The Scottish Executive’s 
justification was that the condition of the Glasgow housing stock was so poor 
that any pilot scheme would cause an unwarranted delay86. Further the 
Glasgow transfer and its post-transfer problems were to play a role in the 
Scottish case study influencing the ballot outcome87.  
5.1.2 Neoliberalisation – Privatisation, dispossession and restructuring 
The question of privatisation comes out strongly in the reviews of government 
policy on housing in Scotland at this time (Scottish Parliament, 1999: Goodlad, 
2000). The government appears to consciously wish to deny of any suggestion 
that stock transfer represents a form of privatisation. Their justification for this 
position was that the NHPs are non-profit distributing; the management board 
will be directly representative of all elements of the local community; and 
tenant involvement is seen as crucial (Scottish Parliament, 1999). Goodlad 
points out that the use of the term “community ownership” is an attempt to ‘... 
extend the experience of community-based associations and avoid 
accusations of privatisation ...’ (Goodlad, 2000: 1). Thus, the deployment of the 
community ownership rhetoric had a dual intention. A Scottish Parliament 
research report adds to this sense of duality by stating that: 
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 ‘The Executive felt that an approach involving pilot projects would have taken years longer 
and would not be defensible given the requirement for investment to tackle the urgent 
problems of social housing in Glasgow’ (Audit Scotland, 2006: 2). 
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 See chapter 7. 
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Transfer was designed primarily to facilitate investment, although in discussions on the 
ground local control was often given as a rationale for transfer. 
(Scottish Parliament, 1999: 35) 
The NHP programme saw the transfer of over 100,000 council homes in nine 
local authority areas. This meant that by 2003, 29 local authorities retained 
over 350,000 homes, a fall of 49 per cent since 1994 (Audit Scotland, 2006: 4). 
From 1998 to 2006 the Scottish Executive has spent £258 million on these 
programmes, while HM Treasury has provided debt write-off support to the 
tune of £1.3 billion. This has been used to address the estimated £7.5 billion in 
repairs and improvements needed (Audit Scotland, 2006: 2). Audit Scotland 
analysed seven completed transfers under the NHP programme and found 
that a total of £59 million was spent on transfer costs (such as tenant 
communication, legal fees and business planning) (Audit Scotland, 2006: 16). 
Further, to make the figures work in the Glasgow LSVT, HM Treasury agreed 
to write-off the historic debt and breakage costs88 totalling £1.1 billion89 (Audit 
Scotland, 2006; Wilcox, 2009b). In addition the Scottish Executive out of their 
own funding agreed to provide a grant of £409 million for thirty years (in 
constant prices) (Audit Scotland, 2005: 55). 
The Scottish government cites the availability of affordable finance from banks 
and building societies as ‘the critical factor’ in the success of partnership 
working in housing (Scottish Parliament, 1999: 25, emphasis in the original). In 
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 Breakage costs are more commonly known as early redemption fees and arise from exiting 
loan facilities before their full term has expired. 
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 Audit Scotland point out that because of the nature of public loans and financing this writing-
off of historic debt by the Treasury ‘... has no real resource cost in economic terms’ and in 
effect ‘... reflects a transfer of funds from one part of the public sector to another ...’ (Audit 
Scotland, 2006: 38). 
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1998 the Scottish Office reported that over £1 billion of private finance had 
been leveraged into the social housing sector as a result of stock transfers 
(Scottish Office, 1998). These private funds have also been underwritten by 
£381 million in public funding between 1989 and 1996/97 (Scottish Parliament, 
1999). 
In Scotland, the overall stock of social rented homes has been in decline 
during the decade since devolution, from over 745,000 homes in 1998 to 
608,000 in 2007 (Wilcox, 2009a: Table 17a). Within this declining trend local 
authority housing stock has reduced more dramatically, with housing 
associations benefiting. Thus, in 1998 local authority and housing association 
stock numbers were 630,000 and 115,000 respectively. By 2007 the 
equivalent numbers were 347,000 and 261,000 respectively (Wilcox, 2009a: 
Table 17a). The decline in total social housing stock has been the product of 
right to buy sales, both from local authority stock and to a lesser degree from 
housing association stock, outstripping the new builds which are predominantly 
in the housing association sector90 (Wilcox, 2009b). In the years since 
devolution the gross housing investment has increased in both cash and real 
terms such that in 1997/98 £727 million was invested, which rose to £1,042 
million in 2006/0791 (Wilcox, 2009a: Table 80). This does raise the question, 
why is there a continuing decline in the social rented housing stock. The rate of 
decline in the rented social housing stock has reduced in the years since 2005, 
but this has in the most part been the result of a collapse in the right to buy 
sales – from 13,033 in 2005 to 2,151 in 2009 (Pawson and Wilcox, 2011: 
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 These trends are also evident in the Scottish case, see SCHA business plan (2005: 24-25). 
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 Figures calculated using a GDP deflator index with 2007/08 prices as the base year. 
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Table 20c). Thus, it appears that the slower rate of reduction in social rented 
housing stock is a result of fewer homes being lost to the sector (through right 
to buy) rather than an increase in the total housing stock as a result of the 
increased investment. It should be noted that the post-devolution trend has 
been a break from the long-term decline in investment, with 1997/98 
representing the low point. For comparison, at the time that stock transfers 
were beginning in 1987/88 the equivalent gross housing investment in 
Scotland was £1,620 million92 (Wilcox, 2009a: Table 80) over double the 
1997/98 level.  
The restructuring of democratic accountability and user involvement has taken 
a different flavour in Scotland; although, in a similarity to the English 
experience, Audit Scotland stressed the primary role of stock transfer is to 
leverage private finance into the public housing sector to enable improvements 
in the housing stock (Audit Scotland, 2006: 18). Other roles such as improved 
tenant participation and community empowerment therefore become 
secondary. The model developed in Scotland prior to devolution saw ‘small-
scale, locally focussed and tenant controlled’ aspects of the transfer process to 
the fore (Wilcox, 2009b: 27).  This meant, in contrast to the English 
experience, that ‘... 49 per cent of existing registered organisations [with 
Scottish Homes93] have a majority of tenants on their boards’ (Scottish 
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 See previous note. 
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 Social housing regulation in Scotland has gone through a number of different forms since 
the creation of Scottish Homes in 1989 as a funder, regulator and provider. In November 2001 
Communities Scotland replaced Scottish Homes but only carried on the functions of funding 
and regulation. In April 2008 Communities Scotland was abolished with a new arms-length 
executive agency (The Scottish Housing Regulator) covering regulation set-up in its place. In 
April 2011 the role and functioning of the regulator was again revised with the establishment of 
The New Scottish Housing Regulator. 
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Parliament, 1999: 26). This figure includes all registered housing associations, 
not just those created form stock transfers. 
Audit Scotland state on several occasions that ‘transfers have increased 
tenant control’ (Audit Scotland, 2006: 3; see also pages 23, 25 and 30). The 
evidence provided comes from a survey of tenants’ groups carried out by Audit 
Scotland as part of their investigation. They report that ‘... 57 per cent of 
respondents with experience of transfer felt it had brought a big improvement’ 
(Audit Scotland, 2006: 23) in participation. There are a number of points that 
need to be raised in relation to this figure. First, there is no definition of what 
tenant participation94 is or means. Further the terms tenant participation, tenant 
control and tenant empowerment are used inter-changeably in the report. 
Second, the survey also shows that 36 per cent felt there was no difference or 
that participation had worsened post-transfer. Third, it appears that the manner 
in which the question was set in the survey could lead to a skewed response. 
The results are reported in four categories (Big improvement, No difference, 
Worse than before and No response). The use of the adjective “Big” here 
allows the reported result to have an accentuated impact. Further, from a 
separate question they report that ‘... only 35 per cent of respondents believed 
they are involved as equal partners in the decision-making process’ of their 
landlord (Audit Scotland, 2006: 34). Ultimately none of the foregoing is an 
attempt to deny that improvements in tenant participation may have occurred 
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 For England, DCLG carried out a consultation on “Tenant Empowerment” in 2007. While in 
the initial consultation document there is no definition of the term tenant empowerment it does 
state the following: “people should be empowered and supported to control their lives, trusted 
to be consulted and, where they want to be, involved in running services used by the whole 
community” (DCLG, 2007: 10). The main thrust of the consultation document is in the direction 
of reviving the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) and Right to Manage policies that 
have been in place since the late 1980s but had little impact on the council housing stock as a 
whole. 
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following stock transfers; however, it is difficult to sustain such a claim based 
on the evidence provided. Further, the critique in this thesis is based on a 
qualitative change in the social relations between the mass of tenants and their 
landlord, which moves from democratic control, to a corporate governance 
model where tenant board members are not allowed to represent a particular 
constituency (i.e. the ordinary tenants) but must put the interests of the transfer 
organisation first. Furthermore, Audit Scotland (2006) also identify occasions 
where there has been problems with the operating of the management boards 
in transfer organisations (see Glasgow example). McKee’s (2009) research 
into the Glasgow stock transfer in 2003, found that despite the stated 
motivation for stock transfer being ‘community ownership’ and ‘tenant 
empowerment’, there was a lack of awareness of this among lay tenants, who 
had more tangible concerns such as investment in repairs and maintenance.  
Audit Scotland also report limitations in a key accountability mechanism, 
concerning the form of the promises made to tenants prior to the transfer:  
Councils do not appear to be well-placed to enforce guarantees to tenants in the case of 
any non-performance by the new landlord. In such cases, the remedy available to the 
council under the transfer contract would be a claim for damages. It seems doubtful that 
this remedy can be effective since, ultimately, tenants would pay any claim for damages 
upheld against the landlord. 
(Audit Scotland, 2006: 45) 
One of the key promises made during each stock transfer concerns future rent 
levels. Housing association rents are usually higher than local authority rents. 
As this is widely known amongst tenants, most stock transfer proposals include 
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a Rent Promise. This promise is designed to reassure tenants that there will 
not be excessive rent rises post-transfer. However, a review of the research on 
this issue found that there are a number of qualifications in rent promises that 
‘have provided scope for rents to rise at rates somewhat in excess of those 
implicit in headline ballot commitments ... without any technical breach of 
undertakings’ (Pawson and Mullins, 2010: 204). This making, breaking and 
monitoring of a rent promise is particularly relevant to the English case study 
below (see chapter 6). 
A further legal difference between the English and Scottish approaches 
concerns the status of consultation and the position of Recognised Tenants’ 
Organisations (RTOs). In Scotland, following the Housing Act 2001 RTOs are 
legally recognised partners for tenant participation and consultation. In 2005 
there were 604 RTOs on the regulator’s database ranging in size from less 
than ten members to over 15,000 tenants. (Audit Scotland, 2006: 48). This 
legal position leads to a different relationship between the local state and 
tenant organisations. In Scotland, the strategy adopted by the state towards 
tenants’ organisations has been less confrontational, than in England (see 
chapter 6), and more based on working together. This is not to say that 
working together as equal partners has developed in Scotland; rather that the 
tenants’ movement and organisations in Scotland have been less curtailed 
than in England. These points will be highlighted in the Scottish case (chapter 
7).  
The Glasgow stock transfer illustrates the tensions inherent between tenant 
participation and the corporate governance model used in transfer housing 
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associations.  The approach to governance of transfer housing associations in 
Scotland has allowed more variation within a common framework than exists in 
England. For example there is a variety of legal forms among Scottish transfer 
housing associations and, until 2000 at least95, many associations saw up to 
half of their board members drawn from tenants. The GHA management 
committee was set-up with a third tenants, a third council nominees and a third 
independent representatives. As in England, these committee members are 
not there to represent a constituency but must put the interests of the housing 
association first (Audit Scotland, 2006: 32). This led to an episode where: 
In May 2004, GHA’s Management Committee voted to remove two of its members 
because of conduct which did not comply with GHA’s Code of Conduct for its members 
and other rules. One of the issues was a conflict these members perceived between 
what they believed was their duty to tenants and their obligation as members to act 
always in the best interests of the organisation. 
(Audit Scotland, 2006: 68) 
5.1.3 Reaction/Contestation – civil society campaigns 
In Scotland, there has been opposition from civil society to the transfer dating 
back to the 1990s, including the high profile Glasgow stock transfer96. In 1999, 
a Scottish Parliament report noted that there has been ‘... opposition from 
parts of the tenants’ movement and from public sector unions to any form of 
transfer’ (Scottish Parliament, 1999: 33). The motivation for this opposition 
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 In 2000 the Scottish Executive issued guidance on the organisational form and governance 
of stock transfer landlords. One element of which was an attempt to standardise the board 
formation along the same lines as the English associations with tenants comprising a third of 
the governing body (Audit Scotland, 2006: 31)  
96
 For accounts of the Glasgow campaigns against stock transfer see Mooney and Poole 
(2005), and McKee (2009). 
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arises from allegations of privatisation, security of employment and tenants 
rights post transfer (Scottish Parliament, 1999). The early stock transfers from 
Scottish Homes also generated opposition and contestation from tenants and 
other groups (Goodlad, 2000). Goodlad reports that by 1996 ‘... tenants had 
already voted against transfer proposals in a few cases ...’ (Goodlad, 1999: 
125); and a campaign group called “Freedom of Choice” (FoC), which 
represented tenants, had been formed and ‘... was achieving a profile among 
tenants and at conferences across the country’ (Goodlad, 1999: 125). In a 
similarity with the anti-HATs campaigns in England, FoC’s main campaign aim 
was to allow the Scottish Homes tenants the choice of transferring to a local 
authority, if they had to transfer at all.   
5.1.4 Summary 
The purpose of this section has been to set out the context and development 
of council housing stock transfers in Scotland, using the research framework 
developed in chapter 3. It should be noted that the same generative 
mechanisms and tendencies were at work in the Scottish context as in 
England (i.e. the reduction in funding followed by a policy thrust to leverage 
private finance into the social housing sector). Despite this there are some 
specific differences in the manner in which stock transfers have developed in 
Scotland; the major one being the use of community ownership. The first stock 
transfers in Scotland developed on a localised basis with a strong emphasis on 
the tenants taking a lead role. However, the approach of the Scottish 
Government has been much more closely allied to the generic English model, 
but has also consciously used the rhetoric and some elements of the earlier 
transfers. There are two other important themes from this review that are 
Stewart Smyth 
200 | P a g e  
 
relevant to the case studies below. The first concerns the claims of increased 
and enhanced tenant participation / control / empowerment made by 
supporters of stock transfer. This includes not just tenant board members but 
the whole governance system of transfer housing associations (e.g. regulation 
and the legal contract with the local authority). Secondly, the whole policy 
context in Scotland has been dominated by the preparation, transfer and post-
transfer experience of the housing stock in Glasgow. All these themes97 will 
feature as elements of the Scottish case study (chapter 7). 
5.2 Stock transfer in Wales 
5.2.1 Policy development 
While, housing in Wales is a devolved responsibility of the Welsh Assembly 
Government (WAG), the scope for deviations from the Westminster policy is 
much more restricted than in the Scottish case98. It is the Westminster 
government that sets the financial parameters for the devolved assembly and 
in the case of housing has stipulated that borrowing funds which increase the 
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) is unacceptable (National 
Assembly for Wales, 2001). Thus, local authorities in Wales are not allowed to 
borrow but housing associations are, as they fall outside of the PSBR. This is 
in contrast to Scottish local authorities who have the ability to borrow since 
2004 (Perry, 2009).  The National Assembly for Wales Policy Review of 
Housing Stock Transfer states as its first recommendation that the WAG 
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 These are – the role of finance, the rhetoric of tenant participation and empowerment, and 
the contestation by tenant-led civil society campaigns. 
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 Housing is Field 11 of Schedule 5 to the Government for Wales Act 2006 (National 
Assembly for Wales, 2008). The devolution settlement under the Government for Wales Act 
2006, allows for the National Assembly of Wales to make an “Assembly Measure” which add 
to or vary the legislation passed in Westminster. Assembly Measures can only be made in 
specific “Fields” of policy. Housing is one such field. 
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should challenge this restriction on borrowing (National Assembly for Wales, 
2001). Gwenda Thomas, AM and Chair of the committee which produced the 
report states in the Foreword: 
... the Committee feels that the most straightforward option would be a change in local 
government finance system to allow councils to borrow on the same terms as housing 
association. In the absence of such a change, the Committee’s view is that stock 
transfer, with appropriate safeguards for tenants, should continue to be an option 
available to local authorities for modernising their housing stock. 
(National Assembly for Wales, 2001: i) 
Thus, the WAG has adopted a policy of stock transfer with the aim of 
implementing the policy in a way that differentiates the Welsh approach to the 
discredited stock transfer policy in England (National Assembly for Wales, 
2001). The stated priorities for the WAG is the achievement of the Welsh 
Homes Quality Standard99, enhancing tenant engagement and allowing the 
choice of courses of action to be taken at the local authority level. However it is 
worth re-stating that in the absence of the ability to increase public borrowing 
the over-riding priority has been to attract private finance into the social 
housing sector. 
In a similar manner to the development of stock transfer in England, the Welsh 
experience is of sporadic and uncoordinated transfers occurring through the 
1980s and 1990s. The current system governing stock transfers only started 
transferring significant stock from 2003. This process has been intensified with 
the adoption of the Welsh Housing Quality Standard (WHQS) in 2004. Unlike 
the position in England, ALMOs have not been adopted by the WAG as they 
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 This is the Welsh equivalent of the Decent Homes standard for England. 
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are not considered financially viable; ‘... this means there are only two options 
for meeting WHQS: stock retention or stock transfer’ (National Assembly for 
Wales, 2008). In 2003, Bridgend County Borough Council was the first 
municipal authority to complete a stock transfer under the current LSVT 
regulations (National Assembly for Wales, 2008). However, the first estate 
transfer occurred in 1991 when 200 homes were transferred to Clwyd Alyn 
Housing Association. The WAG adopted the WHQS with a target for 
achievement of 2012, based on a survey of the housing stock condition in 
2004 the WAG estimate that only 0.8 per cent met the WHQS (National 
Assembly for Wales, 2008). 
5.2.2 Neoliberalisation – dispossession and restructuring 
The same trends observed in other jurisdictions are also evident in Wales. 
Table 1 shows some summary statistics covering England, Scotland and 
Wales and illustrates the similarities between all three, and especially between 
England and Wales. In the twenty years since the introduction of LSVT to 
2008, 62,000 homes have been transferred out of local authority control in 
Wales, representing 24 per cent of the council housing stock using 1988 as a 
base year. This compares to 28 per cent transferred in England and 22 per 
cent transferred in Scotland (Pawson, 2009).  
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Table 3: Stock transfers in Great Britain 1988-2008 – summary statistics 
 Stock Transferred 
1988-2008 
Post-transfer local 
authorities in 2009 
Stock transfer housing 












% of social 
housing 
England 1,140 28 167 47 1,007 26 
Wales 62 24 10 45 53 24 
Scotland 193 22 6 19 134 22 
Source: Pawson (2009: 24) 
The council housing stock in Wales was in a considerably worse condition 
when compared to that of the early stock transfers in rural southern England, 
requiring significant public funds in the form of over-hanging debt write offs and 
dowries100. The local authority stock transfers completed by 2008 cost a total 
of £323 million in debt write-offs and breakage costs (Pawson, 2009). For the 
transfers completed by early 2009 the annual dowry101 funding was £28 million 
and the WAG had projected a total of £821 million to cover dowries over the 
next five year period (Pawson, 2009). Wilcox (2009b) states that in 2008/09 
gross social housing investment rose to its highest level in 15 years in real 
terms. The figures used by Wilcox exclude funds from the private sector. This 
level of funding does not represent a renewed financial settlement for council 
housing in Wales as the increased funds are in large part being distributed by 
quangos (such as the Homes and Communities Agency) to the housing 
association sector (Wilcox, 2009b).  
In Wales there are a range of alternative transfer organisation models that 
could be adopted. The WAG was concerned that there were ownership and 
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 The equivalent of gap funding in England. 
101
 In Wales this funding was paid to transfer housing association through the Major Repairs 
Allowance via the local authority that transferred the housing stock. 
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democratic deficits involved with the traditional model used in England 
(National Assembly for Wales, 2001; 2008). In their place the WAG 
encouraged the development of a Community Ownership model. The 
Community Ownership (CO) model has a focus on developing wider benefits 
for the local community. For example, any surpluses generated by a CO 
organisation are recycled into regeneration projects, mortgage rescue and 
equity release schemes. In a further development there is the Community 
Mutual (CM) model, where ‘Unlike existing models ... not only is the business 
conducted for the benefit of the community, but the organisation is also owned 
by the community’ (AWICS, 2008). With the CM model the local authority 
housing passes to the tenants, collectively, as they are the only shareholders 
in the new housing mutual (Pawson, 2009). One of the key differences 
between the CM and CO models is that the former has a default facility where 
all tenants are members (unless they choose to opt out), whereas in the latter 
tenants must apply and pay a (nominal) fee to become members (AWICS, 
2008). Despite the CM model being advanced as a “Welsh Solution”, ‘... it 
should be recognised that only five of the first ten stock transfer associations 
which will have been established in Wales by 2010, have been set-up on this 
basis’ (Pawson, 2009: 27-28). The Welsh case study (chapter 8) analyses one 
such CM housing association. 
5.2.3 Reaction/Contestation – civil society campaigns 
Out of the three jurisdictions Wales has experienced the lowest level of 
opposition and campaigning against stock transfer. This is in part due to the 
stock transfer policy developing later in Wales and in part the lack of a major 
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city whole stock transfer (such as Birmingham or Glasgow) acting as a focal 
point. However, there has been anti-transfer tenant-led campaigns some of 
which have stopped the privatisation of their homes by winning a “No” majority 
in the ballot, for example Swansea in March 2007 and Caerphilly County 
Borough Council in February 2012.  
5.2.4 Summary 
The experience of stock transfer in Wales shows the same broad trajectory as 
in Scotland and England. While there are some noteworthy differences in the 
timing of policy development and the development of the Community Mutual 
model, the fundamental driver for stock transfer in Wales is the need to 
leverage private finance into the social housing sector to achieve the WHQS. 
This is the result of political decisions taken by HM Treasury in Westminster 
that restricts the borrowing capacity of local authorities in England and Wales. 
As is the case with the other jurisdictions these neoliberal reforms have also 
generated opposition from tenants and civil society groups, even if there has 
been a lack of a single defining transfer campaign (such as Glasgow in 
Scotland). 
6. Conclusion 
While their importance can sometimes be overstated, financial considerations have 
been the single most important underlying driver of the stock transfer process. 
(Pawson, 2009: 28) 
While not seeking to overstate the role of financial considerations to the 
exclusion of all others, there is a primary importance to the manner in which 
the neoliberal state has used finance, driven by the Westminster government 
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priorities, to reform and restructure council housing. It is the need for access to 
additional funding and the limited choices that the Westminster government 
has allowed that has forced local authorities across all three jurisdictions to 
pursue (willingly or not) stock transfer. This is clearly illustrated by the quote 
from Gwenda Thomas (AM) above and the dual aspects in which the policy 
has been pursued in Scotland. It should also be remembered that the need for 
additional finance has been generated from the long-term underfunding and 
cuts in expenditure for council housing, resulting in the backlog of repairs 
estimated to be £19 billion in England alone at the start of the Decent Homes 
programme (NAO, 2010). This led to the position where there were backlogs of 
repairs amounting to billions of pounds worth of work. Thus the government’s 
implementation of the neoliberal roll-back/roll-out dynamic has been to starve 
council housing of funding, create a crisis position and then use that crisis to 
restructure and reform the sector according to neoliberal principles.  
The processes described above have their roots in the ideological 
perspectives adopted by the successive British governments since the mid-
1970s102. Alongside the right-to-buy policy, the restriction on local authorities’ 
ability to borrow against future rental streams has been a key generative 
mechanism in reforming the sector. This restriction comes from a purely 
ideological basis as it depends upon a definition applied by the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS) in calculating the PSBR, which includes local 
authorities and quangos, but excludes housing associations (despite the public 
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subsidy needed for many stock transfers to take place). Perry (2009) points out 
that with the use of this definition the UK is out of step with the rest of Europe. 
By approaching stock transfer policy through an analytical framework based on 
the critique of neoliberalism, it is possible to demystify the rhetoric around 
tenant participation and empowerment, and uncover the generative 
mechanisms driving stock transfer policy. The policy-makers have not 
presented the policy purely in terms of the need to access private finance. The 
stock transfer policy is also presented as enabling and improving tenant 
involvement and empowerment (however ill-defined these concepts are). Thus 
the stock transfer housing associations have tenants on the board (although, 
usually in a minority), and are required to involve tenants in decision-making 
processes (usually through consultative and focus groups). The weaknesses in 
this model have led to the development of the community mutual model in 
Wales where tenants can effectively act like shareholders in a company and 
hold the board to account using corporate governance mechanisms. And, in 
Scotland there is the use of rhetoric around community ownership models.  
Finally, this chapter has also identified a reaction to the neoliberalisation of 
council housing service, in the form of contestation from the civil society 
campaigns. This opposition operates at two levels. First, at the national level 
where groups such as DCH, campaign and lobby in defence of direct funding 
of housing through local authorities. Second, there has been opposition at a 
local level where tenants and other civil society organisations have 
campaigned against proposed LSVTs. This local opposition can be found 
across all three jurisdictions with examples of tenants securing “No” votes in 
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ballots and thus reproducing democratic accountability relations with their 
landlords.  
This chapter has in the main addressed two of the research objectives – to 
explore and evaluate the impact of neoliberal market reforms on public 
services and related accountability relations; and, to demonstrate how these 
reforms have generated opposition/resistance in the form of civil society 
campaigns – with a greater emphasis on the former rather than the latter. 
These two research objectives correspond to the Neoliberalisation and 
Reaction/Contestation elements of the research framework. Only in passing 
has the third element (of Reproduction or Transformation) been addressed in 
this chapter. The steps in the argument started with showing the central role 
that finance has played in restructuring and reforming the delivery of social 
housing. The result of which has been a move of housing stock out of local 
authority control to private not-for-profit housing associations. In the process 
the accountability relations change with a move to a corporate governance 
model from a democratic accountability model. The process of reform and 
restructuring has also generated resistance and opposition at both local and 
national levels through tenant-led campaigns that involve civil society 
organisations. And it has been noted that in a minority of cases through these 
campaigns tenants have reproduced existing democratic accountability 
relations. All these elements are explored further in the local case studies 
below.  
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CHAPTER 6 
English case study 
1. Introduction103 
This chapter examines the first of three case studies covering local stock 
transfer campaigns. This case study concerns a partial stock transfer in a 
northern city in England, where the tenants voted in favour of transfer. The 
stock transfer generated a significant tenant-led civil society anti-transfer 
campaign. Northern City Council (NCC) was relatively late in addressing the 
requirements of the Decent Homes standard, although the poor condition of 
the stock had been known for some time.  In 2000/01 NCC carried out a stock 
condition survey which found that of its 61,570 homes, 66 per cent did not 
meet the Decent Homes Standard104. It was not until 18 February, 2004 that 
the council executive endorsed the Housing Investment Options Strategy105 
and later still, in September 2005 agreed a delivery plan106.  
This date is significant as the council leaders (officials and politicians) will have 
been aware of the failed Birmingham whole stock transfer. Following, the 
Birmingham rejection the government changed their advice to councils to avoid 
whole stock proposals. Thus, NCC set out a strategy of breaking up the 
housing stock and pursuing a range of ALMOs, PFIs and LSVTs. The transfer 
in this case study was not the first time NCC had used the policy; they had 
                                            
103
 A version of this case study was published in Critical Social Policy in February 2013 
(Smyth, 2013a). 
104
 NCC Housing Strategy (2004-07: 46). 
105
 NCC Executive minutes (12 Sept 2007). 
106
 NCC Executive minutes (20 Dec 2006). 
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pursued stock transfers since 1996. However, it did generate the most 
organised tenants’ opposition in the city. In total there had been 19 partial 
stock transfers before the transfer to SW Housing Trust Ltd. (SW) in 2007. The 
majority of these transfers had been in the overspill estates in neighbouring 
local authorities and with the exception of two transfers all involved 3,000 or 
fewer homes; some transferring less than 100 homes. SW is the transfer 
housing association, covering 6,000 homes, set up following a tenant ballot, 
with a 73 per cent turnout and a 59 per cent vote in favour107.  
Applying the research framework developed at the end of chapter 3, this case 
study is divided into three sections covering the neoliberalisation process of 
the local council housing (section 2); reaction/contestation by a civil society 
campaign and the reactions of the local state to this challenge (section 3); and 
finally the reproduction or transformation of the accountability relations (section 
4). The chapter concludes with a short discussion and summary (section 5). 
The chapter illustrates how the triadic research framework can be used to 
identify and analyse the generative mechanisms, social structures and agents 
that make, re-make and exercise accountability relations. 
2. Neoliberalisation 
The neoliberalisation of public services has been theorised in two ways – the 
roll-back/roll-out dynamic (Peck and Tickell, 2002) and a series of related 
processes – accumulation by dispossession, restructuring of services and 
restructuring of democratic accountability. This section illustrates these 
theorisations. 
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Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
211 | P a g e  
2.1 Roll-back/roll-out 
It was not possible to obtain the detailed figures relating to the size of the 
under-investment in the council housing stock in the six wards that SW 
covers108. However, as already noted at an authority-wide level the impact of 
roll-back policies was to leave NCC with two-thirds of its housing stock needing 
substantial investment to reach the Decent Homes standard. NCC’s response 
was to roll-out a mosaic of neoliberal policy solutions in the forms of ALMOs, a 
PFI scheme and several stock transfers including SW. SW’s tenanted market 
value (TMV) was negative. The new transfer housing association planned to 
invest nearly £120 million over the first five years. This indicates the scale of 
the backlog created by the roll-back policies. NCC’s response in the SW area 
was to pursue a stock transfer.  
2.2 Dispossession of council housing 
This case study illustrates how the SW transfer was underwritten by public 
funds. From NCC’s perspective the disposal posed two financial difficulties. 
First, the stock’s TMV was ‘substantially negative’109 (i.e. the expected cost of 
the repairs and maintenance is greater than the discounted future rent cash 
flows). This led to a successful application to the Treasury for gap funding, up 
to a maximum of £43.8 million110. The second issue concerned the historic 
debt associated with the housing stock; where the TMV is positive any surplus 
from the disposal reduces the historic debt. However, as the TMV was 
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Stewart Smyth 
212 | P a g e  
 
negative there was ‘overhanging debt’. Again the Treasury intervened and 
made an ‘overhanging debt one off payment’111, amounting to £132 million112. 
From SW’s perspective they were receiving housing stock at a ‘Gross Transfer 
Price’ of zero, in need of substantial investment. As Kevin explains: 
… a contract was drawn up that ‘we will give you 6,000 houses that are going to need 
£137m spent on them’ … ‘we’ll give you the houses for nothing if you will sign a 
document saying you will guarantee to do the work in the homes’. And that’s how they 
came to be transferred for free.  
(Kevin, Tenant Board Member (TBM)) 
The planned capital budget for SW over the first five years was £117 million113, 
financed by £34 million gap funding and a 30-year loan facility of £90 million 
from Barclays Bank114. Kevin explains the implications: 
I don’t know whether you know it or not, but Barclays have got the – what’s the word 
you use – the charge that if SW defaults [Barclays] can take the houses, not the 
Council. A lot of people don’t realise this, that they’re mortgaged to Barclays.  
(Kevin, TBM) 
The final sentence is significant as it was not clearly explained to the tenants 
during the campaign and ballot that their houses would effectively be mort-
gaged to a bank.  
The case study illustrates a primary generative mechanism at work, the use of 
finance. This commences with the reductions in funding over many years, 
leading to a position where the housing stock in the SW area required funding 
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of £107 million to reach the Decent Homes Standard115. Having inherited and 
in part created this crisis, the New Labour government promoted solutions 
based on marketising and privatising the housing stock. Public money is used 
to subsidise the chosen solution, in this case an LSVT. The total amount of 
subsidy for SW is not publicly available but consists of an historic debt write-off 
(£132 million), a transfer process budget/set-up costs (£3 million) and gap 
funding (£34 million).  
In addition, SW raised a £90 million loan from a bank, secured on the housing 
stock. This funding arrangement allows the local council to pursue the stock 
transfer on the basis of promising tenants new kitchens, bathrooms and other 
improvements. However, the sources of funding from the private sector are 
kept in the background. Studies of stock transfers in Glasgow and Birmingham 
(Daly et al., 2005; Mooney and Poole, 2005) found the use of a similar public 
subsidy. The above sets the context for a discussion of accountability relations 
and their contested nature both pre- and post-transfer. 
2.3 Restructuring democratic accountability and user involvement 
There is evidence from the anti-transfer tenants, that they have a conception of 
accountability based on the idea of democratic control (see section 3.). In 
contrast, the new landlord operates a corporate governance style board along 
with promises of greater tenant involvement: SW ‘sees tenant involvement as 
an integral part of high quality service delivery’116. The offer document states 
that tenants rent will be spent on more opportunities for tenant involvement 
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 SW Offer Document (Dec 2006). 
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(among other activities)117. However, there is little detail of how this will be 
achieved beyond what the council was already doing and a promise that there 
will be training available for those who want to be more involved118. In practice, 
Keith (TBM) states that SW is a better listener to the tenants (this is explored in 
3.3).  
SW’s board has three different constituencies (the local authority, tenants and 
independents), each with four members. The SW Offer Document gives pen 
profiles of those on the ‘shadow board’, who went on to make up the first full 
management board. The independent members included two directors of other 
housing associations, a chartered surveyor and the finance director of the local 
airport. The local authority nominees included three councillors from local 
wards and the Director of Housing. A report to NCC Executive described the 
nominees as ‘acting as company directors’119.  
The tenant board members (TBMs) were all long-term council tenants, two of 
whom were chairpersons of their local Tenants and Residents Associations 
(TRAs). A major criticism of stock transfers concerns the process by which 
new board members are appointed or selected (rather than elected)(Robbins, 
2002). The offer document explains that for TBMs, a shortlist of tenants was 
drawn up based on nominations from all tenants. Those shortlisted were then 
interviewed by a panel drawn from the local TRAs. This approach appears to 
contradict Pawson and Smith’s (2009) finding that the initial cohorts of TBMs 
are often elected. The independent board members were appointed following a 
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call for applications advertised in local newspapers and an interview; they were 
appointed on ‘the basis of their skills and experience’120.  
The foregoing aptly illustrates Harvey’s (2005) ‘governance by experts and 
elites’. There is no direct election on to the board; there is no process for 
removing board members. The independents are chosen because of their 
expertise; while the tenant board members form an elite separate from the 
body of tenants with the ability to make decisions affecting all tenants. As 
Robbins (2002: 268–269) comments, ‘the governance of RSLs is, from the 
point of view of tenants, unelectable, unrecallable and to a large extent, 
unaccountable’.  
Another set of accountability relations concerns the regulatory environment. 
Council housing has a web of regulation, at the heart of which is the 
relationship between tenants and their landlord, the local councillors. The 
ultimate sanction that tenants can exercise is the removal of their landlord 
through the ballot box. Alongside this, the Audit Commission carried out 
inspections and local authorities had to supply data returns to the DCLG for 
monitoring purposes. Post-transfer the Audit Commission carried out the same 
role121; in addition, transfer housing associations are subject to a housing 
regulator, and have an ongoing contractual relationship with the local authority 
that is legally bound to monitor compliance with the promises made in the offer 
document. The tenants as a collective body disappear from the regulatory web 
and are replaced by a regulator and a contract (Smyth, 2013a).  
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The case study illustrates the impact of these changes with regard to the rent 
rises in 2009 (see section 4); whereas, tenants remaining with their local 
authorities, and exercising ‘every day’ accountability (see section 3.3 and 
chapter 9), had their rent rises halved. Tenants with SW experienced higher 
rent rises contravening the rent promise, but the bodies in the regulatory web 
did not intervene. Regulatory intervention is not unheard of; Mullins (2006) 
reports that, up to 2005, 20 per cent of transfer housing associations had been 
subject to regulatory supervision. This raises the question of how many other 
cases are there, like SW, where there has not been intervention. 
Despite the foregoing, supporters of stock transfer policy seek to justify it on 
the basis that tenants are directly involved through the management board. 
The TBMs (who are selected) sit in a privileged but contradictory position. 
They have access to information denied (or at least prior) to the rest of the 
tenants and have decision-making powers. However, the fundamental 
contradiction is that they must at all times put the interests of SW first. This is a 
point of contestation by anti-transfer campaigners, and is further amplified by 
the potential power the private finance provider has over the future of the 
housing stock. As Collier (2005), Mooney and Poole (2005) and Mullins (2006) 
note, the introduction of private finance means the tenants’ power and 
importance is further reduced.  
This thesis does not focus on the relations with the private finance provider 
specifically, but has shown that the housing is effectively mortgaged to a bank. 
Further research is needed into how this relationship works in the long term, in 
particular the manner and circumstances in which the private financier is able 
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to take precedence over the tenants. These points taken together illustrate 
how the LSVT policy accords with broader neoliberal concerns of a suspicion 
of democracy and a preference for governance by experts and elites (Harvey, 
2005). In the process, democratic accountability relations are eroded or 
replaced.  
2.4 Summary 
This section applies the first element of the research framework and analyses 
the neoliberalisation processes in the case of the SW transfer. There is 
evidence that public money has been used to subsidise the transfer of public 
assets at a low cost to the new housing association, who in turn financialised 
the housing stock by using it as collateral to borrow from a bank. In the 
process, the democratic accountability relations have been restructured with a 
move from democratic control with eighteen local councillors representing the 
tenants to a management board that conforms to governance by experts and 
elites. 
3. Reaction/Contestation 
There are two aspects to this element of the research framework; first, is the 
generative affect that the neoliberalisation process has in the form of tenant-
led civil society campaign. This campaign focuses on organising a range of 
activities with the sole objective of contesting the privatisation of their homes 
and securing a no vote in the ballot. Further, this contestation has another 
layer where the local council reacts to the challenge of the tenant-led 
campaign. Second, the contestation is explored further through a dialogical 
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analysis of press cuttings and campaign materials. The aim of which is to show 
how accountability is contested by both the pro- and anti-transfer campaigns. 
3.1 Tenant-led civil society campaign 
The campaign was started by two former Labour councillors – Steve and Joe – 
who were active in their local Tenants’ and Residents’ Association (TRA). The 
TRA had started to oppose the transfer in January 2006 by passing a motion in 
support of the Fourth Option and insisting on electing their representative for 
the proposed transfer steering group. This immediately met resistance from 
senior managers in NCC’s housing department and the chair of the NCC 
residents’ association, who stated in a letter sent to the chair of the local TRA: 
The Tenants and Residents Association can arrange a public meeting to hear the points 
of view on the Fourth Option … However, it cannot support any motion in relation to the 
Fourth Option because this is a direct contravention of the Constitution which does not 
allow the Association to be involved in political issues … If the Association does support 
the Fourth Option then its recognition and funding would be withdrawn.122 
As Steve pointed out in a subsequent email to his local councillor, on the local 
authority’s residents’ association own website it states that one of its Aims and 
Objectives is ‘to lobby for legislative and other changes’123.   It does appear to 
show a contradictory attitude that the local authority-wide residents’ 
association can be involved with ‘political issues’ but one of its component 
bodies is not allowed.  
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 Extracts from a letter sent to the chair of the TRA (11 Jan 2006). 
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 Interview with Steve (anti-transfer tenant).  
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However, this episode should be seen in the context of a propaganda and 
ideological battle that had been enjoined by tenants and the officers of the 
local council. The issue of whether the Fourth Option is a political campaign 
ran throughout the early part of 2006. This episode also shows the competing 
(dialogical) meanings of the term ‘political issue’. Steve and the TAST 
campaign saw the proposed privatisation of their homes as a politically 
motivated act and sought to fight it on that terrain. In contrast the city council 
officials sought to deploy the term (political issue) in such a manner as to 
undermine opposition to the privatisation. 
This was one of a number of episodes where the local council sought to stifle 
the tenants’ campaign. In these circumstances Steve and Joe stepped outside 
their roles in the local TRA and set up a campaign group called Tenants 
Against Stock Transfer (TAST). The formation of TAST illustrates the 
interaction between individuals’ pre-existing ideas (on privatisation) and the 
concrete actions of social structures (in the form of the local state) (Bhaskar, 
1989). When individuals are faced with a change in their social circumstances 
– for example, the proposal to privatise their council house – they hold an 
internal conversation about how to react to the proposal (Archer, 2003). Most 
feel there is little they can do even if they maintain an interest in the subject. 
However, a minority feel it necessary to actively oppose the transfer proposal. 
For example: 
... the people involved in [the campaign] had an understanding of why councils had 
responsibility for providing social housing, council housing ... Because, it’s interesting, 
some of the people who were involved in it were quite elderly and certainly a couple had 
been involved in this estate when it was first built in the inter-wars.  
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They clearly understood the reasons why councils built houses, because the private 
sector couldn’t cope. And there was always that – fear is probably too strong a word – 
but returning back to that. People had very, very strong reservations about that...  
(Joe, anti-transfer tenant) 
This quote, along with a similar one noted in the Welsh case study (see 
section 3.1, chapter 8) show there is an underlying acceptance of the need for 
state provision of housing because the private sector cannot provide the 
housing needs of all in society. And when presented with the threat of 
privatisation it resonates with these pre-existing ideas. This forms the spark or 
basis for their motivation to become active in the local campaigns. 
In common with the anti-transfer campaign in Wycombe District Council stud-
ied by Watt (2008), TAST had support from DCH and other civil society 
groups. During the 12 months prior to the ballot, TAST organised five public 
meetings, the biggest of which attracted over a hundred tenants and was 
addressed by representatives from DCH, UCATT (construction workers’ trade 
union) and Austin Mitchell, MP. A number of local trade unions supported 
TAST, with financial donations from a Unison (local government workers) 
branch, while a local Transport and General Workers’ Union branch bought 
5,000 copies of a DCH newspaper for delivery to tenants. 
3.2 Local state reaction 
In addition to the examples above, this section sets out other examples of how 
the officials at the local authority and the pro-transfer campaign sought to 
undermine the tenants’ opposition. The local TRA organised a public meeting 
in April 2006 to discuss whether they should adopt the Fourth Option (which 
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they did by a 5 to 1 majority). Also at this meeting a vote was taken on who 
should be their representative at the steering group of the proposed housing 
association124. Neal (an 85-year-old pensioner) was elected and attended the 
steering group meetings in the period from April to October 2006. During this 
time, Neal continued to campaign against the transfer. In October, he wrote to 
the local newspaper setting out his reasons for opposing the transfer. This 
letter ‘prompted Town Hall chiefs to boot him out of the group’125, with the chair 
of NCC Residents’ Association stating: 
He’s cheating on fellow tenants – you can’t play the double agent in this day and age. You 
are either for it or against it.126  
The above corresponds with the experience of other anti-transfer 
campaigners, in seeing their opportunities to challenge the transfer closed 
down by the local council officers (HOCCHG, 2005; Robbins, 2002). The 
House of Commons Council Housing Group (HOCCHG, 2005) report also 
identified problems with the conduct of ballots, which was evident in this stock 
transfer.  
Government guidance states that the local authorities must present a balanced 
case on stock transfers (DCLG, 2009), but recognise the process has been 
brought into disrepute (DCLG, 2007). This case study provides evidence 
questioning the balanced nature of the process; for example, a local tenant 
complained about receiving letters urging her to vote for transfer from the NCC 
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 Minutes of TRA committee meeting (28 Apr 2006). 
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 Local newspaper (26 Oct 2006). 
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 Local newspaper (26 Oct 2006). 
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Director of Housing, who was also a council nominee on the SW shadow 
board127.  
Further, there is evidence that local housing staff were required to distribute 
materials in support of the transfer. These examples highlight the resource 
asymmetries between the local council and the small tenant-led campaign 
opposed to it. As Steve explains: 
… they were putting leaflets through the door; they put a DVD to everybody’s door telling 
you how wonderful it was going to be. 
They had a campaign with staff from the local housing office doing it … and they employed 
some people specially to do it as well. 
A massive campaign of persuasion to get tenants. I’m guessing they didn’t spend less than 
a couple of hundred thousand pounds. 
In contrast: 
We applied to three trade unions and got about £10,000 altogether. And some of that we 
only got right at the last minute, so we couldn’t use it properly. 
(Steve, anti-transfer tenant) 
NCC’s actual spend was £824,252 on the transfer including publicity, 
consultants’ reports and staff time128. 
In addition, there is evidence that local housing staff were required, as part of 
their employment, to distribute materials in support of the transfer. There is a 
clear conflict of interest with the body that is proposing the transfer, using their 
own staff to advance the pro-transfer arguments. This would appear to 
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 Letter to local newspaper (8 Feb 2007). 
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 Freedom of Information request by the researcher (7 Aug 2012). 
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contradict government guidance of ensuring a balanced ballot process. The 
use of housing staff in this manner is another example of the resource 
asymmetries between those advocating transfer and the under-resourced 
group of tenants that opposed to it. 
However, the most contentious part of the ballot concerned what constituted a 
majority vote. For the transfer to go ahead a simple majority was needed. 
However, previous ballots in the NCC area had needed a majority of all eligible 
tenants. Effectively that meant that if a tenant did not vote, their vote would be 
counted as against the transfer. During the early stages of the transfer 
process, NCC kept to the existing practice but towards the end of the 
consultation period changed the rules to a simple majority of voters. This 
caused confusion amongst the supporters of the anti-transfer campaign and 
led to threats of legal action by TAST: 
… opponents of the transfer say the ballot was unfair … [They] … claim that the 
council’s decision not to count abstentions as ‘no’ votes, as in previous stock-transfer 
ballots, meant that the transfer was effectively decided by the 1,785 tenants who didn’t 
vote. 
If abstentions had been counted as ‘no’ votes, the number of votes against the transfer 
would have been 3,812, beating the 2,904 ‘yes’ votes.129  
In the same article Joe (anti-transfer tenant) was quoted: 
We will be involved in discussions with our legal representatives very shortly and, 
dependent on those discussions, we may be in a position to challenge the legality of the 
way that ballot was conducted.130 
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Joe did contact the local Law Centre who on behalf of the tenants’ campaign 
wrote several times to the local authority, without any success. The argument 
they advanced is not whether the council changed its voting policy or whether 
this was communicated to the tenants (both of which were accepted by the 
council and the tenants) but the extent and thoroughness of this 
communication. The council claimed to have made 5,686 successful calls131 
during the ballot period. Each call was scripted to include the sentence ‘Do you 
realise that if you don’t vote it will not count towards any decision’132.  
Members of the TAST campaign are unclear about exactly when the change 
occurred but it was between one and three months from the start of the ballot. 
The final legal advice the tenant’s received was they had a case but were out 
of time to pursue it. It is not possible to gauge the extent of the impact that 
changing the ballot date had on the result. Certainly the anti-transfer 
campaigners felt strongly enough to obtain legal advice. This is not the first 
time that such tactics have been used (for example the Torbay transfer 
outlined in chapter 5) and the House of Commons Council Housing Group 
(HOCCGH, 2005; 2009) has documented evidence of similar tactics being 
used in other LSVT and ALMO ballots. This leads to the conclusion that if 
there was no effect, then why make the changes. 
3.3 Contested language  
This case has already highlighted a couple of examples of contested language 
between pro- and anti-transfer campaigns. The following explores the differing 




 Letter sent from the local authority to local law centre (28 Mar 2007). 
132
 Ibid. 
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conceptions of both sides towards accountability and the exercising of control 
(reward or sanction). 
One of the key arguments advanced by those who oppose stock transfers is 
that the tenants will lose control of their landlord, as elected councillors will be 
replaced by an unelected board. There are a number of elements to this that 
need to be unpacked. The three tenants interviewed, did not hold an uncritical 
view of the previous relationship between the local authority and the tenants. 
The idea that simply being able to vote out councillors meant tenants could 
exercise control was not strongly identified. But there was a form of 
accountability and control that was exercised based on the mandate that 
councillors possessed. Steve, who was chair of NCC housing committee from 
1984 to 1987, explained how tenants would bring issues to the attention of 
their local councillor:  
I was aware that councillors would make representations to senior housing officers, the 
Director of Housing in fact, about particular cases that they had where tenants had a 
problem and the management would not, for whatever reason, would not respond to 
that problem. The Councillor felt that it was one that something should be done about, 
so we approached the Director of Housing and if they got knocked back by the Director 
of Housing as well, sometimes they would come to me as chair of the Housing 
Committee. 
(Steve, anti-transfer tenant) 
Under the new system Steve identifies a problem where tenants can raise 
issues with their local councillor, but ‘now the councillors complain that, well, 
you know, they ask SW but they just get an answer back from the officers and 
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that’s that. They’ve got no further pull’133. In other words the councillors’ power 
to influence (or even control) the housing service has been reduced to asking 
questions and relaying the answer back to the tenants. This is the position, 
even with councillors nominated on to the board of SW; although as noted 
above the council sees them as company directors not representatives of the 
local people. 
Kevin (TBM) raises another element when asked to compare the pre- and 
post-transfer approaches: ‘The attitude of (NCC) to its tenants and the attitude 
of SW to its tenants are completely different. SW is much more aligned to 
being a good landlord to its tenants; whereas (NCC) wasn’t … Now SW is 
much more a listener. They will listen more to the tenant. The difference being 
that SW’s got 6,000 tenants, whereas NCC had 72,000 tenants at one stage, 
which is a bloody lot of tenants’134. As part of this listening strategy SW 
organises three tenants’ conferences a year, has a standing tenant 
consultative group and ad hoc working groups135.  
SW considers listening as a form of accountability as one of their objectives. In 
their first set of financial statements, as one of six objectives they list ‘Listen 
and consult’ and state: ‘We are open and accountable to our residents. We 
consult and involve them before we make plans and decisions, making sure 
they are involved from the start’136. 
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 Steve (anti-transfer tenant). 
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 Kevin (TBM). 
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 Kevin (TBM) and SW Offer Document (2006). 
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 SW Report and Financial Statements, For the period ended 31 March 2009 (pp. 10). 
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While SW may consider they are accountable by listening more to tenants, 
Kevin explains that the tenants have less control: 
… tenants can complain and all that … A tenant under SW cannot change a situation. 
They can only make a suggestion … as a tenant of SW, my ability to force a change is 
virtually wiped out. Whereas under NCC, you could try to force a change, and in theory 
it was there. But in practice it just didn’t bloody work. 
(Kevin, TBM) 
Kevin recognised that councillor and tenant board members are able to 
influence SW. And he identified that the councillors could be removed from the 
board if they lost their seats. There is also the relationship between the board 
and the officers of the transfer housing association. Kevin is critical of the 
abilities of many of the tenants who apply to become board members and 
serve on it, saying that they lack the competence and education to handle the 
role. This may well explain the very high turnover of board members between 
those on the shadow board and the board less than three years after transfer. 
Of the original shadow board members only one third were still in place137. 
One episode sheds some light on this turnover. Before SW officially came into 
operation a shadow tenant board member resigned in protest at the ongoing 
influence of the local authority that was still attempting to control the actual 
involvement of tenants in the decision-making processes138. 
A sharp contrast in the pro- and anti-transfer position on accountability is 
shown in a local press article before the ballot. Three months before the ballot 
took place the local newspaper ran a full page on the “... proposed council 
house sale?” with one tenant in favour and one opposed given equal space to 
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 Board members taken from SW website (accessed on 22 July 2010). 
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 Minutes of the TRA (18 Sept 2007). 
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outline their reasons. Significantly Steve (anti-transfer tenant) spent 
approximately a third of his space explaining the impact the transfer would 
have on accountability relations. He stated: 
... there will be less accountability because, under company law, which applies to 
housing associations/trusts, directors are required to work only to further the interests of 
the company and ensure financial stability. Any ‘tenant’ director will be kicked off the 
board if they try to assert the interests of tenants against the interests of the 
company139. 
By way of contrast, in the same article the tenant in favour of the transfer also 
talking about the role of the board stated the new transfer HA: 
... would be run by a board of volunteers – one third of the board members 
would be tenants, giving us real decision-making powers. Remember, it’s a 
not-for-profit organisation not a private landlord140. 
This pre-transfer claim contrasts with the actual composition of the board as 
outlined above.  
Below, the conceptions of an accountable landlord are explored through a 
dialogical analysis of the interview responses of all three tenants. Each 
interviewee was asked, what the term an accountable landlord means to them. 
Kevin (TBM) set out his understanding as:  
An accountable landlord is somebody, who if they don’t get it right, can be told to get it 
right by another body. As a tenant of SW, if SW don’t do the sort of things that they 
promise to do in their tenancy agreement, as a tenant I could complain to which is now 
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the TSA141, ... that SW is not keeping to what they promise to do ... And I expect them to 
correct that problem. That’s primarily what an accountable landlord means to me as a 
tenant. 
(Kevin, TBM). 
The first point to note here is the transference of agency from the tenants to 
the TSA to exercise the control element of the accountability relations; in 
contrast, to the democratic accountability advanced by TAST, where the 
tenants have the ability to exercise control (reward or sanction) through the 
ballot box. This transference has its roots in a pessimism in the ability of 
tenants to act collectively to pressurise their new landlord. This is reinforced by 
Kevin with a recognition that under the new (post-transfer) system of 
accountability tenants have less power over their landlords ‘... as a tenant of 
SW, my ability to force a change is virtually wiped out’142.  
Steve (anti-transfer campaigner), agrees with Kevin’s point about the decrease 
in tenants’ ability to influence their landlord post-transfer (see quotes above); 
he argues that communication and consultation with tenants is a key element 
of being an accountable landlord. However, Steve’s attitude towards tenants’ 
organisation and representation is fundamentally different. For Steve it is the 
responsibility of an accountable landlord ‘... to grant rights for tenants to have 
associations and to provide support to the tenants’ organisations ... both 
financial and perhaps other support ...’143 The other support should include 
training on legal matters related to housing and on current government 
policies. It is also important for the tenant organisations to have a democratic 
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 Tenant Services Authority (TSA), was the body charged with handling complaints by 
tenants until it was disbanded in April 2012. 
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 (Kevin, TBM). 
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 (Steve, anti-transfer tenant). 
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structure. The conception of accountability outlined by Steve is one where 
there is an independent tenants’ movement that is powerful enough to enter 
into consultations with their landlords on more equal terms.  
The strategy of looking to develop a strong independent tenants’ movement is 
not a nostalgic echo, but reflects the manner in which the local and national 
state has gone about pursuing the privatisation of council housing. Since the 
1980s, tenants’ groups have been neutered and made compliant over an 
extended period (Grayson, 1997). Steve explains how when he was chair of 
the housing committee there was an active tenants group, which was 
constantly pushing the council for improvements. Steve says ‘... it was very 
progressive and successful for a period of years ... a situation where we were 
out to help tenants’ associations ...’144.  
3.4 Conclusion 
The case illustrates that in response to the tenants organising an anti-transfer 
campaign, the local and national state pursued a number of tactics and actions 
to promote a ‘yes’ vote, and attempt to limit the tenants campaign. In common 
with other studies (Daly et al., 2005; Mooney and Poole, 2005), this case study 
found there are huge financial resources used by the national state to 
underwrite the stock transfer. The local council is also able to access public 
funds for a publicity budget; while the anti-transfer campaigns are denied 
access to public money and facilities. The local authority also exercised its 
power by threatening to disaffiliate the local TRA, expelling a democratically 
elected representative from the steering group and changing the rules on 
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counting the ballot. Thus, it is difficult to see how an organisation that is born 
out of these anti-democratic tactics could then go on to empower tenants. 
Other studies show how the LSVT process is contested and generates 
opposition (Mooney and Poole, 2005; Watt, 2008, 2009). In a similar manner, 
this case study illustrates how public accountability is a contested arena, 
where a tenant-led local campaign clashes with an alliance of local council 
managers, politicians and tenants aided by the national state. Supported by 
guidance from the regulator, post-transfer relations limit accountability to 
information provision, where the body of tenants are seen as passive receivers 
(Smyth, 2012). Tenant activity is channelled into controllable events such as 
tenant conferences and consultation panels, which have no decision-making 
capacity. However, the case study also highlights an alternative view of tenant 
activity based on grass-roots campaigning against the transfer policy that 
draws together an alliance of civil society organisations. In this case the 
tenant-led civil society campaign did not stop the transfer, but there have been 
a significant number of campaigns that have stopped privatisation. This point is 
discussed further in chapter 9. 
4. Reproduction or Transformation 
This section analyses the outcome of the reaction and contestation on the 
accountability relations. The starting point is to state that following the ballot 
result, the council housing stock was transferred to a new housing association. 
This means that the accountability relations were transformed from democratic 
accountability to a corporate governance–style board (McDermont et al., 2009; 
Robbins, 2002); and the removal of everyday accountability was identified in 
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section 3. There are other aspects in the transformation that need to be 
analysed. The post-ballot events include housing stock improvements, board 
membership and the question of rent rises. These issues are all covered by 
promises made in the offer documents of transfer housing association, which 
the tenants use in making their decision on how to vote.  
Broken promises, such as in the Glasgow transfer (Mooney and Poole, 2005; 
McKee, 2009) form a basis for the tenants to exercise accountability. However, 
post-transfer the accountability relations have been transformed, diluting their 
ability to control (praise or blame) their landlord. This point is especially 
relevant in the case of the rent promise (see section 4.3). 
4.1 The board 
Membership of the SW board has not been stable. Of the original shadow 
board members only one quarter (i.e. three, one from each constituency) were 
still in place three years after the transfer. The seat which was vacated by the 
TBM resigning in protest remained unfilled for at least the next four years. 
Within the first 12 months of operation, the Director of Housing of NCC, one of 
the RSL directors and the finance director from the local airport had resigned 
their seats on the board. In the financial year to 31 March 2009, two further 
board members left. In their 2010 (web-published) annual report SW disclosed 
four vacancies on the board (two among the independents and two among the 
tenants). By August 2011 the vacancies among the independents had been 
filled, but the tenant seats remained vacant. Pawson and Smith (2009) found 
that there was a high turnover of initial TBMs. The evidence of this case study 
suggests that tenants are not engaging with their landlord over a longer period. 
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To highlight the full extent of the restructuring of democratic accountability it 
should be noted that the board of 12, with only three having a relationship to a 
democratic mandate (i.e. the councillors), was put in the place of 18 elected 
councillors across six different local authority wards. 
4.2 Post-transfer housing stock improvements 
Since the transfer real improvements in the condition of the housing stock 
have been achieved. SW reported in their regulatory return for the year ended 
31 March 2010, that 1,929 (32.7 per cent) of their homes failed the Decent 
Homes Standard; this was a reduction from 3,198 (53.8 per cent) in 2008. As 
at 31 March 2010, SW had completed renovations on 2,979 (65 per cent of 
planned) kitchens, 3,457 (59 per cent) bathrooms and 3,326 (56 per cent) new 
PVC windows145. Other improvements also included electrical re-wiring, 
heating/boiler improvements and the installation of upstairs toilets.  
The critique in this thesis is not that improvements have not been made 
(although there have problems in other cases, for example following the 
Glasgow transfer (Mooney and Poole, 2005)), rather that there have been 
fundamental changes to the tenants’ ability to hold their landlord to account. 
This is illustrated by what happened to rent levels post-transfer. 
4.3 Rent increases  
LSVT tenants are asked to vote on the basis of a series of publications and 
consultations, including the offer document. The offer document includes 
promises made to tenants about how their new landlord will act. One of the key 
promises concerns rent levels. This is a contentious issue as it is widely 
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acknowledged that housing association (HA) rent levels are higher than local 
authority levels (Wilcox, 2009a: Table 72). The SW offer document states on 
eight separate occasions that tenants will be treated no different with regard to 
rent rises, if they vote for transfer. For example the section Your Rents states: 
‘What would happen to my rents if the transfer goes ahead? Nothing will 
change …’146.  
The rent promise put forward in the offer document is complicated by the 
government’s ‘target rents’ policy, which seeks to converge all social rents to 
the same level. As a result local authority rents, as well as some housing 
associations, are being increased to achieve a pre-determined level. Therefore 
the rent promise in the offer document is a relative one: 
This means that if tenants vote for stock transfer, the rent you will pay to SW will be the 
same as the rent you would pay to the Council if the transfer does not go ahead.147  
This promise was repeated in other communications, for example in a letter 
sent by the Executive Member for Housing at NCC, during the ballot period. 
Analysis of the first four years post-transfer shows what has happened to rent 
levels. Immediately following transfer, SW had an all-properties average 
weekly net rent of £59.09; this compared to the NCC figure of £61.21 per 
week. However, by 31 March 2010 SW’s rents had increased to £67.60 per 
week compared to NCC figures of £66.30 per week. Thus SW’s rents have 
increased faster than NCC’s. The Regulatory and Statistical Returns for SW in 
the years 2008–2010 show that rents increased by 6.4 per cent in 2008/09 and 
by a further 7.5 per cent in 2009/10. The explanation for this divergence from 
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the rent promise lies in the impact of the target rents policy. SW has followed 
this policy, increasing rents accordingly. However, NCC has followed the 
government announcements on rent increases which have been subjected to 
political pressure and lobbying by councillors and tenants’ groups. Using the 
target rents formula the average rent increase for council tenants in April 2009 
was to be 6.2 per cent. In March 2009, the Housing Minister halved the 
increase to 3.1 per cent (Rogers, 2009). 
This episode raises two issues. First is the question of holding the transfer HA 
to the promises made in the offer document, as set out in the section How 
would promises be kept? The web of regulation that covers transfer HAs 
includes roles for the housing regulator, the Audit Commission as inspectors 
and NCC as a contractually bound party to the transfer. The Audit Commission 
did not carry out an inspection of SW Housing before this responsibility was 
withdrawn in 2011. The regulator’s first regulatory judgement report in 2010 
confirmed SW’s compliance with the target rents policy. There is no public 
record of NCC intending to exercise their legal rights and hold SW to account 
for breaking the rent promise.  
Second, the episode illustrates an exercising of accountability through political 
pressure exerted by tenants, councillors and MPs on the government through 
a variety of channels that resulted in the rent increases being halved. This is 
an example of the ‘everyday accountability’ that Steve identified. Tenants of 
transfer HAs do not have equivalent mechanisms of influence and control 
available. 
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This section illustrates the impact of transforming the provision of social 
housing following a stock transfer. It has analysed central elements of the 
transfer process – how the board operates, improvements in stock condition 
and rent increases. While the housing stock has improved post-ballot, on the 
topics related to accountability – the governance of the HA and adherence to 
the rent promise – the case illustrates problems and an erosion of the tenants 
ability to hold their landlord to account. 
5. Conclusion 
The above took the research framework (Neo – R/C – R or T) and applied it to 
the case study of a partial stock transfer in a northern English city. The 
elements of the framework have difference emphases in each case study. For 
example the issue of stock transfer as a form of privatisation was not a strong 
theme in this case study (but is prominent in the Scottish case study). Also it 
should be noted that the process of restructuring social housing is implicit in 
the basis of the case.  
Section 2 illustrates the impact of neoliberalisation on the housing stock 
covered by the transfer. The capital financing discussion shows the role that 
private finance has in the transfer HA. This is not just the charge set against 
the housing stock; but the nature of financing the transfer in the first place, led 
to significant gap funding and a debt write-off funded from the public purse. 
This latter point is relevant to sustaining the argument that stock transfer does 
represent a form of privatisation (as an example of accumulation by 
dispossession) with public funds being used to aid the transfer of a public 
asset at little or no cost to the private sector. 
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In section 3 the reaction/contestation element explored the differing 
conceptions of what the term an accountable landlord means. Unexpectedly 
the tenant board member recognised the diminution in tenant power following 
the stock transfer. However, lying behind this analysis is a view that tenants 
cannot influence their landlord instead an outside agency (such as a regulator) 
must uphold the accountability relations. This is contrasted to Steve’s (anti-
transfer tenant) position with an accountable landlord’s role to stimulate, 
sustain and fund an active independent tenants’ organisation.  
The analysis in section 4 highlighted two essential elements of the debate over 
accountability. The rise in the rent levels in 2008 and 2009 shows that the 
structures for regulation and accountability set-up by the transfer (i.e. 
regulation by the regulator; the contractual relationship between NCC and SW; 
and tenant members on the board) are not robust enough to hold SW to the 
pre-transfer promises made.  
Throughout the case study there have been points of commonality between 
this case and issues identified in chapter 5. These included power 
asymmetries between the tenants’ campaign and the local authority; for 
example, threatening to withdraw funding from the local TRA if they 
campaigned in support of the Fourth Option. The role and position of the 
tenant board members (although it would appear that the high turnover of 
board members, which is not unique to SW but is not recognised in the policy 
documents on LSVT). And finally the manoeuvring over the ballot process with 
the change in the manner in which the abstentions were to be counted in the 
ballot.  
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The case illustrates the drive for stock transfer at the local level is the 
adherence to neoliberal forms of regeneration pursued by the national 
government and accepted by the local Northern City elite. The case also 
illustrates that the pursuit of such actions did generate opposition and 
contestation. On one level, this can be seen as tenants attempting to hold their 
landlord to account for the decision to privatise their homes; a reactive 
accountability. In this case study the outcome was that the privatisation 
proceeded and, from the tenant campaigners’ perspective at this stage, 
unclear implications in the medium to long-term. Thus, there is a 
transformation of accountability relations in this case moving from the ballot 
box to the board room. However, this transformation is not pre-determined. 
The next chapter presents a case study where the tenants’ campaign was 
successful in stopping the privatisation of their homes. Thus, the accountability 
relations remain rooted in local democracy, and illustrating the tenants (and 
other civil society organisations) as active agents directly influencing how 
accountability relations are made, re-made and exercised.   
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CHAPTER 7 
Scottish case study 
1. Introduction148 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the generative mechanisms and context 
of a local anti-transfer campaign where the tenants have voted against stock 
transfer. This case study concerns a proposed whole stock transfer in a 
Scottish city. As with the other local case studies, the proposed transfer 
generated a significant tenant-led civil society anti-transfer campaign. 
Significantly this campaign was able to stop the privatisation of council housing 
in the city, and therefore reproduce the existing democratic accountability 
relations. These events are analysed using the triadic research framework 
(Neo – R/C – R or T). 
In June 2004, Scottish City Council (SCC) councillors decided that its housing 
stock would need to be transferred to a not-for-profit private housing 
association. There were a variety reasons motivating this change149 in housing 
strategy, including the city council responding to the devolved and 
Westminster governments’ housing policy agendas. In February 2004, the 
Scottish Executive housing minister announced the adoption of the Scottish 
Housing Quality Standard (SHQS) with a target date of 2015 for compliance150. 
In contrast to the English position of a choice of three options 
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in 2001 (see below). 
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(PFI/ALMO/LSVT), in Scotland stock transfer was the only allowed basis for 
accessing private finance to improve council housing. In addition, both the 
Westminster government and Scottish Executive were willing to make 
significant resources available to underwrite the stock transfer process. Further 
the local managers in SCC were influenced by the perceived success of the 
Glasgow ballot and transfer in 2003. As noted in chapter 4, in the biggest 
single stock transfer in Britain, Glasgow tenants have voted by 58 per cent (on 
a 64 per cent turnout) in favour of transfer. However, problems in the Glasgow 
transfer started to emerge during 2004 and 2005, and significantly influenced 
the proposed Scottish City transfer. These problems included, delays and 
difficulties with the upgrading work; tenant representatives left (or, were 
excluded from) the new board of Glasgow Housing Association (GHA) claiming 
frustration at the way they had been treated (Mooney and Poole, 2005). 
However, it is the access to an estimated package of £2 billion investment that 
was the prime motivator for the proposed transfer in this case study.  
At the time of the proposal in 2005, SCC had a housing stock of 24,115 
units151 with over 18,000 on the social housing waiting list looking for 
accommodation either with the council or housing associations152. Further, 
SCC had (and continues to have) one of the highest average rents in Scotland; 
at the time of the ballot it was £49.44 per week153. As with other stock transfers 
the question of the future level of rent rises is central to the promises made to 
tenants.  Finally, SCC also has an established and functioning structure of 
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 SCHA Business plan, (2005: 25) 
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(Scottish Government, 2013). 
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tenants’ organisations and representation. The Scottish City Tenants’ 
Federation (SCTF) is a city-wide umbrella group drawing together tenant 
representatives from over 60 registered tenant organisations (RTOs). The 
SCTF is funded from the public purse directly by SCC. 
This chapter is structured the same as the previous case, around the three 
elements of the research framework developed at the end of chapter 3. 
Section 2 covers the neoliberalisation process of the local council housing; 
while, section 3 analyses the reaction/contestation of a civil society campaign 
and the (re-)actions of the local council to this challenge. And finally, section 4 
explores the reproduction or transformation of the accountability relations 
following the no vote in the ballot. The chapter concludes with a short 
discussion and summary (section 5). Again, the chapter illustrates how the 
triadic research framework can be used to identify and analyse the generative 
mechanisms, social structures and agents that make, re-make and exercise 
accountability relations. 
2. Neoliberalisation 
In May 2001 SCC published a Housing Stock Options Study carried out by 
DZT Pieda Consulting. The aim of the study ‘... was to take an objective and 
thorough appraisal of the alternative courses of action available to the Council 
for the long-term financing, investment and management of its housing 
stock’154. The study looked at three options: retention, partial transfer or full 
transfer; and concludes that partial transfer has no clear rationale and that full 
transfer performs well but is ‘... less well-placed to support tenant involvement 
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... or to contribute to some housing and corporate policy objectives’155. Thus, 
retention ‘... performs best at the like-for-like level. The financial analysis 
shows that the cashflow is sufficient to resource the expenditure ... to current 
levels’156. Some ten months later in March 2002, Sharon Graham157 (executive 
member for housing at SCC) when asked about the possibility of SCC 
following Glasgow in the pursuit of a stock transfer, stated: 
There is little tenant appetite for such change and if there was no demonstrable 
advantage, we concluded that it would be contrary to the best interests of our tenants, 
and of those wanting to obtain affordable rented housing, to go down that road. Looking 
forward we now have to tackle the challenges that come with stock retention for that is 
no easy option either.158 
However, by June 2004 the senior management at SCC had changed their 
position, with transfer seen as the only option for achieving the SQHS and 
keeping rent rises to the level of inflation. 
In May 2004 a local newspaper ran the headline ‘THE END OF THE COUNCIL 
HOUSE – City to unlock £2 billion for housing vision’159. The article underneath 
set out that £1 billion would be invested from the public purse. A further £1 
billion was expected to come from other (unspecified) sources and be invested 
in affordable housing. The propaganda battle had been enjoined by the SCC 
officers. The £2 billion investment claim was regularly repeated through a 
range of different publications including the internal housing department 
bulletin and local newspapers.  Between December 2004 and June 2005 the 
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 Scottish City Council, Housing Stock Options, Executive Summary, (May 2001: 9). 
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 Scottish City Council, Housing Stock Options, Executive Summary, (May 2001: 9). 
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 This name has been changed to sustain the anonymity of the case as far as possible.  
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 National Scottish newspaper, (16 Mar 2002) 
159
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claim was set across the front of all Better Homes For Scottish City (BHFSC) 
newsletters; however, there is no breakdown of where this investment is to be 
sourced and the figure does not appear in the Scottish City Housing 
Association (SCHA) Business Plan published in September 2005. 
The original article also advances one of the key justification of the proposed 
stock transfer, in that the state would write off the historic debt of SCC housing 
– estimated to be £310 million (Audit Scotland, 2006); thus, giving the new 
housing association a clean slate from which to start borrowing. The resulting 
investment would mean an additional 10,000 affordable homes would be built 
over the next 10 years mainly for rent; 4,000 dilapidated homes would be 
demolished and the new transfer housing association would achieve of the 
“Scottish City Standard”160 quicker. The council leaders deployed the language 
of tenant choice as a justification of the transfer. For example, the council 
leader stated: 
This is not a political failure. We have been successful in meeting many of our targets. 
But without this the overall situation in housing will decline. Council housing should be 
housing of choice, it should not be housing of a last resort.161  
This quote is of interest not just for the use of the language of the Westminster 
government’s choice agenda, but it also shows that the SCC housing 
department was very far from providing a poor service (this was also 
recognised by tenants in other quotes throughout the course of the transfer 
process).  
2.1 Roll-back/roll-out 
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Chapter 5 has already set out the roll-back/roll-out dynamic covering Scotland 
as a whole. At a local level that dynamic was also present. SC has seen a 
reduction of over 10,000 council housing homes between 1998-2012; with the 
total stock standing at just over 20,000 homes in 2012162. A stock condition 
survey was carried as part of the Stock Options Appraisal report in 2001:   
In general, the stock condition survey reported that the Council’s housing stock has 
acceptable standards of basic services and amenities. However many of the 
components (e.g. kitchens, bathrooms) are nearing the end of their useful life.163 
 
It is difficult to make cross-case comparisons in this area due to the differing 
basis on which stock conditions are measured. However, it is reasonable to 
conclude from this that the impact of the roll-back process on the quantity of 
the SCC housing stock was a similar degree than to the English or Welsh case 
studies, even though the overall stock condition was better. However, there 
was still a need for future investment: 
The total like-for-like investment, which includes limited improvements, for the housing 
stock over a thirty-year period is estimated at £493m. The study also developed what is 
termed the ‘Scottish City Standard’ focusing on a set of physical improvements to the 
housing to be undertaken over a fifteen year period. The estimated cost of implementing 
the Standard is an additional £227m.164 
As already outlined, with this level of future investments SCC was faced with a 
choice between retention and LSVT. After the initial decision to retain the 
housing stock, it appears that the increased public subsidy in the form of 
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promised debt write off and gap funding generated the change in policy. In this 
way finance, especially the use of public money is a generative mechanism 
driving the direction of local housing policies. 
2.2 Dispossession of council housing  
In November 2005, the Scottish City Against Stock Transfer (SCAST) 
campaign claimed that according to the council’s own figures the value of each 
house, covered by the proposed transfer, was just £899165. The SCHA 
Business plan stated a proposed transfer price of £21.610 million, for the 
whole housing stock of 22,967 units166. This gives an average price per home 
of £940. This compares to the English case where there was no transfer price, 
due to a negative TMV. However, the taxpayer would not have benefited from 
these funds in this case study, because again public money would have been 
used to smooth the transfer, with a payment of £260 million to cover historic 
debts and another £50 million in finance facility breakage costs. In addition, 
SCC spent £0.8 million167 on the rejected transfer and had a budget of £9 
million from the NHP programme (Audit Scotland, 2006: 55). Thus a similar 
pattern to the English case is evident with the use of public money to subsidise 
the transfer of public assets at a low cost for the benefit of finance capital.  
2.3 Restructuring public housing 
The long-term trend for council housing in this city has like elsewhere been 
one of decline. In 1998 there were 31,635 units whereas by 2010 the number 
of units had fallen to 20,331. Up to the date of the proposed transfer, the RtB 
policy had a major impact, with sales continuing ‘... at around 550 - 700 per 
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annum, averaging at around 2.3 per cent of the total stock each year’168. In line 
with nationwide trends, there had also been an increase in social housing 
provided by Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) to the extent that by 2005, 
15,000 homes were with housing associations169. These trends continued after 
the tenants’ rejection of the transfer; between 2005 and 2012 there was a 
reduction in social housing stock170 of a thousand homes. As significant, the 
RSL sector continued to grow so that in 2005 it accounted for 37.2 per cent of 
the total social housing stock, rising to 45 .2 per cent by 2012171. While the 
Communities Scotland database showed that 27 different housing associations 
operated within the city at March 2004, just nine of them provided 11,500 of 
the housing association homes in the city. Further the biggest five of these 
were at the time of the stock transfer proposal in the process of merging either 
with each other or becoming members of the UK-wide group Places for 
People172173; with one taking over a smaller housing association174. 
Another relevant characteristics of council housing in the city included the rate 
of decline in council housing stock has reduced since the rejected transfer. 
Thus in the five years prior to the ballot in 2005 the total number in the housing 
stock declined by 17.9 per cent; but in the five years post-ballot the decline 
was only 11.7 per cent175. On a local level the tenants’ rejection of the transfer 
                                            
168
 SCHA Business plan (2005: 25) 
169
 SCHA Business plan (2005: 24) 
170
 Social housing includes both local authority and housing association stock. 
171
 Authors own calculations based on figures available from Scottish Government data 
(Scottish Government, 2013). 
172
 In 2009, Inside Housing reported that Places for People was in discussions with the 
Housing Corporation about floating on the stock market (Inside Housing, 2009). 
173
 Scottish Local News, (3 Aug 2006). 
174
 SCHA Business plan, (2005: 29). 
175
 Authors own calculations based on figures available from Scottish Government data 
(Scottish Government, 2013). 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
247 | P a g e  
appears to have slowed the marketisation and neoliberalisation processes 
rather than stop them outright. However, it should be noted that over half of the 
social housing stock in the city still remains with the local authority; there would 
be none if the tenants and others had not resisted the transfer proposal. 
2.4 Restructuring democratic accountability and user involvement 
The SCHA was to be set-up as an Industrial and Provident Society under the 
legislative provisions of the 1965 act of the same name176. The constitution of 
the SCHA was still in development at the time the ballot result was announced 
and so was never completed; however, the SCHA business plan does set out 
the broad rules concerning membership and the management board. The 
management board was to have up to nineteen members, split between four 
groups. There were to be six tenant board members, five council nominees 
and five independent members with the facility to have up to three co-optees.  
Besides the six tenant board members there were three Labour councillors, 
along with one each from the Liberal Democrats and Conservative parties. The 
Independent board members included two public sector professionals, a senior 
banking executive, a company director with a background in private sector 
house building and a director of public affairs with a professional association 
who had worked on the Glasgow stock transfer177.  
The process for selection of the tenant and independent board members was 
similar to that adopted by SW Housing. The council placed advertisements in 
the local media outlets and requested applications including CVs. Then: 
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Applications were shortlisted against the person specification and interviewed by the 
Director of Housing, [SCC] Executive Member for Housing and tenant representatives. 
Selection of members was made taking into account the need to ensure a range of 
skills, knowledge and experience across the Board.  References were sought for 
successful applicants.178 
Following this initial selection process independent and tenant board members 
were to serve a three year term and face (re-)election at the appropriate AGM. 
The council nominees were to remain the prerogative of the council although 
they must be replaced at least every three years179. The business plan also 
sets out the rules for membership of the society and thus the body of people 
who would decide the future composition of the board. There were to have 
been three different categories. The first two are self-explanatory being tenant 
members and council member (i.e. the SCC). The third category was to have 
been ‘General Members’ who were individuals who either worked or lived 
within the limits of SCC but who are not tenants of SCHA. This category also 
includes organisations that would have supported the aims of SCHA and as 
such was designed to draw in the wider community within the city. The model 
of governance and accountability set out above was not welcomed by the anti-
transfer campaigners. As Andrew stated: 
I can only speak for what I saw in the constitution and business plan I got hold of, which 
actually was publicly available. ... what it said in there ... that tenants’ representative, 
once he was on the board or she was on the board, was not a tenants’ representative. 
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She was a housing association representative to the tenants. Therefore, that to me is no 
democratic accountability or participation. 
(Andrew, anti-transfer tenant) 
These competing conceptions of accountability are explored further in section 
3.5 below.  
Similar themes are evident in the Scottish and English cases. There was a 
proposed general move to a corporate governance model (McDermont et al., 
2009) to replace the democratic accountability relations. This included a three 
constituency board but with a minor difference, as the TBMs would have been 
accountable the members of the housing association at AGMs (this is not the 
case in the English study). However, once elected TBMs would have been in 
the same position as their counterparts in SW, in having to put the interests of 
the HA first. In contrast, David (SCAST and Unison activist) (explicitly and 
others implicitly) advanced the idea of an everyday accountability, through 
lobbying and political pressure that could be placed on councillors (see section 
4 below).  
Further, the alternative to democratic accountability advanced by Sharon 
Graham (SCC, Executive member for Housing) followed the same structured 
web of regulation that had failed to address the rent rises in the English case; 
in which the body of tenants play no active role. Tenants were to be listened to 
and have their views and priorities sought. Effective tenant participation 
involves gathering tenants views and ‘also uses market research techniques to 
gain wider views, particularly from those tenants who are less likely to attend 
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meetings or join groups’180. However, at no stage were tenants as a group to 
be given decision-making powers. 
2.5 Summary 
This section has analysed the neoliberalisation process in the Scottish city 
case. There is evidence covering all three aspects of this process 
(dispossession, restructuring of the service and of democratic 
accountability/user involvement). With similarities to the English case study, 
there is evidence of a willingness to use public funding to subsidise the 
transfer process and a preference for a management board with governance 
by experts and elites. As this case study concerns a whole council stock 
transfer, there was data available on the council housing trends across the city 
that allowed an analysis of the restructuring of the service. Again this is 
consistent with the broader trends examined in chapter 5. It also showed how 
the use of public finance played a key role in changing the existing housing 
policy of retention. Once that decision had been made, officials deployed the 
propaganda claims about the funding involved. The reaction to and 
contestation of such claims is explored in the next section. 
3. Reaction/Contestation 
The reaction and contestation in this case study is on a qualitatively different 
level to that of the English (or the Welsh, see chapter 8) case study. This is to 
be expected given the tenants’ rejection in the ballot; even though the local 
council had an equivalent level of resources at hand and deployed similar 
tactics to those outlined in the previous two chapters. Despite this a group of 
                                            
180
 SCHA Business Plan (2005: 36). 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
251 | P a g e  
activists and trade unionists organised a successful anti-transfer campaign 
(see 3.1). The rest of the section looks at the reaction of the local state 
(section 3.2), the position of the city’s tenants’ federation (section 3.3), the 
contested claims over rent increases (section 3.4) and a dialogical examination 
of the utterance an “accountable landlord” (section 3.5).  
3.1 Tenant-led civil society campaign (SCAST/Unison) 
So I think it was a grass-roots campaign that won ... you know, it’s a David and Goliath 
situation with the money they had. And we just put enough effort into changing people’s 
minds to get a no vote. 
(David, Unison activist) 
Scottish City Against Stock Transfer (SCAST) was the tenant-led campaign 
group set up to co-ordinate the anti-transfer campaign. It originated in a small 
meeting in a public house among a group of local activists and campaigners 
who had known each other through previous anti-privatisation campaigns. 
From the founding of SCAST, Unison housing shop stewards were at its core. 
The shop stewards were implementing national union policy to oppose stock 
transfer, but were also conscious that the way to stop the proposed transfer 
was through a tenant-led grass-roots campaign. These two elements fed off 
each other; with local Unison shop stewards being involved SCAST was given 
credibility, as they were known to tenants as housing workers. Also with 
tenants involved, SCAST could justifiably claim to be the real voice of the 
tenants. This contrasted with the pro-transfer campaign which was seen as a 
top-down and management-driven. Thus, the convenor of the Scottish City 
Tenants’ Federation (SCTF) was reported as saying: ‘No-one has said to the 
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council that they want a stock transfer. This is a landlords idea’ (sic)181. While, 
just as the ballot papers were being issued, a SCAST campaigner and council 
tenant, criticised the whole transfer process for only debating one option, 
stating ‘this is entirely undemocratic. We’re not just here to rubber-stamp top-
down council policy’182.  
Unison was not the only trade union involved183; the SCAST steering 
committee also included delegates from Unite and intermittently from the GMB. 
These delegates also brought with them resources in terms of money and 
leaflets. Funding was secured from several trade unions to pay for an SCAST 
broadsheet newsletter; in addition the local Unison branch produced their own 
newsletter calling for a no vote. Unions were not the only source of finance; 
SCAST took donations on street stalls and at the end of public meetings. 
These donations are important not just as a financial resource but also 
because they represent a commitment and level of support from local people 
towards the campaign. Similarly to the English case study, the financial 
resources for SCAST were tiny in comparison to the SCC campaign. In 
response to a question raised by an opposition member in SCC, the total 
identified costs to January 2006 were £2,648,492184. These costs do not 
include an estimation of staff time spent on the transfer process over the 
previous 18 months. The costs although incurred by SCC were to be picked up 
by the Scottish Executive and Communities Scotland through the Community 
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Ownership Programme. Of the above SCC spent £671,842 promoting the 
stock transfer185, including a controversial £200,000 contract with a PR firm; 
one of whose directors is an ex-SCC council leader186. Definitive financial 
records for SCAST have not been kept; however, the local Unison branch 
secretary’s annual report for 2005 records that less than £10,000 was spent 
from the union’s general political fund187. Unison was the main funder of the 
SCAST campaign. It should be noted again that anti-transfer campaigns are 
not allowed access to public funds. 
There were a range of different meetings during the course of the campaign. 
SCAST organised a series of public meetings that included local tenants and 
trade unionists on the platform alongside national figures such as Independent 
MSP, Margo McDonald and Defend Council Housing chairperson, Alan 
Waters. One such meeting took place in June 2005 and was organised by 
SCAST as a public debate on the proposed stock transfer. SCC refused to 
send a representative on the basis that SCAST was not an RTO and so they 
were not obliged to consult them188. In addition SCAST organised protests 
outside council meetings ‘... designed to make sure councillors were aware of 
the opposition’189  to the planned transfer. One such protest in November 2005 
included tenants bringing along doormats with “No Entry” printed on them. 
SCAST also drew on the experience from other campaigns in Scotland 
particularly in Glasgow and Dundee (with speakers from these campaigns 
speaking at SCAST meetings). Dundee had voted against transfer by a 2 to 1 
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majority in a consultation in 2003 but in the same year Glasgow had become 
the single biggest LSVT in Britain when tenants voted in favour. During the 
course of the campaign the local newspapers and media included a number of 
stories covering the problems Glasgow Housing Association (GHA) was having 
in carrying out the renovations promised, tensions on the board and pursuing 
the secondary stock transfers to local neighbourhood associations. Glasgow 
also provided the SCAST campaign with examples of what not to do. The 
Glasgow campaign had been fractured with at least three separate campaign 
organisations (Mooney and Poole, 2005). Campaigners in the Scottish City 
took this on board and from the start worked hard to maintain a unified 
campaign.  
In contrast to both the English and Welsh case studies key Unison activists 
were involved in the SCAST campaign. A majority of the housing department 
shops stewards committee were firmly against the transfer, as was the branch 
as a whole. However, the position among the membership in the housing 
department was more fluctuating, with a significant minority throughout the 
course of the campaign in favour of transfer, thinking they would benefit from 
it. As David explains: 
... it wasn’t a case like, you know, 90 per cent of people were or 100 per cent hard 
against stock transfer. It’s much more fluid than that ... So we had a lot of arguments. 
You know, I went to meetings in the housing department with members and I had quite 
challenging arguments with people saying well this is why we think this is wrong. 
... we knew there was a significant minority of people were willing to contemplate this 
[stock transfer] and maybe accept it. Half accept it. 
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Although, when it didn’t happen, they weren’t fussed either. You know, I mean, it was 
quite funny. They weren’t in tears when the no vote happened.  
(David, Unison activist) 
The impact of the ballot result on management at SCC was of a different order: 
You know, middle management upwards, I think they were, they were shattered a long, 
long time, weeks and weeks, because they couldn’t conceive, after all the money they’d 
spent, after all the publicity, after getting people on TV and personalities to say this was 
fine. And people, tenants got a DVD with a personality saying how fantastic it was. After 
all that, they thought well surely people will see that we are right, but they didn’t. 
... they tried to create the impression it was all done and dusted before the vote. It’s 
going to happen, it’s inevitable; and they convinced themselves. So when it didn’t 
happen, they just were in shock for a long time. Nobody spoke to me from management 
for weeks and weeks and weeks. 
(David, Unison activist) 
3.2 The local state reacts 
The city council expended significant effort and resources on publicising their 
transfer proposal. Besides the statutory consultation in the form of the offer 
document, SCC also sent glossy leaflets and a DVD to all tenants. The council 
also had teams of workers knocking on tenants’ doors; an anti-transfer 
campaigner stated, we ‘... had a lot of complaints from people who feel 
intimidated. The council workers won’t go away, they are very 
confrontational’190. The council denied the claims of intimidation during the 
19,000 visits they had carried out. However, in a similarity with the English 
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case study, SCC refused to allow the tenants’ federation (SCTF) convenor, 
Jane, to be a member of the Stock Transfer Tenants’ Advisory Group191. Jane 
was an active member of SCAST and an outspoken critic of the transfer policy, 
but she was the democratically elected convenor of SCTF and was respected 
by fellow tenants. As Mary explained: 
 obviously, because she was who she was, we wanted her to be in there, because she 
was a good irritant sort of thing. But they didn’t want Jane on there, because she was a 
negative person and she didn’t agree with it. 
(Mary, SCTF) 
In the summer of 2005, SCC decided to bring forward the date of the ballot 
from spring 2006 to before Christmas 2005; the spring 2006 date was already 
public knowledge. The date change was picked up by SCAST who highlighted 
the episode to raise questions about the council’s motives.  The convenor of 
the SCTF said that the ballot being brought forward ‘... concerns me because it 
could mean the council is looking to rubber-stamp its plans without proper 
consultation’192.  However, SCC did not take these objections on board and as 
a result created a negative impression among the SCTF and the tenants they 
represent. The Scottish Tenants’ Organisation went further stating that ‘... 
tenants are being treated with contempt. The ballot is being railroaded 
through’193. 
3.3 Scottish City Tenants’ Federation (SCTF) – “a very prickly fence” 
                                            
191
 A joint group between SCC and SCTF to discuss issued raised by the transfer. 
192
 Scottish Local News (21 June 2005). 
193
 Scottish Local News (Nov 2005). 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
257 | P a g e  
As already described194, recognised tenants’ organisations (RTOs) have a 
legal role in consultation and tenant participation, under Scottish law. In this 
case the RTOs are represented by Scottish City Tenants’ Federation (SCTF). 
SCTF is a membership organisation, formed in 1991, with 56 RTO members 
as well as over 30 other organisation and individual associate members during 
2005/06195. SCTF is itself an RTO for the purposes of consultation with the city 
council, who are also its main funder.  The SCTF found itself pulled in different 
directions during the course of the campaign. Initially the Federation followed 
their pre-existing policy of opposition to stock transfer. Immediately after the 
announcement of the transfer proposal an SCTF spokesperson is quoted as 
saying: ‘We do not support the housing stock transfer ... At the moment, the 
council’s housing department is becoming much more effective in dealing with 
tenants. We are concerned this will not happen with the housing 
association’196. The following day the Scottish Local News reported the launch 
of an anti-transfer campaign, which was supported by SCTF as well as the 
Scottish Socialist Party MSP, Colin Fox197.  
The following month at its annual general meeting, the SCTF’s position was 
somewhat qualified when a motion was passed that reiterated its opposition to 
stock transfer ‘...where these are not tenant driven and we view government 
policies that seek to coerce tenants away from local authority landlords as 
wrong and damaging’198. By September 2004 equivocation was present in the 
federation’s position with the convenor of SCTF stating:  
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We are not campaigning against the council. They’re having their arms twisted by the 
Scottish Executive and central government. But we’re quite concerned that the current 
stock transfer doesn’t make economic or social sense.  
We’re saying “If these funds are there to invest in housing, just do it”.199 
This was followed in June 2005, by a new report that SCTF was undecided 
whether to support the proposed transfer200. However, the SCTF executive 
included members who vehemently opposed the transfer, and joined the 
SCAST campaign. This resulted in the SCFT convenor being censured by the 
city council from joining the Stock Transfer Tenants Advisory Group (as 
outlined above). Mary (current executive member of SCTF) sums up the 
position that SCTF then took with regard to the proposed stock transfer:  
 All we were trying to do was give tenants the information, so that they could make a 
choice or help answer any questions that they had. We weren’t promoting no, we 
weren’t promoting yes. We were sitting on a very prickly fence.  
(Mary, SCTF) 
This does not mean that the SCTF had no impact on the outcome of the ballot. 
As part of the transfer process the tenants are required to choose an 
Independent Tenants Advisor (sometimes known as the “tenants’ friend”). In 
most transfers this role is captured and steered by the local authority with a 
pro-transfer organisation chosen201. However, in this case SCTF exerted 
pressure on the council during the selection process to ensure the chosen 
adviser (Tenants Information Service - TIS) was an organisation they trusted 
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and who had a reputation for representing tenants. The significance of this 
later in the campaign becomes apparent from the following quote, where 
Andrew (SCAST tenant activist) explains about TIS: 
 Yes, they actually, they sort of sat on the fence, if I remember rightly ... well, they were 
... pretty critical of the business plan that Scottish City had produced, while they still 
wouldn’t come down on one side or the other. And I remember reading the stuff and 
thinking ‘... oh right, they’re going to be on our side’ and getting to the end of the report 
and thinking ‘...how the hell did you come to that conclusion’. I mean, they pointed out 
the gaping holes in the finances, things like that, you know. 
(Andrew, anti-transfer tenant) 
A month before the ballot opened the local newspaper ran a story with the 
opening sentence: ‘Independent researchers claim to have discovered a £29 
million shortfall in the projected cost of keeping [the city’s] council house stock 
in good repair’202. TIS had reviewed the business plan of the proposed transfer 
housing association (SCHA), in line with their role as independent tenants’ 
advisor and found the business plan to be ambitious and did not take account 
of increasing building costs or inflation. The TIS report did provide both the pro 
and anti-transfer campaigns with ammunition to use during the final days of the 
campaign. For example, in November 2005, a local newspaper ran an article 
entitled: ‘Stock Transfer Vote: “Yes” vs. “No”’, in which Sharon Graham was 
able to claim the TIS report concluded there was a huge financial benefit of 
adopting the transfer.  Yet in the same article the chairperson of SCAST, was 
able to claim the TIS report showed that income for SCHA had been 
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overestimated and that there would be cuts in staff and money spent on 
repairs.  
3.4 “Lower Rents”  
As with the English case study and is common practice across Britain, a rent 
promise (or guarantee) is made to the council tenants that if the transfer is 
approved rents will be kept within specified limits. In this case, under the 
heading ‘Lower Rents’203, there would be inflation only rent rises over the 
whole business plan period of 30 years and this would be guaranteed for the 
first 5 years204. This position was also publicised by the vice chairperson of 
SCHA in June 2005205  and the SCC director of Housing in September 
2005206. In contrast, there were regular threats that if the transfer did not go 
ahead rents would rise dramatically. An early example of which is reported in a 
local newspaper where ‘council bosses have claimed rents would need to 
double to improve housing if it remained under their control’207. This startling 
claim was not attributed to any one specific council officer but that did not stop 
the claim being repeated during the course of the campaign, for example in the 
Scottish Local News (SLN) on four separate occasions during 2004 and 2005. 
Anti-transfer campaigners challenged the council leaders claim over keeping 
rent rises pegged to inflation levels208, pointing out that housing associations 
are run like private businesses with the result that rents will have to increase209 
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and that government figures show that transfer housing associations have a 
history of raising rents faster than other housing associations210. In May 2005, 
the anti-transfer campaign was aided by a leaked letter from David Orr the 
chief executive of the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations to Malcolm 
Chisholm, Communities Minister. In the letter Orr states, ‘Indications are that 
rent increases that are inflation only may be unsustainable in the long term as 
costs increase’211. In the same article, the SCC head of Housing indicated that 
after a ten year period and the achievement of the quality standard ‘... the 
mechanism for rent rises thereafter should be based on discussion and 
agreement between tenants and the housing association’212. The independent 
tenants’ adviser213 in October 2005 while giving approval to the first 5 years 
rent guarantee challenged the assumptions in the SCHA business plan based 
upon which the 30 year inflation only rent rises were formulated214. This issue 
is returned to when analysing the post-ballot period below (in section 4). 
3.5 Contested language 
As with the English case study it is possible to get an insight into the differing 
views on accountability and in this case specifically the concept of an 
accountable landlord, through a dialogical analysing of the utterances 
deployed in newspapers articles, campaign materials and the interviewees. In 
the following, two intertwined utterances – privatisation and accountability – 
are dialogically analysed. The pro-transfer campaign, the senior managers at 
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SCC had two audiences to address. First, were the tenants who received a 
range of materials including newsletters215 between December 2004 and June 
2005, along with other ad hoc leaflets. From the end of the summer in 2005 
the formal stages of consultation were implemented, including the distribution 
of the offer document in October 2005. Second, were the staff working in the 
housing services department and the council more broadly, which included an 
organised trade union branch taking an active part in opposing the transfer 
plans. It is from these sources that the following data is drawn. In contrast to 
the English case study the major arguments and contestation concern whether 
the proposed stock transfer, represented a form of privatisation. Whereas in 
the English case study the role of the board members, how they were selected 
and what role they had to play was important; in this case the role of tenant 
board members was barely mentioned.   
The anti-transfer campaign used every opportunity to portray the transfer as 
privatisation. For example, in the run up to the ballot in November 2005 
SCAST produced and distributed a four page newsletter with the headline on 
the front page: ‘Vote No to Privatisation’216. In newspaper articles the anti-
transfer campaigners regularly deployed quotes that linked the transfer to 
privatisation. For example the chair of SCAST was quoted as saying: ‘The 
housing association will be run like a private business that will be accountable 
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to the banks and will be concerned with competitiveness and profits’217. In a 
strategically timed intervention just before the ballot papers were issued, Gavin 
Strang, Labour MP ‘... launched a scathing attack against the city's 
controversial stock transfer plan, branding it "privatisation" of the [City’s] 
council houses’218.  
These claims were met directly by the pro-transfer campaigners, chief among 
them local councillor, SCC executive member for housing services and chair of 
the SCHA shadow board, Sharon Graham. In the same newspaper article that 
reported Strang’s position, Graham rejected his claims and instead stated that 
privatisation is about profit-making for shareholders and that housing 
associations are public bodies. This position contrasts strongly with Robbins 
(2002) assessment that however housing associations are classified they are 
not public bodies. In the same month the Scottish Local News gave a page 
over to the stock transfer inviting Graham (as SCC executive member for 
Housing) to put forward the Yes campaign’s arguments and an anti- transfer 
activist, the No campaign’s position.  In her article Graham describes the 
privatisation claims as a “big myth” and “rubbish”, stating that housing 
associations are non-profit-making where every penny goes back into housing 
services. In an earlier article the vice-chairperson of SCHA and tenant 
representative set out why ‘the anti campaigners are wrong, it’s not 
privatisation’219. His arguments included that the local authority has to deal 
with private banks anyway, and thus this would not represent any change.  
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The attitude of the banks can be gleaned from an article in a national Scottish 
newspaper after the transfer was rejected that included the views of the head 
of corporate and business banking at Lloyds TSB Scotland, who was also a 
member of the shadow board of SCHA, having ‘... completed a year’s intensive 
training...’ for that role220. In the same article, a senior colleague who describes 
the bank’s experience of stock transfer: ‘Our experience with stock transfers is 
that private ownership drives improvements through. Board members were not 
paid, so if people had in their mind that there was profiteering going on, that 
could never happened’ (sic)221(emphasis added). It should also be noted that, 
at the time, Lloyds TSB Scotland were at the forefront of stock transfers in 
Scotland financing deals with transfer housing associations in the Borders, 
Glasgow and Argyll & Bute222. 
These competing utterances on privatisation reflect the social positions of the 
actors involved as part of either the pro- or anti-transfer campaigns. The anti-
transfer campaigners want to label the process as a privatisation due to the 
negative heteroglossia around that term (worsening service, higher charges, 
and senior management enrichment). In response, the pro-transfer 
campaigners seek to unify and limit the meaning of privatisation to profiteering 
not ownership or control. In part this is an attempt to smooth the transfer 
process in favour of a yes vote. It also has the effect of pushing questions 
about control and accountability into the background. These are explored 
below. 
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Lying not far from the surface of these contested views on stock transfer as 
privatisation, is a different attitude towards accountability, control and 
specifically democratic control over housing services. The anti-transfer 
campaigners made the link between privatisation and the loss of democratic 
accountability/control over the housing services223. For example, the SCTF 
convenor is reported to have told a meeting of tenants, ‘the council are not the 
best landlords in the world but at least we have some democratic control’224. 
An executive member of SCTF highlighted a concrete effect of this democratic 
control, and a reflection of the rent increase experience highlighted in the 
English case: ‘Councils know they are accountable so they keep rent rises at 
reasonable levels, but housing associations don’t need to do that’225. This 
executive member continued the same line even when the SCTF as a whole 
was taking a more equivocal stance. In June 2005 she stated: ‘Put simply, this 
is privatisation’226. Gavin Strang in a letter sent to SCAST argues that council 
housing is an asset for all the citizens, where ‘... ultimate control over housing 
stock lies with the democratically elected city council’227. 
The pro-transfer campaign claimed there would be accountability to tenants 
but did little to layout how this would be exercised. For example, a council 
tenant (and subsequently a tenant board member of the SCHA shadow board), 
stated: ‘We should make sure the new Scottish City Housing Association is set 
up in a way that ensures it is tenant-led and the recent improvements in tenant 
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participation continue in the new organisation’228.  In contrast, Sharon Graham 
chose to attack the notion of democratic control, describing the ability of 
tenants to vote out councillors as “nonsense” due to the fall in the number of 
council tenants where ‘today only around one in eight ... householders are 
council tenants, and the idea that they have the power to change a council 
administration is fanciful’229. On the other hand Graham argued tenants are 
shaping the priorities of SCHA and through the board of the new housing 
association will have a critical part to play.  
This contestation also took place within the housing department of SCC. In 
response to the stock transfer proposal the Unison branch campaigned both 
internally among its members and externally in support of SCAST. At the 
branch AGM in February 2005 the branch unanimously decided to seek legal 
advice with regards to the instruction by SCC’s management to members to 
canvas for a yes vote; to support any member faced with victimisation for 
adhering to Unison policy; to write to all members explaining the union’s 
position and to SCC insisting that information given to tenants includes the 
case for and against stock transfer. On the basis of this AGM decision in 
August 2005 the branch leadership produced an A4 double-sided newsletter 
with the headlines: ‘Save Our Council Housing Special – Investment without 
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strings, not stock transfer’230. In the newsletter Unison state that one of the 
reasons they are opposed to stock transfer is the loss of democratic 
accountability and explains that there are principles at stake including: 
 Stock transfer means privatisation of an essential public service ... 
 Democratic control and accountability through elected councillors will be lost231. 
In response the monthly internal bulletin distributed to all housing staff in 
September 2005 contains a section entitled “Housing Transfer – Exploring the 
Myths” with the first sentence reading: 
Organisations and individuals campaigning against housing transfer often distribute 
material with content that is either exaggerated, out of context, misleading or completely 
untrue.232 
The briefing then goes through 15 “myths” setting out management’s view on 
each. Given the audience of the briefing note, most of the issues raised 
concern the working conditions and TUPE arrangements for staff if the stock 
transfer goes ahead. There are two myths relevant for this discussion. Firstly, 
the argument that SCHA represents a form of privatisation is rejected (with a 
definitive ‘this is not true’) explaining that, ‘to most people “privatisation” means 
a company that makes profit and then distributes that to shareholders or 
Directors etc.’233. SCHA does not comply with this understanding as it will be a 
society not a company; it will be required by its regulators to be ‘not-for-profit’; 
the board will act in a voluntary capacity, and all surpluses will be reinvested in 
the housing stock.  
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Secondly, the loss of democratic control and accountability is addressed. This 
time there is no definitive rejection of the “myth”; instead there is an 
explanation of the mechanisms of influence that tenants will have post-
transfer. These include the ability to lobby the five local Councillors on the 
board; the ability to get involved with local RTOs and the SCTF234; there will be 
six tenant board members, and all tenants will be members of the society and 
so can vote at each AGM ‘... on key housing issues, including electing tenant 
and independent Board members’. In a separate Q&A section of the bulletin, a 
question was asked about how the members voting rights would be exercised. 
The reply set out quorum rules for AGM and special general meetings, the 
ability to include postal votes in calculating whether the meeting was quorate 
and that decisions would be made by a simple majority. There was no mention 
of the differing forms of membership and any implications this may have had 
for decision-making. 
In contrast to the English case study the question of the priorities of board 
members did not become a significant issue during the campaign. This may 
have been because the proposed transfer housing association was to take the 
legal form of an Industrial and Provident Society (IPS). The shadow board had 
to choose between the legal forms of an IPS or Company Limited by 
Guarantee (either form is acceptable to the regulator, Communities Scotland, 
for registering as a RSL).  The decision in favour of an IPS was taken on the 
basis that it ‘...is the traditional model used in Scotland and the Board felt that 
it sends out a stronger message that SCHA is not for profit and is an 
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organisation that is inclusive to all’235. This inclusivity does not extend though 
to a representative democratic model of governance, as the following extract 
from SCC minutes shows: 
As with all Board members, once appointed and when acting for the organisation, 
Tenant Board members are required to put the interests of the organisation first. This is 
significant because some have expressed a preference for a model whereby tenant 
members would act literally as “representative” of a particular constituency (e.g. a 
geographical area or an Area Board). Communities Scotland has confirmed that this 
model would not be acceptable in terms of statutory registration.236 
SCC and SCHA developed five key commitments237 that formed the basis of 
the proposed transfer and were embedded in the offer document and business 
plan. The offer document sets out the regulator environment that SCHA would 
be operating in, including the contract between SCHA and SCC, the regulation 
by Communities Scotland and that ‘the Board will be held to account by its 
members – the tenants’238.  However, an internal housing staff bulletin stated 
that SCHA ‘... will be a not for profit organisation and will be accountable to the 
Housing Regulator, Communities Scotland’239.  This apparent confusion over 
who the transfer housing association would be accountable to, is a product of 
the web of regulation that covers transfer housing associations (and also other 
privatised public services). As illustrated in the previous case study such web 
allows for the possibility of no one holding the HA to account (for example over 
rent increases) and as importantly the tenants as a body disappear from the 
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accountability relations. Despite these limitations, the commitment to “keeping 
promises” covers SCHA’s attitude towards accountability and tenant 
participation240.  
Against this SCAST made a number of points including that members of the 
board are accountable to the IPS not the tenants; that the IPS would be 
accountable to the banks and private finance providers and further: 
‘If SCHA breaks their promises we won’t have any redress: the offer document is a 
contract between the new landlord and the council – not between the new landlord and 
tenants.’241 
The vision and values adopted by the SCHA board also give an insight into 
how they expected accountability relations to be exercised in the post-transfer 
organisation: ‘Openness and honesty – demonstrating our trustworthiness and 
accountability through our transparent decision making processes’242. Here 
accountability is conflated with transparency – a practice critiqued by Smyth 
(2012) – rather than any question of control, giving an example of Cooper and 
Johnston’s (2012) accounting satisfies accountability in practice. 
Finally, there are similarities in the views of the anti-transfer campaigners 
interviewed in the Scottish and English case studies, when it comes to the term 
an accountable landlord. For all interviewees, accountable in this context 
meant some form of impact or challenge through tenants’ actions. These 
actions may be directly through the ballot box or indirectly through lobbying the 
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councillors between elections; something that David labelled “everyday 
accountability”: 
So we’d always say that you’ve got an accountable landlord ... because you can get rid 
of them every so often by voting against them and getting new people in. Also, in-
between elections, you can go to your councillor to complain and they’re under political 
pressure to take your inquiry seriously or your complaint seriously. And that is quite 
important. So, everyday accountability, in the sense that if the housing department fails 
to address your complaint properly you can go to a councillor. 
(David, Unison activist) 
This concept of “everyday accountability” is the same as the system of 
accountability that Steve in the English case study outlined. 
3.6 Summary 
This section has examined a range of reactions and contestations that 
occurred during the Scottish case study. In common with the other local case 
studies, this includes the proposed neoliberalisation of council housing. 
However, in this case the level of opposition was broader and more organised 
than in the other two cases; with Unison shop stewards playing a centrally 
important role. Faced with an opposing campaign the local state reacted 
employing tactics that were used in the English case study and documented in 
the HOCCGH reports in chapter 5 (e.g. excluding representatives of the anti-
transfer campaign and bringing forward the ballot date). 
There is a second and as important dimension to the contestation that 
concerns the issues of privatisation and accountability. The section highlights 
the competing meanings and tactics used by both campaigns over these 
utterances. There are two different approaches used by the local state to these 
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utterances. On privatisation there was an outright denial that stock transfer 
represents a form of privatisation. Dialogically this can be ascribed to the 
existing heteroglossia surrounding the term (i.e., that privatisation result in 
poorer quality service, higher charges and enrichment of senior managers) 
consequently, denial is an appropriate response. When it came to 
accountability, the heteroglossia is more fluid with multiple meanings; hence 
the tactic was used to try to give accountability a different meaning than 
democratic control. This included an attack on the efficacy of local government 
accountability from a tenant’s perspective. Of relevance here is the counter 
argument advanced by David where the loss of accountability in a stock 
transfer is not just on a formal level but (and arguably more importantly) the 
question of everyday accountability. This is also illustrated in the final element 
of the research framework; in this case the reproduction of democratic 
accountability relations. 
4. Reproduction or transformation 
The most significant difference with the English case study is the tenants’ 
rejection, in the ballot, of their homes being privatised. While this was done for 
a variety of reasons (see section 4.1 below), one of the motivations was the 
threatened loss of democratic accountability. Further through the actions of the 
SCAST campaign and the voting of the tenants the accountability relations 
have not been transformed along neoliberal lines; instead democratic 
accountability relations have been maintained (reproduced). 
4.1 Result and post-ballot period 
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In December 2005 the Electoral Reform Society announced the result of the 
ballot. The “No” campaign had won by a narrow margin:  
 6,653 (47%) voted in favour of housing transfer 
 7,301 (53%) voted against housing transfer 
- a majority of 648 votes against transfer. 
 Number of tenants eligible to vote 22,926 
 Number of tenants returned ballot papers 13,868 
 Percentage of tenants who voted 60.5% 
 Spoiled Ballot papers 14 
 Ballot papers counted 13,854 243 
Following the rejection, the management at SCC commissioned research into 
the result. The research combined qualitative and quantitative data collection 
methods including a telephone survey of 1,067 tenants and seven discussion 
groups. The most common reasons for voting against the transfer were: 
 Glasgow (21%) 
 Idea of change (19%) 
 Privatisation (10%) 
 The thought of having a new landlord (9%) 
 Possibility of rents rising (7%) 
 General impression from ‘hearsay’ (7%) 244 
There had been a media story concerning possible legal problems with the 
Glasgow transfer that gained significant coverage in the first two weeks of the 
ballot, which partly explains its position as the single biggest reason why 
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tenants voted against stock transfer.  The research also found that 72 per cent 
of tenants thought SCC was either a very good or good landlord. Significantly 
the report concludes: 
Whilst some of the perceptions of voters (such as Glasgow, privatisation etc) may not 
be factually accurate, there is no evidence that voters could have been easily 
persuaded to change those perceptions. It could be argued that the framing of this issue 
- in terms of “is it privatisation - yes or no?’’ - presents an unwinnable situation.  
At this stage all possible future strategic options should be kept under consideration... 
[However] the prospects of winning another ballot would appear to be limited.245 
Given the time lapse since the proposed stock transfer, it is possible to 
evaluate some of the claims made during the campaign. The two most 
prominent claims made by the pro-transfer, of what would happen if the 
transfer was rejected concerned rents and achieving the SHQS. On the rents 
the newspapers regularly claimed rents would have to double if the transfer 
was rejected. This claim was never attributed to any SCC official and so while 
the claim clearly had a role in the propaganda battle it would be inappropriate 
to use it as a measure against which to evaluate the performance of SCC 
since 2005. In the January 2005 the BHFSC newsletter sent to tenants, a 
section entitled “What if tenants vote ‘No’?” contains the following: ‘rents would 
have to rise above inflation every year for the next few years ...’246. This theme 
was returned to in a later issue which stated that the only way to reach the 
SHQS and keep rent rises at the level of inflation was through transfer247. On 
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the same page, SCC presents two rent figures. The first, if the transfer goes 
ahead average rent after five years (by 2010) would be £58.49 per week; the 
second, if the transfer is rejected after five years the average rent would be 
£67.57 per week. The actual average rent in 2010 was £65.48 per week248; 
meaning that the rent levels increases had been closer to the above inflation 
figures quoted at the time of the ballot. The above inflation rises were 
confirmed by Mary (SCTF executive member) in her interview as having been 
negotiated between SCC and, the SCTF and the other RTOs at 2.7 per cent 
per annum until 2015. Second, the additional income raised has enabled SCC 
to make progress towards the SHQS 2015 target. The percentage of council 
homes achieving the SHQS has increased from 14 per cent in 2007 to 53 per 
cent in 2010249. In November 2004, SCC Housing Senior Management Team 
claimed that transfer would allow the achievement of the SHQS within ten 
years250. By 2010 the council was over half way to achieving that target without 
stock transfer. 
5. Conclusion 
There are strong similarities between this case and the experience of stock 
transfer in the English case study. The city council used a range of tactics to 
minimise opposition to the proposed transfer; they promised “lower rents” and 
that the transfer would result in better tenant participation. In contrast to the 
English case study there was greater and more organised resistance in the 
form of SCAST. Although, SCTF softened their outright opposition to stock 
transfer in the face of an actual proposal, they were still able to influence the 
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process by insisting on TIS as the Independent Tenants’ Advisor. However, 
the most important difference was the tenants’ rejection in the ballot; itself an 
act of accountability and also resulting in democratic control being reproduced 
by the tenants.  
The proposed transfer in this case itself illustrates the contested nature of 
accountability mechanisms; but not in an as overt manner as in the English 
case study. For example the question of accountability of the board and in 
particular whether tenant board members were there to represent their fellow 
tenants or had a primary loyalty to the new organisation was a minor issue. 
There was though a heated battle over whether the stock transfer represents a 
form of privatisation. The research framework adopted in this thesis argues 
that stock transfer is a form of privatisation. The important point to note at this 
stage is the link between the contestation of privatisation as a concept on the 
surface and what this highlights as the underlying attitudes of the pro and anti-
transfer campaigners towards the concepts of accountability and democratic 
control. The anti-transfer campaigners displayed a strong attachment to the 
exercising of control over their landlord through the ballot box, making the link 
between having a landlord who is subject to such pressures and affordable 
rent rises. On the other hand the pro-transfer campaigners rarely dealt with this 
issue directly, choosing to explain how tenants could influence the proposed 
new landlord or by rubbishing the existing democratic process, including by 
arguing that tenants made up a minority of the electorate. 
The impact of the successful SCAST campaign can be seen in another way in 
the post-ballot period. There have been higher rent rises than were promised if 
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the transfer had gone ahead; although it should be remembered that TIS 
questioned the financial calculations on which those rents were based. 
Significantly these rent increases were negotiated with RTOs and SCTF, an 
example of the tenants having direct involvement through their own 
representative bodies. This compares to the SW case where not only was the 
rent promise broken but the TBM, Kevin, vocalised the lack of influence that 
tenants now have over their landlord. 
In addition, the chapter also illustrated a number of other themes common with 
the English case including the financial asymmetries between the pro and anti-
campaigns; the use of tactics such as excluding anti-transfer individuals and 
the brining forward of the ballot date. However, the most important point from 
this whole case study and the most obvious is that the anti-transfer 
campaigners won and the transfer proposal was rejected. The implication is 
fundamental to this thesis. A group of tenants, trade unionists and others 
organised themselves into a campaign, challenged a policy advanced by the 
local council and backed by the devolved and Westminster governments, the 
outcome of which was that the accountability relations they exercise over their 
landlord stays in the form of democratic control. It was an alliance of civil 
society groups that held the local state to account.  
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CHAPTER 8 
Welsh case study 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter to examine the generative mechanisms and context of 
a local anti-transfer campaign that was on-going at the time of the fieldwork. 
This case study concerns a proposed whole stock transfer in Welsh County 
Borough (WCB). As with the other local case studies, the proposed transfer 
generated a significant tenant-led, civil society, anti-transfer campaign. At the 
commencement of the planning and data collection this campaign was on-
going and therefore the result was not known. The tenants of WCB did vote in 
favour of transfer and in the process transformed the existing democratic 
accountability relations. A second visit to the field, post-ballot, allowed for 
further data collection. At this time Gower Housing Association was in the 
process of being set-up; however, this did not hinder further data collection 
covering the development of the transfer RSL, including the establishment and 
operation of the first months of the RSL. These events are analysed through 
the triadic research framework (Neo – R/C – R or T). 
In 2011 WCB council transferred 9,207 homes to the newly established Gower 
Homes Ltd251. The transfer ballot for the transfer had ended a year earlier with 
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56.6 per cent of tenants voting in favour on a turnout of 61.6 per cent252. 
Gower Homes Ltd. is a community housing mutual association. As was noted 
in chapter 5 this form of housing association is presented as an innovative 
response – a Welsh solution – to the discredited transfer housing association 
forms that are dominant in English transfers. This claim is critiqued below. 
WCB is a council covering two significant towns on the south Wales coast and 
numerous small villages in the valleys inland from the coast. The area has 
suffered economic decline over the past two decades as the traditional heavy 
engineering and coal mining industries have declined. Over a range of 
deprivation indicators (including, percentage of people aged 16-74 
unemployed; and, percentage of people with good general health) WCB 
scores worse than the Welsh national average253.The former council housing 
stock is spread throughout the borough in many small pockets, with a large 
concentration on one estate in an urban area.  This housing stock was in 
general amongst some of the poorest in condition in the whole of Wales. In 
2005, the Welsh Assembly Government stated that WCB council was among 
six councils that would not be able to meet the WHQS by 2012, unless it 
pursued a stock transfer254.  
This chapter is structured the same as the two previous case studies, using the 
triadic research framework developed at the end of chapter 3. Section 2 covers 
the neoliberalisation process of the local council housing; while, section 3 
analyses reaction/contestation by a civil society campaign and the reactions of 
the local state to this challenge. And finally, section 4 explores the 
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reproduction or transformation of the accountability relations and its 
implications, following the ballot. The chapter concludes with a short 
discussion and summary (section 5). Overall this chapter highlights more 
similarities with the English case study, than the Scottish one. These include 
the financial and resource asymmetries during the campaign, a high turnover 
of board members and higher than promised rent rises. As with the other case 
studies, the chapter illustrates how the triadic research framework can be used 
to identify and analyse the generative mechanisms, social structures and 
agents that make, re-make and exercise accountability relations. 
2. Neoliberalisation 
This section applies the elements of the neoliberalisation process identified in 
chapter 3. Specifically for this case study the three relevant processes are roll-
back/roll-out (Peck and Tickell, 2002) of the state/public services, the 
dispossession of council housing (Harvey, 2005) and the restructuring of user 
involvement and democratic accountability (Whitfield, 2006). This section 
concludes with a short summary. 
2.1 Roll-back/Roll-out 
As identified in the background to these case studies (see chapter 5), finance 
has been used as the generative mechanism in pursuit of the neoliberal 
market based reforms of the council housing sector. This generative 
mechanism has a dual impact. First the existing council housing stock has 
suffered from under investment for three decades causing a backlog of repairs 
and maintenance. Second, the option of stock transfer is made attractive as a 
solution to this backlog because it is underwritten by public monies. Both these 
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aspects are evident in this case study. A stock condition survey carried out for 
WCB council in 2004, estimated that £152 million would need to be spent over 
a six year period to achieve the Welsh Housing Quality Standard (WHQS) and 
that a total of £694 million need to be spent over the next thirty years to 
maintain the housing stock at that level255. In contrast, the local authority 
estimated it could only afford to invest £40 million over the next six years 
leaving a shortfall of £112 million256. These figures give an indication of the 
cumulative impact of years of under-investment on the council housing stock in 
WCB that is in line with the national under-investment identified in chapter 5. 
This under-investment is not just caused by simple reductions in spending but 
also the use of centralisation and redistribution of rents (known as the Housing 
Revenue Account); in the process of which tenants in WCB were having £5 
million “clawed back” by the Treasury each year257.  The impact of the roll-back 
of the state (Peck and Tickell, 2002) allows a coercive argument to be 
presented early in the transfer offer document: ‘The Council believes that as 
financial rules applying to local authorities stand, transfer to Gower Homes is 
the only way to achieve the WHQS’258. 
Later in the offer document, the roll-out neoliberal justifications for the 
proposed LSVT are presented when the extent of public subsidy for the 
process is set out. This subsidy includes the removal of the claw back rules for 
Gower Homes Ltd.; the ability to borrow, as housing associations do not count 
against the government’s public debt metric; and, the full use of income from 
                                            
255
 Gower Homes Ltd., Offer Document: formal consultation (Jan 2010: 4). 
256
 Gower Homes Ltd., Offer Document: formal consultation (Jan 2010: 4). 
257
 Gower Homes Ltd., Offer Document: formal consultation (Jan 2010: 9). 
258
 Gower Homes Ltd., Offer Document: formal consultation (Jan 2010: 4). 
Stewart Smyth 
282 | P a g e  
 
Right to Buy sales (at the time local authorities were only allowed to use 25 per 
cent of this income the remainder being handed over to the Treasury)259. 
2.2 Dispossession of council housing 
In addition, there are two specific and large subsidies for the transfer process. 
First, to allow the transfer housing association the ability to borrow, HM 
Treasury pays off the historic debt that is attached to the council housing. In 
the case of WCB this debt write-off is estimated to be £35 million260. Second, 
even with the debt write off, the council housing stock has a negative transfer 
value (i.e. the cost of the needed repairs and maintenance is greater than the 
discounted future rent cash flows). In these circumstances, as was shown in 
the English case study, there is the need for a dowry (or gap funding) from the 
WAG. In the case of Gower Homes Ltd. the amount of gap funding is not 
currently in the public domain; however, the Gower Homes Business Plan 
(January, 2011) shows an annual dowry of £6.2 million for 27 years from 2011-
12261. These two points illustrate Harvey’s (2005) conception of public assets 
being released to the private sector at little or no cost; a process that is only 
possible by the use of public finance. 
The foregoing illustrates finance (both public and private) as the driver of the 
policy. As shown in the discussion on social housing and devolution in Wales, 
the political preference for AMs was direct funding and provision of council 
housing. However, the financing of public housing is deliberately constructed 
to rule out that (Fourth) option. Instead, with the public subsidies for stock 
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transfer, the WAG and WCB have adopted and pursued the policy. While 
finance is the driver there is also the impact on accountability relations that 
goes with neoliberal reforms of council housing; in particular, the governance 
of the new transfer housing association.  
2.3 Restructuring democratic accountability and user involvement  
The process of neoliberalisation also seeks to change the accountability 
relations, moving from a housing committee with democratically elected 
councillors to a board running the transfer housing association. The following 
illustrates how, in this case, the new accountability relations involving the 
board were designed to operate. This is followed by an exploration of how the 
relations have operated in practice over the two years since the transfer ballot 
result was announced. In common with SW housing association in the English 
case study, Gower Homes Ltd’s board is made up of three constituencies – 
tenants, local authority nominees and independents; each constituency has a 
maximum of the five members. However, Gower Homes is a community 
mutual housing association, which gives it a different relationship with the 
tenants. In the English case tenants are largely passive only to be consulted 
rather than having real decision-making powers. Community mutual housing 
associations are supposed to be different with tenants being members and 
having more control over the board (a position more analogous with 
shareholders in a company). First, tenants in Gower Homes do not 
automatically become members of the community mutual, they must apply to 
join and pay a nominal fee of £1. Second, in the rules governing Gower Homes 
Limited there are five different classes of membership. Besides tenant 
members there are leaseholder members, independent members, local 
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authority members and associate members262. The independent members are 
admitted on the basis of selection criteria agreed by the board. The local 
authority is the only designated local authority member263. Associate 
membership is open to anyone who is 16 years or older ‘... lives or works in 
[WCB] ... and qualifies for membership in accordance with any membership 
policy formulated by the Boards and approved by the Members ...’264 this 
includes corporate bodies. 
Third, having these five constituencies leads to complications and inequities in 
relation to voting and decision making by members. For example, to change 
the rules, dissolution, removal of a member or amalgamating with a company 
or another industrial and provident society, there is a weighting of votes in 
each class of membership with the total tenant membership receiving 34 per 
cent of the weight, the same amount as the local authority member. Further, ‘... 
the votes of the Members in each class shall be cast as a collective single vote 
... either ‘for’ or ‘against’ a resolution ...’265. For all other decisions each 
member shall have one vote, with the limitation that Leaseholder Members 
cannot constitute more than 5 per cent of the votes cast266. Fourth, there is a 
trigger point where the election of tenant board members moves from a ballot 
of the whole tenant population to a vote of the tenant members only. This 
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occurs when 5 per cent of all tenants become members of the Gower Homes 
Ltd.267.  
The board is not the only arena in which tenants can seek to influence their 
landlord. The Rules of Gower Homes Ltd. recognises the need for ‘... a 
strategy and programme to secure the widest possible community involvement 
in the Community Mutual’268, and allows a process where devolvement of 
services and assets can occur to local groups within certain circumstances269. 
In addition to membership, tenants are encouraged to join the POWER group 
(that consults tenants over scheduling of work and appointment of contractors) 
or apply to stand for the board as tenant members (see below)270.  
The foregoing analysis of the rules of Gower Homes are examples that while 
tenant involvement is deployed as a key benefit of the transfer process the 
planned structures are designed to involve a small, elite group of tenants. 
Further, and in parallel to the English case, this elite group of tenants are 
combined with independent board members who are appointed on the basis of 
their experience and expertise in areas relevant to running social housing as a 
business. Of the current four independent board members there is an 
accountant, solicitor, chartered surveyor and a retired local government officer. 
The elite group of tenants can be seen in the appointment process of the 
Independent Tenants’ Advisor (ITA). WCB must consult its tenants and 
facilitate the tenants in selecting an ITA. A newsletter sent out to tenants, 
explained how the ITA was appointed: 
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In Spring 2008 the Council sent a survey to all tenants asking if they wanted to get 
involved. Nine of us (all tenants from the Borough) were interested in the options for the 
future of our homes and we took control of the appointment process for the Independent 
Tenants Advisor ... We chose TACT@DOME271 ...272 
This is nine tenants out of a total population of over 9,000 homes.  
2.4 Summary 
LSVTs are supposed to enhance tenant participation. This example supports a 
major criticism of stock transfers, that the rhetoric does not match the practice 
of participation (Mooney and Poole, 2005; Mullins, 2006). A more accurate 
portrayal comes from Harvey’s (2005) concept of governance by experts and 
elites. The previous democratic accountability relations are replaced by a 
group of elite tenants and independent experts, representing one of the 
impacts of the neoliberal market-based reforms. Further, the above also 
illustrates the manner in which finance is used as a generative mechanism that 
drives the policy of stock transfer. This is highlighted by the repeated argument 
that given the current public funding restrictions LSVT is the only option 
available. There is also evidence that if funding was to be made equally 
available for councils that choose to retain their housing stock, the political 
preference would be to follow that option. The next section explores these 
tensions in the contexts where individuals and groups set out to challenge the 
restricted funding priorities of the Westminster and Welsh Assembly 
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governments, which in turn led to clashes between those in favour of stock 
transfer and those against. 
3. Reaction/Contestation 
Last March 6,366 tenants voted in the ballot to decide the future of more than 9,000 
council homes. The council claimed transferring them to a social landlord was the best 
way of ensuring they were brought up to standards set by the Assembly. 
A total of 3,600 tenants supported the transfer to not-for-profit landlord Gower Homes 
and 2,758 were against it.273 
WCB council is dominated by the Labour Party. In the spring of 2012, the 
Labour Party had a majority of 25 seats on the council. The next biggest party 
was Plaid Cymru with 11 councillors; the Conservative Party had no 
councillors. This current council make-up is typical and has been the same for 
many decades274. This position led one of the anti-transfer campaigners to 
describe WCB council as ‘the citadel’275. Labour is the party of (local) 
government within WCB and thus used to wielding power rather than 
challenging or campaigning against a policy or particular action of the council. 
In WCB, this has traditionally been left to grass-roots campaigns, sometimes 
with the support of individual Plaid Cymru (PC) councillors.  This section 
analyses the reaction and contestation to the neoliberalisation of council 
housing in WCB over three dimensions. First, is the formation and actions of 
the a local DCH civil society campaign; second, concerns the reactions of the 
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local state to this campaign and third, is a dialogical analysis of accountability 
for social landlords.   
3.1 Tenant-led civil society campaign 
The local Defend Council Housing (DCH) campaign in WCB was initially 
formed when a local Plaid Cymru councillor (Morgan) contacted an old school 
friend (Hywel) who had been involved with previous anti-privatisation 
campaigns in the area (including a campaign that stopped the privatisation of 
school catering services). Hywel and Morgan were then able to pull together a 
campaign involving local tenants, activists from a nearby council (where 
previously a proposed stock transfer had been rejected), support from the 
regional office of Unison and the national DCH campaign group. Against, were 
the forces of the local council – the vast majority of WCB councillors (including 
all members of the Labour group), some tenants and officers in the local 
authority – and backed by national and devolved governments.  Over the 
course of ten months these alliances contested the nature of the stock transfer 
process; one aspect of which was the accountability relations that should be 
implemented for the social housing landlord. 
The formation of the local DCH group illustrates the interaction between 
individuals pre-existing ideas (on privatisation) and the concrete actions of 
social structures (in the form of the local state) (Bhaskar, 1989). When 
individuals are faced with a change in their social circumstances – for example, 
the proposal to privatise their council house – they hold an internal 
conversation about how to react to the proposal (Archer, 2003). Most feel there 
is little they can do, even if they maintain an interest in the subject. However, a 
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minority feel it necessary to actively oppose the transfer proposal. For 
example: 
Well, I think really there was an awareness amongst at least some tenants and other 
key people that the proposed stock transfer amounted to privatisation. For myself ... I’m 
a socialist ... and I’ve been involved in several privatisation battles ... And so I was 
aware of the issues then and I was brought up in a council home...  
... I was contacted by a local councillor, Plaid Cymru councillor ... And he said look, we 
really must, you know, get some kind of campaign going and he asked me to, you know, 
climb aboard basically.  
(Hywel, anti-transfer activist) 
This quote, along with a similar one noted in the English case study (see 
section 3.1, chapter 6) show there is an underlying acceptance of the need for 
state provision of housing because the private sector cannot provide the 
housing needs of all in society. And when presented with the threat of 
privatisation it resonates with these pre-existing ideas. This forms the spark or 
basis for their motivation to become active in the local campaigns. 
The WCB LSVT campaign was particularly acrimonious. In post-ballot 
interviews both sides openly stated that the other had lied during the course of 
the campaign. The anti-transfer campaigners said their opponents lied about 
the condition of the housing stock and that tenants would receive secured (as 
opposed to assured) tenancies after transfer. While Rees (who was a member 
of the shadow board during the campaign and post-transfer is the Chair of the 
board) told of how the council had received a call from an 85-year old tenant in 
tears, having received a note from DCH saying ‘...that he would be put out of 
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his home because he couldn’t live there on his own ... we were going to get rid 
of everybody living on their own over a certain age. What absolute rubbish’276. 
Hywel illustrated the tensions around the campaign by sharing his experience 
of attending a consultation meeting organised by the Independent Tenants’ 
Advisor, Tact@Dome. During a break Hywel tried to distribute copies of the 
DCH newspaper and describes the reaction from the Tact@Dome consultant: 
She flew at me ... she was screaming, “You can’t give it out, take it back, take it back”. 
And she said, “... it’s all lies, it’s all lies...”. I said, “Well, you don’t know, you haven’t 
read it”. 
 Hywel (anti-transfer activist) 
In contrast to the Scottish campaign the unions at a local level did not actively 
support the anti-transfer campaign. In part, this is an expression of the dual 
approach taken by the trade union, Unison; where the national policy is one of 
opposition to stock transfers but at a local level branch officers will seek to 
protect their members’ jobs and employment conditions by identifying with 
local management’s analysis and prospective plan of action. In the WCB case 
local authority housing staff were regularly deployed in promoting pro-transfer 
events such as road shows and staffing show houses.  
The anti-transfer campaigners gave a number of examples of the tactics used 
by the council to undermine their campaign. These included, how one of their 
supporters have been ejected from a council-run fete for wearing an anti-
transfer t-shirt277; tenants displaying “Vote No” window posters were told to 
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remove them278 and a housing officer was suspended for speaking out against 
the transfer at an internal staff meeting279.  Morgan outlines how the housing 
staff reacted when he was in the council offices: ‘I used to walk into the 
Housing Department, right, and you’d think I had rabies, they were running 
everywhere, not to be seen speaking to me’280. For the “No” campaigners the 
local union members were seen as being in the pockets of the local authority 
management and too frightened to speak out281.  
Despite, these limitations a group of local tenants, councillors and activists with 
support from the regional office of Unison, did manage to sustain a campaign 
of public meetings, leaflet drops (of at least one leaflet to each of the 9,200 
homes) and media interventions (press releases and letter-writing) over the 
course of ten months up to the ballot.  
In common with the other case studies and existing literature (Daly et al., 2005; 
Mooney and Poole, 2005), this transfer illustrates the power and resource 
asymmetries between the pro and anti-transfer campaigns. On resources 
Gower Homes’ business plan included a budget of £6 million to cover the costs 
incurred during the stock transfer process282. Of which £1.3 million was spent 
pre-ballot on items such as a lead consultant (£73,470); staff advisor 
(£64,380); Independent Tenant Advisor (£126,470); offer document and 
DVD/Video (£133,200), and seconded staff and support admin (£379,330)283. 
These costs along with the post-ballot budgeted costs of £4.45 million were 
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initially paid for by way of a loan from WCB local authority to the new entity, 
Gower Homes. However the local authority can reclaim this money from the 
WAG. In contrast, the “No” campaign spent in the region of £500284. This 
money was generated by the campaign through fund-raising events such as 
second-hand book sales and individual donations285. The anti-transfer 
campaign also had support from Unison at a regional level, which paid for and 
printed 10,000 newsletters286. Even with this help from Unison, Hywel’s 
characterisation of the campaign as a “... David and Goliath situation”287 is 
appropriate.   
This case again shows the basic formulation of a group of individuals 
contacting each other with the idea of opposing the proposal to privatisation 
local council housing. These individuals are then able to co-ordinate a number 
of civil society individuals and organisations to form an anti-transfer campaign. 
When comparing this case to the previous Scottish case, there are two obvious 
differences that go a long way to explaining why the WCB campaign failed to 
stop the LSVT. First, while tenants were involved in WCB they were not as 
central, and did not lead in the manner in which they did in the Scottish. For 
example the initiators of the WCB DCH campaign were not council tenants. 
This meant they did not have existing access to existing networks of tenants. 
In these circumstances the addresses of tenants became even more important 
(see next section 3.2). Second, the Scottish case illustrated the central role 
that the local Unison trade union can play in providing credibility and resources 
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to an anti-transfer campaign. As described above this was completely absent 
in the WCB campaign.  
3.2 The local state reaction  
A prominent issue in this case study, which also illustrates the power and 
resource asymmetries in the LSVT process, was a struggle over access to the 
addresses of the tenants who were being balloted. The precedent for access 
to this information was set in a proposed stock transfer in Mid-Devon District 
Council in 2006288. In WCB, Hywel made a similar request on 29 June 2009 (it 
should be remembered that the ballot took place in February and March 2010). 
Having received this request, WCB initially delayed their response, 
contravening the 20 working day rule in the FoI legislation. It was not until 1 
February 2010 that Hywel received a substantive response, which was a 
denial of his request. Hywel sought a review which at this stage is normally an 
internal matter. However, on 12 March the council wrote to Hywel saying that 
they could not make a determination on his case without a decision from the 
Information Commissioner (IC). This is a failure by the council to comply with 
its legal responsibilities under the FoI legislation (which was subsequently 
pointed out by the IC). During the rest of 2010 there was correspondence back 
and forth between WCB and the Information Commissioner until in September, 
the IC called a halt and proceeded to a Decision Notice. The Decision Notice 
issued in January 2011 found that WCB council had breached the FoI 
legislation on five separate occasions. The IC ordered the council to provide 
Hywel with the addresses within 35 calendar days. However, there is an 
appeal procedure against decision notices from the IC, which the council 
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undertook, only for the Information Rights Tribunal to uphold the original 
decision on 30th December 2011. 
This episode illustrates a number of issues relevant to the stock transfer 
process and accountability relations. First, even though Hywel and the anti-
transfer campaign have had their right to information upheld the transfer has 
still gone ahead. This is despite appeals being made, to the Welsh Housing 
Minister, not to ratify the transfer until the outcome of the FoI request was 
clear. Secondly, one of the reasons advanced by the council for not providing 
the addresses was that it puts vulnerable people at risk289; something rejected 
by the IC, but an attitude that remained prevalent among the pro-transfer side, 
as Rees confirmed in his interview. However, Rees went further and stated 
that he felt the decision to withhold the addresses was correct ‘...because DCH 
weren’t giving out accurate information’290. The anti-transfer campaign was 
much more cynical about the delays and actions of WCB, seeing it as a tactic 
to avoid giving the addresses out until after the transfer had occurred. The IC 
judgement found against these actions of the council, stating: 
The Commissioner believes that there is a legitimate public interest in ensuring that 
council tenants voting on a possible stock transfer of Council property are fully informed 
of both the advantages and disadvantages of such a decision.291 
And, 
The Commissioner considers that the Council could have been asked to present the 
arguments to the Council tenants themselves. However, the campaign group would not 
have had confidence in the Council to do this.292  
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The decision notice also illustrates a third issue. As noted in the chapter 2 any 
set of accountability relations must involve an element of transparency and 
information giving. The Information Commissioner recognises this when 
stating: 
The Commissioner also believes that there is a legitimate public interest in ensuring that 
the conduct of a campaign which may result in the sale of a significant part of the 
Council’s assets is seen to be both transparent and accountable to the wider community 
within the Council’s boundaries.293  
Both the funding disparity and FoI case illustrate the manner in which the stock 
transfer process in skewed in favour of the pro-transfer campaign. The anti-
transfer campaign is denied access to public funding and relevant information 
which the pro-transfer side has in abundance. These examples raise a 
question mark over how such a process can provide a more accountable 
landlord with greater tenant participation, when the process of bringing that 
landlord into being exhibits such undemocratic activities. The contested nature 
of the language used in a stock transfer and the competing conceptions of an 
accountable landlord are explored next using a dialogical approach (Bakhtin, 
1981; Sullivan, 2012).    
3.3 Contested language 
The dialogical analysis initially highlighted confusion over the term an 
accountable landlord among the actors in both the pro and anti-transfer 
campaigners.  In response to the question what does the term, “an 
accountable landlord”, mean to you, Rees stated that ‘... it means being 
accountable to tenants... I mean, to transfer to this kind of organisation is a 
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chance for the community actually to have a say in the housing and their area’ 
and that ‘...it does mean involvement. It means tenant engagement’294. In this 
respect, Rees is advancing the position articulated as a justification for transfer 
by the Westminster and Welsh Assembly governments. For example the new 
Regulatory Framework for Housing Associations in Wales, published in 
December 2011, states as one of its principles295 that: 
The Regulatory Framework puts tenants at its heart by:  
• Ensuring that housing associations work with their tenants and people who use their 
services in planning, and assessing the quality of, services.  
• Providing information that allows tenants and others to compare the performance of 
their housing association to that of others.  
• Ensuring that the Welsh Ministers take account of the views of tenants and service 
users.296 
This claim of tenants at the heart of the framework is later compromised by a 
wide ranging attitude towards accountability, that ‘...is achieved by making 
housing associations accountable to their tenants, to people who use their 
services, to those who lend them money, and to other organisations that play a 
vital role in meeting local housing needs, such as local authorities’.297 Two 
points are striking about these quotes. First is the issue of multiple principals, 
where the accountee is being held to account by a range of accountors often 
with competing information requirements (Sullivan, 2003) and ‘reward or 
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sanction’ mechanisms (Gray and Jenkins, 1993). In these circumstances, it is 
possible to look at the ‘reward or sanction’ mechanism that each accountor 
has over the transfer housing association. Taking each in turn, the local 
authority has a legal contract with the transfer housing association that allows 
them to monitor the promises made in the offer document. Financial institutions 
will have a legal contract usually based on some form of charge over the 
assets of the housing association. Service users who are not ‘members’ (see 
above) of the housing association will be able to exercise consumer choice, 
where an alternative supplier is available.  
And finally, the tenants (where they are members of the community mutual 
housing association) will be able to exercise control over a third of the board 
members. In these circumstances the effective accountability mechanisms are 
weakest for the service users and tenants/members and could be given a 
lower priority when compared to the finance providers; a situation noted in 
other research by Mooney and Poole (2005) and Mullins (2006).  
Second, this is the logical conclusion given the origins of the new Regulatory 
Framework was based on a consultation with the housing association sector 
that recognised the financial importance of that sector and the need to ‘... 
maintain this significant level of investment and secure more funding in the 
future, there is a need to increase lenders’ confidence in the sector’298. Here 
again is an example of the priority given to private sector finance that was 
shown in the quote from Gwenda Thomas (AM) in chapter 5. Further the 
earlier quote from the regulatory framework, illustrates an attitude of equating 
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information provision to tenants/members with accountability299. The regulatory 
framework emphasises the need for an effective and well managed board, but 
at no point sets out the process of how the board members are to be selected, 
nominated or elected.  
Thus, for tenants the LSVT represents a move away from democratic control of 
their landlord through local elections, to holding a much weaker position in 
relation to board members; and where the regulatory framework does not 
specify how those board members, are to be accountable to the tenants. It 
should also be clear that to justify this change means that the current position 
of accountability exercised through the ballot box, cannot (in neoliberal terms) 
be acceptable, with the community as a whole having a say on how housing 
and their local area is run.  
On the anti-transfer side, a local tenant Lydia presented a very similar reply to 
Rees, summarising: ‘So I would look on an accountable landlord as somebody 
where I would have certain amount of right to say how that landlord is treating 
his tenants’300. It was Morgan that raised the question of democratic control: 
‘Well, accountable landlord is some body which the council owns, under 
democratic control. That’s an accountable landlord, who is answerable to the 
people through the elected members’301.  This led to the following exchange in 
the group interview: 
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MORGAN: So I believe the accountable landlord is councils. And we’re moving away 
from it unfortunately. 
LYDIA: Democratically controlled. 
MORGAN: Democratically controlled, by people, they elect members, if a member is not 
up to the job, out he goes in four years time. If the council is not up to the job, out the 
council goes in four years time. And that’s the way it’s got to be. 
LYDIA: And what I find appalling is that you are moving something out of democratic 
control. And they keep plugging into you all the time, “... but we’re not for profit ...”, but 
that’s not the point. The houses are owned by a body [of people], not by the council. So 
they’re actually giving away the assets of the people. And that, to me, is giving away 
accountability as well, isn’t it? Because you’ve got no rights through your councillor or 
anything. So they have given away my accountability or their accountability to me. They 
have given away. 
(Lydia, anti-transfer tenant; Morgan, anti-transfer councillor) 
This exchange illustrates two important aspects; firstly, the relations of 
accountability as expressed through local elections. This is common to all 
three anti-transfer campaigns in this thesis. Secondly, Lydia’s final contribution 
gives an insight into the motivation of those within anti-transfer campaigns; 
they are attempting to stop the loss of collectively owned assets and the rights 
they (as tenants) have to control those assets, their homes.  
The publicity used by the anti-transfer campaign illustrates the same themes 
as identified by Smyth (2012) where the argument over a reduction in 
accountability comes in two forms. Firstly, there is a defence of the existing 
democratic forms of accountability, such that housing ‘under Council control ... 
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is secure and democratic’302 and that if the stock transfer goes ahead ‘direct 
accountability of council landlords is lost’303. The second theme is a critique of 
the promised democracy in the new landlord. This argument had an additional 
layer in WCB, as the transfer housing association is set-up using the 
community mutual model. The Wales DCH newsletter describes the 
community mutual model as ‘privatisation with a fancy wrapper’304; and goes 
on to raise familiar criticisms that tenant board members will have to act in the 
interests of the housing association not as representatives of the tenants and 
that tenants will only make-up a third of the board. What becomes clear with 
the community mutual model is that the form of control being implemented, is 
taken from private sector corporate governance model with the exception that 
1) the tenants are members (shareholders), and 2) the members only have 
control over a third of the board305. Both these themes were combined in a 
local DCH leaflet publicising a local public meeting in July 2009, which under 
the heading “6 Reasons to Reject the Transfer Offer”, stated: 
No accountability.  Council tenants can vote for their landlords in local council 
elections every four years. Registered Social Landlords are simply not accountable to 
us in the same way306. 
The above examples illustrate two relevant elements. First that there are 
competing and contested concepts of accountability; one based on democratic 
ideas of accountability, the second based on a variant of corporate governance 
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practices. Drawing on Bakhtin’s (1981) work these two competing meanings of 
the one concept are rooted in the concrete social relations of neoliberalisation 
and the reaction that process has generated from tenants and other civil 
society actors. Second, in the local DCH campaign materials it is clear that the 
question of changing accountability is one of the factors (reasons) that is 
deployed to motivate and mobilise tenants (and others) to oppose the stock 
transfer. Thus, accountability becomes a contested arena, where the state and 
civil society clash; the outcome of this clash then leads to democratic 
accountability relations being reproduced (if, a no vote is secured) or, as in this 
case study, accountability relations and mechanisms are transformed along 
corporate governance lines (McDermont et al., 2009).  
3.4 Summary 
This section has analysed the reactions and contestation generated by the 
WBC stock transfer. As the tenants voted in favour of transfer this case has 
more similarities with the English case study than the Scottish one. The local 
civil society anti-transfer campaign was originated in a similar manner to the 
other case studies but failed to attract significant support from the local council 
trade union branch. The local state enjoyed significant financial resources and 
was willing to transgress FoI legislation as a tactic to undermine the anti-
transfer campaign. The attitudes of the pro- and anti-transfer campaigns 
towards democratic accountability, tenant participation and corporate 
governance style management boards are similar in both this and the English 
case. Although, the form of the transfer housing association, as a community 
mutual, is supposed to be a solution to the discredited English model, the rules 
of Gower Homes are complicated with little direct control by the body of 
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tenants. The next section analyses what has happened since the transfer 
focussing on how have the governance rules been implemented and what has 
happened to the rent promise.  
4. Reproduction or Transformation 
This section analyses the impact of the tenants’ vote in favour of transfer in 
WCB. With this vote the accountability relations are transformed from a 
democratic form to a corporate governance form albeit one wrapped up in a 
community mutual facade. This analysis covers two elements, first the rent 
promise from the offer document is analysed and compared to the actual rises 
since transfer; and second, the implementation of the community mutual rules 
concerning the board and membership is explored and discussed.  
4.1 The rent promise 
Many stock transfers result in a divided tenant body with regard to rent rises – 
the Glasgow transfer is a good example (Mooney and Poole, 2005); with the 
rent promises made to transferring tenants not applying to new tenants post-
transfer. As the Gower Homes business plan makes clear:  
A distinction is made between the rents charged to new tenants and those for 
transferring tenants - the latter benefiting from a rent guarantee.307 
Thus any new tenants will be subject to the higher rents that the RSL sector 
charges.308 The following analysis only concerns tenants who transferred 
direct to Gower Homes from the local authority. 
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TABLE 4: Expected average weekly rent levels and percentage increases 
RENT YEAR COUNCIL RENTS GOWER HOMES RENTS 
2010-11 £60.35 £58.21 
2011-12 £63.35 (+5.0%) £59.64 (+2.4%) 
2012-13 £66.35 (+4.7%) £61.40 (+2.9%) 
2013-14 £69.35 (+4.5%) £63.52 (+3.4%) 
2014-15 £72.20 (+4.1%) £66.02 (+3.9%) 
2015-16 £74.73 (+3.5%) £68.61 (+3.9%) 
2016-17 £77.35 (+3.5%) £71.32 (+3.9%) 
2017-18 £80.05 (+3.5%) £74.13 (+3.9%) 
2018-19 £82.85 (+3.5%) £77.06 (+3.9%) 
2019-20 £85.75 (+3.5%) £80.10 (+3.9%) 
Source: Gower Homes Ltd. Offer Document (2010: 21) 
In common with the English case study there has also been what was 
described as “breathtaking” rent rises announced just weeks after the housing 
stock was transferred309. The issue is about what is an expected and 
acceptable rent rise. The offer document contains a table showing the 
expected rent levels if the housing had stayed with the local authority and the 
rent level that Gower Homes Ltd is committed to post-transfer (see table 4).  
There are a number of points relevant here. First, from these figures in the first 
year there is an expected rent rise of 5 per cent if remaining with the local 
authority, but only a 2.4 per cent rise if transferred to Gower Homes310. 
However, of the ten years shown the first year shows the biggest differential 
increase in favour of Gower Homes, which over the next four years narrows 
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until in the later five years Gower Homes expect to increase their rents at a 
higher rate than if the housing had stayed with WCB. Second, the offer 
document highlights the rent year 2014-15 both in the text and by shading the 
council rents box (see table 4). This is the year where the cash differential 
between the two rent levels is at its greatest. After 2014-15 the differential 
narrows as Gower increases its rents faster than WCB. It is important to 
remember that the business plan for Gower Homes is over a thirty year period 
not just ten years. Third, Gower intends to increase rents for transferring 
tenants (inflation +1.85 per cent) at a faster rate than for new tenants (inflation 
+1 per cent), until such time as the two converge311. Fourth, the actual rent rise 
for Gower Homes in ‘2011-12 rent figures increased using RPI at 4.6 % in line 
with WAG guidance’312. 
The rent promise is designed to reassure tenants that there will not be 
excessive rent rises post-transfer. However, a review of the research on this 
issue found that there are a range of qualifications put into rent promises that 
‘have provided scope for rents to rise at rates somewhat in excess of those 
implicit in headline ballot commitments ... without any technical breach of 
undertakings’ (Pawson and Mullins, 2010: 204). 
This case study aptly illustrates the point and the implications for 
accountability. In March 2011, just days after the transfer some tenants 
received notice of their new rent levels that represented a 6.6 per cent 
increase313. The difference is in part explained by the use of whole stock 
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averages in the offer document, as compared the actual individual figures for a 
three-bedroomed house increasing from £66.96 per week to £71.38 per week 
(or 6.6 per cent)314. This illustrates how the transfer HA can formally comply 
with the promises made in the offer document and yet, the tenants’ experience 
is divergent from the promises made.  
There are two other aspects of the issue. First, local councillors argued that 
Gower Homes had implemented a rent rise twice the Welsh average315 and 
that local authorities which had chosen to retain their housing stock had lower 
rent rises. While there are a number of reasons why the other rent rises are 
lower than Gower Homes (including pressure from tenants), it does illustrate 
the argument that stock transfer is not always a cheaper option for the tenant. 
Further a parallel can be drawn with the experience of council tenants in 
England who faced rent rises of over 6 per cent in 2009 and 2010, but political 
pressure exerted through democratic (“everyday”) accountability relations, 
forced the Housing Minister to halve the proposed rise316. Second, the old and 
new process of setting the rent rises was contrasted by a local councillor: 
“When WCB Council increased rents, a report would go before councillors and 
it would be debated and approved or otherwise. But I don’t know what 
democratic process this new organisation has”317. While the promises outlined 
in the offer document and voted on by the whole tenant population could be 
considered a democratic process, this is not without limitations (as outlined 
above, the use of averages gives individual tenants little insight to their actual 
likely rent levels).   
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Further the accountability mechanism for breaches of the promises in the offer 
document is a legal one, based on the contract between the local authority and 
the transfer housing association. In a similar manner to the English case study 
the web of regulation, that replaced the democratic accountability relations to 
the tenant, is shown to be inadequate in holding Gower Homes to account for 
the promises made before the ballot. This is despite the emphasis and rhetoric 
of policy-makers and regulators, on ensuring the new RSL is accountable.   
4.2 The management board 
The actual experience of bringing the community mutual rules to life illustrates 
a number of difficulties. Despite the transfer taking place in March 2011 (a year 
after the ballot result announced) there were no tenant members of Gower 
Homes at that time; and it was not until January 2012 that tenants could apply 
for membership318.  On 16th March 2012, Gower Homes issued a press release 
celebrating the co-incidence of their 99th member, being 99 years old319. At this 
rate of registration (i.e. 100 members per quarter) it would take over 350 years 
for all tenants to become members of their community mutual landlord. There 
is also a similarity with the English case study, where there is a significant 
turnover of board members, particularly among the tenant members 
constituency. At the time the offer document was published in January 2010, 
there were only 14 members of the shadow board (the Independents 
constituency had only four members)320. By the spring of 2012 (just two years 
later), there were only eight original members left on the board. The worst 
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affected constituency was the tenant board members, with the Chair of the 
board being the only member still in place321. Further, by March 2012 there 
were only two tenant board members, with three tenants resigning from the 
board in December 2011, due to ill health322.  
4.3 Summary 
The tenant vote in favour of transfer transformed the accountability relations in 
this case study in much the same manner as the English case. In both cases, 
there are similarities in breaches (depending on your interpretation) of rent 
promises and difficulties in maintaining a stable board with a significant 
turnover of board members in all constituencies not just among tenants. The 
significant difference between the post-transfer organisation structure of this 
case study and the English one, concern the use of the Welsh solution, a 
community mutual housing model. However, this difference appears to have 
had little impact in generating a more engaged, involved, participating tenant 
body. 
5. Conclusion 
This case study presents the last of the data for this thesis. Each of the case 
studies in the thesis has their own features. In the case of WCB, the question 
of stock transfer as privatisation, while present, did not feature to the same 
degree as in the Scottish case or even the English one. The key 
characteristics of this case study are the manner in which finance has been 
used to create a problem (roll-back) and then subsidise one preferred solution 
(roll-out, LSVT); the acrimonious nature of the campaign coupled with power 
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and resource asymmetries in favour of the pro-transfer side; and, even with the 
adoption of a community mutual housing model, the erosion of democratic 
accountability relations with the establishment of the new transfer housing 
association. The English case study also illustrated this point and highlighted 
the limitations of the alternative accountability relations brought in with the 
stock transfer with regard to the promises made concerning future rent rises. 
As part of the LSVT process there is an accountability relationship between the 
local authority and the transfer housing association in the form of a legal 
contract (whether exercised or not). However, the tenant does not appear in 
these relations. A common element of both this and the English case study is 
that the tenant board members are first, a minority on the board and second, 
are not to act as representatives of tenants but as if they were directors of the 
limited companies they now help to run.  
In all three local case studies the primary generative mechanism for this 
process is finance, its lack over numerous years leading to a backlog of repairs 
and then it use to encourage stock transfers. The background to the study 
(chapter 5) illustrates the ideological aspects of this process, with regard to the 
policy decisions taken at the Westminster level that impact at local levels (for 
example to allow transfer housing associations to borrow and not local 
authorities; or, to fund debt write offs for transferred housing stock but not for 
those councils that retain it). This also leads to an acceptance at a local level 
that there is no alternative, despite the wishes of local politicians323. 
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In each of the three local case studies a local tenant-led campaign was 
organised that built an alliance of civil society individuals and organisations 
including tenants, councillors, trade unions and other activists. The main 
difference between the three case studies is the level of involvement of the 
local authority trade union members in the anti-transfer campaign. This is not 
the sole but is a major contributory factor in why the tenants in the Scottish 
case study voted against the proposed transfer. In the English and Welsh case 
studies the local authority trade union members were largely absent (or 
involved with the pro-transfer campaign), even if their regional officers 
supported the anti-transfer campaigns with donations (mainly in the form of 
printing costs). 
The most relevant difference between the case studies for this thesis is what 
has happened to the accountability relations. The triadic research framework 
posited a dynamic that the neoliberalisation of public services generates a 
reaction/contestation, one of the outcomes is the reproduction or 
transformation of accountability relations. In the English and Welsh cases the 
counter-veiling reaction/contestation of the anti-transfer campaigns was not 
strong enough to overcome the neoliberalisation generative mechanism with 
the supporting local state reaction. This resulted in the transformation of 
accountability to forms inspired by private sector corporate governance model 
(McDermont et al., 2009). Whereas, in the Scottish case study, the counter-
veiling reaction/contestation of the anti-transfer campaign overcame the 
neoliberalisation generative mechanism; even with the supporting local state 
reaction. In this case, resulting in the reproduction of the existing democratic 
accountability relations. 
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Returning to the two research aims of this thesis: 
1. To develop a framework that explores public accountability as a 
dynamic, complex and contested social process; 
2. To analyse how accountability relations between public service 
providers and users are made, remade and exercised in the context of 
marketised and/or privatised provision. 
In addressing 1 above, a research framework was developed, in chapter 3, of 
neoliberalisation – reaction/contestation – reproduction or transformation. All 
the case studies illustrate this process of tenant-led civil society campaigns 
challenging and sometimes transcending the decisions made by the national 
and local state. While these case studies occurred in the last decade, the 
literature review identified other examples in history where civil society has 
sought to challenge and control the state, from the Diggers and Levellers in 
seventeenth century through the Chartists to the tenants’ movements of the 
twentieth century. With this perspective the recent contestation over the 
accountability relations in social housing can be seen as the latest example of 
this on-going dynamic social process. This is the link to the second research 
objective; as to understand the contestation over social housing in the past 
twenty-five years also requires an understanding of the neoliberal market-
based reforms that have been pursued in Britain during that period. This case 
study, along with the other local case studies, have illustrated the process 
whereby service users react to the proposed privatisation of their homes  and 
in certain circumstances stop this process and maintain democratic 
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CHAPTER 9 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
... a framework of public accountability that enables different accounts of public purpose 
and practice to be deliberated in a democratic public sphere: constituted to include 
difference, enable participation, voice and dissent, through to collective judgement and 
decision, that is in turn accountable to the public. 
Where is such a democratic accountability to emerge from when the public sphere is 
within the iron design type of neo-liberal corporate regulation? 
(Ranson, 2003: 476) 
1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to draw the arguments in this thesis to a coherent 
conclusion. To achieve this, the discussions in the previous chapters are 
recapped with conclusions drawn, leading to an exposition and defence of the 
contribution to knowledge claim. In addition, there are some preliminary 
theorisations on the nature of accountability based on the case studies’ data 
which leads to the outlining of a future research agenda. 
The aim of this thesis is to explore the manner in which accountability relations 
are made, re-made and exercised in a public service, taking the privatisation of 
council housing as the data field. Council housing tenants are unique citizens 
as they are able to elect their landlord; thus, exercising democratic 
accountability. The neoliberalisation of public services, including council 
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housing, has removed democratic accountability and replaced it with 
governance by experts and elites, in private not-for-profit companies. This 
neoliberalisation process has generated a significant reaction in the form of 
civil society campaigns that contest the transfer and with it the changing nature 
of accountability relations. It is posited that these processes of 
neoliberalisation and the reaction/contestation it generates are general 
although not always evident. The council housing stock transfer policy brings 
these processes to the surface, the outcome of which is either to reproduce 
the existing democratic municipal accountability relations or transform them to 
privatised corporate governance styled accountability.  
It is posited that these processes are also present in other public services; for 
example, the Academies and Free Schools programmes in education. 
Developing a framework to capture these processes, lays the foundations for 
further general application to other public services. 
In chapters 1 and 4, drawing on the existing literature concerning the nature of 
the current theorisations of accountability, its relationship with public services 
and the emphasis on human agency, the following research aims were 
derived:  
1) To develop a framework that explores public accountability as a 
dynamic, complex and contested social process; 
2) To analyse how accountability relations between public service 
providers and users are made, remade and exercised in the context of 
marketised and/or privatised provision. 
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These research aims require a series of related research objectives to guide 
the case study development; each objective is discussed separately below. 
The objectives are: 
a) To explore and evaluate the impact of neoliberal market reforms on 
public services and related accountability relations; 
b) To demonstrate and account for how these reforms have generated 
opposition/resistance in the form of civil society campaigns; 
c) To demonstrate the extent to which the actual form and content of 
accountability relations is contingent on the outcome of the contestation 
between neoliberal state reforms and civil society campaigns; 
d) To develop an initial research framework that enables new insights into 
the workings of accountability relations in the context of marketised 
and/or privatised public services. 
As set out in chapter 4 (see table 2), these research aims and objectives form 
the basis for the thematic data analysis that informed the case study 
development in chapters 6 to 8 and the background to the studies in chapter 5.  
This chapter is structured as follows; the next section continues and deepens 
the analysis from the case studies. The aim is to illustrate the manner in which 
the triadic research framework has enabled and structured the data collection 
and thematic analysis. Section 3 sets out and discusses the contribution to 
knowledge claims in this thesis. This includes both the theoretical claim, of the 
integrated triadic research framework, and also an empirical claim of 
answering Cooper’s (1997) call for research that makes visible those who 
suffer the effects of the new accounting and accountability regimes.  
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Although not part of the knowledge claims, section 4 sets out some initial 
theorisations of accountability relations based on this work. This provides a 
path to a broader terrain in section 5, which is a possible future research 
agenda. In section 6, the thesis concludes with two reflections concerning the 
import of critiquing current policies on public housing and an alternative, 
optimistic outlook on how existing social relations can be transformed. 
2. Discussing the case studies and the research aims 
This section discusses the case studies in the context of the research 
framework and the research aims and objectives. The aim is to critically 
evaluate the extent to which the case studies have addressed the aims and 
objectives; thus providing the basis for the claims of contribution to knowledge 
made in this thesis. The focus of the discussion is the data provided in the 
case studies and a critical evaluation of the research framework. Building on 
the initial analysis and comparisons already carried out in, and between the 
case studies, this sub-section includes further cross-case thematic analysis324. 
The first three research objectives map directly onto the triadic research 
framework: 
 Objective a), to explore and evaluate the impact of neoliberal reforms is 
captured in the first element of the triad – Neoliberalisation; 
 Objective b), to demonstrate and account for the opposition generated 
by neoliberalisation is captured in the second element – 
Reaction/Contestation;  
                                            
324
 Appendix 4 includes a table showing a basic cross-case comparison of each of the data 
themes. 
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 Finally, objective c) to demonstrate the contingent nature of 
accountability relations on the outcome of the previous two elements 
(objectives) is captured in the final element of the triad – Reproduction 
or Transformation.  
Collectively these three elements and related objectives, address the second 
research aim to analyse how accountability relations are made, re-made and 
exercised in the public services. The first research aim – to develop a 
framework to explore public accountability as a dynamic, complex and 
contested social process – is linked to the final research objective (d) above. 
This research aim and objective is addressed by combining the triadic 
research framework developed in addressing research objectives a) to c) with 
a second triad of the state, civil society and a dynamic relationship between 
the two. The combination of these two triads is discussed in more detail below. 
The following sub-sections analyse the data presented in the case studies by 
using the first triadic framework. 
2.1 Neoliberalisation  
The thematic data analysis for this element of the research framework covers 
four themes – the roll-back/roll-out dynamic, dispossession of council housing; 
restructuring of democratic accountability and restructuring/commodification of 
council housing. Each theme is explored below. 
2.1.1 Roll-back/roll-out of the state 
In each case study evidence was presented of the roll-back/roll-out dynamic 
being present. This local data was also augmented by looking at the national 
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trends in council housing over the past thirty years (in chapter 5). Central to 
this dynamic is the deployment of public funding. Initially with its reduction 
creating a crisis in the form of huge backlogs in repairs; followed by subsidising 
the roll-out of neoliberal based solutions (i.e. PFI/LSVT/ALMO). The local 
cases could not be considered as early adopters of LSVT and there is 
evidence in both the Scottish and Welsh cases of some initial opposition to 
stock transfers by local political leaders (for example, LSVT was initially ruled 
out in the Scottish case). However, it appears that in all cases the attraction of 
access to private finance, subsidised in the form of debt write off and gap 
funding coupled with a staunch opposition the Westminster government to the 
Fourth Option, was too great to resist. The role of finance as a generative 
mechanism is explored further below. 
2.1.2 Dispossession of council housing 
The case studies illustrate the manner in which public assets (council housing) 
were released to private sector finance capital at subsidised rates, to allow the 
generation of profits from future income streams. A process characterised as 
dispossession of council housing following Harvey’s (2003; 2005) 
dispossession by accumulation.  
The deployment of finance is central to understanding how the housing sector 
(and more broadly other parts of the public sector) has been reformed and 
restructured. Two major themes developed through the case studies. The first 
concerns how public money has been used in smoothing the transfer process; 
the second covered the impact that privately raised finance played as a 
justification for stock transfer.  
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The state’s role in funding the transfer process is evident in a series of 
activities. These include the adoption of the Tenanted Market Value (TMV) 
model, with its central element that the transfer should be fiscally neutral for 
the receiving landlord. In the English and Welsh cases the value of the housing 
transferred was negative; requiring the state to step-in. SW received gap 
funding of £34 million from HM Treasury. A similar position was reported in the 
Welsh case with an annual dowry of £6.2 million. In the Scottish case the TMV 
was positive leading to an agreed transfer price of £21 million to be paid by 
SCHA to the SCC325.  
Irrespective of the transfer price in all cases the government was to write-off 
the historic housing debt (£132 million in the English case, £35 million in the 
Welsh and £310 million in the Scottish). This is not the end of the public 
subsidy as the costs of the pro-transfer campaign are paid for out of the public 
purse326. In SCC this amounted to more than £2.6 million; in WBC a budget of 
£5 million was set aside and the actual spend by NCC was £0.8 million327.  
In all cases little was said about the need for the transfer HAs to borrow from 
private sector organisations (a planned peak of borrowing of £95 million for 
SCHA and £90 million for SW). The write-off of historic debt was a much more 
prominent element in the Scottish case than the others, with the proposed 
transfer being justified on the basis that it was the only way to access this level 
                                            
325
 Treasury rules state that these funds must be used to pay down the historic housing debt 
associated with that housing stock. 
326
 In the Scottish case these cost were absorbed by the devolved administration into their 
COP programme. 
327
 In part the wide variation in pro-transfer expenses is due to the different relative sizes of the 
transfers; however, the differences are most likely to be based upon variations in what is 
included in the calculations. 
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of investment. When in the Scottish case anti-transfer campaigners called on 
the government for a level playing field (that if the funds are available then the 
historic debt should be written off without the need for transfer), the pro-
transfer campaigners said this was unrealistic.  
The English case study and the evidence from Kevin (TBM) illustrates the role 
played by the private sector financier in the post-ballot period, where the 
transfer housing association has secured a charge on the tenants’ homes as 
collateral for access to the loan facility with Barclays’ bank. Although further 
research would be needed on the impact of these post-ballot arrangements, it 
is reasonable to assume that the board will be cognisant of Barclays 
requirements and regulations; and where these may contradict tenants’ 
interests (for example over the levels of rent rises) then the finance provider 
would be preferenced over the tenants.  
2.1.3 Restructuring user involvement and democratic accountability 
The case studies illustrates that the restructuring of user involvement is an 
important element of the overall neoliberalisation process. In this process the 
deployment of terms such as tenant involvement, participation and control is 
designed to encourage a vote in favour of transfer. As with other aspects of 
neoliberalisation the ideas of enhancing tenant involvement have been 
contested by the tenant-led campaigns. Further, the case studies illustrate 
Harvey’s (2005) conception of ‘governance by experts and elites’; while at the 
same time the previous democratic accountability is eroded and replaced by 
private-sector inspired corporate governance ideas, as McDermont et al. 
(2009) outline. 
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Those advocating stock transfer use a range of related terms to describe, 
influence and obfuscate the underlying nature of the relations between tenants 
and their landlord. Terms such as tenant consultation, tenant participation, 
tenants control and community empowerment are used interchangeably to 
cover a range of activities. The Scottish case study highlighted an example, 
where it was pointed out that the favoured description of Community 
Ownership had no definition; but did have a dual purpose, to both extend the 
positive connotation with community based housing associations and also to 
undermine the accusations of privatisation. There are similarities between the 
Scottish and Welsh cases in the legal/organisational form of the proposed 
landlord; with the latter using the Community Mutual model. In practice, the 
actual form of the community mutual organisation in the Welsh case study has 
led to a very small elite group of tenants becoming members. 
If the new transfer organisation forms do not deliver tenant control, the 
purpose and role of the tenant board members is called into question. The 
advocates of transfer point towards tenants being board members and thus 
having a greater input into the decision-making processes of the new landlord. 
In addition, they argue that transfer housing associations are better at listening 
and consulting their tenants; partly due to their smaller size (e.g. 6,000 homes 
for SW instead of over 70,000 for NCC) and partly due to a change in culture. 
There is a corollary argument that portrays (sometimes with justification) the 
councils’ attitude towards tenants in a poor light. Building on this, advocates of 
transfer argue that the post-transfer regulatory system is more tenant friendly, 
in that tenants can complain to the relevant regulatory organisation. It is 
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implied they can also raise issues with their former landlord, the council, who 
are legally contracted to monitor the transfer housing association. The 
experience of the rent rises in the English case raises questions over the 
effectiveness of this regulatory system. 
Those who oppose stock transfer argue that the regulatory system is not 
structured to representing the interests of tenants, but for the efficient and 
effective running of the transfer housing associations as businesses328. It was 
noted in the Scottish case study that not all local authority landlords have a 
poor track record on consultation. The anti-transfer campaigners recognise the 
sometimes poor performance of their local authority but argue that if the 
council operated in a different policy environment with funding on a par with 
transfer housing associations, they would improve329. Moreover, local authority 
tenants have a special relationship (described as “unique citizens”) with their 
landlords that would be lost if transfer proceeds. Anti-transfer campaigners 
argue that council housing is already owned by the community (Glynn, 2010), 
they elect their landlord through local elections and have secure tenancies, the 
terms of which can only be changed an act of parliament.  
Finally, the anti-transfer campaigners note that even though tenants are on the 
board in most cases they are not elected to those positions; they are only one 
of three groups on the board and are in the minority; and must act in the best 
interests of the housing association rather than representatives of the tenants. 
                                            
328
 The implicit justification for this from the pro-transfer side is an assumption that an effective 
and efficiently run business will satisfy the needs of the tenants. This assumption has a parallel 
with accounting standard setters who assume that if the information needs of the finance 
providers are satisfied then all other users of financial information will also be satisfied. Both 
assumptions are contested. 
329
 For example, the move from the mid-1990s to set-up neighbourhood housing offices and 
devolve more frontline staff and services to them, has been hailed as one such positive 
development. 
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The above leads to a dilution of the power and control that tenants' exercise, 
post-transfer. 
An alternative theorisation of this reform process is captured in Harvey’s 
(2005) ‘governance by experts and elites’. The argument runs that neoliberal 
theorists and policy-makers are ‘profoundly suspicious of democracy’ (Harvey, 
2005: 66). Their preference is for governance by experts and elites willing to 
reproduce managerialist social relations. The governing boards of all transfer 
housing associations are a good example of this form of governance.  
In each case study the board was split into three categories covering tenants, 
independents and council nominees. In the English and Scottish cases the 
tenant and independent board members were selected using traditional 
employment selection methods of applications and interviews. This was also 
the case with the independent board members in the Welsh case. The basis 
on which the independent board members were selected was their knowledge 
or expertise; hence, the presence of solicitors, financiers, company directors 
and other professionals among this constituency. The tenant board members 
form an elite group, separate from the mass of other tenants and are 
prohibited from representing them.  
In the SW case there is no procedure for either the removal or appointing of 
future TBMs. In the Welsh case there was a ballot of all tenants to elect the 
TBMs for the shadow board. However, the rules of Gower Homes Ltd. contain 
a trigger point where future elections are restricted to members of the 
community mutual.  
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The council nominees retain an element of democratic accountability as the 
majority (although not all) of them are elected members of the local council. 
The process followed in the Scottish case was one of nominations and if 
necessary a vote by the council members. The position in the English case 
was slightly different, with the council nominating a council officer, alongside 
four councillors. Also, it is not clear from NCC council records how the five 
nominees became board members (by appointment, selection or vote of the 
council members). Overall, with a proposed stock transfer the previous forms 
of democratic accountability are eroded and reformed to fit neoliberal priorities 
and the needs of private finance providers. 
2.1.4 Restructuring/commodification of council housing 
Chapter 5 (Background to the studies) highlights the trends in the social 
housing sector since 1979 using out a range of secondary, statistical data. 
These measures, covering the number of housing units and money spent on 
social housing, showed the following trends: 
 Public investment in social housing is in long-term decline. 
 The result is a reduced total number of social housing homes through 
the loss of stock via the right to buy programme and successive 
governments’ policy of not re-investing in new housing stock. 
 Within this declining stock there has also been a major restructuring of 
the providers of social housing, with the housing association sector 
benefitting at the expense of local council provision. 
The result of these trends has been to turn council housing from a tenure of 
choice for many in the post-war period to a residualised social service, where 
only those with the greatest personal and social problems (e.g. drug addiction, 
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mental illness and disability) are eligible for housing (Pawson and Mullins, 
2010).  As would be expected there is a close relationship between the 
national and local data, with none of the local case studies showing any 
alternative trends than those found at the national level. Although, as 
highlighted in the cross-case thematic analysis (see Appendix 4), there is a 
lack of detailed data at a local level with only the Scottish case having enough 
to enable a separate section on this data theme. 
These figures and trends are the outcomes of government policies that could 
be described initially as the rolling back of the state. However, this only 
partially explains the impact of neoliberal reforms on the sector. As the state 
has withdrawn from direct provision, there has been a corresponding rolling 
out of forms of governance and regulation based around free-marketers’ ideas 
of consumer choice and the enabling state (Ridley, 1988).  
For example, on one level the transfer of housing stock is justified by an 
appeal to enhancing tenant choice. The local and national state is to provide 
the regulatory environment – through agency bodies and contractual relations 
– in which the housing associations are to operate. Therefore, the role of the 
state does not diminish, but changes to rolling out the creation and 
maintenance of conditions for consumer choice and regulation (Peck and 
Tickell, 2002). From the election of the New Labour government in 1997, the 
state took on an interventionist, restructuring role particularly evident in the 
Decent Homes programme (and devolved equivalents). This meant councils 
being promised extensive monetary resources if stock transfer was 
successfully pursued.  
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This neoliberalisation process appears at times to be overwhelming and all 
encompassing (Broadbent et al., 1996; Ranson, 2003). The government 
deploys significant public funding to make privatisation, through LSVT, appear 
irresistible. This is coupled with the employment of professional marketing 
strategies and the promise of real home improvements. However, to focus on 
the neoliberalisation process only, is one-sided. Neoliberal reforms have also 
generated a reaction and contestation from tenants, campaigners and trade 
unionists, as discussed below.  
2.2 Reaction/contestation 
The previous sections have illustrated some of the contestation over 
privatisation and tenant involvement. Here, the emphasis is on identifying the 
manner in which the actions of the social actors can be understood in the 
context of their concrete, social contexts. These sections draw on the agency, 
structure and language identified in the theoretical framework.   
2.2.1 Tenant-led civil society campaigns and local state reactions 
In all three cases, anti-transfer campaigners organised grass-roots campaigns 
seeking to unite disparate groups and individuals around the one aim of 
stopping the stock transfer. The campaigns organised public meetings with a 
range of speakers both nationally and locally known; distributed newsletters 
and leaflets; wrote letters to local newspapers and issued press releases; held 
fund-raising events; organised protests and lobbies of council meetings, and 
drew support from the trade union movement.  
The pro-transfer side generated a substantial publicity campaign (including 
leaflets, documents, newsletters and DVDs), door-to-door surveys, show 
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homes, campaign stalls and touring buses staffed by local authority 
employees, financed by public money. The local councils deployed a range of 
tactics and manoeuvres to secure the transfer that could be considered anti-
democratic. These included using its position of power to exclude those who 
opposed the transfer from consultative bodies (for example in the English and 
Scottish cases). In the Welsh case, contravening the Data Commissioners 
rules, the local authority refused to give the addresses of the homes under 
transfer to those campaigning against the transfer. In the Scottish and English 
cases there were issues concerning the timing and running of the ballots 
respectively. 
Between these two campaign groups, there were bodies that occupied a 
formally independent role, although in practice their independence can be 
called into question. In the first group is the SCTF; while in the second is the 
Independent Tenants’ Advisor (ITA). The ITAs are formally independent with a 
role to ensure that the information produced by the pro-transfer campaign is 
factual and includes what will happen if the tenants reject the transfer. They do 
not have a role of ensuring that the debate is balanced (i.e. includes the 
arguments in favour of rejection). Substantively, the independence of the ITAs 
is questioned when they are appointed in conjunction with the local authority 
and, in some cases, are already members of the housing association sector, 
as in the Welsh case. 
The cases provide evidence of Bhaskar’s Transformational Model of Social 
Activity (TMSA) in action. There is a range of pre-existing social structures in 
place before the transfer proposal is advanced. Taking the Scottish case study 
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as an example, these social structures include the local authority SCC and its 
housing department, the elected local councillors, the Scottish Executive and 
devolved government as well as the Westminster government, including the 
Treasury. There are the council housing tenants, their representatives in 
Registered Tenant Organisations, the SCTF and the trade unions at both local 
and national levels. These pre-existing social structures had been part of the 
process of providing council housing for many decades. In June 2004, with the 
decision by senior management at SCC to pursue stock transfer a range of 
social structures come together to promote a “Yes” vote. Alliances of 
individuals (positioned-practices) are made between senior management in the 
local authority, councillors, local MPs, the Scottish Executive, as they act within 
these social structures. As the campaign progresses these social structures 
use their emergent powers to develop new social structures, such as the 
shadow board of SCHA.  
The stock transfer proposal has another emergent effect, the outcome of which 
is the setting up of a temporary social structure in the form of the campaign 
against the transfer (SCAST). Again Bhaskar’s model captures this process 
with the action of individuals at the centre of the process but also the need to 
enter into a social structure (e.g. the SCAST / TAST / Welsh DCH or 
equivalent campaign) to become effective.  
The emergent nature of pre-existing social structures was emphasised above 
(e.g. the emergence of pro- and anti-transfer campaigns from existing social 
structures of local authorities, tenant groups and trade unions). There is also a 
focus on the second triad of Bhaskar’s TMSA (Individual – Reproduces or 
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Transforms – Society), as individuals create and enter into the campaign social 
structures in an effort to reproduce or transform the delivery of council housing, 
including accountability relations. 
There is an additional aspect to this dynamic, covered by Margaret Archer’s 
(1995) concept of contingent contradiction. Here, the two alliances of social 
structures are in clear contradiction – one wanting to transfer the housing 
stock, the other to keep it. Archer’s conception points to the question, is it 
possible to predict the outcome of a ballot process? This is discussed in 
section 2.3.1 below. 
2.2.2 Contested language 
The earlier discussion on the nature of tenant involvement and governance by 
experts and elites highlights the contradictory and contested nature of the 
language used during transfer campaigns. The previous section developed an 
analysis of the elements and combinations of social actors and social 
structures in opposing camps contesting various elements of the LSVT 
process. This contestation occurs at the level of language as well. As Bakhtin 
(1981) argues each utterance is composed of competing forces (centripetal 
and centrifugal) with these forces being apparent as the utterance enters into 
the heteroglossia of competing meanings. A number of examples from the 
case studies illustrate these ideas.  
First, for pro-transfer campaigners in the English and Welsh cases, tenant 
board members are seen as a significant advance, giving tenants real input 
into decision-making. The anti-transfer campaigners argue that the tenant 
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board members cannot act as representatives of the tenants, are misguided 
and being used by the politicians and privateers (see the Scottish and Welsh 
case studies). Thus, the language surrounding tenant involvement becomes 
contested and a battleground for the pro- and anti-transfer campaigners to 
fight over.  
Second, the same analysis can be developed over the use of the term 
privatisation, as illustrated in the English case and the comparison of the pro- 
and anti transfer tenants’ local newspaper articles. In the Scottish case the 
contestation over the term privatisation was very sharp, with the pro-transfer 
campaign strongly denying that stock transfer is a form of privatisation.  
A third example occurs in the Welsh case study, where both sides of the 
transfer process openly claim that their opponents lied. Using a different 
research design this would be seen as a form of bias; but using dialogics, the 
social basis for each claim of lying is identified (in this case it is the competing 
claims of opposing campaigns).  The Welsh case study in the analysis of the 
term ‘an accountable landlord’ reveals the stratified social nature of language. 
The TBM gave a jargon-ridden response, covering tenant involvement and 
engagement, strongly reflecting the dominant government discourses, 
contained in Regulatory Framework for Housing Associations in Wales and 
other documents. In contrast the anti-transfer campaigners gave a response 
based on the landlord being democratically controlled by the people through 
the ballot box at local elections.  
A similar pattern of exchanges, representing the same social forces was found 
in the other case studies. Anti-transfer campaigns all based their conceptions 
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of an accountable landlord on representative democratic accountability. The 
pro-transfer campaigns had commonalities but also used different emphasis.  
For example, supporting the corporate governance style accountability in the 
Welsh case; and undermining the idea that democratic accountability works in 
the Scottish case. These differing views of the meaning of an accountable 
landlord, represents the differing social positions and perspectives of those 
involved. In part they are a justification for their actions – an expression of the 
internal conversation (Archer, 2003)330; which in turn, depends on their attitude 
towards the government’s policy and attitudes towards privatisation, 
marketisation and public funding.  
2.2.3 Summary 
This subsection has discussed and analysed the reaction and contestation 
evident in the case studies.  The thematic data analysis also identified other 
civil society groups as a significant relevant theme in the case of the Scottish 
case, in the form of the SCTF as discussed earlier. It should also be noted that 
the dialogical analysis is apparent in all the sub-sections above not just in 
relation to contested language. The following analyses and discusses the final 
element of the framework, the reproduction or transformation of accountability 
relations.  
2.3 Reproduction or transformation 
The ballot result is central to whether the accountability relations are 
transformed or reproduced. Hence this section looks at the ballot results not 
just of the three case studies but also from research more broadly. However, 
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the result is only a signifier of what is likely to happen in the period after the 
result is announced. To that end there is an analysis of three key aspects 
(rents, board membership and stock improvements) of the post-ballot period. 
2.3.1 Ballot results and post-ballot period 
Nationally, definitive data on the results of ballots is difficult to obtain. Besides, 
the complications of housing being a devolved provision in Scotland and 
Wales, no central statistics are collated. For example Wilcox’s annual housing 
review publishes the details of only those who have voted for transfer; as does 
the Housing and Communities Agency database for England. Despite this, 
Pawson and Mullins (2010) estimate that nationally, 24 per cent of transfer 
ballots return a rejection; while the figure in London rises to 33 per cent (Watt, 
2009).  The point here is that there is significant opposition to the stock transfer 
policy, this is all the more noteworthy given the power and financial 
asymmetries between the campaigns outlined earlier.  
The impact of the critical realist analysis, including Archer’s (2003) contingent 
contradiction, is also relevant to the ballot results and whether it is possible to 
predict the outcome of a ballot in advance. Taking a positivistic approach to 
answering such a question would involve attempts to isolate variables and 
search for correlations in the different cases as a form of explanation. Leading 
to an answer that would be structured along the lines of, if a + b + c is present 
then the ballot result will be positive (or negative). In contrast, a critical realist 
answer states that it is not possible with certainty to predict in advance the 
result of a ballot.  In part this is because there are too many variable factors 
involved, making any equation impossible to calculate. But more importantly, 
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the outcome is dependent upon generative mechanisms, tendencies, counter-
tendencies and contingencies which are transfactual and may not by active in 
any one ballot.  
For example, in the case of a stock transfer ballot tenants have the 
transfactual capacity to resist the proposed transfer by organising together and 
forming a campaign; whether this is activated is contingent on a range of 
factors including their own internal conversation (Archer, 2003). Moreover, this 
contingency can be seen at a collective level as well, where local authority 
councillors voting for a transfer, does not also mean the tenants will agree. Or 
indeed, the existence of a campaign against a proposed transfer does not 
mean tenants will vote against in the ballot.  
However, it is possible to talk of probabilities as some outcomes are more 
likely to be realised than others. This can be illustrated by looking at the 
information and financial resource asymmetries of the pro- and anti-transfer 
campaigns. In the Welsh case study, the local authority refused to give the 
addresses to the anti-transfer campaigners. With regard to financial resources, 
the WCB had a budget of £6 million to publicise and pursue the proposed 
transfer, as opposed to a few hundred pounds by the anti-transfer campaign. 
In these circumstances it is unsurprising that the tenants voted in favour of the 
transfer. In the Scottish case study a similar position occurred when the council 
spent at least £2.5 million as opposed to £10-15 thousand by those opposed to 
transfer. A crucial difference with the Scottish case was the local Unison trade 
union branch being at the heart of SCAST and campaigning among their 
members with SCC. Overall, the transfer process is stacked in favour of 
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securing a “Yes” vote; not just because of the examples given previously but 
also the large public subsidy that underwrites the policy.  
Applying these ideas to the case studies, in the English and Welsh cases the 
counter-veiling reaction/contestation could not overcome the neoliberalisation 
generative mechanism, resulting in the transformation of accountability 
relations. In the Scottish case study, the counter-veiling reaction/contestation 
did overcome the neoliberalisation generative mechanism, resulting in the 
reproduction of the existing democratic accountability relations. 
With regard to the post-ballot period, the Scottish and English case studies can 
be analysed. In the Scottish case eight years after the ballot, the housing stock 
in the main remains with SCC. There does not appear to be any prospect of 
pursuing a re-ballot, as has happened in some areas (e.g. High Wycombe in 
2000 and 2011). The council has steadily been improving the condition of the 
housing stock and is set to achieve SHQS by 2015. This has come at the cost 
of higher than inflation rent rises. In the English case, there have also been 
improvements in the housing stock although locally the Decent Homes target 
of all housing reaching the standard by 2010 has been missed by 32.6 per 
cent331. The major issue post-ballot is that the rent promise made to tenants 
has not been kept resulting in significant rent increases in the first four years 
since the transfer. The significance of this position is to highlight the limitations 
of the regulatory system and environment covering transfer housing 
associations; the system did not stop SW from increasing the rents by higher 
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levels than NCC (even if there is some “wriggle room” with regard to the use of 
the fair rents formula)(Pawson and Mullins, 2010).  
It is also worth remembering that the reason the council rents did not increase 
by the threatened 6 per cent in 2009, was in part due the political pressure 
tenants could exert on local and national politicians. An example of the 
everyday accountability identified in the English and Scottish case studies.    
With regard to the board members including tenants, independents and council 
nominees, the two cases where the transfer went ahead showed a high degree 
of turnover. There is a suspicion with the English case that the initial 
independent board members (including the director of housing and finance 
director of the local airport) were put in place for marketing purposes only, as 
both resigned their places on the board within a year of SW coming into 
operation. In the Welsh case there has been a difficulty in maintaining a full 
complement of TBMs. In both cases, this position is likely to be a reflection of 
tenants not prioritising the role of TBMs or community ownership forms, as was 
found by McKee (2009) in her study of the Glasgow stock transfer.  
Finally, it must be stated that in the English case there has been a substantial 
improvement in the condition of the housing stock post-transfer. However, 
there has also been an improvement in the housing stock in the Scottish case. 
While rents in both cases have increased in part to fund the improvements, in 
the Scottish case these were negotiated with the SCTF, whereas in the 
English case they were set out in rent promise with substantial wriggle room 
(Pawson and Mullins, 2010). Therefore, it is appropriate to conclude that 
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council housing stock can be improved while remaining within the public 
sector; this has been the case for Birmingham city council (Smyth, 2013b). 
This comparison also shows that with stock transfers, tenants will receive new 
kitchens, bathrooms and other improvements but at the cost of the loss of 
democratic control and an expectation of future rent rises. 
At this point it is worth pausing on the nature of generative mechanisms in this 
thesis. Roy Bhaskar was quoted earlier on the nature of mechanisms and 
reality: ‘The world consists of mechanisms not events. Such mechanisms 
combine to generate the flux of phenomena that constitute the actual states 
and happenings of the world’ (Bhaskar, 2008: 47). This can be illustrated on 
different levels. For example, at the most abstract it is the neoliberalisation of a 
public service that generates the reaction/contestation of civil society 
campaigns. By moving to another level of detail it has been the use of public 
finance as a generative mechanism to neoliberalise the services; first through 
its withdrawal creating a crisis and second, through subsidising neoliberal 
solutions. This generative mechanism operates in a broader context (the 
adoption of neoliberal policies can be traced back through the economic crisis 
of the 1970s to the activities of the Mont Pelerin Society, and so on). However, 
for this thesis the originating generative mechanism is the use of public 
finance.  
2.4 Summary 
This section built on the analysis and discussions in the case studies, both 
extending and deepening it, with the aim of showing how the research 
framework has enabled and structured such analysis. While there are certain 
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differences between the case studies, the evidence presented is robust and 
relevant in establishing the usefulness of the research framework for analysing 
how accountability relations in the public services are made, re-made and 
exercised. Using this as a basis the next section discusses the contribution to 
knowledge claims that can be established from the cases.  
3. Contribution to knowledge: the framework  
This section discusses the two knowledge claims made in the thesis. The two 
related research aims (to develop a framework and then use it to analyse how 
accountability relations are made, remade and exercised in the public services) 
were discussed in the previous section. In doing so, it provides the basis for 
the main contribution to knowledge; that is a two triadic research framework 
(of, Neoliberalisation – Reaction/Contestation – Reproduction or 
Transformation; and a dynamic relationship between the state and civil society) 
for analysing changes in public accountability relations. There is also a second 
empirically-based contribution relevant to the accounting literature (Cooper, 
1997), with the focus on the actions of tenants and other civil society actors 
and how accountability relations are made, re-made and exercised. This 
contribution is limited to the data field under study but does adumbrate a future 
research agenda. In this way both these contributions can be seen as staging-
posts on the way to developing a theory of Critical Public Accountability 
(Smyth, 2007; 2012).  
3.1 A two triadic research framework 
At the end of chapter 3 a holistic research framework was developed, 
containing two separate but related triads. The first triad (Neo – R/C – R or T) 
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attempts to capture the generative mechanisms and processes (tendencies 
and contingencies) that lead to public accountability relations being made, 
remade and exercised. The triad provided the structure for the case studies 
above including guiding the data collection, analysis and presentation. The 
triad is the heart of this thesis; it is the ongoing dynamic of accountability 
relations in the public sector. 
The second triad contains a dynamic relationship between the state and civil 
society. This triad is an attempt by abstraction332 to locate the actors involved 
in the process of reproducing or transforming public accountability relations. 
An important benefit of this abstraction is to enable the development of 
theorisations such as Critical Public Accountability (Smyth, 2007; 2012; and 
see below). However, this second triad also enabled the development of the 
first triad by anchoring its initial formulation in concepts (the state and civil 
society) that already had strong classical Marxist theorisations (if at times 
competing ones).  
It is worth remembering that the use of civil society as a concept can be 
problematic for critical researchers (Lavallette and Ferguson, 2007). Civil 
society is a concept that has been co-opted for the forces of neoliberalisation, 
often to obfuscate the nature of the reform processes. This thesis rejects that 
role for civil society. Instead, civil society is seen as a site of resistance 
(Harvey, 2005; Sinha, 2005) that is filled by anti-transfer tenants, trade 
unionists and other anti-privatisation campaigners. 
                                            
332
 See section 4 below. 
Stewart Smyth 
338 | P a g e  
 
Both triads and the holistic research framework provide a robust tool to 
address the research aims of this thesis but as importantly to analyse the 
accountability relations in other public services and in other contexts (this point 
is developed further in section 5 below). On that basis, the two triadic 
integrated research framework provides a contribution to knowledge that is 
rooted in the accountability literature.  
3.2 Amending one triad  
In the context of this thesis and its research aims, the process triad (of Neo – 
R/C – R or T) has provided a relevant and insightful analysis of the dynamic 
nature of accountability relations in a specific British public service. In part the 
privatisation of council housing was chosen as the research field due to the 
transparency and clarity involved with having a ballot result; thus, being able to 
show the outcome of the reaction/contestation (R/C) element of the triad. 
However, there is a difficulty with this formulation. The case studies were 
chosen on the basis that there was a significant reaction from the tenants and 
others that manifested itself in contestation (in the form of a civil society 
campaign). It should be clear that for tenants to reject the transfer proposal 
there needs to be a campaign; however, not all transfer proposals result in 
significant campaigns of the type studied here. Equally this does not mean that 
transfer proposals go without some reaction; it is easily envisaged that some 
tenants would react negatively to a particular transfer proposal but lack the 
experience, contacts or confidence to organise a campaign. In these 
circumstances, there is a reaction but no contestation.  
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Therefore, for future research the triad needs to be amended, to split R/C so 
that the reaction and the contestation can be analysed independently but 
relatedly. This would lead to the revised triad being: Neo – R and then C – R or 
T (i.e. that neoliberalisation leads to a reaction and then contestation resulting 
in the reproduction or transformation of accountability relations).  
3.3 Empirical contribution  
There is a second empirically-based contribution to knowledge from this thesis. 
Cooper (1997: 35) identified that ‘those suffering the effects of new accounting 
regimes also seem to be invisible.’ As already noted this situation is not unique 
to the accounting literature and is also found in housing studies. Significantly in 
recent years there is more visibility of working people in both literatures – in 
housing studies with Watt (2008), Hodkinson (2010), Glynn (2009), Mooney 
and Poole (2005); and in accounting with Arnold and Cooper (1999), Thomas 
and Williams (2009), and Cooper et al. (2011)333. On accountability specifically, 
Laughlin (1996) identifies that there are circumstances in which individuals in 
the caring professions could resist and challenge the imposition of neoliberal 
accountability relations. Laughlin raises this resistance as an issue that needs 
further research.  
The emphasis in this thesis is slightly different to Laughlin’s (1996), taking a 
perspective not from professionals or public sector managers but from service 
users and organised labour. The thesis does provide an empirical contribution 
to both Cooper’s (1997) and Laughlin’s (1996) call for further research. Further 
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it shows that working class people possess the agency to challenge and at 
times transform the imposition of neoliberal accountability relations.  
4. Preliminary theorisations 
Drawing on Llewellyn’s (2003) work, some initial theorisations are developed, 
in part as a stepping stone to the following section that outlines possible future 
research. Llewellyn (2003) develops a five level framework (see table 3) to 
illustrate theorising in qualitative management and accounting research. The 
levels of theorisation pivot around Level 3: Concepts theorize, which ‘... can be 
thought of as linking lower levels of theorization (metaphor and differentiation) 
to higher ones (context-bound and context-free theorizing)’ (Llewellyn, 2003: 
673). 
Table 5 – Five levels of theorisations, adapted from Llewellyn (2003: 667) 
Level Theory Focus 
One Metaphor theorizes By imaging and grounding 
experience of the unfamiliar in the 
familiar 
Two Differentiation theorizes By “cutting the pie” of experience 
through the creation of dualities 
Three Concepts theorize By linking agency and structure 
through practice 
Four Theorizing settings Explaining how contexts for 
practices are organized 
Five Theorizing structures Explaining impersonal, large scale 
and enduring aspects of social life. 
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Following the ontology adopted earlier in this thesis, the search for correlations 
and constant conjunctures that lead to theories based on consistent predictive 
ability is inappropriate; rather, theories based on the causal-explanatory model 
are adopted. Instead of inductive and deductive logic, critical realists use 
retroduction and abduction (see section 2, chapter 4). Both these forms of 
logic are utilised here to re-theorise the nature of accountability relations in the 
case of social housing. In addition, it should be stated that theory building ‘... 
certainly involves imagination – usually deployment and development of 
metaphors, analogies and models – and also abstraction...’ (Sayer, 2004: 9). 
In critical realist research, theory is a conjecture about the relationship 
between the generative mechanisms and the empirical they produced 
(Ackroyd, 2004). The objective of which is to locate the mechanisms in or ‘at 
the end of a causal sequence’ (Ackroyd, 2004: 151). For example, section 
2.3.1 identified the deployment of public funding, as the generative mechanism 
from which the neoliberalisation process proceeds. 
Drawing on the data from the case studies together with the literature review, 
this preliminary theorisation takes place over three different levels (Llewellyn, 
2003). First, a level four theorisation of the settings is developed as a theory of 
Critical Public Accountability (CPA). Second, a key emphasis in CPA is the 
conception of accountability from below, which corresponds to a level three 
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4.1 Towards a theory of Critical Public Accountability 
The research framework developed in chapter 3 has two separate but related 
triads. This thesis has focused on modelling (Sayer, 2004) the generative 
mechanisms involved with the neoliberalisation process (Ackroyd, 2004). To 
initially theorise this process there needs to be an amount of abstraction 
concerning the actors and processes involved. Hence, there are two 
(abstracted) actors and a relationship to this theorisation of public 
accountability; the state, civil society and a dynamic relationship of control. 
Thus, CPA has been outlined as a dynamic relationship where civil society 
seeks to challenge and control the state (Smyth, 2007; 2012). Following 
Llewellyn’s (2003) work, CPA draws on grand narrative theorisations in the 
form of the Marxist analysis of the state and civil society. The case studies 
provide evidence to support the neoliberalisation of the state, in the form of 
roll-back and roll-out actions, and the restructuring of user involvement in the 
form of governance by experts and elites. The reaction of civil society 
individuals and organisations was found to have a basis in each of the case 
studies with the generation of tenant-led civil society campaigns. 
The dynamic relationship between these two elements is multiple, contingent 
and for this theorisation requires a historical perspective. CPA holds that the 
nature of this relationship is a dynamic one. This can be seen in two ways. 
First, the outcome of the contestation between the state and civil society is 
both contingent and potentially transformative. The case studies illustrate this 
with differing ballot results in the Welsh and English case to the Scottish case. 
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Although covering only three cases, national334 estimates report a significant 
minority (between 24 per cent and 33 per cent) of transfer proposals are 
rejected by tenants.  
Second it is possible to see a similar dynamic relationship between the state 
and civil society occurring time and again throughout history. This was 
discussed in the literature review in chapter 3. The history of the “awful idea” of 
accountability showed the changing nature of the idea from ancient, through to 
the modern societies. At times this has been an accountability of the people by 
their rulers (such as in Norman England), or an accountability to the people 
(such as in ancient Athens). Taking this historical perspective the dynamic 
changing accountability relations between the governing and governed 
becomes perspicuous. There is also an alternative accountability formulation 
that links this historical perspective and the conception of CPA; from the 
Levellers and Diggers in the English revolution through to the Chartists and the 
organised labour campaigns of the twentieth century. This is the story of 
accountability from below. 
4.2 Accountability ‘from below’ 
In the literature review in chapter 2, two dominant approaches towards 
accountability - those who see accounting as satisfying accountability and 
those who see accountability as broader than accounting (Copper and 
Johnston, 2012) - were illustrated and discussed. Both approaches 
conceptualise services users (tenants) playing a minor role in the nature of 
accountability relations – that is if they are not completely absent as noted by 
Cooper (1997).  In reaction to this drawback a conception of downwards 
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accountability has been developed by those working in the NGO accountability 
field (Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). In the context of the case studies 
presented here downward accountability would place the emphasis on the 
transfer housing associations to find innovative ways of consulting and 
involving tenants. This is the same policy line pursued by previous 
governments and regulators, and used to justify the eroding and replacing of 
democratic accountability in council housing. In common with the dominant 
approaches to accountability in the literature, downward accountability fails to 
capture the actions of individuals and organisations in civil society in making, 
remaking and exercising democratic accountability relations. 
In contrast to these formulations, accountability from below attempts to capture 
the actions of the tenant-led civil society campaigns as active agents. Here the 
focus is on the agency of individuals who initiate the local anti-transfer 
campaigns and the alliances they build with other civil society individuals and 
organisations. It is worth noting that accountability from below is not a 
normative theorisation but built on an observation of the actual agency of real 
people; echoing Marx’s (1998) materialism quoted in chapter 1335. 
Accountability from below is a level three theorisation, illustrating ‘... how 
individuals make things happen through resources’ (Llewellyn, 2003: 687). It 
also links to the historical perspective outlined above, where accountability is 
an idea that has motivated individuals to form campaigns and take collective 
social action at a variety of historical times (e.g. the Diggers or the Chartists).  
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Finally, as accountability from below locates the agency of ordinary people 
(Watt, 2008) as the source of opposition and contestation to challenge the 
dominant logics of neoliberal accountability reforms (Kamuf, 2007; Ranson, 
2003). This point can be illustrated by considering the creation of the 
democratic accountability relations that neoliberalisation has been reversing 
over the past thirty years. In council housing the right to a ballot on changing 
the landlord was won by a tenants’ campaign in the 1980s. More broadly, the 
right to hold government to account was only achieved after campaigning by 
organised labour and other civil society groups. Remembering, and 
understanding, this history is important for those who critique the private sector 
inspired market-based reforms of public accountability and wish to see a 
renewal of democratic forms (Kamuf, 2007; Ranson, 2003). In response to 
Ranson’s (2003) question quoted earlier – where is such a democratic 
accountability to emerge from when the public sphere is within the iron design 
type of neo-liberal corporate regulation? – democratic accountability originated 
with civil society movements in the form of the Levellers, Diggers and 
Chartists. It was accountability from below that provided the democratic 
accountability relations which neoliberalisation has been eroding. This 
understanding of democratic accountability origins provides a basis for 
renewing democratic accountability in 21st century.    
4.3 Everyday accountability 
The third theorisation comes in the form of a differentiation at the micro level 
(Llewellyn, 2003). Here “everyday” is counter-posed with annual or 
quadrennial/quinquennial accountability, exercised through the ballot box. 
Everyday accountability was illustrated in the English case study with two 
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examples. First, there were the accountability relations that Steve outlined 
when he was an elected councillor and chair of the housing committee, where 
tenants could lobby him and his fellow councillors, if they wanted to hold 
council officers to account. In this way, everyday accountability has a direct 
influence on the nature and exercising of accountability relations within local 
council organisations. This form of accountability is diminished post-transfer.  
The English case also illustrated a second expression of everyday 
accountability with the reduction in rent increases for council tenants in 2009 
and 2010. The halving of these increases was a result of the lobbying and 
campaigning of tenants, their organisation, local councillors and back-bench 
MPs. This differentiation theorisation can only exist and be effective because 
annual/quadrennial/quinquennial accountability exists, through local and 
general elections. Councillors, MPs and government ministers would not react 
to the lobbying by tenants (or ordinary people) if they did not have the power to 
vote them out at the next election. Or to put it in accountability speak, the 
power of reward or sanction. 
5. Reflections on the thesis 
At this point it is worth reflecting on some important elements of the arguments 
made above, before moving onto set out a future research agenda. The three 
elements addressed in the following sub-sections are the utilisation of Marx’s 
political economy vis-à-vis critical realist ideas in the trajectory of the thesis, a 
critique of the concept of democratic accountability and finally, how this thesis 
extends the literature on public accountability. 
5.1 Marx’s political economy vis-à-vis critical realist ideas 
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As set out in detail in chapter 4 this thesis utilises a philosophical underpinning 
and theoretical framework that integrates a classical Marxist understanding of 
(capitalist) society with a critical realist philosophy of science and human 
knowledge. Chapter 4 contains an argument to show how Marx’s method of 
historical materialism and critical realism are complementary336. Of central 
importance is the adoption of the critical realist concepts of ontological depth 
and generative mechanisms. The combination of ontological depth, generative 
mechanisms and Marxist ideas can be seen in the following example. It is 
argued that the change in the post-war consensus on the role and actions of 
the state (p. 77) and the adoption of neoliberal policies (including the roll-
back/roll-out dynamic) (p. 82) is a result of an analysis of capitalism utilising 
the Marxist identification of the decline in profit rates since the end of the post-
war boom (p. 83). Thus, declining rates of profit become a generative 
mechanism contributing to the understanding the behaviour of the state.  
The impact on council housing is shown via the application of Harvey’s (2005) 
accumulation by dispossession concept (p. 82) and the lack of, or deployment 
of public funding as a generative mechanism (p. 337). Such analyses are 
based on a deep ontology to illustrate the surface level appearance of the 
LSVT policy is the outcome of the operation of generative mechanisms (e.g. 
the decline in profit rates and the adoption of neoliberal policy responses). All 
of these elements form the foundations for the triadic research framework 
which seeks to capture the neoliberalisation process of public housing and 
related accountability relations. 
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This brief summary of the central argument in the thesis is set out to show that 
the adopted, integrated theoretical framework is appropriate for addressing the 
research aims: 1) to develop a framework that explores public accountability as 
a dynamic, complex and contested social process; and 2) to analyse how 
accountability relations between public service providers and users are made, 
remade and exercised in the context of marketised and/or privatised provision. 
It is the combination of both Marxist theory and critical realist philosophy that is 
necessary, as if either were used on their own then important insights would 
not be possible. 
For example, critical realism (on its own), as a theory of science, have little to 
say about the nature of the capitalist state or civil society. Further, the critique 
of neoliberalism adopted above is built on a classical Marxist analysis, not 
critical realism. Therefore, critical realism as a philosophy needs to be 
augmented by other theories where appropriate; for example, a Marxist theory 
of society and dialogical theory of language. Equally, classical Marxism is 
augmented by the appropriate integration of critical realist ideas (Fleetwood, 
2014). 
A reliance solely on classical Marxism would also lead in a different direction 
and address different research aims. For example, Brown (2014), while 
arguing for the adoption of systematic dialectics (contra critical realism), sets 
out how Marx presented the workings of capitalism through the retention and 
development of new categories. Marx’s concern was to present the value form 
(i.e. labour) as it moves through the capitalist system starting with the form of 
commodities, money, capital and onwards (Brown, 2014: 9). The importance of 
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Marx’s value form insight is present in this thesis (for example, in the declining 
profit rates referred to above or in the (mis-)use of the TMV technique to work 
out the valuation of the housing stock to be transferred). However, the analysis 
of the value form under capitalism is not the central analysis that addresses 
the research aims. Similarly other Marxist concepts such as alienation or 
fetishism could be applied to analyse neoliberalised public services, giving 
additional insights (for example, a deeper understanding of the popular 
disengagement with representative democratic institutions). These additional 
insights are in themselves answers to other research questions, rather than 
different approaches to answering the research aims and objectives of this 
thesis. 
There are tensions in the use of critical realism and classical Marxism. Two 
critiques of CR from different Marxist perspective are briefly explored below. 
Roberts (2002) argues that Marxism can be strengthened by the development 
of a theory of science. According to Roberts, the lack of such a theory has not 
stopped Marxists engaging in important debates up to now – for example the 
transformation problem in labour process theory (Roberts, 2002: 9). He states 
Marxism should be open to integrating other ideas but then criticises 
Fleetwood (2002) for not starting from Marxist categories and developing them; 
and instead relying on CR examples to explain points.  
The difficulty with Roberts argument is that while he admits Marxism could be 
strengthened by the development of a theory of science, his pre-condition that 
any such theory must be developed from within existing Marxist categories, 
places restrictions on how this development can be achieved. Further, 
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adopting Roberts approach has already led to some inappropriate (Fleetwood, 
2002) developments in particular theories central to Marxism. For example 
Fleetwood (2002), convincingly challenges the use of deductivist logic (and 
related positivist philosophy) as applied in the development of some versions 
of the Labour Theory of Value (LTV). Moreover, this challenge is achieved by 
relying on CR categories, which Fleetwood then uses to argue for a more 
secure footing for understanding LTV. In contrast to Robert’s approach, and 
more akin to Fleetwood’s (2002), this thesis has sought to integrate CR and 
classical Marxism as the most appropriate strategy to address the stated 
research aims and objectives.  
Brown develops a second critique, arguing that there is a limitation in CR as it 
starts with the simple (empirical) but adds complexity as it descends through 
abstraction to the real (deep) generative mechanisms. Further as these 
mechanisms possess transfactual powers and compete with each other to be 
actualised, there is a contingency involved. His critique is that this is a linear, 
unidirectional process. In contrast, Marx’s method allows for moving back to 
the surface by reassembling abstractions to allow clearer insights. Brown 
argues for the use of systematic dialectics, where the starting point is the 
capitalist system as a whole. Such an analysis proceeds on the basis not of 
individual (empirical) events but collections of actions and events across the 
whole system. Contra CR’s transfactual powers, for systematic dialectics ‘such 
powers cannot exist unexercised, nor be exercised unrealized (un-actualized). 
The power must be continually actualized ... if the system itself ... is to be 
reproduced’ (Brown, 2007: 509-510). 
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There are three main difficulties with the use of systematic dialectics as 
espoused by Brown (2007). First, it is not immediately obvious how systematic 
dialectics can be operationalised in to a useful research strategy. Brown tries 
to illustrate this by discussing tendencies in a systematic dialectical manner but 
in the process he re-introduces the transfactual nature of powers (Brown, 
2007: 515). Second and related to the previous point, Brown recognises that 
CR’s use of ontological depth is accurate at a local perspective (Brown, 2007: 
512) but does not suffice when using a system-wide perspective. At this level 
of abstraction tendencies must be actualised for the system to reproduce itself 
and the differentiation between social relations and social activities is conflated 
– they ‘are just ‘flip sides’ of one another’ (Brown, 2007: 513). This approach 
runs the risk of conforming to the central conflationism of structure and agency 
that Archer (1995; 2003) critiqued in Giddens’ work (see chapter 4). 
Third, for systematic dialectics capitalism is seen as a limited totality, with 
structures (or powers) that must continually act. This gives an impression of a 
static, stable (potentially ossified) system. There are two problems here. First, 
science is infinite (Callinicos, 2005) both because capitalism is a historically 
evolving system and ‘in principle no-one is in a position validly to claim that 
they have arrived at a complete knowledge of “the real subject”’ (Callinicos, 
2005: 50). Second, and most importantly, when compared to CR’s stress and 
focus on human emancipation, a system-wide perspective such as that 
advanced by Brown (2007) leads to a downplaying of human agency and an 
overstatement of the ongoing reproduction of the capitalist system337. This 
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criticism has also been made of others using systematic dialectics, such as CJ 
Arthur (Callinicos, 2005).  
To conclude both Roberts (2002) and Brown (2007) agree with Fleetwood that 
Marxism would be enhanced by the development of a “full-blown” theory of 
science (Fleetwood, 2002). In contrast to Fleetwood, they are sceptical about 
CR’s ability to play such a role. However, when comparing the alternatives 
advanced by Roberts and Brown, the approach adopted for this thesis is that 
CR is the best alternative available. And more importantly, the combination of 
CR and classical Marxism set out above provides a coherent theoretical 
framing in which to address the thesis’ research aims.  
5.2 Critique of ‘democratic accountability’ 
This chapter starts with a quote from Ranson (2003) that summarises the 
relationship between public accountability and democratic accountability. 
Public accountability can be discharged in a variety of ways. The history of 
accountability, in chapter 3, demonstrated how medieval rulers sought to hold 
their officers and subjects to account (Dubnick, 2002; Normanton, 1966). 
These societies were not democratic but public accountability was exercised. 
In contrast, the exercising of public accountability in ancient Athens was 
democratic in its nature (Bird, 1973; Roper, 2013). Normanton (1966) observes 
that the nature of accountability at any point in time depends upon the nature 
of the state. The form of the state is in turn based upon socio-political, 
historical and economic relations of each form of class society.  
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Understanding the nature of accountability in the ancient world, in both Greek 
and Roman societies, sets the parameters and differences in alternative views 
of how democratic accountability can be exercised. Roper (2013: 35) argues 
‘... that there are two fundamentally distinct but still interrelated traditions of 
democratic thought and practice’. 
One originated in [ancient] Athens  ... and was subsequently revived and further developed 
in popular movements by (among others) the Levellers, Diggers, Chartists, Communards 
and, Russian workers and peasants in 1917. 
(Roper, 2013: 35) 
The second tradition draws on the much more limited experience of democracy 
in Roman civilisation, with its oligarchic nature. Roper (2013) argues this 
tradition forms the basis of modern representative democracies, along with the 
constitutional settlements following the English, American and French 
revolutions. In summary, the ‘former is the democratic tradition of the labouring 
citizens; the latter is a tradition of the propertied classes’ (Roper, 2013: 35). 
Applying these ideas to the focus of this thesis; the form of public 
accountability that evolved in British public services following 1945 saw 
bureaucratic, professional and democratic accountability relations to the fore. 
Democratic accountability was, and remains, expressed through the ballot box 
in periodic elections for both national and local governments. Along with this 
democratic accountability, a culture and set of practices developed between 
tenants and local councillors. This is expressed by Steve in the English case 
study and captured in the conception of everyday accountability. These forms 
of democratic accountability essentially comply with the tenets of 
representative democracy (Roper, 2013). However, the 1970s and early 1980s 
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also saw the boundaries of representative democratic accountability blurred 
with a range of experiments involving service user participation (Richardson, 
1983). For example, tenants being members of local authority housing 
committees, sometimes with voting rights (Grayson, 1997; Richardson, 1983). 
In contrast, the election of the Conservative government in 1979 brought a 
challenge to the post-war consensus, portraying state provided public services 
as a barrier to the efficient operation of resource allocation through market 
relations. This was coupled with a series of public sector reforms that 
increased managerial power and accountability (Broadbent and Laughlin, 
2013).  
In the case of council housing stock transfers this has meant the 
transformation of the local authority housing committee (made up of 
democratically elected councillors positioned on top of a bureaucratically 
structured housing department) into a corporate governance-styled 
management board in a private housing association. As argued earlier 
Harvey’s (2005) concept of governance by experts and elites aptly describes 
the new relations of social housing. Despite the rhetoric around tenant 
membership of the transfer housing boards, these new governance and 
accountability relations cannot be described as democratic in terms of either of 
the traditions identified by Roper (2013).  
As stock transfer represents a movement away from democratic accountability, 
it provides a basis (reason), among others, for some tenants to contest the 
transfer; and in a minority of cases reproduce the existing representative 
democratic accountability relations. This process is the first step in answering 
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Ranson’s (2003) question about where is such a democratic accountability to 
emerge from. However, the local campaigns against stock transfer are 
essentially conservative, seeking to hold onto existing democratic relations 
even with the limitations and problems that they entail, as Eileen Short noted 
earlier. The overall aim, from a Marxist perspective – of social change such as 
through the successful contesting of reforms – is the extension of democracy 
beyond the representative to the participatory; from the political to include the 
economic; from the limited talking-shop to all-encompassing working bodies. 
As Lenin argues in State and Revolution, the socialist’s aim is ‘an immense 
expansion of democracy, which for the first time becomes democracy for the 
poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the money bags’ 
(Lenin, quoted in Roper, 2013: 242).   
To summarise there is a spectrum of forms of public accountability with 
corporate governance-styled public accountability at one end and socialist 
participatory public accountability at the other. The post-war consensus 
centred on representative democratic public accountability.   
5.3 Building on the accounting literature review 
The literature review in chapters 2 and 3 drew on a subset of the broader 
accountability literature, that of public accountability. Accountability is a 
research subject that is addressed in a variety of academic disciplines not just 
accounting and management studies. This is also true of public accountability. 
Thus, the earlier literature review has roots in public management (Pollitt, 
2003; Law, 1999); political science (Dubnick, 2002; Fukuyama, 2011, Mulgan, 
2003); development studies (Newell and Wheeler, 2006); public policy (Kamuf, 
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2007; Mullins, 2006; Ranson, 2003) as well as accounting (Broadbent and 
Laughlin, 2013; Sinclair, 1995; Stewart, 1984).  
To clarify the nature of public accountability, Bovens (2005) identifies two 
aspects that distinguish it as a subset of accountability. First, the account is 
given in public (i.e. a concern for transparency). Second, the accountability 
relationship is situated within the public sector. These two aspects set the 
boundaries to the thesis’ research field. It is also recognised that as with any 
boundary there are debates concerning its limits and contents. For example, 
the last 50 years have seen changes in the makeup of what is considered to 
be the ‘public sector’ (e.g. the nationalisation and privatisation of industries 
such a steel-making or the banks being taken into public ownership in recent 
years). The first issue links to Bovens’ concern for transparency. However, 
research into certain activities in the public sector, notably the Private Finance 
Initiative (PFI), confronts the barrier of commercial confidentiality (for example 
see Edwards and Shaoul, 2003). In summary, Broadbent and Laughlin (2003: 
26-27) utilising the language (but not the theory) of the principle/agent 
relationship, state: ‘what is clear is that ... public accountability involve(s) the 
electorate as “principals” in a more reactive rather than proactive role with the 
government “agents”’. The case studies show this reactive role but not in the 
form of the voting electorate but as civil society campaigns. This point is further 
explored below. 
The use of Cooper and Johnston’s (2012) two distinct literatures on 
accountability although not based in the public accountability subset, still holds 
as a relevant approach to analysing the PA literature. After all it would be very 
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unusual for the characteristics of a broader group (the accountability literature, 
in general) not to have some resonance in the narrower group (the public 
accountability literature, in specific). However, it was noted that there is a 
distinct group of studies in (public) accountability that draw on critical theories; 
a significant contribution to which comes from Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) 
and their work on accounting and by extension accountability in the public 
services since the mid-1990s. 
Broadbent and Laughlin’s (2013) work is closest to the concerns of this thesis. 
Broadbent and Laughlin (2013: 95) are influenced by the NPM (more precisely 
New Public Financial Management) literature, in combination with their 
conceptualisation of ‘accounting logic’ (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013: 11) to 
frame their work. This is a world where there is an exchange – a “something 
for something” culture – where accounting (in its broadest sense) is the return 
for the receipt of resources (i.e. public funding). There is much depth to this, 
including integrating the work of Habermas and Gorz. One of their themes is 
closely related to the concerns in this thesis.  
In very broad terms, Broadbent and Laughlin (2013) argue that with the 
adoption of NPM, and imposition of related priorities, by successive British 
governments, there has been an increase in managerial forms of 
accountability (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). Further, they recognise both 
the possibility and existence of resistance (Laughlin, 1996) to the imposition of 
these reforms; analysing the resistance of public sector managers and the 
caring professions (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). This is a resistance that 
adapts to the imposition of increased managerial accountability through 
buffering techniques or accepting colonisation (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2013). 
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While this thesis follows a similar path to Broadbent and Laughlin’s work, the 
starting point is the observation that service users (tenants) and civil society 
groups (trade unions) are resisting (reacting/contesting) the marketisation of 
ownership and control of their homes including the restructuring of 
accountability relations. The identification of civil society campaigns as 
potential change agents not only recognises another potential group (in 
addition to the caring professions and public managers) resisting 
NPM/neoliberal reforms but raises two related points. First, what generative 
mechanisms are in place to cause the formation of these campaigns?  This 
leads to the utilisation of classical Marxism, critical realism and the critique of 
neoliberalism as central to the theoretical framing discussed above.  
Second, there is the need for the appropriate identification and analysis of the 
agents in the process of neoliberalising public services. For Broadbent and 
Laughlin (2003; 2013) their starting point for analysing the resistance comes 
when ‘governments use law or regulations inappropriately [such that] there is a 
possibility that “structural coupling” may break down’ (2003: 29). In a strong 
reflection of the past thirty years of public service reforms and trade union 
retreats/defeats, for Broadbent and Laughlin the prospects of any resistance, 
from the caring professions are bleak leading either to buffering, absorption or 
colonisation processes. For the electorate, resistance is most likely to lead to 
increased managerial accountability rather than increased control over the 
government (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003).  
In comparison the central difference with the case studies in this thesis is that 
at times and in certain circumstances (e.g. the Scottish case study) resistance 
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from civil society groups (including tenants and trade unions) leads not to more 
managerial accountability but a reproduction of (representative) democratic 
accountability, and along with limited but important elements of control over 
the government.  
These two points – the need for alternative theoretical framings and the 
identification of civil society groups as active agents – are the most important 
ways in which this thesis builds on and seeks to set out new research agendas 
for the literature on public accountability.  
6. Future research agenda 
This section sets out some initial thoughts on future research that would build 
on the work in this thesis, concluding with a vision for a research programme to 
be carried on in post-doctoral studies. 
6.1 Different public services 
Although the previous two sections have attempted to abstract and theorise 
the research framework with the aim of making it useful to researchers looking 
at other public services, this research is firmly rooted in the data field of 
council/social housing. Therefore a productive line of future research would be 
to take the triadic research framework and apply it to other public services. The 
health and education sectors would seem most appropriate, as central to the 
framework is the analysis of a social movement that reacts to the 
neoliberalisation of public services and contests the reform programme. In both 
these public services there are significant campaigns in the form of Keep Our 
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NHS Public (KONP) and the Anti Academies Alliance338. Of the two, the 
current education policy in the form of Academies and Free Schools being set-
up outside of local authority control and run on a business-like basis would 
appear to have the most apparent similarities to the LSVT policy. 
6.2 Embellishing the theorisations 
Applying the triadic research framework to different public services would also 
help develop and embellish the three theorisations outlined above – Critical 
public accountability, accountability ‘from below’ and ‘everyday’ accountability. 
This could include the search for evidence of everyday accountability in 
education in the form of school governors and the local education authority; or 
the identification, by campaigners in KONP, of existing democratic forms of 
accountability in the NHS that are threatened by neoliberalisation. It may be 
the case that accountability does not play a significant role in contesting the 
privatisation of the NHS.  
There is a second path that could embellish at least one of the theorisations 
(accountability from below) through looking at accountability relations 
throughout history. The discussion of the “awful idea of accountability” in 
chapter 3 sets out the terrain for this path with particular examples of 
accountability from below in the form of the Levellers, Diggers and the 
Chartists. There are also breaks in the path that have to date been lost; such 
as how the ideas of Athenian democratic accountability (Roper, 2013) were 
passed through to the English revolution. This historical research path could 
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 For more on the Keep Our NHS Public campaign see: 
http://www.keepournhspublic.com/index.php  For more on the Anti Academies Alliance see: 
http://antiacademies.org.uk/ 
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also enhance the other theorisations showing the changing dynamic nature of 
the relationship between civil society and the state in different time periods 
(Normanton, 1966).  
The conception of everyday accountability could be extended to look at 
historical episodes where the separation between political accountability, that 
bourgeois representative democracy is based on, and economic accountability 
have been overcome; situations where democratic accountability took a 
participatory form such as the Paris Commune (Roper, 2013). In more recent 
history this leads to a focus on cases of participatory budgeting, for example in 
Porto Alegre (Wainwright, 2003).  
6.3 The use of CR-Marxism-Dialogics 
As already noted, the import of social movements and campaigns is not 
obvious when reading even the critical literature on accounting and 
accountability (Cooper, 1997). In large part this due to the adoption of research 
strategies and philosophical perspectives that either omit, or actively ignore, an 
emphasis on the agency of ordinary people and organised labour. It is here 
that the theoretical framework developed in chapter 4 is relevant and 
potentially opens up new terrains for critical accounting (and accountability) 
research to explore. This theoretical framework was consciously developed in 
response to the post-modern critique that many critical accounting researchers 
feel needs to be integrated into their philosophical approaches – see for 
example Gallhofer and Haslam (2003).  Others draw on the Habermasian 
theory of communicative action with its normative basis339 (Broadbent et al., 
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1997; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Laughlin, 1996). Both see language as 
centrally important to social science research. This is accepted and is 
recognised in the adoption of a theory of language (dialogics), a theory that is 
based on actual, material interactions of people in their social context as they 
are, rather than as we would want them to be.  
Further when dialogics are coupled with critical realism’s under-labouring 
philosophical tasks, the common criticisms of classical Marxism are diminished 
(if not made redundant). For example, the argument that Marxism is 
reductionist and deterministic, is countered by the use of critical realist ideas of 
emergence and contingency.  Further, this theoretical framework allows a 
focus on the activity of workers and other civil society groups as agents for 
social change. This links to Cooper’s (1997) call to make workers (in this 
thesis, in the form of civil society groups) visible in the accounting literature; 
and further argues that workers’ campaigns possess the ability to reproduce or 
transform the existing social structures. Despite his pessimism in 1984, 
George Orwell recognises this:  ‘If there is hope,’ wrote Winston, ‘it lies in the 
proles’. 
Drawing on the previous three hundred pages, the past couple of pages briefly 
set out a wide ranging research agenda into the changing and dynamic nature 
                                                                                                                              
generated understanding of the organization in question”. However, throughout their reflection 
there is a lack of appreciation of social structures and power relationships; so that there is no 
differentiation across organisational actors (e.g. the disparity in power between school 
principals and newly-qualified teachers is not recognised). Additionally, the manner in which 
any potential conflict between organisational actors is to be resolved is by the “force of the 
better argument” (Broadbent et al. 1997, p. 645). Broadbent et al. (1997) recognise these 
difficulties and that the root of the problem lies in a fundamental debate about Habermas’ 
work. In contrast the CR/Dialogics framework seeks to overcome these normative limitations in 
Habermas’ discourse theory.  
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of accountability relations in public services and beyond with the challenging of 
the division between political and economic accountability. This is an agenda 
that through the study of social movements and accountability relations, seeks 
to democratise society as fully as possible. This is the vision for a programme 
of research. 
7. Conclusion 
There are two concluding reflections that flow from the arguments in this 
thesis. The first concerning the on-going relevance of the data field (i.e. social 
housing); the second concerning the agency of ordinary people (Watt, 2008), 
the 97 per cent that Manning (1996) studied in the English revolution, 
somewhat foreshadowing the Occupy movement of 2011/12 (Gamson and 
Sifry, 2013).  The idea to locate the study of accountability relations in public 
housing originated in 2005; at a time when despite the collapse of the dot com 
investment bubble another asset bubble was maintaining its inflation only to 
burst following the financial crash of 2008. In 2005 the preference for individual 
private home ownership and private market relations dominated government 
policy on housing. At the turn of the century the New Labour government had 
proclaimed its desire to abolish council housing completely.  
Five years on from the financial crash, housing policies remain based on the 
same theoretical outlooks that led to the crash in the first place. The housing 
market in Britain has now reached a stage where it is not able to deliver for 
any party – tenants (private, council and social), private landlords, first-time 
buyers, house builders, the homeless – the only exception being the global 
rich investing in London properties (Hutton, 2013). Meanwhile, the privatisation 
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of public housing policy continues with the proposal to transfer the housing 
stock of the biggest public landlord in these islands (DSD, 2013). The point 
here is that the arguments for the defence of council housing are even more 
pressing now, as is a change in direction of government policy. As Marx 
(1998), Engels (1970) and others have noted habitation is a basic necessity for 
human existence. In modern societies having an address is essential to 
access basic public services and partake in society. The private market cannot 
provide decent affordable housing for all in society; as Glynn notes ‘if public 
housing didn’t exist, we’d have to invent it’ (2009: 9). The past thirty years has 
seen that lesson lost among policymakers; but the counter-evidence is 
mounting. This is the ongoing relevance of studying council and public 
housing. 
The second thought is related to the first. It is campaign groups such as 
Defend Council Housing, the House of Commons Council Housing Group and 
various trade unions that have spent much of the past two decades 
campaigning in defence of council housing and the related (democratic) 
accountability relations. These campaign groups have been supported by 
thousands of tenants, trade unionists and workers in local battles against stock 
transfers. Most of the time the privateers in the local and national state have 
won but on many occasions the ordinary people have successfully challenged 
the irresistible logic of neoliberalisation and related accountability. This is the 
central point of both this thesis and future research on accountability relations 
– to adapt Glynn’s declaration, accountability systems (like housing systems) 
‘... are man-made, and can be remade’ (Glynn, 2009: 9). It is here that Marx’s 
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well-known aphorism that humanity makes history but not under circumstances 
of their choosing is relevant. The point is humanity makes history; not just the 
politicians and policymakers, entrepreneurs and captains of industry, but all of 
humanity. With ordinary people, the 97 percent, playing a role that can in 
particular circumstances change the world; which in the final analysis is the 










                                            
340
 ‘The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 – Research framework, objectives and data themes 
(pre-cross case analysis)  
Element of 
framework 




Neoliberalisation Obj: To explore and 
evaluate the impact of 
neoliberal market 
reforms on public 
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actual form and content 
of accountability 
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relations are contingent 
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neoliberal state reforms 















Towards a theory of 
Critical Public 
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Obj: To develop a 
revised theorisation of 
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mechanisms and 
relations in the context 
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Appendix 2 – Case studies databases  
English case study 
I. Key informant interviews: 
a. Tenant activists / No campaigners (x2) 
b. Tenant board member of transfer housing association 
II. City council documents: 
a. Reports/minutes to Committees & Executive (x3)   
b. Housing Services Business Plan (2007/08 – 2009/10) 
c. LSVT Offer document 
d. Deed of covenant 
e. Corporate Housing Strategy 2004-07 
f. Publicity sent to tenants (x4) 
III. SW housing association documents, including: 
a. Principal transfer agreement 
b. Development agreement 
c. Deed of warranty  
d. Deed of covenant 
e. Annual report 2009 
f. Financial Statements y/e 31-3-09 
g. Business Plan, May 2010 
h.  Annual regulatory returns (2008 & 2009) 
IV. Campaign documents: 
a. DCH newsletter 
b. Correspondence with politicians (x5) 
c. Correspondence with local officials (x25) 
d. Minutes of tenants’ association meetings (x 4) 
V. Press clippings (x20) 
VI. Other: 
a. FoI decisions / emails 
Scottish case study 
I. Key informant interviews: 
a. Officer of Scottish City Tenants’ Federation(SCTF) (also a 
tenant) 
b. Unison Housing officer 
c. Tenant activist in campaign 
II. Scottish City Housing Association (SCHA) business plan 
III. Press cuttings (x51 from Local News, The Scotsman & Herald Scotland) 
IV. SCC local authority documents: 
a. Minutes of Stock Transfer Tenants’ Advisory Group (13 
meetings) 
b. Scottish City Council (SCC) minutes (and related reports) 
covering meeting when stock transfer / housing discussed, 
including: 
i. June 2004 – meeting to start the transfer process (x10 
documents) 
ii. Sept 2005 – meeting agrees to the ballot (x11) 
iii. Jan 2006 – post-ballot meeting (x3) 
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c. Stock Options Report to SCC (May 2001) 
d. SCC Housing Strategy 2002 – executive summary & full report 
e. Information in SCC housing staff file, including: 
i. Glasgow City Council Housing Partnership Steering report 
ii. Glasgow transfer proposal 
iii. Staff monthly briefing (Apr & Sept 2005) 
iv. XL (internal housing) newsletters covering the transfer (x4) 
v. SCC/SCHA Tenant newsletter (x7) 
vi. Briefing on employee implications of transfer 
vii. Owners FAQs 
viii. Tenants’ Voice (SCTF publication) Spring 2005 
ix. Unison leaflet challenging SCC publicity/propaganda 
V. National government documents: 
a. Sundry national reports and statistical summaries from Scottish 
Government and Audit Scotland 
VI. Campaign materials: 
a. DCH broadsheet (Nov 2005) 
b. Unison newsletter (Aug 2005) 
c. SCAST leaflet 
VII. Scottish City Tenants’ Federation: 
a. Stock Transfer Policy 
b. Future of Council Housing Briefing Note 
c. Notes on Progress Group (x2) 
 
Welsh case study 
I. Key informant interviews: 
a. Campaign activist (Oct 2009) 
b. Focus group (Oct 2009) 
c. Focus group (Aug 2010) 
d. Tenant member of shadow board (Aug 2010) 
II. Local council documents: 
a. Reports/minutes to council committees (x14) 
b. Council staff bulletin (x1) 
c. Landlord Stock Business Plan (2008-38) 
d. Housing Strategy 2007-12 
e. Minutes Tenants & leaseholders Theme Group 
f. Tenant newsletters (x6) 
g. ‘Meet the board’ broadsheet 
h. LSVT Offer document 
i. Tenant issue guides (x4) 
j. Housing services bulletin 
k. Letters to tenants (x2) 
III. Gower Housing Association documents, including: 
a. Press releases from website 
b. HA Rules 
c. Post-transfer tenant newsletters (x4) 
d. Gower Homes Ltd. – Financial Statements 31/03/12 
IV. National government documents, including: 
a. WAG Regulatory frameworks (2006; 2011) 
b. WAG LSVT documents (x3) 
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V. Campaign documents: 
a. Leaflets (x8) 
b. Correspondence – mainly covering FoI request (x16) 
c. Press releases (x1) 
VI. Press clippings (x19) 
VII. Tenants’ Independent Advisor: 
a. Leaflet 
b. Letter to tenants 
c. Tenants’ newsletters (x5) 
VIII. Other: 
a. Unison briefing 
b. Campaign meeting observation notes  (14th Oct 2009) 
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Appendix 3 – Sample interview consent form 
Research Participant Information & Consent Form (Spring 2010) 
Project Title: Critical Public Accountability – the case of social housing 
Invitation: You are being invited to take part in a research study. Participation 
in the project is entirely voluntary. Before you decide it is important for you to 
understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please 
take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if 
you wish. Please ask me if there is anything you are unsure about, or if you 
would like further information. 
The Study: The study is being undertaken as part of a doctorate in philosophy 
(PhD) at Manchester Metropolitan University. The aim of the research is to 
study accountability relations in the context of public services with a particular 
emphasis on the role of service users. The study is focused on social housing 
and the impact of tenants’ organisation. 
Your involvement, should you agree to take part: You will be interviewed 
by myself, and this should last for about half an hour. You will also be asked 
if you agree to the interview being recorded on a voice-recorder or a similar 
device. This is to allow me to be able to transcribe the material and analyse it 
at a later date. If you agree to this, you may still ask for the recorder to be 
switched off at any time during the interview. 
Confidentiality and Anonymity: At no point will your identity be revealed to 
anyone other than the academic supervisors and examiners of the project. All 
notes and audio records will be kept in secure storage and used in accordance 
with the Data Protection Act (1998). No identifying information will be supplied 
to a third party. The case studies will be anonymised and any identifying 
information stated during the interview will be changed to make it anonymous. 
For national figures it may not be possible to completely anonymise your 
contribution. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The research will be written up as an academic thesis. It will be stored in the 
library and/or the archives at Manchester Metropolitan University. In addition 
the results may be published in academic and / or other journals or 
publications, but always on the basis of the provisos given above concerning 
confidentiality and anonymity. 
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For further details or questions, contact:  
Researcher:      Director of Studies: 
Stewart Smyth,      Paul Brook   
DCU Business School    MMU Business School 
Dublin City University    Manchester Metropolitan Uni. 
Collins Avenue     Aytoun Campus 
Dublin, Ireland     Manchester M1 3GH 
Tel: +353 (0)1 700 5680    (0161) 247 3993 
Email: stewart.smyth@dcu.ie    p.brook@mmu.ac.uk  
You are free to take part or not in this study. If you choose to participate 
you can withdraw from the study at any time. 
Consent  
 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet relating 
to the study and have had the opportunity to ask questions; 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason; 
 I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
Name of participant: 
 
 
Signature:         Date: 
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Appendix 4 - Thematic cross-case analysis 
Framework element 
 
English Scottish Welsh 
Neoliberalisation: 
 
   
Roll-back/roll-out of the state (use of 
finance) 
 
X X X 
Dispossession of council housing 
 
X X X 
Restructuring of service user 
accountability (Governance by experts 
and elites) 
X X X 
Restructuring/commodification of service 
 
 X  
    
Reaction/contestation: 
 
   
Tenant-led civil society campaigns 
 
X X X 
Local state reactions 
(asymmetries of the process) 
X X X 
Contested language (‘an accountable 
landlord’) 
 
X X X 
Other civil society groups 
 
 X  
    
Reproduction or transformation: 
 
   
Ballot result 
 
X X X 
Post-ballot rents 
 
X X X 
Post-ballot TBMs 
 
X  X 
Post-ballot improvements 
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Appendix 5 – Reflexive account of research process 
Robson (2002: 377) describes real world research as the ‘art of the possible’; 
this is an apt description of the research process pursued for this thesis. 
During the course of the fieldwork I moved countries to Ireland and changed 
jobs on two occasions. This required me to pre-plan and organise a series of 
interviews that could be completed during the course of a two or three day 
fieldwork trip.  
At the start of the project I had little more than a passing knowledge of social 
housing policy and accountability relations. I was aware of campaign groups 
such as Defend Council Housing and that they campaigned against 
privatisation in the form of stock transfers, with some degree of success. 
Despite many years of being a participant in a variety of campaigns I had not 
been involved with any stock transfers.  
This posed the problem of gaining access to relevant data sources. Section 
4.2, in chapter 4 explained how the case study selection was carried out; 
however, in practice there was also a significant amount of serendipity and 
opportunism involved (Robson, 2002) coupled with Buchanan et al.’s (1988) 
advice to use existing contacts, friends and even relatives. Both elements are 
evident in the following account.  
Access to the English case study was relatively straightforward, although it did 
rely upon an existing contact (Ashwin) that I had made through my trade union 
activities. I had previously been approached by Ashwin with a view to gaining 
support from my union, University and College’s Union (UCU), branch for 
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DCH. Ashwin supplied the contact details of an ex-Labour councillor and 
tenant activist (Joe) who had been centrally involved with the English case. 
Joe in turn contacted Steve (another ex-Labour councillor and tenant activist) 
who was also willing to be interviewed. Reflecting on these events at the time I 
was surprised at how willingly all involved gave up their time; especially, so 
with Joe as I carried out a dummy/pilot interview with him a couple of months 
prior to the recorded one.  
While I had carried out interviews some years before for a Master’s 
dissertation, I was lacking in confidence and concerned about jumping straight 
into a real interview. In part this was out of a concern about making a mistake 
and in part from feeling the pressure to appear competent (Robson, 2002). 
The pilot interview allowed me to build confidence, test whether I had done 
enough preparation and therefore appeared competent. Joe very patiently 
agreed to this two stage data collection.  
The initial introduction by Ashwin played a role beyond one of simple 
communication; it also contained an element of endorsement. With both ex-
Labour councillors I felt I would hold more credibility as a trade union branch 
officer and so communicated that to them early in our encounters.   
To gain access to the tenant board member in the English case I approached 
the transfer housing association direct, requesting an interview with the 
chairperson of the board, who was a tenant. The request was sent by email 
with a copy of the Information and Consent Form (see appendix 3) attached. 
This resulted in an interview with Kevin, in the premises of the transfer housing 
association. During the interview, in response to certain technical questions, 
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Kevin stated that he did not know the answers but would supply the 
information to me, if I sent him an email with the requests. After a short email 
exchange and negotiation with the finance director, where assurances over 
anonymity were given, all requested documents were supplied.  
On reflection and in contrast to the relationship with Joe and Steve, my image 
as an academic carrying out a research project registered at a well-known 
university, gave me the initial credibility to allow physical access (Saunders et 
al., 1997) to Kevin. However it was my pre-interview preparation and 
relationship building during the encounter with Kevin that gave the necessary 
cognitive access (Saunders et al. 1997) that allowed the follow-up enquiries 
which resulted in access to confidential business information from the housing 
association’s finance director.  
A similar experience was involved with the Welsh case study. I met Hywel at a 
DCH national meeting where he gave an update on his local campaign. Hywel, 
a retired teacher, was extremely supportive of my research project. Not only 
did he agree to being interviewed he also arranged for two other campaign 
members to be interviewed, gave me access to campaign materials, letters 
and press cuttings.  
We arranged my first visit to Hywel’s town so that I could observe a campaign 
meeting. After this meeting I was approached by an attendee to enquire who I 
was and why I had been furiously taking notes. The individual was reassured 
when I stated I was with Hywel and was carrying out some research, that I was 
“not one of them ... a council spy”. This episode indicates the heightened 
Critical Public Accountability – a framework 
403 | P a g e  
levels of tension and suspicion that are generated while a transfer campaign is 
on-going. As highlighted in chapter 8, the pro- and anti-transfer campaigns in 
the Welsh case study were particularly acrimonious towards each other, with 
both sides overtly telling me that the others had lied.   
This suspicion was also evident in the interview I carried out with Rees, a 
tenant board member in the Welsh case study. Shortly after the ballot result 
was announced in favour of transfer, I approached the local council direct 
initially by email and followed-up with phone calls. I started to negotiate access 
with a press office that had responsibility for the stock transfer. Throughout my 
negotiations and subsequent encounter with the council press officer there 
was a noticeable degree of suspicion shown towards me. I put this attitude 
down to a consequence of having just come through a tough tenants’ ballot 
and campaign.  
Despite this suspicion, every request I made regarding the interview and 
subsequent follow-ups for documentation was provided. I think this reflects a 
tension the council officer and Rees experienced – they were suspicious of my 
enquiries but also wanted to provide information in a controlled manner about 
what they felt was a positive message concerning the improvement to the local 
public housing stock. This tension was very evident in the actual interview with 
Rees.  
The interview took place in the council offices. This is understandable as while 
the vote to transfer had been taken some months earlier, the transfer housing 
association had not been set up by the time of the interview. However, it is 
noteworthy that Rees was accompanied by two council officers from the 
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housing department who sat in on the whole of the interview. In my notes of 
the interview I recorded that Rees glanced at the two council officers in a 
manner expressing a certain unease when asked questions about the future 
business plan and finances of the new housing association.  
It is clear that the timing of the interview just a few months after the end of a 
bitter campaign had meant that the council was still concerned about 
controlling the information about the LSVT. This stands in stark contrast to the 
other tenant board member interviewed in the English case study, where the 
interview was carried out in the offices of English housing association on a 
one-to-one basis.  
In the Welsh case my image as an academic was important to gaining access 
to Rees. It is highly likely that if I had approached the council via Hywel or 
Morgan (an anti-transfer Plaid Cymru councillor) that access would have been 
denied. However, I did not hide the fact that I had previously interviewed 
members of the anti-transfer campaign. It was at this point, towards the end of 
the interview that Rees spoke disparagingly about the opposing campaign 
stating that they were spreading lies.  
I had originally hoped to study the “no vote” that tenants in Birmingham had 
returned in 2003. That vote is seen as a significant turning point in the 
development of the LSVT policy. Only two years earlier the Deputy Prime 
Minister, John Prescott, had announced his intention to abolish council 
housing within the next decade by transferring 200,000 houses a year using 
the LSVT policy. The Birmingham result put pay to this ambition. Birmingham 
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was the biggest proposed transfer at the time, covering over 70,000 council 
homes. For these reasons I had hoped to study that campaign.  
At the same meeting that I met Hywel, I was made contact with some DCH 
activists who had been involved with the Birmingham campaign. I approached 
them in the same manner as Hywel but was immediately met with indifference 
and a degree of hostility. The source of this appeared to be research fatigue, 
where there had been a number of researchers who had turned-up previously, 
collected the data they had wanted and disappeared again. To overcome this I 
portrayed myself as an activist who had been a campaigner and that I did not 
intend just to leave after I’d got the data I needed but to feedback the lessons 
from my research. On that basis, I did acquire an email address and phone 
number and an agreement that I could contact the activist in the future. 
However, after several emails, phone messages and one very inconclusive 
phone conversation it became apparent that access was not going to 
materialise. 
This left me still in need of a case study where the tenants voted against 
transfer; this would eventually be the Scottish case study. The Scottish case 
study selection illustrates the element of serendipity involved with flexible 
design research. I attended the DCH national conference in London in March 
2010, where I met Sarah Glynn. She had recently read a supportive review I 
had written of her book (Glynn, 2009). While chatting I outlined the difficulty I 
was having securing access to a “no vote” case study. Immediately she called 
over David, a council housing worker and trade union activist, from the city in 
the Scottish case study. I secured an agreement with David to be in contact 
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with a view to sorting out a fieldwork visit during the summer of 2010. David 
also supplied me with the contact details of a tenant activist, Andrew. After this 
chance meeting, separately I contacted the Scottish city’s tenants’ federation 
to secure an interview with someone who had been involved at the time of the 
transfer.   
At the time that I travelled to Britain to conduct the interviews and data 
collection (first to a conference in Leeds and then onto the Scottish city) I had 
a definite appointment to see David but only a vague agreement with Andrew 
and the tenants’ federation. In both cases these were to turn into solid 
interviews; with Mary from the tenants’ federation supplying important 
documents such as the proposed transfer housing association 5-year business 
plan.  
I also made an approach (by email with the Information and Consent form, 
followed by phone calls) to interview the city council’s Housing Director from 
the time of the proposed transfer. At the time of the fieldwork he remained in 
the city council having been promoted. However, he was unavailable at the 
times I was in the city. As I was living in Ireland by this stage I took the view 
that a trip to the Scottish city just to interview him would not justify the costs or 
time, especially as he was not a tenant and that the main source of pro-
transfer data I have relied upon, in all three local case studies, is publicly 
available documents and reports. 
One final episode regarding gaining access is worth recounting, concerns the 
interview with the DCLG official in March 2010. Originally I sought an interview 
with the Housing Minister at the time and had approached the department 
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directly via email (with the Information and Consent form attached) and a 
follow-up phone call. I was told the Minister was unavailable at the times I had 
suggested but that an official would substitute for him, and that I should seek 
to contact her direct to arrange the final details, which I did.  
At the interview the official was welcoming but slightly aloof, saying she was 
not directly involved with the LSVT programme but was the head of the Decent 
Homes policy. During the course of the interview, held at the DCLG offices in 
London, on two occasions she advanced the idea that there were an 
increasing number of tenant-led stock transfers. This is a significant claim as 
one of the critiques developed by those who oppose the policy is that in 
general tenants want to stay with their council landlord; and that the LSVT 
policy is effectively being imposed by central government with the complicity of 
local councils. I asked her for examples of these tenant-led transfers and 
would she be willing to supply me with contact details, so I could follow-up 
those cases. She agreed to forward me that information along with a couple of 
other documents after the interview. Despite several emails and phone calls 
the promised information never materialised. 
The experience with the DCLG official was the exception. For example during 
the same trip to London I was able to interview Austin Mitchell, MP and Eileen 
Short chairperson of DCH without any difficulties. Overall, I have been 
surprised by the willingness of all to give-up their time and allow me access to 
their personal records.  
For all those interviewed, with the possible exception of the DCLG, the issues I 
wanted to talk about were important to them; they had devoted a significant 
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part of their lives to the campaigns and were proud of what they had achieved 
(even if they had lost the ballot). This is also relevant for the tenant board 
members, as they felt that they were making a difference by helping to improve 
the public housing stock. In these circumstances an outsider arriving and 
asking to record their experiences would be very welcome341.  
This is a positive factor I had not anticipated before going into the field. Instead 
I was aware of my need to present myself in alternative roles to different 
groups to gain access. As outlined above, I played on the roles of trade 
unionist/campaigner and academic. For the tenants/activists who opposed 
their local stock transfer the former role was a factor giving me credibility. 
Additionally, in the English case study the recommendation by Ashwin helped. 
Whereas, the surroundings of the DCH events when contact was first made 
with Hywel (Welsh) and David (Scottish) did communicate that I was broadly 
sympathetic to their cause. In contrast, it was a formal, direct approach in the 
role of an independent academic that allowed me access to the tenant board 
members in the English and Welsh cases.   
Besides securing access to interview participants there were also challenges in 
finding the information that is publicly available on the internet. I spent a 
considerable amount of time searching the websites of each of the three local 
authorities, the DCLG, the Scottish parliament and the Welsh assembly. Each 
website was structured differently and this was further complicated by my initial 
                                            
341
 Interestingly this meant that often participants were ambivalent towards the anonymity 
clause. 
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lack of knowledge of the new structures in local government following the 
introduction of the cabinet-style system.  
Having found the council committee meetings where stock transfers were 
discussed, the uploaded documents were often only be the meeting agenda 
and minutes. These minutes regularly referred to reports that were tabled at 
the meetings but copies were not available on the website. In the Welsh and 
Scottish cases I was able to approach some of the interview participants and 
secured the relevant documents.  
In the English case I requested a series of documents and information direct 
from the Housing department. After several follow-up emails and phone calls 
without the information being supplied I submitted a Freedom of Information 
(FoI) request, in accordance with the procedure set out on the council’s 
website. I had an awareness of the limitations of FoI requests from the 
literature and also the difficulties that the anti-transfer campaigners in the 
Welsh case had experienced (see chapter 8). My request was initially ignored 
and only following an appeal was partially granted. Besides data on costs, I 
had requested a copy of the stock options appraisal report which is required 
before any transfer can go ahead and was referred to in a report by the 
director of Housing and Neighbourhood Services at the Community 
Regeneration Scrutiny and Overview Committee Executive.  
The initial response to my appeal provided me with a web link to a report by 
the director Housing and Neighbourhood Services to the council’s Executive 
committee. A report that, as it was publicly available, I had already accessed. I 
replied that this was not the report I requested and stated where the stock 
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option appraisal report had been referenced and that this type of report is 
usually prepared by an outside consultancy such as PwC or Tribal. The local 
authority’s response was: ‘Unfortunately our Committee Services Colleagues 
cannot trace a copy of the final report that you are requesting’.  
It is not possible to know whether the original stock options appraisal report, 
which contains the basis and justification for pursuing one option instead of 
another, is actually lost or that the local authority did not wish to supply the 
report because of the information it contained. This whole episode does show 
the tenacity necessary in data collection; the FoI process took seven months 
and I spent a further five months requesting the information beforehand. 
Reflecting on the above I think the account highlights a number of elements 
that researchers need to be aware of, and possibly take advantage of, in 
pursuit of a research project. These include using every opportunity to secure 
access to data, whether through family, friends, acquaintances or serendipity. 
The researcher also needs to be aware of the how participants may see 
him/her; in this case as academic and/or activist. Finally, the researcher needs 
to show tenacity in securing data. 
 
